I propose that logic may be seen as a science of patterns—however, not in the sense in which mathematics is a science of patterns, but rather in the sense in which physics is. The proposal is that logic identifies, explores, and fixes the inferential patterns which de facto govern our argumentative practices. It can be seen, I argue, as picking up the patterns and working from them toward the state of reflective equilibrium, where the laws it (...) aims at are explicitly articulated. Due to the normativity of logic, this process is not quite the same as that in which a natural science works its way from data to its laws; however, there is no reason why it should be seen as proceeding via a mysterious "a priori analysis.” Instead, it should proceed in the intersubjective space in which the sciences are practiced. (shrink)

Since its publication in 1967, van Heijenoort’s paper, “Logic as Calculus and Logic as Language” has become a classic in the historiography of modern logic. According to van Heijenoort, the contrast between the two conceptions of logic provides the key to many philosophical issues underlying the entire classical period of modern logic, the period from Frege’s Begriffsschrift (1879) to the work of Herbrand, Gödel and Tarski in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The present paper (...) is a critical reflection on some aspects of van Heijenoort’s thesis. I concentrate on the case of Frege and Russell and the claim that their philosophies of logic are marked through and through by acceptance of the universalist conception of logic, which is an integral part of the view of logic as language. Using the so-called “Logocentric Predicament” (Henry M. Sheffer) as an illustration, I shall argue that the universalist conception does not have the consequences drawn from it by the van Heijenoort tradition. The crucial element here is that we draw a distinction between logic as a universal science and logic as a theory. According to both Frege and Russell, logic is first and foremost a universal science, which is concerned with the principles governing inferential transitions between propositions; but this in no way excludes the possibility of studying logic also as a theory, i.e., as an explicit formulation of (some) of these principles. Some aspects of this distinction will be discussed. (shrink)

Nowadays the answer to the question “what is logic?” seems very simple and obvious—“logic is a science,” and after that usually one says what is this science about. As for the expressions “logic is an art” or “the art of logic,” then they are only metaphors or some kind of “façon de parler” used in serious scientific discourse. One of my aims here is to trace the line of development of dichotomy “logic as (...) an art—logic as a science” and to demonstrate that both these feat uses of logic have fundamental historical roots and play very important conceptual role in any theorizing about logic. Despite the fact that logic is undoubtedly a science, it can be interpreted as an art, moreover, the analysis of logic from this point of view expands, it seems to me, the researching possibilities in the field of the philosophy of logic at least in better understanding what is logic, what creates its unity independently from the historical period of its development, topics, and methods. (shrink)

The paper discusses in how far medieval logic can appropriately be characterized as a formal science. In this respect, the special mediecal approach to logic as a scientia sermocinalis is examined as well as its main doctrines, namely the theories of supposition and of consequences, and the famous characterization of logic as an ars artium or scientia scientiarum. It is pointed out that medieval logic is not devoted to the setting up of formal systems or (...) any metalogical analysis of formal structures. Logic in the medieval sense of the discipline is necessarily connected with semantical aspects of natural language. Accordingly, we are confronted with a discipline going far beyond the formal structures of discourse. The classification of medieval logic as a formal science is appropriate only under selected perspectives. (shrink)

Mathematics as a Science of Patterns is the definitive exposition of a system of ideas about the nature of mathematics which Michael Resnik has been elaborating for a number of years. In calling mathematics a science he implies that it has a factual subject-matter and that mathematical knowledge is on a par with other scientific knowledge; in calling it a science of patterns he expresses his commitment to a structuralist philosophy of mathematics. He links this to a (...) defence of realism about the metaphysics of mathematics--the view that mathematics is about things that really exist. Resnik's distinctive philosophy of mathematics is here presented in an accessible and systematic form: it will be of value not only to specialists in this area, but to philosophers, mathematicians, and logicians interested in the relationship between these three disciplines, or in truth, realism, and epistemology. (shrink)

