After compulsory secondary education; many teenagers face the process of choosing a university degree. This process involves uncertainties referred to their personal abilities, interests, social expectations and professional future. The present work is aimed at determining whether the reasons behind the selection of a particular university degree differ depending on the chosen degree. Another objective is determining whether these reasons differ significantly according to gender. The sample comprises 983 students belonging to the area of social and legal sciences at the (...) University of Seville. The obtained results reveal the existence of four main reasons behind the selection of university degrees for which significant gender-related differences were observed: easy degree, job opportunities, high wages and provision of social services. Besides, these seven reasons are observed to differ widely in six of the considered degrees. (shrink)

Does home-based family involvement influence academic performance? To answer this question, a case study research was carried out with 96 children from all six levels of primary education at a public school, and their families. Data regarding home-based family involvement were collected using a questionnaire. Academic achievement was measured from school marks. The results reveal that, apart from two of the factors considered, home–family involvement as a whole is not significantly related to academic achievement. These two factors are access to (...) informal education resources and parents’ employment. Family involvement related to the access of children to informal education resources is significantly related to a better academic achievement. Those students with both parents working perform best, and those with none working, worst. Although gender does not appear to significantly influence academic achievement and family involvement, the results show that girls attain better school performance and re... (shrink)

En este texto partiremos de la conocida tensión cinematográfica entre la imagen y la narración, refiriendo a un caso concreto de cine mexicano tipológico costumbrista. Es un género que se distingue por una trama débil constituida por secuencias con un importante peso mostrativo o “descriptivo”, más que narrativo y el espectador se entretiene en el reconocimiento de los estereotipos, obteniendo un goce mimético de reconocimiento. Para abordar tal reconocimiento mimético distinguiremos entre los imaginarios literarios y los imaginarios fílmicos. Los imaginarios (...) literarios son esquemas faltos de concreción. Por el contrario, los imaginarios fílmicos no son lo absoluto una cuestión de la imaginación más o menos vaga, sino que dada su base fotográfica presentan girones de la realidad tal cual es en su apariencia. Este imaginario fílmico ya no consta de imágenes de la mera imaginación, al gusto del que se las imagina, sino que consta de fragmentos fotográficos de la apariencia real, por lo que esas imágenes de calidad fotográfica tienden a generan de inmediato aprobación o rechazo. Puede ser que se lea algo que no gusta y entonces tiende a dejarse de lado, pero es más difícil dejar de lado algo que, aunque no guste no se leyó sino se vio. Para analizar el género de narrativa débil tipologizante recurrimos a la teoría de D. Bordwell sobre la construcción de la historia combinándola con la teoría de R. Barthes acera de los núcleos, catálisis, informantes e indicios narrativos. (shrink)

El conocimiento sobre Fernando el Católico en la actualidad continúa siendo bastante limitado, especialmente en lo referente a sus últimos días y posterior muerte. Tradicionalmente se achacó su deterioro de salud, según los principales historiadores coetáneos y posteriores, al empleo abusivo de afrodisíacos para poder engendrar al ansiado heredero con la reina Germana de Foix. Pedro Mártir de Anglería fue el único que recogió datos de forma continuada en el tiempo, que han sido pasados por alto por la historiografía. Mediante (...) un estudio interdisciplinar, se ha realizado una lectura sistemática de las cartas del Epistolario del humanista lombardo, extrayendo todas las noticias del progreso de su salud para trazar un cuadro clínico. A partir de este, los afrodisíacos quedan definitivamente excluidos como causa del deterioro de la salud del rey. Tomando los edemas y la disnea como principales síntomas, se ofrece una nueva hipótesis sobre el fallecimiento del Rey: el fallo cardíaco. Palabras clave: Fernando el Católico, muerte, enfermedad, insuficiencia cardíaca, afrodisíacosNowadays, the knowledge about Ferdinand the Catholic is quite limited, especially on his last days and his death. According to the main historians, the obit of the king was caused by the massive use of aphrodisiacs due to the desire of fathering an heir with Germaine of Foix. The works of Pedro Mártir de Anglería offers much more data about the evolution of Ferdinand's disease that was never kept in mind. Through an interdisciplinary study, a systematic reading of the Epistolario letters of the lombard humanist has been carried out in order to describe a medical condition. Based on it, the thesis of abuse of aphrodisiacs has to be discard completly. As the oedemas and dyspnoea are the principal sytoms, a new hypothesis about the death of the Catholic King is offered: the heart failure. Key words: Ferdinand the Catholic, death, illness, heart failure, aphrodisiacs. (shrink)

