The ArgumentThe article explores the reasons for the rise to prominence of Newtonian natural theology in the period following the publication of thePrincipiain 1687, its continued importance throughout the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries, and possible explanations for its rapid decline in the second half of the nineteenth century. It argues that the career of Newtonian natural theology cannot be explained solely in terms of internal intellectual developments such as the theology of Newton's clerical admirers or the (...) impact of the work of Hume or of Charles Darwin. While such intellectual movements are undoubtedly of considerable importance in accounting for the rise and fall of Newtonian natural theology, they do not of themselves explain why British society was more receptive to particular bodies of thought in some periods rather than in others. Hence this article – in common with a number of recent studies – attempts to draw some connections between the growth of Newtonian natural theology and the character of Augustan society and politics; it also attempts to link the decline of this tradition with such nineteenth-century developments as the growing separation between church and state and the secularization of the universities and of scientific and intellectual life more generally. (shrink)

Getting physical: Empiricism’s medical History Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9474-4 Authors John Gascoigne, School of History and Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2056, Australia Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Gascoigne, Robert In October 1962, the world was at imminent risk of nuclear war. In response to the failed CIA backed 'Bay of Pigs' invasion, Soviet Premier Nikita Krushchev had authorized the stationing of nuclear missiles in Cuba, only ninety miles from the coast of Florida. In response, President John F. Kennedy had ordered a blockade of Cuba, which the Soviet Union regarded as an act of war. In fact, the world came much closer to a nuclear exchange (...) than has long been realized. On October 27th 1962 the Soviet submarine B59 was tracked by a group of United States warships, made up of eleven destroyers and an aircraft carrier, which were using non-lethal practice depth-charges in an attempt to bring the submarine to the surface. The submarine had lost radio contact with Moscow, which-as we will see-had very shortly beforehand ordered the freighters carrying nuclear missiles to return home. Under the intense pressure of the situation, the captain of the submarine-who thought that war may already have broken out-was determined not to allow Russia to be humiliated by the capture of his submarine, and was prepared to fire a nuclear torpedo at the surrounding American warships. Three officers had to give permission for a nuclear missile to be launched-the captain himself, the political officer, and Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov, who, although second-in-command of submarine B59, was commander of the flotilla of submarines to which it belonged. Arkhipov overruled his brother officers and refused to authorize the launch of the torpedo. The world owes a great debt of gratitude to this Soviet sailor who may have prevented a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States. My father once told me how an American priest had recounted to him that, during the height of the Cuban missile crisis, the queues for confession at New York's St Patrick's cathedral stretched all the way down the nave and out onto Fifth Avenue. Given the penitential practices and beliefs of the time, and the actual state of events, there was indeed good reason for that! (shrink)

A short review of Gascoigne's Scepticism.

Since Michael Polanyi coined the term “tacit knowledge” in 1958, a huge amount of literature has been produced on this topic. Gascoigne and Thornton’s monograph represents one of the most recent attempts to clarify the concept of tacit knowledge.For other recent publications on tacit knowledge see Collins , Yu and Turner . In their engagement with various thinkers, most notably Polanyi, Ryle, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, John Searle, Hubert Dreyfus, and John McDowell, etc., the authors make impressive efforts to (...) situate the discussion of tacit knowledge in the context of mainstream philosophy. They shed new light on the concept of tacit knowledge by embedding it in contemporary debates, such as those on knowing how, rule-following, conceptualism, language maste .. (shrink)

Values-based medicine derives from an approach first introduced into the philosophy of psychiatry, which aims to demonstrate that the reality of mental illness is not inconsistent with the scientific status of medicine. Associated primarily with the work of K.W.M. Fulford, the argument is that practitioners need to be ethical anti-descriptivists if they are to avoid the authoritarianism of evidence-based medicine, which overlooks the fact that genuine value conflicts can arise during all clinical encounters, and that psychiatry is just the most (...) explicit area in which these occur. This paper takes a philosophically therapeutic line and argues that, by reducing values to the status of preferences, antidescriptivism undermines the value of 'value' and leaves the practitioner with a reduced ability to discern and negotiate genuine conflicts of value. The conclusion is that patients should be respected, not as instantiations of preferences but as valuers ; and that this requires practitioners to become more cosmopolitan and sympathetic, not more theoretically sophisticated. (shrink)

