These essays--and an introduction by William Connolly that lucidly outlines Wolin's thought and the deep uncertainty about political theory in the 1960s that did much to inspire his work--offer unprecedented insights into Wolin's lament ...
Emanuel Levinas and the Limits to Ethics highlights how radically different Jewish ethics is from Christian ethics, and the profound affinities that subsist between Jewish ethics and philosophical and political liberalism. The philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas has captured the imagination of a global constituency who take his absolutizing of ethical demands and his assigning primacy to ethics over all other branches of inquiry in his mapping of Western philosophy to be indicative of a major re-ordering of both personal and cultural (...) identity. It is this re-ordering, they believe, that would restore greater wholeness and value to human life. In this book, Aryeh Botwinick takes issue with both the theoretical analysis that Levinas engages in, and the practical ethical import that he draws from it. Arguing that what Levinas has to say about both skepticism and negative theology can be used to re-route his argument away from the avowed aims of his thought, this book will be of great interest to students and scholars of Jewish Studies, Ethics and Philosophy. (shrink)
The English philosopher Michael Oakeshott is known as a conservative who rejected philosophically ambitious rationalism and the grand political ideologies of the twentieth century on the grounds that no human ideas have ultimately reliable foundations. Instead, he embraced tradition and habit as the guides to moral and political life. In this book, Aryeh Botwinick presents an original account of Oakeshott's skepticism about foundations, an account that newly reveals the unity of his thought. Botwinick argues that, despite Oakeshott's pragmatic conservatism, his (...) rejection of all-embracing intellectual projects made him a friend to liberal individualism and an ally of what would become postmodern antifoundationalism. Oakeshott's skepticism even extended paradoxically to skepticism about skepticism itself and is better described as a "generalized agnosticism." Properly conceived and translated, this agnosticism ultimately evolves into mysticism, which becomes a bridge linking philosophy and religion. Botwinick explains and develops this strategy of interpretation and then shows how it illuminates and unifies the diverse strands of Oakeshott's thought in the philosophy of religion, metaphysics, epistemology, political theory, philosophy of personal identity, philosophy of law, and philosophy of history. (shrink)
In this paper, I would like to argue that the best kind of philosophical defense of democracy is one that is worked out within the framework of negative theory. In a post-metaphysical intellectual climate, negative theory enables us to theorize the best defense of democracy possible. I am using the phrase “negative theory” on analogy with the term negative theology. Just as negative theology argues that we can only indefinitely say what God is not but cannot pinpoint in a positive (...) sense what He is, so, too, negative theory would advocate that we can only ceaselessly explore and highlight the…. (shrink)
The paper addresses the topic of the unavoidability of contradiction in dealing with issues of scepticism – and how coherence can be restored to sceptical arguments and texts. It considers six classic paradoxes in the history of Western thought – of how language works to undermine and derail the coherence of thought. It also theorizes a philosophy of language approach to restore coherence in the classic instances discussed. As its major example, the paper explores how and why the image of (...) successful, long-standing constitutions is a minimalist image through a discussion of the relationship between epistemological scepticism generally and textual scepticism specifically. (shrink)
In Postmodernism and Democratic Theory, Aryeh Botwinick is concerned with defining postmodernism and exploring its political-economic dimensions. Previous attempts at definition have foundered because the theory has a built-in incoherence: in their rejection of reasoned argument, postmodernists must rely on reasoned argument to make their case. This issue of "self-referentialism" is pivotal, for example, in Jurgen Habermas's criticism of the postmodernists. But Botwinick shows that postmodernism can be coherently conceived as a "generalized agnosticism," which remains open to all possibilities - (...) including the possibility of its own falsity. In developing this view of postmodernism, the author applies it to the work of a wide range of contemporary political philosophers, from Jurgen Habermas and Jean-Francois Lyotard to Leo Strauss. Botwinick also invokes a "generalized agnosticism" in assessing the ideas of such classic thinkers as Rousseau, Freud, and Wittgenstein. In the second part of the book, Botwinick uncovers and analyzes participatory undercurrents in the thought of both Hobbes and Plato. On the basis of their work, Botwinick tries to plot the transition between modernist and postmodernist democratic society. (shrink)
Aryeh Botwinick argues for the recovery of a radical democratic tradition that emphasizes the role of individual participation in the development and control of social and political institutions. Such involvement implies philosophical skepticism—the assumption that the truth about what is the best course of action cannot be known with certainty and that, therefore, every person’s opinion has an equal claim to be considered. The crucial stumbling block to reappropriating this radical egalitarian tradition is the supposed unviability of a consistent skepticism. (...) In an effort to chart a new course of philosophical inquiry into political matters, Botwinick grapples with the formulation of a consistent version of skepticism, claiming that it provides "a continually renewing impetus for the expansion of political participation." Twentieth-century philosophers have, for the most part, opted for some version of mitigated skepticism, which, the author argues, "has blinded them to the radical political implications of skepticism." Underscoring a pattern of convergence between Anglo-American and Continental philosophy, Botwinick proposes a number of strategies to rehabilitate the rationality of participatory democratic political institutions by articulating an acceptable version of consistent skepticism. (shrink)
Drawing upon diverse disciplines--political theory, metaphysics, analytic philosophy, intellectual history, and Jewish studies--Aryeh Botwinick calls into question cherished boundaries of western thought, specifically those that isolate religion. In developing his argument, he applies deconstructionist approaches to such classic texts as Plato's REPUBLIC, Maimonides' GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED, and Hobbes's LEVIATHAN.