Background:The first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic caused a shortage of qualified nurses in Spain. As a result, the government authorized the hiring of senior students.Objectives:To explore the ethical dilemmas and ethical conflicts experienced by final-year nursing students who worked during the first outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Spain.Research design:A qualitative exploratory study was conducted using purposive sampling. Semi-structured interviews were carried out using a question guide. Interviews took place via a private video chat room platform. A thematic, inductive (...) analysis was performed of the information gathered.Participants and research context:Eighteen nursing students were recruited from two universities of Madrid, aged between 18 and 65 years old, enrolled in the fourth year of nursing studies and who were hired under a relief contract for health professionals during the pandemic.Ethical considerations:The present study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and the study was approved by the Local Ethics Committee of Universidad Rey Juan Carlos.Results:Three specific themes emerged: (a) coping with patient triage, (b) difficulties in providing end-of-life care, and (c) coping with patient death. Nursing students participated in the process of patient selection for resource allocation and ICU bed occupancy. They were shown how to care for patients who were not admitted to the ICU, in their last moments and were faced with the difficulties of applying end-of-life care. Finally, the nursing students were confronted with the death of their patients, in overwhelming numbers and under adverse conditions.Conclusions:These findings can help shed light on the ethical dilemmas and ethical conflicts faced by novice nursing students, incorporated into the workforce during the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, it was described that students may normalize the death due to the exhaustion and overwhelmed routine. (shrink)

Ao pensar as condições de adequação para a responsabilização moral, Michelle Ciurria não discute se o agente tem controle da ação. Ela propõe que a vítima seja trazida para o centro da discussão e questiona até mesmo a ideia de que a ignorância moral do agente impede a atribuição de culpa em alguns casos. Esse desafio à condição epistêmica pode dar origem a objeções. Por isso, proponho explicar por que essa condição não é importante se levarmos a proposta de Ciurria (...) a sério, e como a influência dos esquemas de gênero na sensação de agência ajuda a mostrar isso. (shrink)

The role of consciousness in the production of actions has received much attention from philosophy and neuroscience. Wegner claims that what he calls the conscious will plays no role in the causal production of human actions, and that it is just an illusion. I will argue that Wegner’s claim is mistaken, because his defense of the alleged illusion rests on how he conceives of what the Readiness Potential represents in a key experiment—Libet’s experiment—and this conception is mistaken. Therefore, Wegner has (...) not offered a convincing reason to believe that humans are deluded about the way they produce their actions. (shrink)

O papel da vontade consciente na produção de ações tem recebido bastante atenção tanto da filosofia como da neurociência. Wegner afirma que o que ele chama de vontade consciente não desempenha nenhum papel na produção causal das ações humanas, e que a mesma é apenas uma ilusão. Será argumentado no presente artigo que a afirmação de Wegner está equivocada, porque a sua defesa da suposta ilusão está fundamentada em como ele concebe o que o Potencial de Prontidão representa em um (...) experimento crucial – o experimento de Libet – e essa concepção está errada. Portanto, Wegner não oferece uma razão convincente para se crer que os seres humanos estão iludidos a respeito de como produzem suas ações. (shrink)

Georges Rey presents a much-needed philosophical defense of Noam Chomsky's famous view of human language, as an internal, innate computational system. But he also offers a critical examination of problematic developments of this view, to do with innateness, ontology, intentionality, and other issues of interdisciplinary interest.

