Functionalism about truth, or alethic functionalism, is one of our most promising approaches to the study of truth. In this chapter, I chart a course for functionalist inquiry that centrally involves the empirical study of ordinary thought about truth. In doing so, I review some existing empirical data on the ways in which we think about truth and offer suggestions for future work on this issue. I also argue that some of our data lend support to two kinds of pluralism (...) regarding ordinary thought about truth. These pluralist views, as I show, can be straightforwardly integrated into the broader functionalist framework. The main result of this integration is that some unexplored metaphysical views about truth become visible. To close the chapter, I briefly respond to one of the most serious objections to functionalism, due to Cory Wright. (shrink)

I begin with a defence of both Gyekye’s universalist and African metaphilosophies. In light of these metaphilosophies, I discuss the contemporary Western hegemony of materialist philosophy of mind and its origins in Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949), showing that the existence and nature of the traditional Akan philosophy, as elaborated by Gyekye, casts serious doubt on some influential founding motivations for materialism. I then argue that traditional Akan philosophy is best aligned with contemporary idealism. Gyekye’s endorsement (...) of dualism is shown to have not been intended as ontologically fundamental, while panpsychism is rejected on the basis of the resistance it offers to the Akan commitment to transcendence. Contemporary idealism, however, is able to accommodate all the main components of traditional Akan philosophy, making both experiential primacy and transcendence central to a metaphysical understanding of reality. Sunsum (spirit) and ōkra (soul) are understood in terms of the distinction between the phenomenal and horizonal conceptions of experience, with consciousness always requiring a distinction between the phenomenal world within an experiential horizon, and the independent being that transcends the horizon. (shrink)

Abstrak: Tujuan dari artikel ini adalah menginterpretasi dan mengafirmasi bahwa Ada (das Sein) dalam “pertanyaan tentang Ada” (die Seinsfrage) dalam pemikiran Heidegger adalah univok sebagaimana konsep Ada itu univok dalam pemikiran Duns Scotus. Oleh karena itu, pertanyaan utama yang menuntun artikel ini adalah, bagaimana dapat ditunjukkan hubungan antara konsep Ada itu univok antara Dun Scotus dan Heidegger? Untuk memahami dengan baik tema ini, kita akan mengulasnya dalam empat bagian. Pertama, kita akan berkonsentrasi pada pengertian konsep ekuivok, analog, univok. (...) Kedua, kita fokus pada konsep analogi dan univok dalam pemahaman Abad Pertengahan. Bagaimana Duns Scotus memahami Ada itu univok akan dijelaskan pada bagian ketiga. Kemudian, kita akan mengelaborasi sebuah penafsiran Ada itu univok dalam pemi- kiran Heidegger pada bagian keempat. Pada akhirnya, konsep Ada itu univok dalam pemikian Heidegger terletak pada konsepnya tentang waktu. Kata-kata kunci: Ekuivok, analog, univok, metafisika, Ada, Dasein, In- nerzeitigkeit, Zeitlichkeit, ekstasis, transendental. Abstract: The scope of this article is to interpret and affirm that Being (das Sein) in Heidegger’s “question of Being” (die Seinsfrage) is similarly univocal to Duns Scotus’ concept of the univocity of Being. Therefore, the central question which guides this article is, how can it point to the relationship between Duns Scotus and Heidegger in regards to the concept of the univocity of Being? To understand well this theme, we will explain it in four parts. First, we concentrate on the definitions of equivocity, analogy and univocity. Second, we focus on the concepts of analogy and univocity in the Middle Ages. How Duns Scotus understands the univocity of Being will be pointed out in third part. After that, we will elaborate an interpretation of the univocity of Being in Heidegger’s thought in fourth part. In the end, concept of the univocity of Being in Heidegger’s thought is put in his concept of time. Keywords: Equivocity, analogy and univocity, metaphysics, Being, Dasein, Innerzeitigkeit, Zeitlichkeit, ecstatic, transcendence. (shrink)

