How is practical reasoning related to ethical reasoning? The most common view is that they are identical: practical reasoning just is ethical reasoning. I criticize this view and then propose an alternative account of the relation between ethical thought and practical thought: ethical reasoning is reasoning about sound practical reasoning. I argue that this account of the relation between ethics and practical reasoning explains various phenomena that more familiar views leave unexplained. It also entails that the philosophy of action bears (...) heavily on ethical inquiry. (shrink)

Commitment to the truth -- Commitment to what you value -- Commitment to "it's all of us" -- Commitment to stand with you when all -- Hell breaks loose -- Commitment to the faults and failures as well as the opportunities and successes -- Commitment to sound financial principles -- Commitment to helping individuals achieve -- Their potential and be their best -- Commitment to a safe place to work -- Commitment to your word is your bond -- Commitment to (...) a good reputation. (shrink)

theories. What was Freud thinking, when, and why and what were the major influences which shaped his ideas? We follow the inner movement of his theory construction, its meaning and coherence, as well as his conceptual logic and personal directions concerning his evolving views of the reciprocal interactions between mind and body, the motivational force of instinctual drives, and the dominant role of sexuality rooted in evolutionary biology in human development, behaviour, and the creation of neurotic disturbances. We follow Freud's (...) construction and sequential reconstructions of his theoretical models concerning the nature, dynamics, and principles of unconscious mental functioning, including his changing concepts on the nature and purpose of dreams. We trace his changing views on the role of deferred action of early childhood experiences and the determining role of unconscious fantasy, psychic reality, in the formation of adult character structure and neuroses. Through such historical analysis this book provides grounding for a meaningful understanding of Freud's familiar concepts: id, ego, superego, and the Oedipus complex. We explore what these concepts meant to Freud, why he conceived them, and what functions they served in his theory of mind. This is the perfect book for students and trainees wanting to learn more about the development of Freud's ideas, as well as for established psychoanalysts and psychotherapists interested in expanding their knowledge of Freud's theories. (shrink)

In order to create a truly meaningful life, we must first accept that the problem is never other people. "The real problem," Sam Silverstein maintains, "is what we believe about other people." Silverstein's new book shows why everything we have been taught about accountability is wrong. Contrary to popular belief, accountability is not a way of doing. Accountability is a way of thinking. It is how we think about ourselves and others. And it is the highest form of (...) leadership. The secret to creating accountable relationships, and elevating the personal benchmark that Silverstein calls the The Accountability Index, lies in making ten critical choices that support an accountable mindset. I Am Accountable offers a comprehensive plan to help you establish and leverage that mindset, deepen commitments, create lasting meaning in your life and relationships, transform the culture within your organization, and foster positive change in the larger community. (shrink)

The 21st Century has seen a dramatic increase in the number of books published on practical halakha. As a result, Halakhic observance has never been more accessible. But how does increased commitment to halakhic detail accomplish its goal of personal and ethical refinement? Halakhic practices are meant to be spiritual entry points for divine encounters. Commitment to Jewish ritual should mold one's character and help facilitate a life guided by divine ideals. In fact, adherence to Jewish law without a parallel (...) understanding of the meaning behind the law runs the risk of transforming halakha into a formulaic set of rules without any larger spiritual vision. Jewish Law as a Journey is a valuable companion to published works of practical halakha. It explores virtues and ideals foundational to daily halakhic practice. Moreover, it offers a systematic exploration of the mitzvot one encounters in a given day and the transformative religious messages that underlie them"--front flap. (shrink)

The average person makes hundreds of decisions each day. They range from the ordinary and mundane to life altering events. May decisions we are faced with have little effect of our lives. They deal with simple problems and require simple choices. However, there are those decisions which impact our lives and the lives of those around us in very significant and consequential ways."--Back cover.

