Consciousness and Qualia is a philosophical study of qualitative consciousness, characteristic examples of which are pains, experienced colors, sounds, etc.

In this paper I describe the place of naive realism in Russell’s changing accounts of perception. I argue ‎for the following conclusions: (1) The early period, 1898-1910: I am inclined to think that the naïve ‎realism that Russell embraced so enthusiastically early on may not have been intended as a naïve ‎realism about perception, but as a metaphysical or semantical thesis. (2) The Problems of Philosophy ‎‎(1912): Russell abandons naïve realism (if, in fact, he ever held it) and presents a (...) sense-datum version ‎of representative realism. (3) “On Matter” (1912): here we see Russell’s best attempt to defend ‎something very close to the standard doctrine of naïve realism. The objects of perception—the ‎‎“everyday material objects such as caterpillars and Cadillacs”—have, of course, undergone severe ‎reconstruction. But the resulting picture does capture the spirit of the doctrine. (4) The period from ‎‎1914 to 1927: though Russell’s thinking about perception underwent some significant changes during ‎this period—the sense datum theory is replaced by neutral monism—I try to show that the ‎distinction between the matter of physics and the thing of common sense is a constant feature of ‎Russell’s changing views. And I suggest that our perceptual relation the thing of common ‎sense (as logically reconstructed by Russell) can usefully be viewed as a limited sort of naïve realism. ‎‎(5) The period after 1927: the thing of common sense no longer features in Russell’s account of our ‎perceptual access to the world. The things we perceive are percepts, located in our private spaces. The ‎only material objects of which these percepts are parts are our brains. All other material objects are ‎beyond our perceptual reach and are accessible only via inference. This is the end of anything ‎resembling the traditional view of naïve realism in Russell’s account of perception. ‎. (shrink)

Im ersten Teil dieser Arbeit zeichne ich den Weg nach, der Chisholm zur Theorie der Zwei Aspekte und damit zur Behandlung von Gustav Theodor Fechners Lehre über das Verhältnis von Leib und Seele geführt hat. Es wird dabei weniger darauf ankommen, Chisholms Argumente zu bewerten als vielmehr zu zeigen, wie diese dazu führen können, eine totgeglaubte Theorie, die Theorie der Zwei Aspekte, und einen ziemlich obskuren Autor, Gustav Theodor Fechner, attraktiv erscheinen zu lassen. Im zweiten Teil werde ich versuchen, aus (...) den vielen Schriften Fechners ein einigermaßen vollständiges Bild seiner Ansichten über das Verhältnis von Leib und und Seele zu erstellen. Ich gelange zu dem Schluß, daß die klassischen Probleme der Theorie der Zwei Aspekte auch in Fechners Werk keine befriedigende Lösung finden. Im dritten Teil werde ich zeigen, daß der Begriff der Person, der aus Chisholms Version der Theorie der Zwei Aspekte fließt, in Fechners Philosophie keinen Platz hat. (shrink)

Im ersten Teil dieser Arbeit zeichne ich den Weg nach, der Chisholm zur Theorie der Zwei Aspekte und damit zur Behandlung von Gustav Theodor Fechners Lehre über das Verhältnis von Leib und Seele geführt hat. Es wird dabei weniger darauf ankommen, Chisholms Argumente zu bewerten als vielmehr zu zeigen, wie diese dazu führen können, eine totgeglaubte Theorie, die Theorie der Zwei Aspekte, und einen ziemlich obskuren Autor, Gustav Theodor Fechner, attraktiv erscheinen zu lassen. Im zweiten Teil werde ich versuchen, aus (...) den vielen Schriften Fechners ein einigermaßen vollständiges Bild seiner Ansichten über das Verhältnis von Leib und und Seele zu erstellen. Ich gelange zu dem Schluß, daß die klassischen Probleme der Theorie der Zwei Aspekte auch in Fechners Werk keine befriedigende Lösung finden. Im dritten Teil werde ich zeigen, daß der Begriff der Person, der aus Chisholms Version der Theorie der Zwei Aspekte fließt, in Fechners Philosophie keinen Platz hat. (shrink)

In this paper I try to state and defend Epicurus' argument that death is nothing to us. I discuss some of the most prominent objections that have been raised against Epicurus' position in the recent literature; the authors whose work I discuss include T. Nagel, B.Williams, H. S. Silverstein, and D. Furley. I argue that all of these author's criticisms are flawed in one way or another While this result does not suffice to prove Epicurus right, it does show that (...) Epicurus' insight is much deeper than many of his critics have suspected. (shrink)

