Exploratory analysis is an area of increasing interest in the computational linguistics arena. Pragmatically speaking, exploratory analysis may be paraphrased as natural language processing by means of analyzing large corpora of text. Concerning the analysis, appropriate means are statistics, on the one hand, and artificial neural networks, on the other hand. As a challenging application area for exploratory analysis of text corpora we may certainly identify text databases, be it information retrieval or information filtering systems. With this paper we present (...) recent findings of exploratory analysis based on both statistical and neural models applied to legal text corpora. Concerning the artificial neural networks, we rely on a model adhering to the unsupervised learning paradigm. This choice appears naturally when taking into account the specific properties of large text corpora where one is faced with the fact that input-output-mappings as required by supervised learning models cannot be provided beforehand to a satisfying extent. This is due to the fact of the highly changing contents of text archives. In a nutshell, artificial neural networks count for their highly robust behavior regarding the parameters for model optimization. In particular, we found statistical classification techniques much more susceptible to minor parameter variations than unsupervised artificial neural networks. In this paper we describe two different lines of research in exploratory analysis. First, we use the classification methods for concept analysis. The general goal is to uncover different meanings of one and the same natural language concept. A task that, obviously, is of specific importance during the creation of thesauri. As a convenient environment to present the results we selected the legal term of neutrality, which is a perfect representative of a concept having a number of highly divergent meanings. Second, we describe the classification methods in the setting of document classification. The ultimate goal in such an application is to uncover semantic similarities of various text documents in order to increase the efficiency of an information retrieval system. In this sense, document classification has its fixed position in information retrieval research from the very beginning. Nowadays renewed massive interest in document classification may be witnessed due to the appearance of large-scale digital libraries. (shrink)

The focus of this book is on conceptual and philosophical issues of perception including the classic notion of unconscious inferences in perception. The book consists of contributions from a group of internationally renowned researchers who spent a year together as distinguised fellows at the German Centre for Advanced Study.

Is causal analysis an appropriate method to discover causal laws? Some prerequisites for any successful application of mathematical causal models are worked out and discussed. It can be shown that these prerequisites cannot be fulfilled by present models and there are strong reasons to assume that they cannot be satisfied by any model. Therefore causal analysis will probably be of no importance for the discovery of causal laws in sociology.

Genome editing holds the promise of revolutionizing many fields in which human interventions have hitherto proved to be insufficient to meet major global challenges, like nutrition and environmental protection. However, it is controversial how far this method might also be applied to the human germline with a view to preventing the transmission of serious genetic diseases to offspring. While there is a near-consensus that genome editing, at the present stage of science, should not be applied clinically, it is unclear whether (...) this also extends to clinically oriented research. It is argued that among the arguments against interventions in the human germline there is only one that is sufficiently strong to be practically relevant: The argument that it is doubtful whether the challenge of off-target effects with potentially fatal health consequences can be met. Since nearly all objectives of human germline genome editing can be attained by PGD, there are good grounds for directing clinically oriented research toward the improvement of this alternative method, which has been proven to be without substantial risks and which involves no ethical problems over and above those involved in genome editing. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungPatientenverfügungen für spätere Zustände schwerer kognitiver Beeinträchtigungen, wie sie für Spätphasen der Demenz typisch sind, stoßen auf weitergehende Vorbehalte als Patientenverfügungen für anderweitige Zustände eingeschränkter Einwilligungsfähigkeit. Einer der Gründe dafür scheinen die ethischen und psychologischen Konflikte im Gefolge von Patientenverfügungen zu sein, mit denen Patienten in gesunden Tagen für bestimmte Phasen der Erkrankung die Nichtbehandlung interkurrenter Erkrankungen oder die Unterlassung künstlicher Ernährung verfügt haben, während sich unter den in der Patientenverfügung gemeinten Bedingungen keine Anzeichen finden, dass sie unter ihrer Situation (...) leiden. Der Beitrag argumentiert für diese Situation für eine „gemischte“ ethische Strategie: Patientenverfügungen im rechtlichen Sinne sollten insbesondere dann, wenn sie im Rahmen eines Advance Care Planning erstellt sind, befolgt werden, um zu verhindern, dass den Vorausverfügenden das Vertrauen in die spätere Befolgung ihres Wunsches nach Abbruch oder Nichtaufnahme medizinischer Behandlungen genommen wird. Dagegen sollten darüber hinausgehende „Pflegeverfügungen“ ohne rechtlich verbindlichen Status nur in Fällen beachtet werden, in denen zwischen vorausverfügtem und „natürlichem“ Willen Konkordanz besteht. (shrink)

