Offering a collection of fifteen essays that deal with issues at the intersection of phenomenology, logic, and the philosophy of mathematics, this 2005 book is divided into three parts. Part I contains a general essay on Husserl's conception of science and logic, an essay of mathematics and transcendental phenomenology, and an essay on phenomenology and modern pure geometry. Part II is focused on Kurt Godel's interest in phenomenology. It explores Godel's ideas and also some work of Quine, Penelope Maddy and (...) Roger Penrose. Part III deals with elementary, constructive areas of mathematics. These are areas of mathematics that are closer to their origins in simple cognitive activities and in everyday experience. This part of the book contains essays on intuitionism, Hermann Weyl, the notion of constructive proof, Poincaré and Frege. (shrink)

Volume 1 of this biography of L. E. J. Brouwer was published in 1999.1 The volume under review here covers the period from the early nineteen twenties until Brouwer's death in 1966. It also includes a short epilogue that discusses the disposition of Brouwer's estate after his death, his influence on others, the paths of some of his students and colleagues, and other matters. Van Dalen notes in the Preface that in preparing this volume he consulted some historical studies that (...) appeared after the first volume was published. He also used new material from various archives. The biography contains interesting quotations from unpublished materials in the Brouwer Archive and from correspondence. The bibliographical references to Brouwer's publications, it should be noted, are somewhat different in this volume. This volume, like the first, contains some nice photographs and reproductions. I noted that there were many typographical errors in the earlier book but Volume 2 is relatively free of them.As is the case in Volume 1, the discussion of Brouwer's mathematical and philosophical work is woven into the narrative of Brouwer's life and times. The story in this volume starts with Brouwer's first contacts with Paul Alexandrov and Paul Urysohn in 1923. The interaction began when Urysohn announced that he had found a mistake in Brouwer's definition of dimension in Brouwer's 1913 paper on natural dimension. Was it just a slip of the pen, as Brouwer always maintained , or something more substantial? Urysohn and Alexandrov ultimately came to agree with Brouwer on the matter, and Urysohn was prepared to grant Brouwer priority for the definition of dimension. There were, however, ups and downs along the way. Karl Menger, through his own work in topology and dimension theory, soon got into the picture, and Brouwer and Menger were to …. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and LogicMark C. R. SmithRichard Tieszen. After Gödel: Platonism and Rationalism in Mathematics and Logic. Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Pp. xi + 245. Cloth, $75.00.Tieszen’s new book offers a synthesis and extension of his longstanding project of bringing the method of Husserl’s phenomenology to bear on fundamental questions—both epistemological and ontological—in the philosophy of mathematics. Gödel held (...) Husserl’s philosophy in high regard, and thought that it offered the most promising avenue for an adequate understanding of the foundations of mathematical thought and practice, but Gödel himself did not give a full systematic statement of how phenomenology might carry out that project. Tieszen takes up the task in this book, which is structured around two main guiding themes. The first is to locate the sources of Gödel’s philosophical views—principally [End Page 303] in Plato, Leibniz, and of course Husserl, along with Kant as a sort of backcloth—and the second is to argue that from these materials, a promising rationalism in mathematics and logic can be consistently articulated. Along the way we also encounter a good many of Gödel’s arguments against an array of reductive positions, Hilbert’s formalism and Carnap’s “logical syntax” project among them, as well as arguments against the prospects of a mechanical or purely computational understanding of the human mind. Many of the arguments (both negative and positive) stem from a reflection on the consequences of Gödel’s landmark incompleteness results of 1931.The core of Tieszen’s positive proposals comes in chapters 4, 5, and 6: here is where we meet with “constituted Platonism,” Tieszen’s name for the rationalist, realist synthesis of Husserl’s method and Gödel’s mathematical insights. Methodologically, the starting point is the actual practice of mathematics as a human undertaking, and its conditions of possibility. At the most general level, it is characteristic of thought to be intentional, that is, to be (or try to be) about something, to have a target, to be a bearer of meaning. So it goes for thought about items in sensory awareness, about fictional objects, or about mathematical subject-matter. Concerning the latter, what we encounter in mathematical experience are frequently “phenomena that resist our will, so that we are ‘forced’ in certain directions” (170); what accounts for this resistance to our will are invariants, which have the further characteristics of repeatability—both for a single subject, and among many subjects—and availability for convergence (221), which, I take it, means availability as structures or concepts upon which many independent rational investigators will come to rest. Thinking mathematical thoughts is quite unlike thinking thoughts about fictional items, because fictions are indefinitely plastic in the face of human will. It is also unlike thought about sensory items, in that the intentional objects at issue are not available to outer sense; but from another angle it is more like thought about real material items than imaginary beings, because our mathematical thoughts are exposed to the possibility of error or misrepresentation in various ways. (An elementary example: most people think that 1 is distinct from 0.9999... repeating: this is a misrepresentation, because they are in fact identical.)The phenomenology of mathematical practice is such that we assay various conjectures and proposals about invariants already given to consciousness by previous practice, and discover what further invariant structures or concepts are revealed as necessary constraints upon the various possibilities that we can experimentally float for ourselves. Sometimes our conjectures or intentions are fulfilled, sometimes they are frustrated; but it is the very fact of fulfillment and frustration which points us to a Platonic reality. It is not the noumenal realm of the “naive” Platonist, in Tieszen’s phrase, but nevertheless an objective reality marked off “on the basis of what stabilizes or becomes invariant in our experience, on the basis of what has a history and a sedimentation that permits of further elaboration, development, constraints, surprises, and so on” (101). In something like this way, human reason and consciousness “constitute the meaning of being” of mathematical objects... (shrink)