Abstrak: Karl Theodor Jaspers, seperti para eksistensialis lain, bergumul dengan persoalan eksistensi manusia. Kekhususan Jaspers terletak pada titik fokus. Orientasi pemikiran Jaspers tidak bukan pada struktur eksistensi, tetapi pada pencapaian eksistensi. Menurut Jaspers, manusia tidak memiliki kekuatan untuk bereksistensi. Eksistensi hanya dapat dicapai dalam relasi dengan Transendensi. Berangkat dari keyakinan ini, Jaspers membangun pemikiran eksistensial metafisiknya dengan pertanyaan dasar, bagaimana manusia dalam situasi konkrit dapat menjangkau Transendensi. Pergumulan ini membawa Jaspers pada eksplorasi chiffer sebagai medium menuju Transendensi. Transendensi berevelasi dalam (...) chiffer, sehingga untuk menjangkau-Nya, manusia harus masuk dan keluar melalui chiffer. Jalan metafisik Jaspers adalah membaca dan menginterpretasi chiffer. Pembacaan akan membawa manusia pada pengalaman mistik revelasi, dan interpretasi chiffer menghasilkan penerangan untuk membangun hidup secara otentik. Keputusan untuk mengikuti penerangan Transendensi menjadi awal dari eksistensi. Pemikiran eksistensial metafisik Jaspers dapat berkontribusi bagi masyarakat pluralis zaman modern yang cenderung gamang dengan keberadaan dan terkurung dalam pola pikir rasionalitas teknologi. Kata-kata Kunci: Eksistensi, Transendensi, metafisika, chiffer, revelasi jalan panjang. Abstract: Karl Jaspers, like other existentialists, thinks about the problem of human existence. Jaspers speciality lies at the point of focus. The orientation of Jaspers thought is not of the existence structure, but how to reach it. According to Jaspers, human beings have no power to exist. The existence can only be achieved in relation with Transcendence. From this point of faith, Jaspers constructs this existential metaphysical thought, how human being in concrete situation can reach Transcendence. This thought takes Jaspers at chipher exploration as a medium toward Transcendence. Transcendence evelates into chipher so that to achieve it, human being must be in and out through chipher. Jaspers metaphysical way is to read and interpreted chipher. The reading will bring human beings to mystic revelation existence, and interpretation of chipher will result in enlightenment to live a life authentically. The determination to follow the enlightenment of Transcendence becomes the outset of existence. Jaspers existential metaphysical thought can contribute to plural community at the modern era which tends to be confusing with situation and limited in the pattern of rational and technological thought. Keywords: Existence, Transcendence, metaphysics, chiffer, long way revelation. (shrink)

What is life? What does it mean when we say that something is alive? What makes something alive? Biology answers the questions with a lot of answers but the answers to the question “what is life?” always have its limitation because its status as an empirical science which starts from the diversity of living things on the Earth. In other words, the answers are not sufficient although they are necessary for us to know what life is. Biology needs a metaphysical (...) explanation to understand more completely the question “what is life?” Metaphysic through the concept of “substantial form” of the Aristotelian-Thomistic thought can contribute an understanding that complements biology to understand “what is life?” with its immanent cause. Keywords: Substantial form, immanent cause, formal cause. Abstrak: Apakah itu kehidupan? Apa artinya ketika kita mengatakan sesuatu sebagai “yang hidup?” Apa yang membuat sesuatu hidup? Biologi menjawab pertanyaan-pertanyaan tersebut dengan berbagai macam jawaban namun jawaban-jawaban biologi terhadap pertanyaan “apakah itu kehidupan?” selalu memiliki keterbatasan karena statusnya sebagai ilmu empiris yang berangkat dari keanekaragaman hayati yang ada di bumi ini. Dengan kata lain, jawaban-jawaban biologi tidak mencukupi walau merupakan hal yang mutlak perlu untuk mengetahui apa yang dimaksud dengan kehidupan. Biologi memerlukan penjelasan metafisis untuk bisa mendapatkan pemahaman yang lebih lengkap akan pertanyaan “apakah itu kehidupan?” Metafisika melalui konsep “forma substansial” Aristotelian-Thomistik dapat menyumbangkan pemahaman yang melengkapi biologi untuk memahami “apakah itu kehidupan?” dengan Causa imanennya. Kata-kata Kunci: Forma substansial, causa imanen, causa formal. (shrink)