Logic as Universal Science offers a detailed reconstruction of the underlying philosophy in The Principles of Mathematics showing how Russell sought to deliver a death blow to the dominant Kantian view that formal logic is a concise and dry science and unable to enlarge our understanding.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

This essay offers a conception of logic by which logic may be considered to be exceptional among the sciences on the backdrop of a naturalistic outlook. The conception of logic focused on emphasises the traditional role of logic as a methodology for the sciences, which distinguishes it from other sciences that are not methodological. On the proposed conception, the methodological aims of logic drive its definitions and principles, rather than the description of scientific phenomena. The (...) notion of a methodological discipline is explained as a relation between disciplines or practices. Logic serves as a methodological discipline with respect to any theoretical practice, and this generality, as well as logic’s reflexive nature, distinguish it from other methodological disciplines. Finally, the evolution of model theory is taken as a case study, with a focus on its methodological role. Following recent work by John Baldwin and Juliette Kennedy, we look at model theory from its inception in the mid-twentieth century as a foundational endeavour until developments at the end of the century, where the classification of theories has taken centre-stage. (shrink)

In Fechner's psychophysics, the 'mental' and the 'physical' were conceived as two phenomenal domains, connected by functional relations, not as two ontologically different realms. We follow the path from Fechner's foundational ideas and Mach's radical programme of a unitary science to later approaches to primary, psychophysically neutral experience (phenomenology, protophysics). We propose an 'integral psychophysics' as a mathematical study of law-like, invariant structures of primary experience. This approach is illustrated by a reinterpretation of psychophysical experiments in terms of perceptual (...) situations involving a constructed apparatus and an instructed subject. The problematic notion of 'measurement of sensation' is thus eliminated: 'sensations' are merely indices for classes of perceptually equivalent configurations (states of the apparatus) specified by the instruction. The locus of the measured is in the inter-subjectively shared, communicable world—not inside the subject's mind. Finally we discuss the role of integral psychophysics as a scientia prima , logically and methodically preceding physics and psychology. (shrink)

Just started a new book. The aim is to establish a science of knowledge in the same way that we have a science of physics or a science of materials. This might appear as an overly ambitious, possibly arrogant, objective, but bear with me. On the day I am beginning to write it–June 7th, 2020–, I think I am in possession of a few things that will help me to achieve this objective. Again, bear with me. My (...) aim is well reflected in the title I chose (just now) for this book: Knowledge & Logic: Towards a science of knowledge. Its most important feature is that I shall take logic to be to knowledge science as calculus is to physics or to materials science. I do not intend to reclaim knowledge from the bosom of philosophy, in which, known as epistemology its erudite discussion has hardly progressed since Plato first defined it as true belief with logos. With only a few adjustments, it will actually provide me with the right, science-bound start. More recently, knowledge has been reclaimed by the field of BA, a reclaim that has opened the box of Pandora: Among the evils, and perhaps at the head of the list, is an overly lay, essentially naive, notion of knowledge. But the very idea that one can have something like “knowledge (management) software” puts us on the right track. (shrink)

In the 21stcentury, there is a turn of thinking toward its reorientation first of all to the human as an author of thought and not to the nature, existing independently of us and of the process of scientific knowledge obtaining. It is possible to see the difference of these two types of thinking in the context of dialogue between W. Whewell’s philosophy and the scientific investigations after the scientific revolution in the beginning of the 20thcentury. In the philosophy of 21stcentury, (...) man is a social being and this is the basis of social philosophy. The artificial world around us is created by a human, it has its foundation in the laws of thinking but not the laws of nature. The foundations of both systems are quite different. In what way can we achieve mutual understanding between them? From both sides some aspects can be put forward, for instance, the concept of a mediator of a thought. This concept is studied actively by W. Whewell and by philosophers of our time, and this leads in both cases to some unexpected interpretation of the basic question of philosophy: the border between thing and thought is becoming less noticeable. We can come to the same result, going by different ways. Whewell finds common qualities for some group of things. Social philosophers are interested in what makes things different. Not one of these idealizations corresponds completely to the reality. Always something is not taken into consideration. A thinker chooses out of real world some of its characteristics that become a basis of a thought system, which explains everything but in its own way. The paper demonstrates the way of possible creation of a new type of thinking. (shrink)