Richard Tieszen's new book1 is a collection of fifteen articles and reviews, spanning fifteen years, presenting the author's approach to philosophical questions about logic and mathematics from the point of view of phenomenology, as developed by Edmund Husserl in the later phase2 of his philosophical thinking known as transcendental phenomenology, starting in 1907 with the Logical Investigations and characterized by the introduction of the notions of ‘reduction’. Husserlian transcendental phenomenology as philosophy of mathematics is described as one that ‘cuts (...) across’ different philosophical positions, such as platonism, nominalism, fictionalism, Hilbertian formalism, etc. but, at the same time, as having built in the conceptual tools which allow one not to incur the kinds of problems which are usually related to one's preferred approach. Phenomenology centers around the notion of intentionality3 or aboutness, i.e. the characteristic of acts of cognition of being about something. The ‘something’ a cognitive act is about is called its ‘intentional object’, meaning the object of an intentional act. Any kind of object can be seen as an intentional object irrespective of whether it is concrete, illusory, abstract, etc. Indeed the emphasis is on the intentional act, as it is in the intentional act that the object—which need not be claimed to exist—is present. In order to achieve knowledge of an object the phenomenologist investigates the consciousness of the knowing subject when performing the act directed to that particular object.Characterized in this way, it is not difficult to see that phenomenology has a straightforward bearing on almost everything, philosophy of mathematics included. As Tieszen puts it , ‘[…] our mathematical beliefs are always about something. They are about certain objects, such as numbers, sets, functions or groups […]’. …. (shrink)

This article deals with a question of a most general, comprehensive and profound content as it is the nature of mathematical–logical objects insofar as these are considered objects of knowledge and more specifically objects of formal mathematical theories. As objects of formal theories they are dealt with in the sense they have acquired primarily from the beginnings of the systematic study of mathematical foundations in connection with logic dating from the works of G. Cantor and G. Frege in the last (...) decades of the nineteenth century. Largely motivated by a phenomenologically founded view of mathematical objects/states-of-affairs, I try to consistently argue for their character as objects shaped to a certain extent by intentional forms exhibited by consciousness and the modes of constitution of inner temporality and at the same time as constrained in the form of immanent ‘appearances’ by what stands as their non-eliminable reference, that is, the world as primitive soil of experience and the mathematical intuitions developed in relations of reciprocity within-the-world. In this perspective and relative to my intentions I enter, in the last section, into a brief review of certain positions of G. Sher’s foundational holism and R. Tieszen’s constituted platonism, among others, respectively presented in Sher and Tieszen. (shrink)

