Historical scientists frequently face incomplete data, and lack direct experimental access to their targets. This has led some philosophers and scientists to be pessimistic about the epistemic potential of the historical sciences. And yet, historical science often produces plausible, sophisticated hypotheses. I explain this capacity to generate knowledge in the face of apparent evidential scarcity by examining recent work on Thylacoleo carnifex, the ‘marsupial lion’. Here, we see two important methodological features. First, historical scientists are methodological omnivores, that is, they (...) construct purpose-built epistemic tools tailored to generate evidence about highly specific targets. This allows them to produce multiple streams of independent evidence and thus maximize their epistemic reach. Second, investigative scaffolding: research proceeds in a piece-meal fashion, information only gaining evidential relevance once certain hypotheses are well supported. I illustrate scaffolding in a discussion of the nature of functional ascription in paleobiology. Frequently, different senses of ‘function’ are not discriminated during paleobiological investigation—something which can mar adaptationist investigations of extant organisms. However, I argue that, due to scaffolding, conflating senses of ‘function’ can be the right thing to do. Coarse-grained functional hypotheses are required before it is clear what evidence could discriminate between more fine-grained ones. I draw on omnivory and scaffolding to argue that pessimists make a bad empirical bet. It is a bad idea to bet against the epistemic fortunes of such opportunistic and resourceful scientists, especially when we have reason to think we will systematically underestimate the amount of evidence ultimately available to them. (shrink)

Dialogue has its origins in joint activities, which it serves to coordinate. Joint activities, in turn, usually emerge in hierarchically nested projects and subprojects. We propose that participants use dialogue to coordinate two kinds of transitions in these joint projects: vertical transitions, or entering and exiting joint projects; and horizontal transitions, or continuing within joint projects. The participants help signal these transitions with project markers, words such as uh-huh, m-hm, yeah, okay, or all right. These words have been studied mainly (...) as signals of listener feedback (back-channel signals) or turn-taking devices (acknowledgment tokens). We present evidence from several types of well-defined tasks that they are also part of a system of contrasts specialized for navigating joint projects. Uh-huh, m-hm and yeah are used for horizontal transitions, and okay and all right for vertical transitions. (shrink)

This volume is a wide-ranging examination of denial and ideological denialism. It offers a readable overview of the psychology and social science of bias, self-deception, and denial, and examines the role of ideological denialism in conflicts over science and public policy, politics, and culture.

Many accounts of scientific modeling conceive of models as fictions: scientists interact with models in ways analogous to various aesthetic objects. Fictionalists follow most other accounts of modeling by taking them to be revelatory of the actual world in virtue of bearing some resemblance relation to a target system. While such fictionalist accounts capture crucial aspects of modelling practice, they are ill-suited to some design and engineering contexts. Here, models sometimes serve to underwrite design projects whereby real-world targets are constructed. (...) In such circumstances, it is unclear what the model is supposed to resemble. Further, while fictionalists often require that models qua models have their content in virtue of construal or interpretation, in some engineering and design contexts success-conditions do not require such content—all that is required is that the model generates the required outputs. I take these points to motivate a view which accommodates fictionalism, but is broader. I articulate and defend an account of models as tools: specifically, material objects which are put to particular uses in particular contexts. (shrink)

When someone thanks someone for something, or advises him against something, or refuses something from him, his action is directed not merely at but to the other. He addresses the other. But is it only actions that exemplify this mode of directedness? This essay argues that it is not.

Beginning with Zagzebski (The Philosophical Quarterly 44:65–73, 1994), some philosophers have argued that there can be no solution to the Gettier counterexamples within the framework of a fallibilist theory of knowledge. If true, this would be devastating, since it is believed on good grounds that infallibilism leads to scepticism. But I argue here that these purported proofs are mistaken and that the truthmaker solution to the Gettier problems is both cogent and fallibilist in nature. To show this I develop the (...) notion of evidence of a state of affairs, a crucial concept in the truthmaker theory. I also argue that a common principle of the transmission of evidence through entailment is false, and the cause of much of the trouble. (shrink)