In my paper 'Validity in Simple Partial Logic'(2002) I made comparison between several definitions of validity in Simple Partial Logic(SPL) and adopted two of them as most appropriate. In this paper, after elaborating more on these two definitions than in my previous paper and considering the characteristics of Partial Semantics, in which these definitions are given, I construct a tableau proof system and prove its soundness and completeness. Then, based on the characterization of Partial Semantics, I will show (...) that we can regard SPL as a logic of extensional alethic modality. (shrink)

In Sandra Waddock’s article “Taking Stock of SIM” in this journal, she identifies key issues in the work of the Social Issues in Management (SIM) Division of the Academy of Management. This article challenges her analysis of SIM scholarship and her arguments of what is necessary for the division to progress. Scholarship in SIM should emphasize two key streams: First, scholars in SIM should seek to develop a science of social forensics, design, and social repair—in essence, develop a method (...) of problem diagnosis, an approach to practical solution design, and a systematic understanding of the selection and implementation of social repair—in other words, seek to understand how to systematically troubleshoot and engineer solutions to fundamental issues in the business and society interface. The second stream, which informs the first, involves the development of original, core, transferable systematics that can “travel”—be the source of understanding-generating analysis—in other disciplines, including the topical regions of the Academy of Management. The article argues that laying claim to and developing true normative theory applicable across disciplines should be a distinctive identifier of work in SIM. The article concludes with an illustration of how systematics can be applied to address the literature’s failure to even seek to understand the logic underlying the standard ethical theories. These theories are properly seen as complements rather than substitutes. We need to ask and answer the “fundamental question of business ethics”: What should I do?.We suggest an approach labeled “integrative ethics,” employing ethical frames/injunctive formats, framed contexts for action, and the distribution of desires. (shrink)

The formal systems of logic have ordinarily been regarded as independent of biology, but recent developments in evolutionary theory suggest that biology and logic may be intimately interrelated. In this book, William Cooper outlines a theory of rationality in which logical law emerges as an intrinsic aspect of evolutionary biology. This biological perspective on logic, though at present unorthodox, could change traditional ideas about the reasoning process. Cooper examines the connections between logic and evolutionary biology and (...) illustrates how logical rules are derived directly from evolutionary principles, and therefore have no independent status of their own. Laws of decision theory, utility theory, induction, and deduction are reinterpreted as natural consequences of evolutionary processes. Cooper's connection of logical law to evolutionary theory ultimately results in a unified foundation for an evolutionary science of reason. It will be of interest to professionals and students of philosophy of science, logic, evolutionary theory, and cognitive science. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a critical interpretation of Hegel’s claims regarding the presuppositionless status of the Logic. Commentators have been divided as to whether the Logic actually achieves the status of presuppositionless science, disagreeing as to whether the Logic succeeds in making an unmediated beginning. I argue, however, that this understanding of presuppositionless science is misguided, as it reflects a spurious conception of immediacy that Hegel criticizes as false. Contextualizing Hegel’s remarks in light of (...) his broader approach to the problem of beginning, I contend that Hegel’s Logic is presuppositionless not in the sense that it satisfies a formal epistemological demand to begin free from all mediation, but in that its self-mediating structure facilitates an immanent deduction of the categories. (shrink)