Richard Tieszen [Tieszen, R. (2005). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXX(1), 153–173.] has argued that the group-theoretical approach to modern geometry can be seen as a realization of Edmund Husserl’s view of eidetic intuition. In support of Tieszen’s claim, the present article discusses Husserl’s approach to geometry in 1886–1902. Husserl’s first detailed discussion of the concept of group and invariants under transformations takes place in his notes on Hilbert’s Memoir Ueber die Grundlagen der Geometrie that Hilbert wrote during (...) the winter 1901–1902. Husserl’s interest in the Memoir is a continuation of his long-standing concern about analytic geometry and in particular Riemann and Helmholtz’s approach to geometry. Husserl favored a non-metrical approach to geometry; thus the topological nature of Hilbert’s Memoir must have been intriguing to him. The task of phenomenology is to describe the givenness of this logos, hence Husserl needed to develop the notion of eidetic intuition. (shrink)

The End of the Timeless God considers two approaches to the philosophy of time, presentism and eternalism. It is often held that God cannot be timeless if presentism is true, but can be if eternalism is true. R. T. Mullins draws on recent work in the philosophy of time as well as the work of classical Christian thinkers such as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas to contend that the Christian God cannot be timeless in either case.

We discuss five kinds of representations of rationales and provide a formal account of how they can alter disputation. The formal model of disputation is derived from recent work in argument. The five kinds of rationales are compilation rationales, which can be represented without assuming domain-knowledge (such as utilities) beyond that normally required for argument. The principal thesis is that such rationales can be analyzed in a framework of argument not too different from what AI already has. The result is (...) a formal understanding of rationales, a partial taxonomy, and a foundation for computer programs that represent and reason with rationales.The five kinds of rationales are as follows: (c)ompression and (s)pecialization, which yield rules, and (d)isputation, which yields a decision. These are modeled as potentially changing the focus of the dispute. Then there are (f)it, a rationale for rules, and (r)esolution, a rationale for decisions. These cannot be modeled as simply; they force disputation to a meta-level, at least temporarily. (shrink)

In this first paperback edition, a new introduction by Tom Burke establishes the ongoing importance of Sleeper's analysis of the integrity of Dewey's work and ...

What kind of knowledge is medical knowledge? Can medicine be explained scientifically? Is disease a scientific concept, or do explanations of disease depend on values? What is ‘evidence-based’ medicine? Are advances in neuroscience bringing us closer to a scientific understanding of the mind? The nature of medicine raises fundamental questions about explanation, causation, knowledge and ontology – questions that are central to philosophy as well as medicine. In this book Paul R. Thompson and Ross E. G. Upshur introduce the fundamental (...) issues in philosophy of medicine for those coming to the subject for the first time. They introduce and explain the following key topics: Understanding the physician-patient relationship: the phenomenology of the medical encounter. Models and theories in biology and medicine: what role do theories play in medicine? Are they similar to scientific theories? Randomised controlled trials: can scientific experiments be replicated in clinical medicine? What are the philosophical criticisms levelled at RCTs? The concept of evidence in medical research: what do we mean by ‘Evidence-based medicine?’ Should all medicine be based on evidence? Causation in medicine What do advances in neuroscience reveal about the relationship between mind and body? Defining health and disease: are explanations of disease objective or do they depend on values? Evolutionary medicine: what is the role of evolutionary biology in understanding medicine? Is it relevant? Extensive use of empirical examples and case studies is made throughout the book. These include debates about smoking and cancer, the use of placebos in randomised controlled trials and controversies about research into the causes of HIV and autism. This is an indispendable introduction to those teaching philosophy of medicine and philosophy of science. (shrink)

First published in 1981, this collection of essays was taken from Peters' larger work, Psychology and Ethical Development in order to provide a more focused volume on moral education for students. Peters' background in both psychology and philosophy makes the work distinctive, which is evident from the first two essays alone: 'Freud's theory of Moral Development in Relation to that of Piaget' and 'Moral Education and the Psychology of Character'. He also displays balance in his acceptance that reason and feeling (...) are both of great importance where the subject of moral education is concerned. Although written some time ago, the book discusses issues which are still of considerable interest and importance today. (shrink)