This volume is an introduction to contemporary debates in the philosophy of mind. In particular, the author focuses on the controversial "eliminativist" and "instrumentalist" attacks - from philosophers such as of Quine, Dennett, and the Churchlands - on our ordinary concept of mind. In so doing, Rey offers an explication and defense of "mental realism", and shows how Fodor's representational theory of mind affords a compelling account of much of our ordinary mental talk of beliefs, hopes, and desires.

One of the themes that has been widely addressed in both the implicit learning and statistical learning literatures is that of rule learning. While it is widely agreed that the extraction of regularities from the environment is a fundamental facet of cognition, there is still debate about the nature of rule learning. Rey and colleagues show that the comparison between human and non‐human primates can contribute important insights to this debate.

A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ?real? laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, in a sense we make explicit. Ceteris paribus laws will carry a plethora (...) of explanatory commitments; and claims that such commitments are satisfied will be as (dis) confirmable as other empirical claims. (shrink)

Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual state we regularly enter (...) as a result of being stimulated by the wave forms we regularly produce when we execute our intentions to utter such tokens (a view I call “Folieism”). In his Ignorance of Language, Michael Devitt objects to this view, arguing that, “On Rey’s view, communication seems to rest on miraculous guesses.” I argue here that my view is not prey to his objections, and actually affords a scientifically more plausible view than his “empiricist” alternative. Specifically, I reply to his objections that my view couldn’t explain the conventionality of language and success of communication (§2.1), that I am faced with intractable difficulties surrounding the identity of intentional inexistents (§2.2), and that, contrary to my view, SLEs can be relationally defined (§2.3). Not only can Folieism survive Devitt’s objections, but (§3) it also provides a more satisfactory account of the role of linguistic intuitions than the “empirical” account on which he insists. (shrink)

Georges Rey; XV*—Semantic Externalism and Conceptual Competence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 315–334, https.

In the 1960s, the growing strategic importance of ocean exploration led the French government to develop greater capacity in marine scientific research, aiming to promote cooperative and diplomatic relations with the leading states in ocean exploration. Devised during Charles de Gaulle's government (1958–1969), the restructuring of French oceanography culminated, in 1967, in the establishment of the state‐led Centre National pour l'Exploitation des Océans (CNEXO). Beyond being intended to control the orientation of marine research at a national level, the CNEXO's mission (...) was to use scientific diplomacy to balance a desire for enhancing international cooperative relations in oceanography with French ambitions to equal the USA's leading capacity to explore the oceans. Its director, the naval officer Yves la Prairie, played a crucial role in articulating scientific, national, and diplomatic interests for France in the oceans. (shrink)

Anne-Lise Rey | : L’article montre qu’après la « révolution scientifique » opérée par l’introduction des idées de Newton en France, Émilie du Châtelet a construit un dispositif épistémique inventif qui lui permet d’articuler principes métaphysiques et experimental philosophy. Je cherche à exposer que, s’il y a bien une relative invisibilité du travail philosophique d’Émilie du Châtelet dans l’historiographie des Lumières, cela tient à la fois au statut de femme savante à cette époque, mais aussi à la situation philosophique d’Émilie (...) du Châtelet, qui ne peut se réduire à aucune filiation et qui élabore une philosophie naturelle originale. | : This paper shows that after the “Scientific Revolution” stemming from the introduction of Newton’s ideas in France, Émilie du Châtelet developed an innovative epistemic framework that allowed her to reconcile metaphysical principles with experimental philosophy. The author aims to show that the relative invisibility of Émilie du Châtelet’s philosophical work within the historiography of the enlightenment is due both to her status as a learned woman at that time and to the philosophical position of Émilie du Châtelet, which cannot be reduced to a single philosophical affiliation and which allows her to develop an original account of natural philosophy. (shrink)

This chapter describes some basic, often puzzling features of intentionality, with an eye to its role not so much in ordinary folk ascriptions but in serious psychological explanations, especially in many of Noam Chomsky's own presentations of his theory. It then considers Chomsky's censure of the notion, leading him to deny what would seem to be the explicit intentionalisms on which he seems to rely. Implicit in Chomsky's treatment of grammar is the idea that the positing of the language faculty (...) offers an “abstract” perspective on a physical system (the human brain) that implements the relevant features of the abstracta in ways we currently don’t understand. Two initial problems might be raised for this picture, one regarding inference and the other, generalization. The proposed model is effectively saying that theorists track states and generalizations of the linguistic system in an explicitly representational format, but what the theory is true of need not have such representational properties. (shrink)