Peirce considered his esthetics to be one of a trio of normative sciences. Ostensibly, the sciences of logic, ethics and esthetics, would study the traditional norms of truth, goodness and beauty. Logic was normative in the sense that it studied how people ought to reason, if truth is to be the result. Similarly, ethics is the study of how we ought to conduct ourselves, if good is to happen. At the same time, Peirce seems to have difficulty fitting (...) the study of the beautiful into this sort of normative framework. As Peirce says, esthetics was handicapped by its definition as a theory of beauty. Instead, Peirce sees esthetics as bound up with a study of ends. Peirce argues that ends are essential to normative behavior, understood as the deliberate pursuit of a purpose, the latter serving to direct and correct the behavior. Ends may be ideals, ideas, standards, or goals. In this regard, the study of esthetics is bound up with what ought to be pursued. The key problem of the normative sciences is to discover which ends ought to be pursued. In Peirce’s formative accounts, he seems to waver between assigning this task to ethics at times and esthetics otherwise. In some places, he argues that ethics defines the ends to be pursued and studies the summum bonum. On the other hand, esthetics is claimed to be the study of ideals, that which is objectively admirable, and the conditions of attractive and repulsive ideas. To that extent, Peirce claims in a number of places that the ethically good rests on a notion of the esthetically good, the morally good being a species of the esthetically good. Although Peirce notes his neglect of the study of esthetics, he does provide a preliminary study of ends, which prove to be instructive in getting a sense of what he counts as admirable to pursue. I argue that besides this positive esthetics, which identifies ends and the conditions which makes them worthy of pursuit, he also suggests a negative esthetics, one that is does not work backwards from the ideal to the means to achieve it, but sees ends as something that evolves forward as human endeavor attempts to correct those pursuits that have led to error and misdirection. Peirce’s negative esthetics is modelled after the way in which he accounts for the ability of science to self-correct away from errant hypotheses to ones less subject to error, converging toward the truth. In the same way, the pursuit of ends is a matter of converging toward the right end through self-correction. (shrink)

One central but unrecognized strand of the complex debate between W. V. Quine and Donald Davidson over the status of psychology as a science turns on their disagreement concerning the compatibility of strict psychophysical, semantic-determining laws with the possibility of error. That disagreement in turn underlies their opposing views on the location of semantic determinants: proximal (on bodily surfaces) or distal (in the external world). This paper articulates these two disputes, their wider context, and argues that both are fundamentally (...) misconceived. There is no special tension between error and strict semantic-determining laws; moreover, the purported bearing of that issue on the dispute over the location of semantic determinants depends upon a mistaken conception of the relation between the nomic status of generalizations and degree of distance between explanans and it explananda. Finally, the wider significance of these conclusions for related contemporary debates is noted. And independent considerations about the possibility of communication, also present in Quine's and Davidson's thinking, are brought to bear on the question of the location of semantic determinants. (shrink)

Throughout his forty-one years of teaching, Kant lectured on logic annually at Königsberg University. This faithfulness to the course was founded on his conviction that logic, taken as the science of the necessary formal laws of all thinking in general, serves as the reflective basis for exploring the use of understanding and reason in the sciences and other disciplines. Hence as their higher education proceeded, students would have the opportunity to consider formally, and not just psychologically or (...) culturally, the more general questions about concepts, laws, and methods of human cognition. Kant’s appreciation of what logic offers to university life was only fortified by his 1770 appointment as professor of logic and metaphysics, with the attendant teaching responsibilities in each field. However widely he ranged in lectures on the metaphysical principles of natural science and morality, he always returned to the home base of logical inquiry. (shrink)