This article responds to two problems confronting social and human sciences: how to relate to digital data, inasmuch as it challenges established social science methods; and how to relate to life sciences, insofar as they produce knowledge that impinges on our own ways of knowing. In a case study of proteomics, we explore how digital devices grapple with large-scale multiples – of molecules, databases, machines and people. We analyse one particular visual device, a cluster-heatmap, produced by scientists by mining data (...) from a large number of experiments on human blood plasma proteins. These proteins make up a myriad multiple whose identity shifts in many ways. Rather than displaying data about proteins, the heatmap constructs a view of the differences and similarities between experiments. We find this attempt to construct a view on many things at once instructive in thinking about multiples more generally. Instead of flattening molecular ‘life itself’, this visual device superimposes layers of digital devices and techniques from a wide variety of disciplines. This layering suggests a different way of relating to the life sciences more generally: rather than what they know, how they know might be of use to social and human sciences when attending to multiplicities. (shrink)

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The significance of Max Black’s indistinguishable spheres for the nature of particles in quantum mechanics is discussed, focusing in particular on the use of the idea of weak indiscernibility. It is argued that there can be four such Black spheres but that five are impossible. It follows from this that Black’s example cannot serve as a model for indistinguishability in physics. But Black’s discussion of his spheres gave rise to the idea of weak discernibility and it is argued that such (...) predicates are unsatisfiable in the way intended. The underlying problem with weak discernibility spreads out to also undermine the whole notion that indistinguishability rests on a notion of the permutation invariance of particles. A better foundation is indicated. (shrink)

Creativity and PhilosophyBerys Gaut and Matthew Kieran Routledge. 2018. pp. 394. £30.99.

BackgroundThe foundation of health and medical research is data. Data sharing facilitates the progress of research and strengthens science. Data sharing in research is widely discussed in the literature; however, there are seemingly no evidence-based incentives that promote data sharing.MethodsA systematic review of the health and medical research literature was used to uncover any evidence-based incentives, with pre- and post-empirical data that examined data sharing rates. We were also interested in quantifying and classifying the number of opinion pieces on the (...) importance of incentives, the number observational studies that analysed data sharing rates and practices, and strategies aimed at increasing data sharing rates.ResultsOnly one incentive has been tested in health and medical research that examined data sharing rates. The number of opinion pieces out-weighed the number of article-testing strategies, and the number of observational studies exceeded them both.ConclusionsGiven that data is the foundation of evidence-based health and medical research, it is paradoxical that there is only one evidence-based incentive to promote data sharing. More well-designed studies are needed in order to increase the currently low rates of data sharing. (shrink)

This paper develops a way of understanding G. E. M. Anscombe's essay “The First Person” at the heart of which are the following two ideas: first, that the point of her essay is to show that it is not possible for anyone to understand what they express with “I” as an Art des Gegebenseins—a way of thinking of an object that constitutes identifying knowledge of which object is being thought of; and second, that the argument through which her essay seeks (...) to show this is itself first personal in character. Understanding Anscombe's essay in this light has the merit of showing much of what it says to be correct. But it sets us the task of saying what it is that we understand ourselves to express with “I” if not an Art des Gegebenseins, and in particular what it is that we understand ourselves to express with sentences with “I” as subject that might seem to express identity judgments, such as “I am NN”, and “I am this body”. (shrink)

Volume 20, Issue 10, October 2020, Page 26-29.

The function of groups as information processors is increasingly being recognised in a number of theories of group cognition. A theme of many of these is an emphasis on sharing cognition. This paper extends current conceptualisations of groups by critiquing the focus on shared cognition and emphasising the distribution of cognition in groups. In particular, it develops an account of the distribution of one cognitive construct, mental models. Mental models have been chosen as a focus because they are used in (...) a number of theories of high level cognition from different areas of research such as cognitive science and human factors and so the implication of this development is wide reaching. This paper reviews the unconnected literatures on distributed cognition and mental models and integrates them in order to extend the theory of mental models to distributed cognitive systems such as groups. The distributed cognition literature is reviewed and the importance of considering the group as single cognitive system is adopted. A range of mental model theories are reviewed leading to the conclusion that they all have, in some form, the central feature of a mapping onto the cognitive system. Combining these two ideas, it is proposed that the model can be a mapping onto the whole group, if the information is distributed appropriately and the connections between parts of the model maintained through communication. This cognitive construct is referred to as a distributed mental model. Implications and applications of this theory are discussed. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga's externalist analysis of epistemic warrant centres on the proper function of the relevant belief-forming mechanism, where proper function is fixed relative to the design plan of the organism in question. He has set this analysis against reliabilism, the other leading externalist contender for the analysis of warrant. Though Plantinga's discussion advances the field of epistemology in a number of important ways, his treatment of warrant is limited by his assumption of creationism in his understanding of design and function. (...) Further, analyses of epistemic warrant focusing on function over reliability either fail at handling problem cases reliabilism can handle, or fail to improve on problem cases for reliabilism. Thus no proper functionalist analysis like Plantinga's can supersede a well-constructed reliabilist analysis. (shrink)

It’s a truism of philosophy that Realists must not postulate more than we could reasonably hope to know, while Anti-Realists must not leave us with so little that all knowledge is impossible. But balance is not easily come by—and even less in philosophy than in life. So philosophy continues to struggle over the hard cases, with neither the Realist nor the Anti-Realist able to score an easy victory.