Health care professionals often face moral dilemmas. Not dealing constructively with moral dilemmas can cause moral distress and can negatively affect the quality of care. Little research has been documented with methodologies meant to support professionals in care for the homeless in dealing with their dilemmas. Moral case deliberation is a method for systematic reflection on moral dilemmas and is increasingly being used as ethics support for professionals in various health-care domains. This study deals with the question: What is the (...) contribution of MCD in helping professionals in an institution for care for the homeless to deal with their moral dilemmas? A mixed-methods responsive evaluation design was used to answer the research question. Five teams of professionals from a Dutch care institution for the homeless participated in MCD three times. Professionals in care for the homeless value MCD positively. They report that MCD helped them to identify the moral dilemma/question, and that they learned from other people’s perspectives while reflecting and deliberating on the values at stake in the dilemma or moral question. They became aware of the moral dimension of moral dilemmas, of related norms and values, of other perspectives, and learned to formulate a moral standpoint. Some experienced the influence of MCD in the way they dealt with moral dilemmas in daily practice. Half of the professionals expect MCD will influence the way they deal with moral dilemmas in the future. Most of them were in favour of further implementation of MCD in their organization. (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship between political revolutions and the evolution of politics. It discusses the circularity within the concept of revolution through Jacques Derrida’s theory of sovereignty as particularly per Rogues – Two Essays on Reason and The Beast and the Sovereign. Derrida’s notions of wheel and ipseity display ontological prerogatives and evolutionary limits of political revolutions possibly coinciding with reversals hard to turn into linear evolutions, excluding rather than reaffirming circularity. Political revolutions show such incapacity to become evolutionary (...) for politics when lacking ontological substance and resting upon formal contingencies such as new techniques. An ‘alturnative’ notion of sovereignty is proposed as a heuristic criterion to gauge political events’ ‘revolutionary’ quality. This undermines the (r)evolutionary nature of political turns, like those associated with the contemporary digitalisation of politics. The Italian Five Stars Movement’s parable is a case in point of digital political turns whose effect is non-evolutionary for politics. (shrink)

R.I.G. Hughes presents a series of eight philosophical essays on the theoretical practices of physics. The first two essays examine these practices as they appear in physicists' treatises and journal articles. By treating these publications as texts, Hughes casts the philosopher of science in the role of critic. This premise guides the following six essays which deal with various concerns of philosophy and physics such as laws, disunities, models and representation, computer simulation, explanation, and the discourse of physics.

Richard Tieszen presents an analysis, development, and defense of a number of central ideas in Kurt Gödel's writings on the philosophy and foundations of mathematics and logic. Tieszen structures the argument around Gödel's three philosophical heroes - Plato, Leibniz, and Husserl - and his engagement with Kant, and supplements close readings of Gödel's texts on foundations with materials from Gödel's Nachlass and from Hao Wang's discussions with Gödel. He provides discussions of Gödel's views, and develops a new type (...) of platonic rationalism that requires rational intuition, called 'constituted platonism'. (shrink)

Implicit processes almost certainly preceded explicit processes in our evolutionary history, so they are likely to be more resistant to disruption according to the principles of evolutionary biology [Reber, A. S. . The cognitive unconscious: An evolutionary perspective. Consciousness and Cognition, 1, 93–133.]. Previous work . Knowledge, nerves and know-how: The role of explicit versus implicit knowledge in the breakdown of a complex motor skill under pressure. British Journal of Psychology, 83, 343–358.]) has shown that implicitly learned motor skills remain (...) stable under psychological pressure and concurrent cognitive demands, and recently [Poolton, J. M., Masters, R. S. W., & Maxwell, J. P. . Passing thoughts on the evolutionary stability of implicit motor behaviour: Performance retention under physiological fatigue. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 456–468.] showed that they also remain stable under conditions of anaerobic fatigue that would have significantly challenged the survival skills of our ancestors. Here we examine the stability of an implicitly learned motor skill under fatigue conditions that primarily tax a different physiological system , but which have equally strong evolutionary connotations. Participants acquired a throwing task by means of an errorless learning method or an errorful method. Motor performance in the errorless condition, but not the errorful condition, remained stable following an exhaustive VO2 max. running test. Our findings replicate and extend the work of Poolton et al., providing further support for Reber’s evolutionary distinction between implicit and explicit processes. (shrink)

For a theist, a man's duty is to conform to the announced will of God. Yet a theist who makes this claim about duty is faced with a traditional dilemma first stated in Plato's Euthyphro—are actions which are obligatory, obligatory because God makes them so, or does God urge us to do them because they are obligatory anyway? To take the first horn of this dilemma is to claim that God can of his free choice make any action obligatory or (...) non-obligatory. The critic claims that the theist cannot take this horn, for God cannot make bad actions good. (shrink)