“Intentional content,” as I understand it, is whatever serves as the object of “propositional” attitude verbs, such as “think,” “judge,” “represent,” “prefer” (whether or not these objects are “propositions”). These verbs are standardly used to pick out the intentional states invoked to explain the states and behavior of people and many animals. I shall take the “normativity of the intentional,” or “Normativism,” to be the claim that any adequate theory of intentional states involves considerations of value not essentially involved in (...) the natural sciences. Thus, according to Normativism, whether or not someone thinks that fish sleep, or even can represent fish at all, depends upon making a judgment about the person’s goodness or rationality, of a sort that would not be involved in merely determining whether or not fish in fact sleep. (shrink)

Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...) have abundant reason to reject. Once we reject it, we can see how issues of the absorbtion of conventions, the revisability of belief, and confirmation holism are compatible with the Traditional Distinctions, and that Quine's discussion only serves to camouflage the question of whether some confirmation relations are constitutive of meaning and knowable a priori. (shrink)

There are two ways to approach political representation. We can view each type of representation or each site of representation – namely a representative actor or institution – on an individual basis and study its internal dynamics. Alternatively, we can look at how different forms of representation and representative actors and institutions interact in a system of representation. In this article, I develop the second view. I make three contributions to the theory of representation from systemic thinking. Methodologically, I explain (...) the contours of a systemic approach to political representation. Descriptively, I propose a definition of a system of representation that captures representative pluralism, distribution of representative work and different levels of representation. Normatively, I set criteria for judging the system of representation and its individual components with systemic criteria. (shrink)

Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...) have abundant reason to reject. Once we reject it, we can see how issues of the absorbtion of conventions, the revisability of belief, and confirmation holism are compatible with the Traditional Distinctions, and that Quine's discussion only serves to camouflage the question of whether some confirmation relations are constitutive of meaning and knowable a priori. (shrink)

Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...) have abundant reason to reject. Once we reject it, we can see how issues of the absorbtion of conventions, the revisability of belief, and confirmation holism are compatible with the Traditional Distinctions, and that Quine's discussion only serves to camouflage the question of whether some confirmation relations are constitutive of meaning and knowable a priori. (shrink)

According to the “Folieism” I have been recently defending, communication is a kind of folie à deux in which speakers and hearers enjoy a stable and innocuous illusion of producing and hearing standard linguistic entities (“SLE”s) that are seldom if ever actually produced. In the present paper, after summarizing the main points of the view, I defend it against efforts of Barber, Devitt and Miščević to rescue SLEs in terms of social, response-dependent proposals. I argue that their underlying error is (...) a failure to appreciate the important shift of the explanatory locus in modern linguistics, from external objects to internal conceptions. I go on to show how (i) pace Devitt, this shift is entirely compatible with there being conventional aspects to language, and also serves to distinguish the ease of natural language from the waggle dance of the bees; and (ii) pace Barber and Smith, it is compatible with an appearance / reality distinction, and with reliance on testimony in epistemology. I conclude with further arguments about why, pace Collins and Matthews, intentionality is a crucial feature of linguistic explanation, even if it is ultimately spelt out largely in terms of computational role. (shrink)

This is a reminiscence and short biographical sketch of the late philosopher and cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor. It includes a summary of his main proposals about the mind: his “Language of Thought” hypothesis; his rejection of analyticity and conceptual role semantics; his “mad dog nativism”; his proposal of mental modules and—by contrast—his skepticism about a computational theory of central cognition; his anti‐reductionist, but still physicalist, views about psychology; and, lastly, his attacks on selectionism. I conclude with some discussion of his (...) idiosyncratic style and of his aesthetic and other interests. An appendix provides some memorable quotes. (shrink)