- Curiosity and the Value of Truth.Michael S. Brady - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 265-284.details
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Curiosity was Framed.Dennis Whitcomb - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):664-687.details
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Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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The Theory of Epistemic Rationality.Richard Foley - 1987 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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How Should We Aggregate Competing Claims.Alex Voorhoeve - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):64-87.details
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Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.details
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Measuring the overall incoherence of credence functions.Julia Staffel - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1467-1493.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Pragmatic Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):434-453.details
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The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):336-372.details
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A Royal Road to Consequentialism?Martin Peterson - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):153-169.details
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What Accuracy Could Not Be.Graham Oddie - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (2):551-580.details
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Two dogmas of deontology: Aggregation, rights, and the separateness of persons: Alastair Norcross.Alastair Norcross - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):76-95.details
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Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives.Alastair Norcross - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (2):135-167.details
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The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good.Linda Zagzebski - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1-2):12-28.details
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An objection of varying importance to epistemic utility theory.Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2919-2931.details
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Moral priorities under risk.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (6):793-811.details
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Limited Aggregation and Risk.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (2):117-159.details
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Axiological Absolutism and Risk.Seth Lazar & Chad Lee-Stronach - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):97-113.details
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Veritistic value and the project of social epistemology. [REVIEW]Philip Kitcher - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):191–198.details
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Veritistic Value and the Project of Social Epistemology.Philip Kitcher - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):191-198.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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Absolutist Moral Theories and Uncertainty.Frank Jackson & Michael Smith - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (6):267-283.details
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Lexical priority and the problem of risk.Michael Huemer - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (3):332-351.details
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Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583.details
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Contractualism and Social Risk.Johann Frick - 2015 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 43 (3):175-223.details
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Headaches, Lives and Value.Dale Dorsey - 2009 - Utilitas 21 (1):36.details
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Aggregating Harms - Should We Kill to Avoid Headaches?Erik Carlson - 2000 - Theoria 66 (3):246-255.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Superiority in Value.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1):97-114.details
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An impossibility theorem for welfarist axiologies.Gustaf Arrhenius - 2000 - Economics and Philosophy 16 (2):247-266.details
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Deontology, individualism, and uncertainty, a reply to Jackson and Smith.Ron Aboodi, Adi Borer & and David Enoch - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (5):259-272.details
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Should the numbers count?John Taurek - 1977 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 6 (4):293-316.details
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Curiosity, Belief and Acquaintance.Ilhan Inan - 2014 - In Virtue Epistemology Naturalized. New York: Springer. pp. 143-157.details
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Making Things Right: The True Consequences of Decision Theory in Epistemology.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 220-239.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Could've Thought Otherwise.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (12).details
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True to Life: Why Truth Matters.Michael P. Lynch - 2004 - Philosophy 80 (314):601-604.details
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