The famous 1893 Chicago World’s Fair celebrated the dawn of corporate capitalism and a new Machine Age with an exhibit of the world’s largest engine. Yet the noise was so great, visitors ran out of the Machinery Hall to retreat to the peace and quiet of the Japanese pavilion’s Buddhist temples and lotus ponds. Thus began over a century of the West’s turn toward an Asian aesthetic as an antidote to modern technology. From the turn-of-the-century Columbian Exhibition to the latest (...) Zen-inspired designs of Apple, Inc., R. John Williams charts the history of our embrace of Eastern ideals of beauty to counter our fear of the rise of modern technological systems. In a dazzling work of synthesis, Williams examines Asian influences on book design and department store marketing, the commercial fiction of Jack London, the poetic technique of Ezra Pound, the popularity of Charlie Chan movies, the architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright, and the design of the latest high-tech gadgets. Williams demonstrates how, rather than retreating from modernity, writers, artists, and inventors turned to traditional Eastern technê as a therapeutic means of living with—but never abandoning—Western technology. (shrink)

There are many problems about business ethics. What I want to deal with is only part of the problem: I want to consider just what can properly be expected of business in general terms by way of ethical behaviour and, along with that, what is special about business ethics and how it is related to the personal morality we are all expected to exhibit in our day-to-day lives; I want to consider how it is that ethical confusions arise from people's (...) mistaking the relationship between personal morality and business ethics; and I want to consider what can be done by way of education in business ethics to raise the standards and just what role philosophical ethics can play in that. (shrink)

In the coverage of the problems of war and peace in Catholicism, researchers sometimes omit the regional component of their manifestation. We are talking about local traditions in Catholicism, which have their own specific approach to solving this problem and sometimes may differ significantly from the "conventional" position. The study of this field is necessary because in the delineated field the position of those theologians who were on the "outskirts" of Catholicism in the intercultural dialogue, on the one hand, led (...) to a deviation from the humanistic orientation about Catholicism. the war. An example would be the concept of a "holy war" of the Crusades, which had the anti-Islamic rhetoric generated not only in the West but also in the East. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article recovers the discussion of the relationship between religion, human nature and happiness in the Scottish Enlightenment physician John Gregory’s (1724–1773) A Comparative View of Human Nature (1765). Through examining Gregory’s best-selling but understudied text, this article explores how the Aberdeen Enlightenment’s own branch of the wider Scottish ‘science of human nature’, centred at the famous Aberdeen Philosophical Society, was as deeply concerned with the study of religion as it was the philosophy of mind. Gregory examined how the (...) purported cultural spread of dogmatic scepticism, associated by the Aberdonians with David Hume, threatened individual happiness and social tranquillity by removing the crutch of religious belief upon which the multitude (though not the philosopher) depended. In doing so, it suggests that the contribution made by physicians to the Scottish Enlightenment’s engagement with religion has been unjustly ignored. (shrink)

The essays in The Philosophy of Spirituality address spirituality as a subject of philosophical interest independent of religion and respecting diverse spiritual traditions: African, atheist, Indigenous, Indian, Stoic, and Sufic perspectives, as well as Western analytic and continental views.

Paper read at the 32nd Conference on Value Inquiry: Reason and Evaluation, 8-10/4, 2005, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.

This collection of essays by leading international philosophers considers central themes in the ethics of Danish philosopher Knud Ejler Løgstrup (1905–1981). Løgstrup was a Lutheran theologian much influenced by phenomenology and by strong currents in Danish culture, to which he himself made important contributions. The essays in What Is Ethically Demanded? K. E. Løgstrup’s Philosophy of Moral Life are divided into four sections. The first section deals predominantly with Løgstrup’s relation to Kant and, through Kant, the system of morality in (...) general. The second section focuses on how Løgstrup stands in connection with Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Levinas. The third section considers issues in the development of Løgstrup’s ethics and how it relates to other aspects of his thought. The final section covers certain central themes in Løgstrup’s position, particularly his claims about trust and the unfulfillability of the ethical demand. The volume includes a previously untranslated early essay by Løgstrup, “The Anthropology of Kant’s Ethics,” which defines some of his basic ethical ideas in opposition to Kant’s. The book will appeal to philosophers and theologians with an interest in ethics and the history of philosophy. (shrink)