Teachers face significant stressors in relation to their work, placing them at increased risk for burnout and attrition. The COVID-19 pandemic has brought about additional challenges, resulting in an even greater burden. Thus, strategies for reducing stress that can be delivered virtually are likely to benefit this population. Mental and Physical Training combines meditation with aerobic exercise and has resulted in positive mental and physical health outcomes in both clinical and subclinical populations. The aim of this pilot study was to (...) evaluate the feasibility and potential effectiveness of virtual MAP Training on reducing stress and improving mood and well-being in teachers. Participants were from recruited online from kindergarten to grade twelve schools in the Northeastern region of the United States and randomly assigned to a 6-week program of virtual MAP Training or no training. Primary outcomes included pre-intervention and post-intervention ratings on self-report measures of social and emotional health. Changes in cognitive functioning and physical health were also examined in secondary analyses. By intervention end, participants in the MAP Training group reported less anxiety and work-related stress compared to those who received no training. Additionally, MAP Training participants reported improvements in depressive symptoms, rumination, work-related quality of life, perceived stress, and self-compassion, whereas no changes were observed in the no training group. Participants also reported increased subjective ratings of executive functioning, working memory, cognitive flexibility, and fewer sleep disturbances. Together, these results suggest that the combination of meditation and aerobic exercise is an effective virtual intervention for improving mental health and well-being among K-12 teachers and may enhance resilience to stressful life events such as occurred during the coronavirus pandemic. (shrink)

Constitutivists hope to locate the foundations of ethics in the nature of action. They hope to find norms that are constitutive of agency. Recently David Enoch has argued that even if there are such norms, they cannot provide the last word when it comes to normativity, since they cannot tell us whether we have reason to be agents rather than shmagents. I argue that the force of the shmagency objection has been considerably overestimated, because philosophers on both sides of the (...) debate have failed to grasp the true source of the authority of agency’s constitutive norm. Some constitutivists believe that this authority is rooted in the inescapability of agency. Yet agency is not, in fact, inescapable. What actually grounds the authority of agency’s constitutive norm is the fact that there is no standpoint outside of agency from which we can intelligibly ask normative questions. (shrink)

Throughout his career, the problems that attracted Louis Pasteur almost invariably involved considerations of specificity of structure and/or of action. Thus, his work on asymmetric crystals showed that chemical form not only specifies crystalline structure, but affects the affinity of ferments as well. In his studies of diseases of silkworms, of beer, and of wine, he could unerringly distinguish with the microscope the specific agents of disease. From this emerged his concept of the specificity of species and against the nonspecificity (...) of spontaneous generation, whence the germ theory of disease. It was in the new field of immunology, however, where the manifestations of an exquisite specificity were most clearly seen. Here, Pasteur's vaccines worked because he chose the specific pathogen in order to induce a specific immunity, and he succeeded each time. But the two most prominent Pastorian successors in immunology, Elie Metchnikoff and Jules Bordet, were not equally successful. Although each contributed significantly to the birth of immunology, each advanced a theory that neglected the principle of specificity and paid a price in consequence. Metchnikoff's phagocytic theory of immunity could not survive the demonstrable specificity of humoral antibodies, while Bordet's physical adsorptive concept of the antibody-cell interaction quickly fell to Paul Ehrlich's demonstration of the stereochemical determination of immunological specificity. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that Robert Nozick's experience machine argument poses an insurmountable obstacle to hedonism as a theory of well-being. After an initial attempt to demonstrate that the persuasiveness of this argument rests on a key ambiguity, I argue that the intuitions to which the thought experiment appeals are not nearly as clear as many philosophers suppose they are. I believe that a careful consideration of the origin of those intuitions -- especially in light of the so-called "paradox of hedonism" (...) -- reveals that they can, in fact, fit quite comfortably into a hedonistic theory of well-being. (shrink)

Reasons are considerations that figure in sound reasoning. This is considered by many philosophers to be little more than a platitude. I argue that it actually has surprising and far-reaching metanormative implications. The view that reasons are linked to sound reasoning seems platitudinous only because we tend to assume that soundness is a normative property, in which case the view merely relates one normative phenomenon (reasons) to another (soundness). I argue that soundness is also a descriptive phenomenon, one we can (...) pick out with purely descriptive terms, and that the connection between normative reasons and sound reasoning therefore provides the basis for a reductive account of reasons. Like all proposed reductions, this one must confront some version of G. E. Moore’s open question argument. I argue that a reductive view rooted in the idea that reasons figure in sound reasoning is well-equipped to meet the open question challenge head on. (shrink)