Intersectionality is a travelling theory; now enjoying significant contemporary visibility and popularity in the feminist blogosphere, it has moved across disciplines and borders in ways that are quite distinct from the scholarly critique developed by Kimberlé Crenshaw some time ago. In this article, I consider how intersectionality is translated, and retheorised, as an intertwined set of everyday knowledges and associated governmental practices that both echo and diverge from some of the complexities and politics of its wide-ranging scholarly uptake. Drawing on (...) interviews with self-identifying feminists in a pilot project mapping contemporary Australian digital feminisms, this article explores two overarching patterns in intersectionality’s mobilisation. First, the shift to understanding intersectionality as an everyday conceptual grid plotting women’s differences along one axis, and measuring relative privilege and disadvantage on the other, recentring whiteness and liberal multicultural models of diversity and inclusion. Second, the transformation of intersectionality into an abstract, individualistic model of conduct, involving the citation and classification of ‘white feminist’ behaviour elsewhere, in frequent judgments on US celebrity culture. As such, intersectionality, while seemingly popular, often remained curiously ‘theoretical’ and divorced from embodied, everyday practices. I suggest in what follows that such a model of intersectionality raises questions of the commercial, racialised, political and mediated conditions that shape the theory’s visibility and materialisation. (shrink)

Dini sahada tartışılan bazı kavramlar birden fazla disipline konu olmuş ve bu kavramlar her disiplinde farklı açılardan ele alınmıştır. Dinî nasların anlaşılmasında önemli yeri olan hakikat ve mecaz bu tür kavramlardandır. Hakikat ve mecaz salt dilbilimsel kavramlar gibi görünseler de birçok dini disipline önemli ölçüde konu olmuşlardır. Fıkıh usûlü, bu kavramları yoğun bir şekilde konu edinen temel dini disiplinlerden biridir. İlk dönem dil kaynaklarında mecaza dair bir tanım yapılmamışsa da ana hatlarıyla “lafzın dilde vazedildiği anlam dışında kullanılması” mecaz kabul edilmiştir. (...) Günümüze ulaşan ilk fıkıh usulü eserinin müellifi İmam Şâfiî (öl. 204/820) ve Mu‘tezilî öncülerden Câhiz (öl. 255/869), Ebû Ali el-Cübbâî (öl. 303/916) ve Ebû Hâşim el-Cübbâî (öl. 321/933) de görüşlerini temellendirirken kavram tanımı yapmadan mecazı kullanmışlardır. Kelamcı usûlcülerden ilk defa mecaz tanımı yapan Ebû Abdullah el-Basrî’den (öl. 369/979-80) iki farklı tanım nakledilmiştir. Ebû Abdullah’ın yaptığı bu tanımlar ana hatlarıyla sonraki asırlarda yaşayan usûlcülerin tanımları üzerinde etkili olmuşsa da yakın takipçileri tarafından kabul görmemiştir. Cessâs (öl. 370/981) ve Bâkıllânî (öl. 403/1013) düşünsel mülahazalar içermeyen sade bir tanım yaparken Mu‘tezilî usûlcülerden Ebü’l-Hüseyin el-Basrî (öl. 436/1044) mecaza dair kelâmî mülahazalar içeren komplike bir tanım geliştirmiştir. Ebü’l-Hüseyin, yaptığı tanımda lafzın mecazi anlamda kullanıldığını ortaya koymak için ilk olarak hitabın türünün temel belirleyici unsurlardan biri olduğuna dikkat çekmiştir. Ebü’l-Hüseyin yaptığı tanımda ikinci olarak lafzın hakiki anlamı gibi mecazi anlamının da bir vazՙ ile olduğuna işaret etmiştir. Ayrıca yaptığı tanımda açık şekilde ifade etmese de konu çerçevesinde yaptı değerlendirmelerde lafzın mecazi anlamda kullanıldığını ortaya koymak için karinenin temel belirleyici unsurlardan biri olduğunu vurgulamıştır. Ona göre lafız, ancak hakiki anlamda kullanılmasına engel bir karinenin olması durumunda mecazi anlama hamledilir. Mu‘tezilî usûlcülerin mecaz tanımlarını konu edinen bu çalışmada öncelikle İlk beş asırda dilcilerin ve Mu‘tezile dışındaki fıkıh usûlcülerinin ortaya koydukları mecaz tanımları incelenmiştir. Daha sonra Mu‘tezilî usûlcülerin mecaz tanımları değerlendirilmiştir. Mu‘tezilî âlimlerin mecaz tanımları içerisinde ekolün düşünsel mülahazalarını dikkate alan Ebü’l-Hüseyin el-Basrî’nin tanımı yakından incelenmiştir. Mu‘tezilî düşünürlerden Kādî Abdülcebbâr’ın mecaz anlayışını yansıtan tanımı günümüze ulaşmadığı için Ebül-Hüseyin’in tanımı incelenirken Kādî Abdülcebbâr’ın görüşleri de irdelenmiştir. Böylece Ebül-Hüseyin’e ait fıkıh usulü sahasında yoğun kelâmî mülahazalar ihtiva eden mecaz tanımının temelde Kādî Abdülcebbâr’a dayandığı ortaya konulmuştur. Çalışmamızda son olarak Ebül-Hüseyin’den nakledilen mecaz tanımının diğer ekollere mensup usûlcüler üzerindeki etkisi de ortaya konulmuştur. Bu tanımın söz konusu usûlcülerden Fahreddin er-Râzî (öl. 606/1210) tarafından kabul gördüğü belirtilmiş ve Râzî’nin bu tanım çerçevesindeki görüşleri Mu‘tezile’nin düşünsel zemininde tartışılmıştır. (shrink)