The most glamorous and even glorious moments in a legal system come when a high court recognizes an abstract principle involving, for example, human liberty or equality. Indeed, Americans, and not a few non-Americans, have been greatly stirred--and divided--by the opinions of the Supreme Court, especially in the area of race relations, where the Court has tried to revolutionize American society. But these stirring decisions are aberrations, says Cass R. Sunstein, and perhaps thankfully so. In Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, (...) Sunstein, one of America's best known commentators on our legal system, offers a bold, new thesis about how the law should work in America, arguing that the courts best enable people to live together, despite their diversity, by resolving particular cases without taking sides in broader, more abstract conflicts. Sunstein offers a close analysis of the way the law can mediate disputes in a diverse society, examining how the law works in practical terms, and showing that, to arrive at workable, practical solutions, judges must avoid broad, abstract reasoning. Why? For one thing, critics and adversaries who would never agree on fundamental ideals are often willing to accept the concrete details of a particular decision. Likewise, a plea bargain for someone caught exceeding the speed limit need not--indeed, must not--delve into sweeping issues of government regulation and personal liberty. Thus judges purposely limit the scope of their decisions to avoid reopening large-scale controversies. Sunstein calls such actions incompletely theorized agreements. In identifying them as the core feature of legal reasoning--and as a central part of constitutional thinking in America, South Africa, and Eastern Europe-- he takes issue with advocates of comprehensive theories and systemization, from Robert Bork to Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, and Ronald Dworkin, who defends an ambitious role for courts in the elaboration of rights. Equally important, Sunstein goes on to argue that it is the living practice of the nation's citizens that truly makes law. For example, he cites Griswold v. Connecticut, a groundbreaking case in which the Supreme Court struck down Connecticut's restrictions on the use of contraceptives by married couples--a law that was no longer enforced by prosecutors. In overturning the legislation, the Court invoked the abstract right of privacy; the author asserts that the justices should have appealed to the narrower principle that citizens need not comply with laws that lack real enforcement. By avoiding large-scale issues and values, such a decision could have led to a different outcome in Bowers v. Hardwick, the decision that upheld Georgia's rarely prosecuted ban on sodomy. And by pointing to the need for flexibility over time and circumstances, Sunstein offers a novel understanding of the old ideal of the rule of law. Legal reasoning can seem impenetrable, mysterious, baroque. This book helps dissolve the mystery. Whether discussing the interpretation of the Constitution or the spell cast by the revolutionary Warren Court, Cass Sunstein writes with grace and power, offering a striking and original vision of the role of the law in a diverse society. In his flexible, practical approach to legal reasoning, he moves the debate over fundamental values and principles out of the courts and back to its rightful place in a democratic state: the legislatures elected by the people. (shrink)