The connection of Hermann Сohen’s “The Logic of Pure Knowledge” with the revolutionary transformations in physics and mathematics at the end of the 19th century is shown. Сohen criticised Kant’s answer to the question “How is mathematics possible”? If Kant refers to a priori forms of pure intuition, Сohen sees in it a restriction of freedom of mathematical thinking by limits of intuition. It has been shown that Cohen's position is in accordance with the main development of mathematics in (...) the last decades of the 19th century, in particular, with K. Weierstrass’ striving to get rid of geometrical or mechanical images and intuitions in the mathematical analysis. Cohen was also well informed about the latest ideas in physics of his time. They are also discussed in “The Logic of Pure Knowledge.” The revolutionary spirit of physics and mathematics was appealing to Cohen, and he felt a corresponding enthusiasm for it. The ongoing scientific revolution is consonant with Cohen’s assertion that the foundations of science are hypotheses. The purity of pure thinking does not guarantee the correctness of any of its constructions. Each step in the development of science requires a critique of existing notions. The development of knowledge from the naive to the critical one shows a movement from a picture of the world as a set of stable things to a picture of continuous movement and change, where change is more important than what changes. Cohen sees such a development in an evolution of the concept of substance in modern physics and he welcomes the replacement of material substance by energy, seeing this movement as a confirmation of critical idealism. Finally, it is discussed whether we can speak of the actuality of Cohen’s logic of pure knowledge. (shrink)

This book revives inductive logic by bringing out the underlying epistemology. The resulting structural reliabilist theory propounds the view that justification supervenes on syntactic and semantic properties of sentences as justification-bearers. It is claimed to set up a genuine alternative to the prevailing theories of justification. Kawalec substantiates this claim by confronting structural reliabilism with a number of epistemological problems. While the book is addressed to both professionals and students of philosophical logic, probability, epistemology, and philosophy of (...) class='Hi'>science, it also surveys ideas central to the development of philosophy in the 20th century. It will be a valuable companion to multifarious graduate and postgraduate courses. (shrink)

Philosophers at least since Kant, with Larry Laudan being a recent example, have suggested that scientific inquiry be thought of as a problem-solving or question-answering activity. The logic of such a conception of scientific inquiry has not been studied systematically, however. This paper presents some of the main aspects of the logic on which such a conception of science is based. That logic is called in this paper model-oriented logic, and it is suggested that one (...) can systematically study optimal questioning strategies with it. (shrink)

From the Editors [of Voprosy filosofii]: Recently the prominent Soviet philosopher, specialist in problems of dialectics, theory of knowledge, the history of philosophy, and esthetics Igor Sergeevich Narskii marked his sixtieth birthday. The editorial board and staff of Voprosy filosofii wish to extend their congratulations to him and wish him good health, happiness in his personal life, and continued success in his work.

1. STRUCTURE AND REFERENCES 1.1. The main part of the dictionary consists of alphabetically arranged articles concerned with basic logical theories and some other selected topics. Within each article a set of concepts is defined in their mutual relations. This way of defining concepts in the context of a theory provides better understand ing of ideas than that provided by isolated short defmitions. A disadvantage of this method is that it takes more time to look something up inside an extensive (...) article. To reduce this disadvantage the following measures have been adopted. Each article is divided into numbered sections, the numbers, in boldface type, being addresses to which we refer. Those sections of larger articles which are divided at the first level, i.e. numbered with single numerals, have titles. Main sections are further subdivided, the subsections being numbered by numerals added to the main section number, e.g. I, 1.1, 1.2,..., 1.1.1, 1.1.2, and so on. A comprehensive subject index is supplied together with a glossary. The aim of the latter is to provide, if possible, short defmitions which sometimes may prove sufficient. As to the use of the glossary, see the comment preceding it. (shrink)

Frege’s logicist program is a program of scientific unification of arithmetic and logic via the reduction of arithmetic to logic. Logic on this view is the prior science, indeed, the most fundamental of all sciences. The coherence of this picture has been questioned, based on the claim that the Basic Laws of logic are not justifiable as judgements. That Frege’s conception of logic suffers from this fatal flaw is incorrect, and in this paper I (...) explore why. The discussion has three primary parts. The first explores Frege’s view of logic, distinguishing pure from applied logic. The second delves into Frege’s conception of science as applications of logic, and how arithmetic is understood as such an application. The third concerns Frege’s account of judgement, and how it carefully distinguishes a judgement from judging, the cognitive act of recognizing truths. The final section turns to how on Frege’s account of judgement, the Basic Laws of logic are in fact justified as judgements, and accordingly can serve as the axioms of the science of arithmetic. The paper concludes with reflections on Frege’s understanding of scientific unification and reduction, and its relation to his logical realism. (shrink)