There are various philosophers who have discussed the role of language in ancient India. Among them, Bhart ṛ hari considered the relation between the superficial appearance of speech and its essential nature. In actual life, we pronounce and perceive the word. He held that there must be some link between ideal logic and worldly truth. His focus in the Brahmakā n ̣ ḍ a of the Vākyapadīya, is on the process of communication, the process of the internalization of speech. He (...) differentiates the perspective of the speaker and the hearer, and explains the movement of sounds. The spho ṭ a theory addresses both how to pronounce the word and how to perceive it. Traces of his discussion are found in the works of his follower Ma n ̣ ḍ anamiśra in his book, Spho ṭ asiddhi. (shrink)

This paper will show how the philosopher Maṇḍanamiśra discusses in his Brahmasiddhi the cancellation of a former element by a latter, which is prescribed in Mīmāṃsāsūtra 6.5.54. We do not have yet a clear idea of what the value of this text holds for him. I would emphasize that probably more than we had expected, it forms an essential part of Maṇḍana’s philosophy. Its authority is sometimes stated explicitly and sometimes not; and we easily overlook the fact that his argument (...) is highly dependent on the Mīmāṃsā scheme. This rule, 6.5.54, was originally purely concerned with the performance of the sacrifice, but Maṇḍana applies it to his epistemic analysis, i.e. his discussion on the relative strength of the valid means of knowledge, giving this rule the status of basic testimony. Furthermore, he interprets the rule in his own unique way, or at least differently from Kumārilabhaṭṭa, integrating it with the argument by his famous predecessor Bhartṛhari. The mutual relationship among Maṇḍana, Kumārila, and Bhartṛhari, will be illuminated by focusing on what Mīmāṃsāsūtra 6.5.54 really means. (shrink)

In recent times, previous studies have reported the manipulation of tools by rats and degus in controlled experimental settings. However, a previous study reported that only one out of eight experimentally naïve rats could manipulate a rake-shaped tool according to the position of a food reward without prior experience of obtaining the reward with the tool before the test. The present study aimed to improve the training of rats and investigate rodents’ ability to manipulate tools according to food position. Stricter (...) criteria were employed when training the rats to promote the rats’ monitoring of their own tool manipulation. Additional training was introduced to give them the opportunity to learn that the reward moved closer to them by pulling an object connected to the reward. The present study showed that only one of eight rats could manipulate a tool according to the position of the reward without prior experience of obtaining the reward with the tool or perceiving that part of the tool came in contact with the reward, as the previous study showed. The change in training did not enhance the rats’ tool-manipulation ability according to the food position. These procedures should be conducted in a wider variety of animals to investigate whether the training in motion control can promote the subjects’ effective tool-use behavior. (shrink)

