Anthony Ellis attempts to offer a deterrence theory of punishment that overcomes a number of common criticisms of deterrence theories in general. While his discussion does suggest many interesting responses that proponents of deterrence theories might use, the theory he defends is problematic for several reasons.

A central problem for the international governance of heritable germline gene editing is that there are important differences in attitudes and values as well as ethical and health care considerations around the world. These differences are reflected in a complicated and diverse regulatory landscape. Several publications have discussed whether reproductive uses would be legally permissible in individual countries and whether clinical applications could emerge in the context of regulatory gaps and gray areas. Systematic comparative studies that explore issues related to (...) the governance of this technology from different national and international perspectives are needed to address the lack of knowledge in this area. In this research report, we contribute to filling this gap by presenting views of stakeholders in the United Kingdom on challenges to the governance of heritable genome editing. We present findings from a multistakeholder study conducted in the United Kingdom between October 2016 and January 2018 and funded by the Wellcome Trust. This research included interviews, literature analysis, and a workshop. We involved leading U.K. scientists, in vitro fertilization clinicians, and representatives from regulatory bodies, patient organizations, and other civil societal organizations, as well as fertility companies. Part one of this article explores stakeholder perceptions of possible global developments in heritable genome editing and associated risks and governance challenges. Part two presents a range of policy options that were generated during the workshop in relation to the challenges discussed in part one. (shrink)

Bioethical debates on the use of human embryos and oocytes for stem cell research have often been criticized for the lack of empirical insights into the perceptions and experiences of the women and couples who are asked to donate these tissues in the IVF clinic. Empirical studies that have investigated the attitudes of IVF patients and citizens on the donation of their embryos and oocytes have been scarce and have focused predominantly on the situation in Europe and Australia. This article (...) examines the viewpoints on the donation of embryos for stem cell research among IVF patients and students in China. Research into the perceptions of patients is based on in-depth interviews with IVF patients and IVF clinicians. Research into the attitudes of students is based on a quantitative survey study. The empirical findings in this paper indicate that perceptions of the donation of human embryos for stem cell research in China are far more diverse and complex than has commonly been suggested. Claims that ethical concerns regarding the donation and use of embryos and oocytes for stem cell research are typical for Western societies but absent in China cannot be upheld. The article shows that research into the situated perceptions and cultural specificities of human tissue donation can play a crucial role in the deconstruction of politicized bioethical argumentation and the assumptions about “others” that underlie socio-ethical debates on the moral dilemmas of technology developments in the life sciences. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Eine Karriere im Hochleistungssport ist mit hohen zeitlichen Belastungen verbunden. Da die Spitzensport- Karriere lebenszeitlich beschränkt ist und in der Regel in der vierten Lebensdekade beendet wird, stellt sich die Frage nach den Auswirkungen eines Engagements im Hochleistungssport auf die Berufskarriere. Hierzu wurden im Rahmen einer quantitativ orientierten Kohortenanalyse ehemalige Spitzensportler zu ihrem beruflichen Werdegang und möglichen Einflussfaktoren des Hochleistungssports retrospektiv befragt. Die Befunde der beiden Teiluntersuchungen zeigen, dass die hohen zeitlichen Anforderungen des Spitzensports den beruflichen Werdegang nur zum (...) Teil beeinträchtigen. Dies gilt nicht nur für sehr erfolgreiche Sportler, sondern auch für Hochleistungssportler, die weniger erfolgreich sind, sowie für Profisportler, die besonders intensiv in das System Hochleistungssport eingebunden sind. Dabei wirken sich Faktoren, wie institutionelle Unterstützungsmaßnahmen, Bekanntheit und soziale Kontakte sowie die Chance im Berufsfeld Spitzensport zu arbeiten, positiv auf die Berufskarriere aus. Allerdings haben sich aufgrund der Professionalisierung des Hochleistungssports die Risiken im kohortenspezifischen Vergleich vergrößert. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the concept of environmental scaffolding can contribute to a better understanding of our affective life and the complex manners in which it is shaped by environmental entities. In particular, the concept of environmental scaffolding offers a more comprehensive and less controversial framework than the notions of embeddedness and extendedness. We contribute to the literature on situated affectivity by embracing and systematizing the diversity of affective scaffolding. In doing so, we introduce several distinctions that provide (...) classifications of different types of environmentally scaffolded affectivity. Furthermore, we differentiate eight dimensions that allow us to evaluate the quality and effectivity of scaffolds in particular applications. On that basis, we develop a taxonomy using paradigmatic examples of affective scaffolding. This taxonomy enriches the current debate by emphasizing distinctions that are often conflated and by identifying fields of application that are commonly overlooked. (shrink)