Responding to volatile criticisms frequently leveled at Leo Strauss and those he influenced, the prominent contributors to this volume demonstrate the profound influence that Strauss and his students have exerted on American liberal democracy and contemporary political thought. By stressing the enduring vitality of classic books and by articulating the theoretical and practical flaws of relativism and historicism, the contributors argue that Strauss and the Straussians have identified fundamental crises of modernity and liberal democracy.
1. Introduction In the post 9/11 political world, many commentators have pointed to the need for locating and exploring cultural continuities between Islam and the West by way of defusing Samuel Huntington's thesis of a “clash of civilizations,” which seemed to have been given such explosive corroboration by the events of 9/11. It seems to me that one of the most promising ways of doing this is to investigate whether—and to what extent—the Qu'ran can be interpreted as a negative theological (...) Scripture. Negative theology emphasizes that we can only say what God is not—but not what He is. Our only…. (shrink)
Ben Zoma's mishnah is astounding from a number of different but interrelated perspectives. He indirectly addresses four of the most central, vexing questions emerging out of human experience—What is wisdom, knowledge, truth? What is strength, power, courage? What is wealth, exalted status? What is honor, reputation?—and manages to turn the questions on their head and resist answering them. His first move in this strategy of resistance is to transform inquiry into these various qualities and attributes into an investigation of the (...) person claiming or aspiring to possess them. This displacement is momentous. Instead of there being a known, finite, delimited…. (shrink)
A unifying perspective to bring to bear on Wittgenstein’s thought is that it represents a continual grappling with the problem of formulating a consistent version of scepticism--one that would not succumb to the charge of being self-refuting. His ultimate resolution of this problem hinges upon the precise content to be invested in his famous philosophical doctrine of the priority of Gezeigt (showing) over Gezagt (saying). I shall argue for a democratic participatory gloss of this doctrine as offering the most satisfactory (...) resolution to the sceptical dilemmas haunting Wittgenstein. (shrink)
ExcerptI. The Action of the Play: The Playacting Character of Human Life Antonio, the “Merchant of Venice,” in speaking to his friend Gratiano at the beginning of the play, says: “I hold the world but as the world, Gratiano: / A stage where every man must play a part, / And mine a sad one” (1.1.77–79).1 The Merchant of Venice, which is a play, is (as Shakespeare announces at the outset) about the inescapability and insurmountability of playacting as the substance (...) of human reality. Life, as it were, is lived at one remove from itself—where our assumption…. (shrink)
(1977). Typologies of theories of justice and political obligation and the vision of a no‐growth society. World Futures: Vol. 15, Ethics and World Order, pp. 289-297.
There is a way of looking at Christian doctrine as classically formulated by St. Paul in “Letter to the Romans” that enables us to see it as proceeding in a quite rigorous sense to introduce variations on monotheism (excavating and defining new dialectical pathways) that had been inaugurated by Judaism. The structure of Jewish belief that confronted St. Paul and his contemporaries had given rise to certain jarring paradoxes that St. Paul, with his Rabbinically trained mind1 that is amply in (...) evidence in the text of Romans, sought to resolve. I would like to map the emergence of these paradoxes…. (shrink)
This book deals with the dilemmas of “grand theory,” which presents a synoptic view of human nature and society, and with testable hypotheses, which consist of more humble propositions subject to empirical testing. Although Alan Sica finds “no fewer than seven or eight distinct theoretical vantage points” (p. 12) represented in this volume,” for the most part they all share vulnerabilities which become evident when confronted with a common set of philosophical strategies. The dilemmas of grand theory are clear in (...) Robert J. Antonio's treatment of what he calls “epistemological perspectivism” (p. 31), whose advocates adhere to “conditional ideas of…. (shrink)
A unifying perspective to bring to bear on Wittgenstein’s thought is that it represents a continual grappling with the problem of formulating a consistent version of scepticism--one that would not succumb to the charge of being self-refuting. His ultimate resolution of this problem hinges upon the precise content to be invested in his famous philosophical doctrine of the priority of Gezeigt over Gezagt. I shall argue for a democratic participatory gloss of this doctrine as offering the most satisfactory resolution to (...) the sceptical dilemmas haunting Wittgenstein. (shrink)
Emmanuel Levinas has provided a hermeneutical key for reinterpreting the Western intellectual tradition. Certain recurring conundrums of Western philosophy led him to regard ethics above all other modes of inquiry and to emphasize infinity rather than totality. Yet, the primacy of the ethical cannot do what he wants it to do. To reinterpret the Western intellectual tradition, it is necessary to shift emphasis to the distinction between infinity and totality. This highlights the religious dimension of secularism, i.e., how modern liberalism (...) still nurtures a religious project, even if that project is itself the result of secularization. It also facilitates a…. (shrink)