This dissertation concerns the methodology Kant employs in the first two sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Groundwork I-II) with particular attention to how the execution of the method of analysis in these sections contributes to the establishment of moral metaphysics as a science. My thesis is that Kant had a detailed strategy for the Groundwork, that this strategy and Kant’s reasons for adopting it can be ascertained from the Critique of Pure Reason (first Critique) and (...) his lectures on logic, and that understanding this strategy gains us interpretive insight into Kant’s moral metaphysics. At the most general level of methodology, Kant says there are four steps for the establishment of any science: 1) make distinct the idea of the natural unity of its material 2) determine the special content of the science 3) articulate the systematic unity of the science 4) critique the science to determine its boundaries The first two of these steps are accomplished by the genetically scholastic method of analysis, paradigmatically the method whereby confused and obscure ideas are made clear and distinct, thereby logically perfecting them and transforming them into possible grounds of cognitive insight that are potentially complete and adequate to philosophical purposes. The analysis of Groundwork I is a paradigmatic analysis that makes distinct what is contained in common understanding, i.e. its Inhalt or intension, making distinct the higher partial concepts that together define the concept of morality. The analysis of Groundwork II is an employment more specifically of the method of logical division, which makes distinct what is contained under the concept, i.e. its Umfang, by which the extension or object of morality is determined. Part I introduces Kant’s conception of moral metaphysical science and why he took it to be in need of establishment, explains the general method for establishing science and the scholastic method of analysis by which its first two steps are to be accomplished, then provides an interpretation of Groundwork I as an execution of this method. Part II details Kant’s determination of the special content of moral science in Groundwork II in relation to the central problem for moral metaphysics – how synthetic a priori practical cognition is possible. (shrink)

Following logicism, Frege famously held that logic is a science on its own. Particularly, he held the informativity thesis, viz., that logic is a science because it is deductively informative. This paper aims to understand Frege’s informativity thesis and its connection with the conception of logic as science. For such, it focuses on some features of Frege’s philosophy that are key for understanding this connection, particularly his conception of analyticity, the role of judgments in (...) inferential reasoning, and the use of decomposition of functions as a means for concept-formation, which Frege names as fruitful definitions. Keywords: Gottlob Frege; Informativity of Logic; Judgements; Fruitful Definitions. (shrink)

The article gives a short account of V.A. Smirnovs scientific biography, including his work in Tomsk University in Siberia and in the Department of Logic of the Institute of Philosophy in Moscow.

In Computer Science stepwise refinement of algebraic specifications is a well-known formal methodology for rigorous program development. This paper illustrates how techniques from Algebraic Logic, in particular that of interpretation, understood as a multifunction that preserves and reflects logical consequence, capture a number of relevant transformations in the context of software design, reuse, and adaptation, difficult to deal with in classical approaches. Examples include data encapsulation and the decomposition of operations into atomic transactions. But if interpretations open such (...) a new research avenue in program refinement, (conceptual) tools are needed to reason about them. In this line, the paper’s main contribution is a study of the correspondence between logical interpretations and morphisms of a particular kind of coalgebras. This opens way to the use of coalgebraic constructions, such as simulation and bisimulation, in the study of interpretations between (abstract) logics. (shrink)

Ulrich Meyer's book The Nature of Time uses tense logic to argue for a `modal' view of time, which replaces substantial times with `ersatz times' constructed using conceptually basic tense operators. He also argues against Bertrand Russell's relationist theory, in which times are classes of events, and against the idea that relativity compels the integration of time and space. I find fault with each of these negative arguments, as well as with Meyer's purported reconstruction of empty spacetime from tense (...) operators and substantial spatial points. I suggest that Meyer's positive project is best conceived as an elimination of time in the mode of Julian Barbour's The End of Time. (shrink)