Dil, düşüncelerin ifade edilmesini, bilgi aktarımını ve sosyal etkileşimi sağlayan temel bir olgudur. Dil eğitimi ise kültürler arası iletişimi kolaylaştıran ve dünya genelinde etkili iletişim kurma becerisi kazandıran bir faaliyettir. Birden fazla dil bilmek, farklı kültürlere ve bakış açılarına açık olmayı sağlar. Yaşadığı dünya düzeni içerisinde çağın gerisinde kalmak istemeyen, uygar ve etkileşimli bir toplum olma niyetini taşıyan Fransa hükümet yetkilileri dil eğitimi konusunda ciddi adımlar atmıştır. 1795 yılında Doğu dilleri üzerine uzmanlaş Inalco’yu kurarak başta Osmanlı olmak üzere İslâm dünyasının (...) konuştuğu dili öğrenen uzmanlar yetiştirmeye başlamıştır. Kuruluşundan itibaren sistemli bir şekilde dil yelpazesini genişleten Inalco, Türkçe, Arapça, Çince, Farsça, Hintçe, Japonca, Korece, Rusça, İbranice ve daha birçok Doğu dilini bünyesine katmıştır. Bu dilleri öğrenen ve konuşan kişiler sayesinde Fransa, Doğuyla olan münasebetini güçlü tutmakta ve burada bulunan devletlerle uzaktan yahut yakından temas içerisinde kalmayı sürdürmektedir. Yaklaşık dört asırlık geçmişiyle Inalco, bir dil eğitimi merkezi olmanın yanında şarkiyat kurumları içerisinde önde gelen, sayısız oryantalist yetiştirip çeşitli sahalarda eserlerin yazılmasına imkân tanıyan bir kurumdur. Kuruluş, misyonuna uygun olarak uzun süre Doğu dilleri ve medeniyetleri üzerine uzmanlaşmış öncü isimleri yetiştirip çalışmalarıyla kültürel etkileşimi teşvik etmiş ve kültürler arası anlayışı geliştirmeye yardımcı olmuştur. Kurumsal tecrübesiyle ilgi alanını hep genişleten Inalco günümüzde neredeyse tüm dünya dilleri ve medeniyetleri üzerine çalışmalarını devam ettirmektedir. Artık dil ve kültür alanındaki uzmanlığı ve köklü geçmişiyle dünya genelinde saygın bir kurum olarak kabul edilmektedir. Inalco’da yetişen dil uzmanları Fransız hükümetinin diplomatik ve ticari ilişkilerinde aktif rol alarak bu konularda yetkililere tercümanlık hizmeti sunmuşlardır. Aynı zamanda uzman oldukları dillerin yeni nesillere öğretilmesinde öğretici pozisyonlarını korumuşlar ve ilişkide oldukları kültürlerin tanınmasında da önemli roller üstlenmişlerdir. Her ne kadar yaptıkları iş şarkiyat hizmeti olsa da Doğu kültürüne ait mirasın gün yüzüne çıkartılmasında, değerlendirilmesinde ve tasnifinde yer alarak bu kültürlere ait ögelerin korunmasında yardımcı unsur olmuşlardır. Silvestre de Sacy, Louis Bazin, Régis Blachère, Louis Massignon vb. birçok Doğu bilimci burada yetişerek hem kendi ülkelerine hem de Doğu kültürüne hizmet etmişlerdir. Ancak akademik ortamda Inalco ve benzeri kurumlar üzerine yeteri kadar çalışmanın olmadığı da bir gerçektir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmada, Inalco’nun kuruluşu, işleyiş şekli ve faaliyet alanları tanıtıldıktan sonra bir şarkiyat kurumu olarak misyonu üzerinde durulacaktır. Saha araştırması, gözlem, yetkili mercilerden alınan bilgi ve belgelerle oluşturulan çalışmanın alandaki boşluğu dolduracağı düşünülmektedir. Yaklaşık dört asırlık geçmişiyle Inalco, bir dil eğitimi merkezi olmanın yanında şarkiyat kurumları içerisinde önde gelen, sayısız oryantalist yetiştirip çeşitli sahalarda eserlerin yazılmasına imkân tanıyan bir kurumdur. Fiilen 1795 yılında Fransa’da kurulan Inalco kuruluş misyonuna uygun olarak uzun süre Doğu dilleri ve medeniyetleri üzerine uzmanlaşmış öncü isimleri yetiştirmiştir. Uzun süre şarkiyat alanına odaklanan Inalco, Doğu dilleri ve medeniyetleri üzerindeki çalışmalarıyla kültürel etkileşimi teşvik etmiş ve kültürler arası anlayışı geliştirmeye yardımcı olmuştur. Kurumsal tecrübesiyle ilgi alanını hep genişleten Inalco günümüzde neredeyse tüm dünya dilleri ve medeniyetleri üzerine çalışmalarını devam ettirmektedir. Artık dil ve kültür alanındaki uzmanlığı ve köklü geçmişiyle dünya genelinde saygın bir kurum olarak kabul edilmektedir. Ancak akademik ortamda Inalco ve benzeri kurumlar üzerine yeteri kadar çalışmanın olmadığı da bir gerçektir. Dolayısıyla bu çalışmada, Inalco’nun kuruluşu, işleyiş şekli ve faaliyet alanları tanıtıldıktan sonra bir şarkiyat kurumu olarak misyonu üzerinde durulacaktır. Saha araştırması, gözlem, yetkili mercilerden alınan bilgi ve belgelerle oluşturulan çalışmanın alandaki boşluğu dolduracağı düşünülmektedir. (shrink)