The history of scepticism is assumed by many to be the history of failed responses to a problem first raised by Descartes. While the thought of the ancient sceptics is acknowledged, their principle concern with how to live a good life is regarded as bearing little, if any, relation to the work of contemporary epistemologists. In "Scepticism" Neil Gascoigne engages with the work of canonical philosophers from Descartes, Hume and Kant through to Moore, Austin, and Wittgenstein to show how (...) themes that first emerged in the Hellenistic period are inextricably bound up with the historical development of scepticism. Foremost amongst these is the view that scepticism relates not to the possibility of empirical knowledge but to the possibility of epistemological theory. This challenge to epistemology itself is explored and two contemporary trends are considered: the turn against foundationalist epistemology and towards more naturalistic conceptions of inquiry, and the resistance to this on the part of non-naturalistically inclined philosophers. In contextualizing the debate in this way Gascoigne equips students with a better appreciation of the methodological importance of sceptical reasoning, an analytic understanding of the structure of sceptical arguments, and an awareness of the significance of scepticism to the nature of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

The history of scepticism is assumed by many to be the history of failed responses to a problem first raised by Descartes. While the thought of the ancient sceptics is acknowledged, their principle concern with how to live a good life is regarded as bearing little, if any, relation to the work of contemporary epistemologists. In "Scepticism" Neil Gascoigne engages with the work of canonical philosophers from Descartes, Hume and Kant through to Moore, Austin, and Wittgenstein to show how (...) themes that first emerged in the Hellenistic period are inextricably bound up with the historical development of scepticism. Foremost amongst these is the view that scepticism relates not to the possibility of empirical knowledge but to the possibility of epistemological theory. This challenge to epistemology itself is explored and two contemporary trends are considered: the turn against foundationalist epistemology and towards more naturalistic conceptions of inquiry, and the resistance to this on the part of non-naturalistically inclined philosophers. In contextualizing the debate in this way Gascoigne equips students with a better appreciation of the methodological importance of sceptical reasoning, an analytic understanding of the structure of sceptical arguments, and an awareness of the significance of scepticism to the nature of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

This book asks whether there any limits to the sorts of religious considerations that can be raised in public debates, and if there are, by whom they are to be identified. Its starting point is the work of Richard Rorty, whose pragmatic pluralism leads him to argue for a politically motivated anticlericalism rather than an epistemologically driven atheism. Rather than defend Rorty’s position directly, Gascoigne argues for an epistemological stance he calls ‘Pragmatist Fideism’. The starting point for this exercise (...) in what Rorty calls ‘Cultural Politics’ is an acknowledgement that one must appeal to both secularists and those with religious commitments. In recent years ‘reformed’ epistemologists have aimed to establish a parity of epistemic esteem between religious and perceptual beliefs by exploiting an analogy in respect of their mutual vulnerability to sceptical challenges. Through an examination of this analogy, and in light of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty, this book argues that understood correctly the ‘parity’ argument in fact lends epistemological support to the argument that religious considerations should not be raised in public debate. The political price paid—paying the price of politics—is worth it: the religious thinker is provided with a good reason for maintaining that their practices and beliefs are not undermined by other forms of religious life. (shrink)

Tacit knowledge is the form of implicit knowledge that we rely on for learning. It is invoked in a wide range of intellectual inquiries, from traditional academic subjects to more pragmatically orientated investigations into the nature and transmission of skills and expertise. Notwithstanding its apparent pervasiveness, the notion of tacit knowledge is a complex and puzzling one. What is its status as knowledge? What is its relation to explicit knowledge? What does it mean to say that knowledge is tacit? Can (...) it be measured? Recent years have seen a growing interest from philosophers in understanding the nature of tacit knowledge. Philosophers of science have discussed its role in scientific problem-solving; philosophers of language have been concerned with the speaker's relation to grammatical theories; and phenomenologists have attempted to describe the relation of explicit theoretical knowledge to a background understanding of matters that are taken for granted. This book seeks to bring a unity to these diverse philosophical discussions by clarifying their conceptual underpinnings. In addition the book advances a specific account of tacit knowledge that elucidates the importance of the concept for understanding the character of human cognition, and demonstrates the relevance of the recommended account to those concerned with the communication of expertise. The book will be of interest to philosophers of language, epistemologists, cognitive psychologists and students of theoretical linguistics. (shrink)

Neil Gascoigne explains the pragmatist attitude to science, contrasting it with both the realism of scientists like Susan Greenfield and Richard Dawkins, and the anti-realism of sociologists like Harry Collins.