The aim of teaching philosophy to children ultimately is not to teach them the history of philosophy, but rather to teach them to think, starting from philosophical concepts. This will help to develop high-level skills in children such as questioning, research, understanding and interpreting knowledge, establishing meaningful relationships between knowledge, creating original ideas, and problem-solving. Models of philosophizing with children have been developed, and systematic application attempts have been made, producing successful results in many countries of the world. According to (...) Matthew Lipman, these skills should be developed at a very young age with use of the model of philosophy for children (P4C). Our aim is to show and explore how to develop and sustain creative thinking, which is one of the achievements of P4C. If Lipman is right, children participating in these activities will start to gain creative thinking skills from an early age and will apply this foundation in other knowledge acquisition processes at more advanced developmental stages. This presentation aims to reveal the interrelation between P4C and creative thinking activity. First P4C will be explained, and then creative thinking and the interrelation between the two will be expanded upon in the conclusion. (shrink)

Multiple modernities has emerged as the post-Huntingtonian paradigm in the study of secularism and religion, and the concepts ‘imaginary’ or ‘ verstehen’ are the most common candidates guiding research aiming to articulate this multiplicity. This article revisits Shmuel Eisenstadt’s original ‘Multiple Modernities’ thesis, Charles Taylor’s concept ‘imaginary’ and Max Weber’s ‘ verstehen’, and offers concise examples on how they are put into practice in the current literature on secularism and religion. I argue that the original Eisenstadt thesis is built upon (...) interactions of modernities, and the ‘imaginary’ and ‘ verstehen’ analytics eliminate from sight non-isomorphic relations between ideas and actions, despite the ample presence of both interactions and non-isomorphic relations in the politics of secularism and modernity. Turning multiple modernities into an exercise in typologies of non-interacting modernities articulated in isomorphic relations between ideas and actions produces new kinds of post-Huntingtonian culturalism. I finally sketch a comparative politics of new meanings as the counter-hypothesis to which ‘imaginary’, ‘ verstehen’ and non-interacting typology analytics of modernities have to respond. (shrink)

This essay focuses on Mahmoud Darwish’s exilic experience as depicted in Memory for Forgetfulness: August, Beirut, 1982 (1986). For Darwish, the siege of Beirut was a climactic moment in which he realized that he is stuck on a perpetual threshold. Imposed by the sovereign power, this exilic threshold characterizes the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon bereft of their rights as citizens and held outside their homeland and political domain. I wish to argue that, rather than being trapped in this condition, Darwish (...) takes it as a vantage point to critically reconstruct the notions of homeland and political belonging. This involves a contrapuntal approach to the notions of homeland, diaspora, and memory, and acts as a form of resistance. It converts the exilic threshold that keeps the poet neither outside nor inside the political domain into a site of worldliness in both the Arendtian and Saidian sense of the term. Elaborating on Judith Butler’s account of cohabitation and diasporic thinking, I argue that the exilic condition Darwish describes can give rise to a political ethic that resists the homogenization of spaces and temporalities, and allows for an alternative sense of political belonging. (shrink)

Research interest in cuteness perception and its effects on subsequent behavior and physiological responses has recently been increasing. The purpose of the present study was to produce a dataset of Japanese infant faces that are free of portrait rights and can be used for cuteness research. A total of 80 original facial images of 6-month-old infants were collected from their parents. The cuteness level of each picture was rated on a 7-point scale by 200 Japanese people. Prototypical high- and low-cuteness (...) faces were created by averaging the top 10 and bottom 10 faces according to the mean cuteness ratings. Then, 50 composite faces were made by mixing two faces randomly chosen from the 60 unused middle-cuteness faces. The normative cuteness ratings of these composite faces were obtained from 229 Japanese men and women in their 20s–60s. The shape of each composite face was transformed to be cuter or less cute along a continuum between the high- and low-cuteness prototypical faces. A two-alternative forced-choice task confirmed that cuteness discrimination was better than the chance level for all 50 face pairs. Moreover, the results showed that young men had poorer sensitivity to cuteness differences in infant faces than older men and women of any age. This Japanese Cute Infant Face dataset, including composite face images and normative rating scores, is publicly available online. (shrink)