In der Einleitung zu Kerstings und Essers Target-Artikel fällt ein Stichwort, das mir in mehrfacher Hinsicht für den gegenwärtigen Stand des Nachdenkens über Sterben und Tod bezeichnend zu sein scheint: Pluralisierung der Todesbilder. Pluralisierung ist eine Herausforderung für jede einzelne der drei Fragestellungen des Artikels. In Bezug auf den Todesbegriff stellt sich die Frage, ob es einen – und nur einen – verbindlichen Begriff des Todes geben kann oder sollte; in Bezug auf das Verständnis des Todes als anthropologisches Grunddatum stellt (...) sich die Frage, ob es eine – und nur eine – gültige sinnverleihende Interpretation des Phänomen des Todes geben kann oder sollte; hinsichtlich des praktischen Umgangs mit dem Tod – dem eigenen wie dem anderer – stellt sich die Frage, ob sich bei aller kulturellen Diversität ein Katalog von basalen Normen findet, für den sich Allgemeinverbindlichkeit beanspruchen lässt. Wie viel Pluralismus ist notwendig, um der faktischen Vielfalt gerecht zu werden? Wie viel ist möglich, ohne Beliebigkeit und Orientierungslosigkeit heraufzubeschwören? Die Antworten der Autoren zeigen, dass sie in der Zulassung von Pluralismus zumeist das rechte Maß finden. Bei einigen scheinen sie mir allerdings zu weit zu gehen, bei anderen wiederum zu wenig weit. (shrink)

Popper gives the concept of social situation the role of key term in the method ology of situational analysis. The important characteristics of the social situation are aims and knowledge, which are attributed to the actor and are part of the situation. Furthermore, the elements of the situation create or are, as social institutions, obstacles to the actor. But more complex situations exist which here are called actor specific situations and are much more structured by the actor. The aims and (...) knowledge of the actors vary widely, so they cannot be attributed to the actors without a serious loss of information. The elements have social meanings and meanings which are ascribed to them by the actors. The concept of dual methodology tries to grasp these complex situations for the purpose of empirical research by combining causal explanation of analytical methodology with intentional explanation of a methodology of understanding. The interface between these methodologies is formed by the concept of generative mecha nisms. These are part of the causal theory as well as data gathered for the intentional explanation. The ideal result of research is achieved if the hypothesis cannot be rejected and the two kinds of generative mechanisms coincide. In this case, the hypothesis is a proven causal statement. Finally, the aptitude of the interpretative methodology for gathering the generative mechanisms is dis cussed. (shrink)

‚Person‘ und ‚PersonalitätPersonPersonalität‘ sind in der Angewandten Ethik, insbesondere in der Bioethik seit den 1980er Jahren aus mehreren Gründen zu Schlüsselbegriffen geworden. In dem Streit um die Bedingungen, die ein Wesen erfüllen muss, um Personalität zugesprochen zu bekommen, kulminieren eine Reihe von oftmals stark emotionalisierten Auseinandersetzungen um den moralischen und rechtlichen Status von Grenzfällen („marginal cases“, vgl. Pluhar 1987) innerhalb und außerhalb der Sphäre des Menschen: auf der einen Seite menschliche Embryonen und Föten, ohne Großhirn geborene Menschen (Anenzephale), schwer geistig (...) Behinderte, irreversibel bewusstseinsunfähige Menschen, Hirntote; auf der anderen Seite Angehörige anderer biologischer Gattungen mit dem Menschen nahekommenden kognitiven und emotionalen Fähigkeiten wie Menschenaffen und Meeressäuger sowie mögliche in Zukunft verfügbare bewusstseinsfähige MaschinenMaschinenethikmoralischer Status von intelligenten Systemen/MaschinenKünstliche Intelligenz. Diese Auseinandersetzung verschärft sich dadurch, dass diametral entgegengesetzte Ethikansätze den Personenbegriff an zentraler Stelle ins Spiel bringen, diesen jedoch zum Ausgangspunkt sehr verschiedener normativer Positionen machen. (shrink)