Neil Gascoigne provides the first comprehensive introduction Richard Rorty's work. He demonstrates to the general reader and to the student of philosophy alike how the radical views on truth, objectivity and rationality expressed in Rorty's widely-read essays on contemporary culture and politics derive from his earliest work in the philosophy of mind and language. He avoids the partisanship that characterizes much discussion of Rorty's work whilst providing a critical account of some of the dominant concerns of contemporary thought. Beginning (...) with Rorty's early work on concept-change in the philosophy of mind, the book traces his increasing hostility to the idea that philosophy is cognitively privileged with respect to other disciplines. After the publication of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, this led to a new emphasis on preserving the moral and political inheritance of the enlightenment by detaching it from the traditional search for rational foundations. This emerging project led Rorty to champion 'ironic' thinkers like Foucault and Derrida, and to his attempt to update the liberalism of J. S. Mill by offering a non-universalistic account of the individual's need to balance their own private interests against their commitments to others. By returning him to his philosophical roots, Gascoigne shows why Rorty's pragmatism is of continuing relevance to anyone interested in ongoing debates about the nature and limits of philosophy, and the implications these debates have for our understanding of what role the intellectual might play in contemporary life. This book serves as both an excellent introduction to Rorty's work and an innovative critique which contributes to ongoing debates in the field. (shrink)

The history of scepticism is assumed by many to be the history of failed responses to a problem first raised by Descartes. While the thought of the ancient sceptics is acknowledged, their principle concern with how to live a good life is regarded as bearing little, if any, relation to the work of contemporary epistemologists. In "Scepticism" Neil Gascoigne engages with the work of canonical philosophers from Descartes, Hume and Kant through to Moore, Austin, and Wittgenstein to show how (...) themes that first emerged in the Hellenistic period are inextricably bound up with the historical development of scepticism. Foremost amongst these is the view that scepticism relates not to the possibility of empirical knowledge but to the possibility of epistemological theory. This challenge to epistemology itself is explored and two contemporary trends are considered: the turn against foundationalist epistemology and towards more naturalistic conceptions of inquiry, and the resistance to this on the part of non-naturalistically inclined philosophers. In contextualizing the debate in this way Gascoigne equips students with a better appreciation of the methodological importance of sceptical reasoning, an analytic understanding of the structure of sceptical arguments, and an awareness of the significance of scepticism to the nature of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

This book addresses the question of the communication of Christian ethics in the public forum of liberal, pluralist societies. Drawing on debates in philosophy, theology and sociological theory, it relates the problem of communication to fundamental questions about the nature of liberal societies and the identity of Christian faith and the Christian community. With particular emphasis on Kantian and neo-Kantian ethics, it explores the link between autonomy and community in liberal societies. The theology of communio, expressed in revealed Christian traditions, (...) can reconcile autonomy and community. Any Christian attempt to communicate this vision must also reflect on Christianity's own identity, especially the ways in which its own self-consciousness grows in critical interaction with secularity. In this light, Christian ethical communication is both a witness to a distinctive identity, founded in the revelation of the triune God, and a vision of universal human solidarity which can reconcile autonomy and community. (shrink)