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make (...) emotions ?embedded? or ?extended? in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of ?embedded? emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are ?extended? or ?distributed.? (shrink)

In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, daß der Hegelsche Anspruch, allein aus dem Anfang als dem Abstrakten und Unmittelbaren das Konkretere und Reichere zu entwickeln, nicht aufrechtzuhalten ist. Damit wird nicht die Dialektik, und insbesondere nicht die Dialektik des Anfangs, preisgege- ben. Es wird aufgezeigt, wie Hegel bei Entwicklung der Kategorien in der Wissenschat'tder Logik stets Bezug nehmen muß auf ein heteroge- nes Etwas. Er versucht dies zu kaschieren. Der Unterschied der ersten Kategorien Sein und Nichts ist aus der unbestimmten Unmittelbarkeit (...) von Sein und Nichts nicht zu begründen. Für den Unterschied von Sein und Nichts muß ein Etwas zitiert werden. Erst dieses Zitat eines Hetero- genen ermöglicht den Fortgang der systematischen Darstellung. Damit ist die idealistische Dialektik in der Darstellung aufgehoben; sie ist negiert und vernichtet, weil sie als falsche aufgezeigt ist, und sie ist aufbewahrt und bestimmend für die Darstellung, weil die Kritik des Fal- schen konstitutiv für das Weitere ist. Im Folgenden werden die Übergänge zu den Kategorien Sein, Nichts, Werden, Entstehen, Vergehen, Nicht-Werden und Dasein analysiert, und es wird aufgezeigt, an welchen Stellen ein heterogenes Etwas zitiert werden muß, um eine korrekte systematische Entwicklung der Katego- rien zu erhalten. (shrink)

This essay explores how indigenous knowledge about plant and animal remedies was gathered, classified, tested, and circulated across wide networks of exchange for natural knowledge between Europe and the Americas. There has been much recent interest in the “bioprospecting” of local natural resources—medical and otherwise—by Europeans in the early modern world and the strategies employed by European travellers, missionaries, or naturalists have been well documented. By contrast, less is known about the role played by indigenous and Creole intermediaries in this (...) process. And yet, the transmission of knowledge between indigenous communities and the European cabinet was neither transparent nor natural, and often involved epistemological, linguistic, and religious obstacles. Drawing on printed and manuscript collections of indigenous remedies, written in colonial Mexico between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries, I focus on how local intermediaries, like creoles scholars, sought to overcome such obstacles by observing indigenous uses of remedies, by studying indigenous languages and by producing natural histories and pharmacopoeias in indigenous languages. Ultimately, behind the Creole participation in the transmission of indigenous remedies, one can point to political and cultural interests and to inclusive definitions of knowledge, which cut across oppositions between science and superstition, cabinet and field, centre and periphery. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 1 Seiten: 386-389.

Review by: Achim Blumensath The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 394-396, September 2013.