George McGhee’s book “Convergent Evolution: limited forms most beautiful” provides an extensive survey of biological convergence. This paper has two main aims. First, it examines the theoretical claims McGhee makes about convergent evolution—specifically criticizing his use of a total morphospace to understand contingency and his assumption that functional constraints are non-contingent. Second, it sketches a group of important conceptual challenges facing researchers interested in convergence.

Like every Bachelor of Arts program, the University of Exeter provides a set of reasons to undertake a BA in philosophy aimed at prospective students and their parents. Here1 are two such reasons:F...

In this essay I revisit Kant’s largely-ignored Third Analogy of Experience with an eye to what it may yet contribute to our understanding of time perception. The essay begins with an elucidation of the purpose of the Third Analogy, followed by an account of how the core argument is intended to work. It then summarizes the problem that has left the Third Analogy out of much of the scholarly literature on Kant. I respond by introducing two ways of scaling back (...) on Kant’s claims. First, I offer a revisionary interpretation of the Third Analogy as a “modest” transcendental argument; second, I propose a re-imagining of the Analogy such that it yields an empirical hypothesis that might be of use in developmental psychology. (shrink)

SummaryThe purpose of this article is to critically undermine two commonly held and closely related contentions regarding the British idealist tradition. The first is that the British idealist tradition went into rapid and terminal decline shortly after the outbreak of the First World War. The second is that J. A. Smith was largely responsible for it. These aims are achieved through a diachronic analysis of Smith's conception of human imperfection as well as an assessment of Smith's intellectual legacy. As this (...) article will show, contrary to the received view, Smith was a philosophical innovator who instigated an intellectual evolution within the British idealist. In particular, this article shows that Smith substituted aspects of his early Greenian philosophy with elements of Italian idealism. As a result, Smith was instrumental in moving British idealism away from its traditional underpinnings and towards more a Croce–Gentilian foundation. It is this neglected philosophical innovation which has given scholars the false impression of the tradition's collapse. By establishing Smith's intellectual innovation this article intends to show that Smith made a much more significant intellectual contribution to the philosophical tradition to which he belongs than has so far been recognised. (shrink)

In this paper, we extend Michel Foucault’s final works on the ‘care of the self’ to an empirical examination of research practice in community-based research (CBR). We use Foucault’s ‘morality of behaviors’ to analyze interview data from a national sample of Canadian CBR practitioners working with communities affected by HIV. Despite claims in the literature that ethics review is overly burdensome for non-traditional forms of research, our findings suggest that many researchers using CBR have an ambivalent but ultimately productive relationship (...) with institutional research ethics review requirements. They understand and use prescribed codes, but adapt them in practice to account for the needs of participating community members, members of their research teams and the larger communities with whom they work. Complying with ethics protocols was seen as only the beginning, a minimum standard; our research suggests that the real ethical work happens in the field, where CBR practitioners encounter community members in diverse public roles and must forge ethical consensus across communities. CBR represents an ethical terrain in which practitioners challenge themselves to work differently, and as a result they care for themselves—and others—in ways that often resist the propensity for domination through public health research.‘…there are different ways to “conduct oneself” morally, different ways for the acting individual to operate, not just as an agent, but as an ethical subject of action.’ (Foucault, 1985: 26). (shrink)

Integrating Rorty and (Social) Constructivism: A View from Harrisian Semiology. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/02691728.2013.782587.