The networked society is impacting all aspects of people’s lives and changing the way that information is obtained and used. For students this impact is changing how information is shared and tasks are performed. A digital enabled culture is resulting in changed norms on collaboration and providing more opportunities for teams to collaborate on a moment’s notice. The digital ethics code of the 1980s is addressed in the current digital culture. This research will develop a measurement scale for digital ethics (...) and assess this scale in the context using students from China. (shrink)

Articles on Hindu ethics and religious life.

Artifacts are ubiquitous and influential in our world, but their nature and existence are controversial. Several theories have been proposed to explain the ontology of artifacts. Drawing on Popper's theory of three worlds, this paper suggests a metaphysics for artifacts along the line of a critical rationalist (CR) approach. This theory distinguishes between three realms of reality: the physical world (World 1), the mental world (World 2), and the world of objective knowledge (World 3). The paper argues that artifacts (...) have different ontological components that correspond to these three realms, and that each component is real and causal. The paper shows how this perspective can account for the intentional and functional aspects of artifacts, as well as their dependence on plans that influence different realms of reality. The paper explains how this pluralistic ontology, compared to the rival theories, enables one to explain the relevant ontological problems of artifacts. The paper also explores how this proposal can lead to a research program encompassing a broader range of technologies, such as social artifacts. In sum, the paper suggests that Popper's three worlds theory provides a rich and comprehensive framework for understanding the metaphysics of artifacts. (shrink)

... PREFACE Paul Gochet (Liege) "[...] une entite physique ne peut etre envisagee que comme une sorte de concretisation, de consolidation locale dans un ...

This paper develops and articulates a metaphysics of intersectionality, the idea that multiple axes of social oppression cross-cut each other. Though intersectionality is often described through metaphor, theories of intersectionality can be formulated using the tools of contemporary analytic metaphysics. A central tenet of intersectionality theory, that intersectional identities are inseparable, can be framed in terms of explanatory unity. Further, intersectionality is best understood as metaphysical and explanatory priority of the intersectional category over its constituents, akin to metaphysical (...) priority of the whole over its parts. (shrink)

What are physical quantities, and in particular, what makes them quantitative? This book presents an original answer to this question through the novel position of substantival structuralism, arguing that quantitativeness is an irreducible feature of attributes, and quantitative attributes are best understood as substantival structured spaces.

How do thought and language manage to be 'about' aspects of the world? J. Robert G. Williams investigates how representation arises out of a fundamentally non-representational world, showing the explanatory relations between the representational properties of language, of thought, and of perception and intention.

What is the relation between the nature of the things you think about, and the ways you think about them? Christopher Peacocke argues that meaning is never prior to metaphysics - to the nature of the world. He shows that this view holds for a wide range of topics, including magnitudes, time, the self, and abstract objects such as numbers.

Kraut and other neo-Aristotelians have argued that there is no such thing as absolute goodness. They admit only good in a kind, e.g. a good sculptor, and good for something, e.g. good for fish. What is the view of Aristotle? Mostly limiting myself to the Nicomachean Ethics, I argue that Aristotle is committed to things being absolutely good and also to a metaphysics of absolute goodness where there is a maximally best good that is the cause of the goodness (...) of all other things in virtue of being their end. I begin by suggesting that the notion of good as an end, which is present in the first lines of the NE, is not obviously accounted for by good in a kind or good for something. I then give evidence that good in a kind and good for something can explain neither certain distinctions drawn between virtues nor the determinacy ascribed to what is good “in itself.” I argue contra Gotthelf that because several important arguments in the Nicomachean Ethics rely on comparative judgments of absolute value—e.g. “Man is the best of all animals”—Aristotle is committed to the existence of both absolute goodness and an absolutely best being. I focus on one passage, Aristotle’s division of goods in NE I 12, which presupposes this metaphysical picture. (shrink)