Constitutivists seek to locate the metaphysical foundations of ethics in nonnormative facts about what is constitutive of agency. For most constitutivists, this involves grounding authoritative norms in the teleological structure of agency. Despite a recent surge in interest, the philosophical move at the heart of this sort of constitutivism remains underdeveloped. Some constitutivists—Foot, Thomson, and Korsgaard (at least in her recent *Self-Constitution*)—adopt a broadly Aristotelian approach. They claim that the functional nature of agency grounds normative judgments about agents in much (...) the same way that the functional natures of artifacts and bodily organs ground normative judgments about those kinds of things. I argue that the neo-Aristotelian conclusions about goodness which follow so straightforwardly from teleological premises are not genuinely normative. Functions are not by their very nature normatively significant. Other constitutivists—notably J. David Velleman and Paul Katsafanas—eschew Aristotelian talk of functions in favor of an approach based on the idea that agency has a constitutive aim. Velleman and Katsafanas both claim that aims are normatively significant. I argue that the fact that agency has a constitutive aim is merely a fact about the motives that produce and regulate actions. And so we are still left with a gap between the teleological and the normative. I conclude by suggesting that constitutivists have failed to find a way to bridge this gap not because none exists, but rather because they have been looking in the wrong place. The constitutivist project can be salvaged, but only if it is supplemented with a reductive metanormative account of reasons for action, an account that links reasons to sound or successful practical reasoning. (shrink)

Health disparities education is an integral and required part of medical professional training, and yet existing curricula often fail to effectively denaturalize injustice or empower learners to advocate for change. We discuss a novel collaborative intervention that weds the health humanities to the field of health equity. We draw from the health humanities an intentional focus retraining provider imaginations by centering patient narratives; from the field of health equity, we draw the linkage between stigmatized social identities and health disparities. We (...) describe a longitudinal health equity curriculum for the Hospice and Palliative Medicine fellowship in Memphis, Tennessee, to give trainees exposure to the concept of structural violence and how it affects clinical care. The curriculum was developed in partnership with humanities and social sciences faculty who staff a Health Equity academic program at a small liberal arts college in Memphis. This curriculum has been implemented for the past four years in support of 22 hospice and palliative medicine fellows. Group debriefs and a mixed methods survey have revealed widespread and lasting impact towards understanding health equity concepts, enhanced communication and treatment of patients, and empowerment to address the broader needs and policies affecting patients and the communities in which they live. Ultimately, we model an educational initiative that integrates equity across the full scope of healthcare practice and equips learners with skills for sustaining compassionate practices, focusing on equity-oriented, person-centered care across the full scope of healthcare practice. (shrink)

A treasured classic on character refinement. This is a newly researched, corrected, annotated and vowelized Hebrew edition with a contemporary English translation. Discusses refining character traits and maintaining a balance in all matters.

The concept of locally specialized functions dominates research on higher brain function and its disorders. Locally specialized functions must be complemented by processes that coordinate those functions, however, and impairment of coordinating processes may be central to some psychotic conditions. Evidence for processes that coordinate activity is provided by neurobiological and psychological studies of contextual disambiguation and dynamic grouping. Mechanisms by which this important class of cognitive functions could be achieved include those long-range connections within and between cortical regions that (...) activate synaptic channels via NMDA-receptors, and which control gain through their voltage-dependent mode of operation. An impairment of these mechanisms is central to PCP-psychosis, and the cognitive capabilities that they could provide are impaired in some forms of schizophrenia. We conclude that impaired cognitive coordination due to reduced ion flow through NMDA-channels is involved in schizophrenia, and we suggest that it may also be involved in other disorders. This perspective suggests several ways in which further research could enhance our understanding of cognitive coordination, its neural basis, and its relevance to psychopathology. Key Words: attention; cerebral cortex; cognitive coordination; cognitive neuropsychiatry; cognitive neuropsychology; context disorganization; Gamma rhythms; Gestalt theory; glutamate; grouping; memory; NMDA-receptors; PCP-psychosis; perceptual organization; schizophrenia. (shrink)

This current study is a pilot project designed to clarify changes in the lived world among people with diagnoses within the schizophrenia spectrum. The Examination of Anomalous World Experience was used to interview ten participants with schizophrenia spectrum disorders and a comparison group of three participants with major depressive disorder. Interviews were analyzed using the descriptive phenomenological method. This analysis revealed two complementary forms of experience unique toszparticipants: Destabilization, the experience that reality and the intersubjective world are less comprehensible, less (...) stable, and generally less real; and Subjectivization, the dominance of one’s internal, subjective experiences in the perception or interpretation of the lived world. Persons with depressive disorders, by contrast, did not experience disruptions of the reality or independence of the world or any significant disruptions of appearance or meaning. These results are consistent with contemporary and classic phenomenological views on anomalous world experience in schizophrenia. (shrink)