This article examines for the first time the jihadist global hegemonic masculinity of Osama bin Laden. Based on Bin Laden’s public statements translated into English, the authors examine how in the process of constructing a rationale for violent attacks primarily against the United States, he simultaneously and discursively formulates a jihadist global hegemonic masculinity. The research adds to the growing interest in discursive global hegemonic masculinities, as well as jihadist masculinities in the Middle East, by scrutinizing how Bin Laden’s jihadist (...) global hegemonic masculinity is produced in and through his public statements. The authors close their discussion by demonstrating how Bin Laden’s discursive practices are embedded in a clash of competing global hegemonic masculinities on the world stage. (shrink)

To what extent can humorism be a legitimate disposition toward the Absurd? The Absurd is born from the insurmountable contradiction between one’s ceaseless striving and the absence of an ultimate resolution – or, as I prefer to call it, the ‘dissolution of resolution’. Humoristic Absurdism is the commitment to a pattern of humorous responses to the Absurd, which regard this absurd condition, as well as its manifestation in absurd situations, as a comical phenomenon. Although the humoristic disposition seems promising, by (...) virtue of humor’s recognition of incongruity and its denial of an ultimate resolution, and succeeds in countering three major objections, it falls prey to the claim that comprehensive humorism portrays as frivolous what is earnest, thereby renouncing the gravity of the desire for ultimate resolution, which is fundamental to the notion of the Absurd. In an attempt to explore alternative roles for humor in a legitimate disposition toward the Absurd, Metamodern Absurdism is suggested, which revolves around a post-ironic oscillation between humor and earnestness. In short, only in a role limited to one pole of an oscillatory pattern of responses can humor be integrated in a legitimate disposition toward the Absurd. (shrink)

Während es im moralisch-politischen Diskurs geradezu unkontrovers ist, dass Toleranz eine eminent wichtige Rolle für ein friedliches Zusammenleben von Menschen in pluralistischen Gesellschaften spielt, ist es alles andere als klar, was Toleranz überhaupt ist. Insbesondere die häufig anzutreffende Auffassung, dass es ‚Paradoxien‘ der Toleranz gäbe, sowie die in der Literatur immer von Neuem auftauchende Vexierfrage, ob Toleranz auch den Feinden der Toleranz gelten kann oder muss, sind deutliche Anzeichen dafür, dass es kein stabiles Verständnis der Natur dieser Einstellung gibt. Das (...) Problem ist nicht zuletzt ein methodologisches. Ich stelle zunächst einige Adäquatheitsbedingungen für eine Theorie der Toleranz auf, und argumentiere dann, dass eine Theorie der Toleranz als eine moralpsychologische Theorie vom normativen Begriff der Tolerierbarkeit frei zu halten ist. Nach der hier vorgeschlagenen Theorie besteht das Herzstück der Toleranz in einer verhaltenswirksamen Kontrolle moralischer Aversionen. Diese Theorie erfüllt die Adäquatheitsbedingungen für Theorien der Toleranz und wird von ihnen sogar erzwungen. Auf der Grundlage der erzielten Ergebnisse, erläutere ich dann Sinn und Rechtfertigung der Toleranzforderung und skizziere ihren Ort innerhalb der Ethik. (shrink)

We generalise the concept of clique width to structures of arbitrary signature and cardinality. We present characterisations of clique width in terms of decompositions of a structure and via interpretations in trees. Several model-theoretic properties of clique width are investigated including VC-dimension and preservation of finite clique width under elementary extensions and compactness.

According to Kant, the moral worth of an action depends on its maxim. As he explains, particularly in the Groundwork, moral worth accrues to an action when the action rests on a maxim selected for its accordance with the moral law. With respect to Religion, however, Kant modifies his understanding of the moral worth of actions. He now expresses the view that an agent acts morally worthy only if he possesses a moral Gesinnung as a character trait. According to this (...) opinion, only such persons can act in a manner that has moral worth who own a good Gesinnung and seek to express it in their actions. But to be in possession of a good Gesinnung depends, according to Kant, on strict conditions that ordinary actors will not realistically be able to fulfil. This accords with Kant's verdict that moral progress has not yet taken place because the conversion in Gesinnung that it would require is still outstanding. (shrink)