From Machiavelli via Hobbes, Locke and Grotius to J.S. Mill and John Rawls, the liberal (and republican) tradition pivots about the primacy of the individual over all forms of human association and allied to this primacy is the replacing of notions of substan¬tive goodness or truth with the ultimate foundation of society upon subjective rights secured by the power of the central state. Those rights are grounded in the human will and the artifice of the social contract that has supplanted (...) older ideas of covenantal relationships governed by a logic of reciprocity or gift-exchange. Liberalism is therefore inherently atomistic and oscillates between the isolated individual and some collective unity either objectively compounded or artificially supposed – ‘Leviathan’ was both. By positing an asocial ‘state of nature’, liberal contractualism purports to invent the artificial order of politics. By contrast, Romanticism – in the works of Novalis, Schlegel, Carlyle, Coleridge, de Biran and Bulgakov – develops develop in novel ways the ancient and Christian idea that human beings as social, political creatures have a natural desire for objective, substantive values by which to orientate their lives and give them that coherent shape which alone engenders a sense of real fulfilment. This teleological space cannot be equated with the impersonal, absolute sovereignty of national states and transnational markets but requires interpersonal relations within a mediated polity that has a transcendent outlook. So whereas liberalism merely regulates the evil and violence which it views as primary (and which therefore it perpetuates and even reinforces), Romanticism offers a vision of partial redemption in this life just because the Fall and original sin never fully destroyed the fundamentally peaceful, ontological ordering of the world. Rather, as fallen creatures equally capable of vice and virtue, human beings can discover their own particular purpose and place in society that is ordered to the good of the whole cosmos ultimately rooted in God’s creative action. By practising virtue, we can be redeemed in this life up to a point and we can begin to redeem the promise of an original harmony. (shrink)

Although the question 'Does psi exist?' has become a recurrent and intransigent problem for psychological science, seen from a historical and social context, there appear to be reasons as to why no determined effort has been made to resolve the question. The sporadic exchanges from parapsychologists and critics appear only to reinforce the status quo: At most, it is agreed that some form of 'anomaly' has been established but there is no consensus about its nature. Yet such a defeatist stance (...) shies away from the long tradition of research into spontaneous phenomena, as well as experimental research with dreams and hypnosis, all of which suggests that, if psi is real, it is not just an anomaly but has true information content and dynamic effects. This work is briefly reviewed and then, since much of the current controversy has centred on the ganzfeld technique, this is used as an example of the issues involved. The ganzfeld induces sleep-onset imagery during which randomly selected film clips are viewed by a sender as a source of psi-mediated information to be incorporated into the imagery. Our current development of the ganzfeld technique, known as the digital autoganzfeld, takes the work beyond 'anomaly status' since it enables real-time recordings to be made of apparently high-quality psi as it enters consciousness. Initial findings from this illustrate the complexity of the phenomena and the need for more adventurous designs in order to stimulate theory development. There is no doubt that technology now exists which would enable us to resolve the issues raised. Whether the area turns out to be a mixture of rampant fraud, artefact and subjective validation or to present genuine phenomena, a resolution of the issue may be seen as having unwanted implications for psychology -- which may be one of the factors explaining why the controversy is left to continue as it is, unresolved. New questions are needed which take into account the natural context in which psi appears to occur, along with the support needed to reach clear answers. (shrink)

The present article starts with the question: Is the thinking practiced in philosophy universal? This question is unfolded and partially answered from five perspectives: the object, the claim, the audience, the thinker, and the method of philosophy. The author gives special attention to the question of how the thought of a catholic philosopher relates to faith and theology. /// O presente artigo parte da seguinte questão: Serà o modo de pensamento praticado na filosofia universal? Esta questào é desenvolvida e parcialmente (...) respondida a partir de cinco perspectivas diferentes: o objecto, a intenção, a audiência, o pensador, e o método da filosofia. O autor dá especial atenção à questão de saber de que modo o pensamento do filósofo católico se relaciona com a fé ea teologia. (shrink)

What are the leading forces and ideas that are shaping our age? In the West, a decade of financial disruption, austerity, and stagnant wages has produced a popular rejection of market fundamentalism that prevailed for over forty years. Mass immigration and multiculturalism have contributed to rapid changes in both family and community life that leave many people feeling dispossessed or even humiliated. Unresponsive government is exacerbating people’s sense of powerlessness and anger. The revolt against the status quo is fuelling a (...) political insurgency against the establishment that replaces the old opposition of left versus right with a similarly simplistic dichotomy pitting the people against the elites. We are witnessing the failure of dualistic thinking and this will not be resolved by substituting one binary for another. Our contemporary conjuncture is such a period of interregnum and a war of position between the hitherto hegemonic ideology of liberalism and its populist rivals. The popular revolt against liberalism, which is driving the political insurgency across the West, highlights the collapse of the authority of the professional political class dominated by liberals. In what follows I shall argue that the emergent ideologies which are vying for hegemony are hyper-liberalism, nationalist traditionalism, and tech utopianism. All of them are variously anti-humanist, to which one can oppose updated versions of one-nation conservatism and ethical socialism. Before setting out the unfolding ‘war of position,’ I will first explore the new anti-humanism that underpins the main ideological movements. (shrink)