When we make ethical claims, we invoke a kind of objective authority. A familiar worry about our ethical practices is that this invocation of authority involves a mistake. This worry was perhaps best captured by John Mackie, who argued that the fabric of the world contains nothing so queer as objective authority and thus that all our ethical claims are false. Kantians such as Christine Korsgaard and David Velleman offer accounts of the objectivity of ethics that do without the controversial (...) realist assumptions which gives rise to Mackie’s skepticism. They contend that our ethical claims correctly invoke objective authority not by corresponding to some normative pocket of the fabric of reality, but rather by expressing commitments that are inescapable. This Kantian strategy is often advertised as an alternative to traditional but “boring” metaethics. Its proponents promise to vindicate our ethical practices without entangling us in familiar metanormative disputes about the metaphysics, epistemology and semantics of ethics. In this paper, I argue that the Kantian strategy cannot make good on this promise. Considered as an attempt to sidestep traditional metaethics, it lacks the resources to produce the desired normative conclusions. The outlook for the Kantian strategy becomes more promising, though, if we pair it with one of two familiar metanormative theories: expressivism or reductionism. The resulting metaethically-loaded versions of the Kantian strategy can deliver the promised conclusions, but only by plunging straight into the quagmire of traditional metaethics. And there all of the familiar objections to expressivism and reductionism await. (shrink)

Phillips & Singer's compelling presentation is weakest in its demonstration of commonalities between sensory plasticity and higher forms of learning and behavior. We propose that available data on schizophrenia can provide such evidence, because of the presence of impairments in a number of functions central to their model, and strong relationships between these dysfunctions and behavior.

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 3, Page 46-48, March 2012.

We are agents: we can deliberate about what to do, and then act on the basis of that deliberation. We are also capable of normative self-governance: we can identify and respond to reasons as reasons. Many theorists believe that these two capacities are intimately connected. On the basis of this connection they conclude that practical reasoning must be carried out under the guise of a justification. This paper explores two strategies for avoiding that conclusion. The first, which just denies the (...) connection between agency and normative self-governance, is rejected as too costly, since it leaves the normative significance of agency unexplained. The second, which suggests that we can respond to a consideration as a reason without representing it as a reason, seems more promising, but it requires a reductive account of reasons for action. The upshot is that metaethics and action theory are entwined in ways that few have recognized. (shrink)

This chapter begins with a discussion of the “Epicurean view” — the view stating that death cannot intelligibly be regarded as an evil for the person who dies because the alleged evil lacks a subject or “recipient.” An argument is then presented in opposition to this view that possesses two key components. The first is an account of the “Values Connect with Feelings” requirement, according to which the connection need not be actual, but merely possible and that the requirement is (...) satisfied provided that the relevant object, state, or event is a possible object, even if it is not a possible cause, of the relevant feelings. The second key component is the employment of a four-dimensional framework that makes it possible to claim that temporally distant events or states, like spatially distant events, exist, and thus are possible objects of relevant feelings. (shrink)

Cleopatra VII, the last of the Ptolemaic rulers of Egypt, reveled in perfume (Plutarch, Life of Marcus Antonius 26.2). She even used it in her seduction of the Roman general Marc Antony. Sailing up the river Cydnus to meet him, she reclined in a canopy spangled with gold, adorned like Venus in a painting. Boys dressed as cupids fanned her and wondrous scents from incense offerings wafted along the riverbanks. Not long after her death in August 30 BCE, a book (...) circulated under her name called Cleopatra’s Cosmetic, full of recipes for fragrant oils and cleansers (Totelin 2017: 114–18). (shrink)

We applaud Shen et al. (2024) for offering a framework to address how to return research results from digital phenotyping within the discipline of psychiatry. However, given the value-laden nature...

Reductive metaethical views have ethical implications that are frequently inconsistent with our settled ethical intuitions and favored ethical theories. This makes theory choice in metaethics difficult. When we are assessing reductive views, what sort of weight should we accord to their counterintuitive ethical implications? How should we weigh intensional adequacy and explanatory power against apparent extensional inadequacy? I argue that we currently assign too much weight to extensional worries in our metaethical theorizing: We should be willing to tolerate even a (...) great many counterintuitive ethical implications for the sake of a compelling explanation of our ethical practices. Especially when it comes to theorizing about reasons for action, extensional worries should take a back seat to intensional adequacy and explanatory power. My case for this claim beings with a familiar story about the origins of our moral concepts drawn from the work of G. E. M. Anscombe and Alisdair MacIntyre and proceeds via an observation about the nature of practical reasoning. (shrink)