Gascoigne, Robert In his exchanges with French sociologist Dominique Wolton, Pope Francis constantly emphasises the imperative to build bridges and gives this a Christological foundation: 'We must build bridges in the image of Jesus Christ, our model, who was sent by the Father to be the Pontifex, the bridge-builder. In my view, that is where the foundation of the Church's political action is to be found'. Responding to the challenge to deepen networks of solidarity in a disconnected world, Christians (...) find the foundation, model and inspiration of their commitment in Christ. Yet the specific invocation of Christ in this ethical task provokes a number of challenges: How does this appeal to a particular person and object of faith reconcile itself with universalist languages of solidarity and human dignity? How should it respond to those who argue that Christians have 'a conflict of interest' when they seek to contribute to debates concerning the common good? Does the appeal to Christ's particularity risk the degradation of Christian faith to a civilisational weapon in disconnected times, a form of closure against other traditions? (shrink)

Gascoigne, Robert Review of: Between the 'mysticism of politics' and the 'politics of mysticism': Interpreting new pathways of holiness in the Roman Catholic tradition, by David Ranson, pp. 303, paperback $39.95, hardback $75.00.

Gascoigne, Robert Review of: Catholic theological ethics, past, present and future: The Trento conference, by James F. Keenan, SJ, ed., pp.374, pb.

Gascoigne, Robert This article is offered in memory of Irene McCormack, the Australian Josephite sister who was killed in Peru by the 'Shining Path' guerrillas in 1991.

Gascoigne, Robert The sexual abuse crisis and the forthcoming plenary council of the Australian Catholic Church are both a provocation and an opportunity to reflect on the condition of the Catholic Church in Australia and to suggest how it might respond to new and challenging circumstances in ways that can inspire its future life and mission. In this article I want to consider some of the characteristics of the era of Australian Catholicism that is now in the recent past, (...) as well as some of the key features of what could be a new identity for the Catholic Church in Australia. After some historical reflections on the phenomenon of 'Catholicism' and its ambivalent legacy, I advocate a new crystallisation of Catholic identity based in the relationship between the mystical and political, specifically in terms of solidarity and hope in the face of human suffering. The broader political context of these reflections is the threat to humane international relationships posed by radical populism. (shrink)

Gascoigne, Robert A quick rollcall of Australian political life demonstrates a remarkable presence of Catholics in leadership positions, including the Governor-General, Sir Peter Cosgrove; the Prime Minister, Tony Abbott; the Leader of the Federal Opposition, Bill Shorten; the two immediate past premiers of New South Wales, Barry O'Farrell and Kristina Keneally; the previous Governor of New South Wales, Dame Marie Bashir; and the Lord Mayor of the City of Sydney, Clover Moore; among others. Indeed, in the immediate past Federal (...) Labor Cabinet, there were three members from just one Catholic school, St Patrick's Christian Brothers College, Strathfield, Sydney, just as there are four old boys of Jesuit colleges in the current Coalition Cabinet. It is noteworthy that there have been relatively few attempts in public commentary and debate to draw attention to this strong cross-party presence. I believe that this is essentially because it is clear that these Catholic political leaders do not represent any kind of ecclesial or communal political bloc, but are manifestly divergent in their political stances and allegiances. Previous linkages between Catholic religious identity and political allegiance have now become obsolete. Our current situation has positive aspects demonstrating a willingness by many Australian Catholics to take up political responsibilities within a context of political pluralism against a background of democratic consensus. Yet it also raises a number of questions about ecclesial identity and formation: What is the political - and ethical - presence and character of the Catholic ecclesial community in Australia, given the considerable divergence of political stances? To what extent does Catholic social teaching function as an agreed resource and inspiration? What is the character of shared membership of the church in the context of vigorously contested and divergent political allegiances? (shrink)

To understand how Richard Rorty's “redescription” of transcendental arguments works against the realist interpretation – and in particular against the notion that philosophy can provide an answer to the quaestio juris – it is helpful to turn to a little history. In Anglophone philosophy, the development of the anti‐skeptical and antireductionist potential of transcendental arguments is usually ascribed to the work of P. F. Strawson and other philosophers influenced by the later L. Wittgenstein. According to Rorty, the following condition is (...) sufficient for designating an argument “realist”: a distinction is made between scheme and content. A transcendental argument against realism is an argument to the effect that attempts to make sense of a notion of justification that would do the work of legitimation required is parasitic on what can be gleaned from the methods of confirmation/inferential relations that we use in practice. (shrink)