Significant work in the philosophy of history has focused on the writing of historiographical narratives, isolated from the rest of what historians do. Taking my cue from the philosophy of science in practice, I suggest that understanding historical narratives as embedded within historical practice more generally is fruitful. I illustrate this by bringing a particular instance of historical practice, Natalie Lawrence’s explanation of the sad fate of Winston the platypus, into dialogue with some of Louis Mink’s arguments in favour of (...) anti-realism about historical events. Attending to how historians seek out and utilize archival resources puts serious pressure on these arguments, motivates realist positions, and re-focuses the philosophy of history towards making sense of historiography as a part of the diversity of historians’ interests. (shrink)

The information contained within the linear sequence of bases (the genome) must be faithfully replicated in each cell cycle, with a balance of constancy and variation taking place over the course of evolution. Recently, it has become clear that additional information important for genetic regulation is contained within the chromatin proteins associated with DNA (the epigenome). Epigenetic information also must be faithfully duplicated in each cell cycle, with a balance of constancy and variation taking place during the course of development (...) to achieve differentiation while maintaining identity within cell lineages. Both the genome and the epigenome are synthesized at the replication fork, so the events occurring during S‐phase provide a critical window of opportunity for eliciting change or maintaining existing genetic states. Cells discriminate between different states of chromatin through the activities of proteins that selectively modify the structure of chromatin. Several recent studies report the localization of certain chromatin modifying proteins to replication forks at specific times during S‐phase. Since transcriptionally active and inactive chromosome domains generally replicate at different times during S‐phase, this spatiotemporal regulation of chromatin assembly proteins may be an integral part of epigenetic inheritance. BioEssays 25:647–656, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Some logical properties of modal languages in which actuality is expressible are investigated. It is argued that, if a sentence like 'Actually, Quine is a distinguished philosopher' is understood as a special case of world-indexed sentences (the index being the actual world), then actuality can be expressed only under strong modal assumptions. Some rival rigid and indexical approaches to actuality are discussed.

Résumé Cet article examine la manière dont Jean Scot Érigène s’approprie et emploie de façon constructive l’anthropologie de Maxime le Confesseur. Il s’agit de montrer que la division en cinq parties de l’être, puisée dans l’ Ambiguum 41 de Maxime le Confesseur, constitue le cadre du Periphyseon. Selon l’auteur, la compréhension de l’être humain de Maxime le Confesseur comme « un atelier de création », comme la synthèse de tous les aspects de la création, comme un agent d’unification, fournit la (...) prémisse anthropologique pour la division dialectique du genre de la nature propre à Érigène. C’est dans le cadre de l’ontologie de Maxime centrée sur « l’homme comme un atelier de création » qu’Érigène a recours à la tradition des arts libéraux. Par conséquent, la division du genre de la nature comme un exercice dialectique doit être comprise dans le cadre de l’appropriation par Érigène de la division en cinq parties de l’être de Maxime le Confesseur, ainsi que de son corollaire, l’anthropologie de l’ officina omnium o. Le projet du Periphyseon est guidé par la possibilité qu’à travers l’application des arts, l’homme pourrait devenir l’ officina omnium, en dépit de la chute ; si la connaissance intellectuelle de la création peut être achevée, alors le retour de toute la création à l’unité de l’être humain intelligible et ultimement à celle de Dieu pourrait être garanti. (shrink)

Wilfrid Sellars employs the metaphor of the space of reasons to express a certain conception of knowledge: “in characterising an episode or state as that of knowing … one is placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says”.1 A growing number of philosophers employ the same metaphor to express a conception of at least some (other) mental states: in characterising a state as that of belief, or intention, one is placing (...) it in the same logical space.2 The burden of Alan Millar’s characteristically careful and thought-provoking book is to tell us what this conception amounts to, and to argue for its truth. Its central claim is that the concepts of belief and intention, and what they are concepts of, are (in a sense to be explained) normative. Chapter four – “the heart of the book”, in Millar’s view3 – is devoted to explaining, and defending this claim. (shrink)