In this paper I try to state and defend Epicurus' argument that death is nothing to us. I discuss some of the most prominent objections that have been raised against Epicurus' position in the recent literature; the authors whose work I discuss include T. Nagel, B.Williams, H. S. Silverstein, and D. Furley. I argue that all of these author's criticisms are flawed in one way or another While this result does not suffice to prove Epicurus right, it does show that (...) Epicurus' insight is much deeper than many of his critics have suspected. (shrink)

Keith Lehrer distinguishes three kinds of questions about consciousness: scientific questions, metaphysical questions, and epistemological questions. He leaves the scientific questions to the scientists. He articulates and answers the peculiar epistemological questions posed by consciousness. And he boldly contends that no metaphysical questions about consciousness remain, once the epistemological questions have been answered. This is an astonishing claim. What happened to the metaphysical questions? Were they pseudo-questions? Were they epistemological questions masquerading as metaphysical ones? And isn't it possible that Lehrer's (...) epistemological account of consciousness raises metaphysical questions of its own? I will argue that Lehrer's account of consciousness does leave a metaphysical remainder. To deal with this remainder, Lehrer could try to expand his explanatory framework—but this would involve to a substantial revision of his current views. I end with a speculative proposal that might allow Lehrer acknowledge all the points raised in this paper, but without forcing him to revise his account of consciousness in a substantial way. (shrink)

Oscar is going to be the first artificial person — at any rate, he is going to be the first artificial person to be built in Tucson's Philosophy Department. Oscar's creator, John Pollock, maintains that once Oscar is complete he will experience qualia, will be self-conscious, will have desires, fears, intentions, and a full range of mental states (Pollock 1989, pp. ix–x). In this paper I focus on what seems to me to be the most problematical of these claims, viz., (...) that Oscar will experience qualia. I argue that we have not been given sufficient reasons to believe this bold claim. I doubt that Oscar will enjoy qualitative conscious phenomena and I maintain that it will be like nothing to be Oscar. (shrink)

IntroductionE.J. LOWE: Event Causation and Agent CausationRalf STOECKER: Agents in ActionGeert KEIL: How Do We Ever Get Up? On the Proximate Causation of Actions and EventsMaria ALVAREZ: Letting Happen, Omissions, and CausationFrederick STOUTLAND: Responsive Action and the Belief-Desire ModelMarco IORIO: How Are Agents Related to Their Actions? The Existentialist ResponseJens KULENKAMPFF: What Oedipus Did When He Married Jocasta or What Ancient Tragedy Tells Us About Agents, Their Actions, and the WorldRüdiger BITTNER: Agents as RulersMonika BETZLER: How Can an Agent Rationally (...) Guide His Actions?Martina HERRMANN: Competence, Options, and RelationsWeitere Abhandlungen/Further ArticlesEduardo FERMANDOIS: Kommunikation ohne Sprache? Zu Davidsons später SprachphilosophieGuido IMAGUIRE: Die Form der Externalität in Russells An Essay on the Foundations of Geometry und die Ursprünge seiner RelationstheorieBuch-Symposium/Book-SymposiumJohn BICKLE: Precis of Psychoneural Reduction: The New WaveAnsgar BECKERMANN: Physicalism and New Wave ReductionismJ. Christopher MALONEY: Reservations about New Wave ReductionAchim STEPHAN: How to Lose the Mind-Body ProblemJohn BICKLE: New Wave Metascience. Replies to Beckermann, Maloney, and StephanBuchnotizen/Critical NotesEingesandte Bücher/Books Received. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Themenschwerpunkt/Special Topic: Bolzano & Kant Gastherausgeber/Guest Editor: Sandra Lapointe Sandra Lapointe: Introduction Sandra Lapointe: Is Logic Formal? Bolzano, Kant and the Kantian Logicians Nicholas F. Stang: A Kantian Reply to Bolzano¿s Critique of Kant¿s Analytic-Synthetic Distinction Clinton Tolley: Bolzano and Kant on the Place of Subjectivity in a Wissenschaftslehre Timothy Rosenkoetter: Kant and Bolzano on the Singularity of Intuitions Waldemar Rohloff: From Ordinary Language to Definition in Kant and Bolzano Weitere Artikel/Further Articles Christian Damböck: Wilhelm Diltheys empirische (...) Philosophie und der rezente Methodenstreit in der analytischen Philosophie Bernd Prien: Socially Constituted Actions and Objects Daniel Enrique Kalpokas: Two Dogmas of Coherentism Jon Cogburn & Jeff W. Roland: Strong, therefore Sensitive. Misgivings about DeRose¿s Contextualism Andre Abath: Brewer¿s Switching Argument Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Amadeus Magrabi: The Value of Feelings for Decision-Making Stefan Reining: Do Pain-Accompanying Emotions Mislead Us?¿Considerations in the Light of Reactive Dissociation Phenomena Peter Königs: Patriotism. A Case Study in the Philosophy of Emotions Besprechungsaufsatz/Review Essay Christopher Gauker: What Do Your Senses Say? On Burge¿s Theory of Perception Diskussion/Discussion Georg Brun: Adequate Formalization and De Morgan¿s Argument Buchnotizen/Critical Notes. (shrink)

Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents Abhandlungen/Articles Massimiliano Vignolo: Why Non-Factualists Should Love Conceptual Role Semantics Jeffrey Goodman: Fictionalia as Modal Artifacts Alberto Voltolini: Against Against Fictional Realism Roderick Batchelor: Grounds and Consequences Timm Lampert and Michael Baumgartner: The Problem of Validity Proofs Ish Haji: On the Direct Argument for the Incompatibility of Determinism and Moral Responsibility Matthias Neuber: Philosophie der modernen Physik ¿ Philipp Frank und Abel Rey Nicola Mössner: Testimoniale Akte neu definiert ¿ ein zentrales Problem des Zeugnisses Anderer Simon Dierig: (...) Goldmans Scheunen-Beispiel und das Problem der Vereinbarkeit von Externalismus und Selbstkenntnis Diskussionen/Discussions Essay-Wettbewerb/Essay Competition Besprechungen/Review Essays Buchnotizen/Critical Notes Eingelangte Bücher/Books Received. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

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In order to contribute to the consolidation in the field ofPositive Psychology, we reinvestigated the factor structure of top 10 positive emotions of Barbara Fredrickson. Former research in experimental settings resulted in a three-cluster solution, which we tested withexploratoryandconfirmatorymethodology against different factor models. Within our non-experimental data (N= 312), statistical evidence is presented, advocating for a single factor model of the 10 positive emotions. Different possible reasons for the deviating results are discussed, as well as the theoretical significance to various (...) subfields inPositive Psychology(e.g., therapeutical interventions). Furthermore, the special role ofawewithin the study and its implications for further research in the field are discussed. (shrink)

Given the apparent nondisplaceability and noncancellability of the derogatory content of slurs, it may appear puzzling that non-derogatory uses of slurs exist. Moreover, these uses seem to be in general available only to in-group speakers, thereby exhibiting a peculiar kind of context-sensitivity. In this paper the author argues that to understand non-derogatory uses we should consider slurs in terms of the kind of social practice their uses instantiate. A suitable theory of social practices has been proposed by McMillan. In typical (...) uses the practice is one of bigotry and discrimination. Non-derogatory uses are only possible to the extent that they consitute acts of an alternative, non-derogatory practice. In the core cases it must be a subversive practice of satire or reappropriation. The social identity of speakers is not an ultimately decisive factor but it is an important constitutive condition: most non-derogatory practices of slur-use can only be performed by a member of the target group. (shrink)

Most accounts of the derogatory meaning of slurs are semantic. Recently, Nunberg proposed a purely pragmatic account offering a compelling picture of the relation between derogatory content and social context. Nunberg posits that the semantic content of slurs is identical to that of neutral counterparts, and that derogation is a result of the association of slur use with linguistic conventions of bigoted speakers. The mechanism responsible for it is a special kind of conversational implicature. However, this paper argues that Nunberg’s (...) proposal suffers from technical and conceptual problems regarding the application of the concepts of implicature and convention. It is proposed that the implicature mechanism should be replaced by expressive commitment attribution. The account advocated here preserves crucial insights of Nunberg’s analysis, 25–48, 2013a, Analytic Philosophy 54, 350–363, 2013b; Bolinger Nous, 51, 439–462, 2017), giving them a firmer conceptual basis. It supports a distinction between derogation and offensiveness of slurs that improves on the one proposed by Hom and May, 293–313 2013), and sheds light on puzzling borderline cases: the use of slurs by ignorant speakers and controversies surrounding the status of some words as potentially slurs. (shrink)

Die bedeutung der jüdischen feste nach Philo.--Der nomos. insonderheit Sabbat und feste, in philonischer beleuchtung, an der hand von Philos schrift De septenario.--Die religions- und kulturgeschichtliche stellung Philos.--Agada bei Philo.--Ursprung, begriff und umfang der allegorischen schrifterklärung.--Die alexandrinische lehre von den mittelwesen oder göttlichen kräften, insbesondere bei Philo, geprüft auf die frage, ob und welchen einfluss sie auf das mutterland Palästina gehabt.

Leopold first discusses the conservation of natural resources in the southwestern United States in economic tenns, stressing, in particular, erosion and aridity. He then concludes his analysis with a discussion of the moral issues involved, developing his general position within the context of P. D. Ouspenky’s early philosophy of organism.