It is increasingly common to conceive of scientific research as something that can be planned, managed, and assessed by applying modern techniques of project management. Expecting research to follow certain standardized procedures to achieve clearly defined goals has a long tradition, in particular, in the natural sciences and has arguably contributed to the acceptance of science as an authoritative force that makes tangible contributions to social progress. For the social sciences, however such a narrow understanding of scientific research causes (...) serious problems. Social science research doesn’t always fit in the logic of project management. Moreover, attempts to adjust research practices to correspond with external, managerial experiences are far more consequential and damaging to the social sciences. This article interrogates the prospects and consequences of project thinking in the social sciences and discusses the likely epistemological consequences. To do so, it will recapitulate the historical and social developments that lead to the adoption of managerial principles in social science research and contrasts them with the philosophical principles that underpinned the scientification of thinking about the social. (shrink)

A Bilingual International Conference on the History and Actuality of the Polish Contribution, from the Lvov-Warsaw school to phenomenology, to Twentieth Century Philosophy. Colloque international bilingue portant sur l'histoire et l'actualité de la contribution polonaise, de l'école de Lvov-Varsovie à la phénoménologie, à la philosophie du vingtième siècle.

Hegel frequently claimed that the heart of his entire system was a book widely regarded as among the most difficult in the history of philosophy, The Science of Logic. This is the book that presents his metaphysics, an enterprise that he insists can only be properly understood as a “logic,” or a “science of pure thinking.” Since he also wrote that the proper object of any such logic is pure thinking itself, it has always been (...) unclear in just what sense such a science could be a “metaphysics.” -/- Robert B. Pippin offers here a bold, original interpretation of Hegel’s claim that only now, after Kant’s critical breakthrough in philosophy, can we understand how logic can be a metaphysics. Pippin addresses Hegel’s deep, constant reliance on Aristotle’s conception of metaphysics, the difference between Hegel’s project and modern rationalist metaphysics, and the links between the “logic as metaphysics” claim and modern developments in the philosophy of logic. Pippin goes on to explore many other facets of Hegel’s thought, including the significance for a philosophical logic of the self-conscious character of thought, the dynamism of reason in Kant and Hegel, life as a logical category, and what Hegel might mean by the unity of the idea of the true and the idea of the good in the “Absolute Idea.” The culmination of Pippin’s work on Hegel and German idealism, no Hegel scholar or historian of philosophy will want to miss this book. (shrink)

There are various ``classical'' arguments against abduction as a logic of discovery,especially that (1) abduction is too weak a mode of inference to be of any use, and (2) in basic formulation of abduction the hypothesisis already presupposed to be known, so it is not the way hypotheses are discovered in the first place. In this paper I argue, by bringing forth the idea of strategies,that these counter-arguments are weaker than may appear. The concept of strategies suggests, inter alia, (...) that many inferential moves are taken into account at the same time. This is especially important in abductive reasoning, which is basically a very weak mode of inference. The importance of strategic thinking can already be seen in Charles S.Peirce's early treatments of the topic, and N.R.Hanson's later writings on abduction although they did not use the concept of``strategies.'' On the whole, I am arguing that the focus should be more on methodological processes, and not only on validity considerations, which have dominated the discussion about abduction. (shrink)

The role of scientific values has taken on new urgency with recent changes in the politics of Western societies. The threat is the erosion of the distinction between true and false in political circles. This could rapidly lead to democracy sliding into populism thence fascism. In the light of this, philosophy and sociology of science should themselves re-examine their role. The main point of the paper is to argue that science could and should push against the erosion of (...) truth in society. Sociological thinking has sometimes tended to erode the difference between science and ordinary thought but it should no longer ignore the political consequences and should, instead, start to take scientific values as a positive resource in society. The philosophical analysis of scientific values, which I will refer to as ‘scientific value analysis, or ‘SVA’, has championed the impact of societal values on science but should also look at the way scientific values could positively affect societal values. (shrink)