Dieter Henrich is one of the most respected and frequently cited philosophers in Germany today. His extensive and highly innovative studies of German Idealism and his systematic analyses of subjectivity have significantly impacted on advanced German philosophical and theological debates. Dieter Henrich and Contemporary Philosophy presents a comprehensive analysis of Henrich's work on subjectivity, evaluating it in the context of contemporary debates in both continental and analytic traditions. Familiarising the non-German reader with an important development in contemporary German (...) philosophy, this book explains the significance of subjectivity for any philosophy that attempts to offer existential orientation and contrasts competing conceptions in analytic philosophy and in the social philosophy of Juergen Habermas. Presenting Henrich's philosophy of subjectivity as a credible alternative to analytic philosophy of mind and a radical challenge to Heideggerian, Habermasian, neo-pragmatist, and postmodern positions, Freundlieb argues that a philosophy of the kind developed by Henrich can regain the cultural significance philosophical thinking once possessed. Dieter Freundlieb is Senior Lecturer in the School of Humanities, Griffith University, Australia. (shrink)

Henrich, Dieter: Theorieformen moderner Kunsttheorie. ISer, Wolfgang: Interpretationsperspektiven moderner Kunsttheorie. GAdamer, Hans G.: Zur Fragwurdigkeit des asthetischen BewuSStseins. INgarden, Roman: Prinzipien einer erkenntnistheoretischen Betrachtung der asthetischen Erfahrung.. KUhn, Helmut: Die Ontogenese der Kunst. ARnheim, Rudolf: Gestaltpsychologie und kunstlerische Form. [ubersetzt von Jurgen Schlaeger]. GOmbrich, Ernst H.: Norm und Form. KUhns, Richard: Psychoanalytische Theorie als Kunstphilosophie. [ubersetzt von Dieter Henrich]. GEhlen, Arnold: uber einige Kategorien des entlasteten, zumal des asthetischen Verhaltens. SImmel, Georg: Soziologische Asthetik. LUkács, Georg: Kunst und objektive (...) Wahrheit. ADorno, Theodor W.: ErpreSSte Versohnung. ZU Georg Lukács: "Wider den miSSverstandenen Realismus. MEad, George H.: Asthetische Erfahrung. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. MOrris, Charles W.: Asthetik und Zeichentheorie. [ubersetzt von Roland Posner]. RItchie, Benbow: Die formale Struktur des asthetischen Gegenstands. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. CReed-Hungerland, Isabel: uber die Ausdruckskraft ikonischer Zeichen. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. ECo, Umberto: Die asthetische Botschaft. [ubersetzt in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Autor von Jurgen Trabant]. MOles, Abraham A.: Informationelle Poetik - Strukturen der poetischen Nachricht - Empfindungsebenen. [ubersetzt von Hans Ronge]. CAvell, Stanley: Welt durch die Kamera gesehen. [ubersetzt von Lore Iser]. KAplan, Abraham: Referenz in der Kunst. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. ZIff, Paul: Was es heiSSt zu definieren, was ein Kunstwerk ist. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. URmson, James O.: Darstellung auf der Buhne. [ubersetzt von Jens Kulenkampff]. GOodman, Nelson: Kunst und Erkenntnis. [ubersetzt von Jens Schlaeger]. (shrink)

First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmatically presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). The central question here is that about the actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form (...) of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). ---------- Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass das Verbot sprachlicher Selbstreferenz als Lösung des Antinomienproblems einen pragmatischen Widerspruch enthält und damit nicht nur zu restriktiv, sondern geradezu inkonsistent ist (Kap.1). Ferner werden Möglichkeiten nicht-restriktiver Strategien zur Antinomienvermeidung diskutiert, wobei sich die explizite Einbindung der – pragmatisch präsupponierten – Konsistenzforderung als optimale Strategie erweist (Kap.2). Zentral ist hier die Frage nach dem eigentlichen Grund antinomischer Strukturen. Er erweist sich als eine Form von negativer Selbst-Bedingung (Kap.3). Dies nötigt zu einer Klärung des Status negativer Begriffe (Kap.4). Die Verallgemeinerung dieser Überlegungen (Kap.5) leitet über zur eigentlichen Analyse der antinomischen Grundstruktur (Kap.6): Entscheidend zur Pragmatik des Begriffs gehört, dass ihm eine Bedeutung positiv zukommt, sodass durch den Begriff qua Begriff stets auch Positivität konstituiert ist. Dadurch ist ein negativer Begriff durch eine prinzipielle Ambivalenz gekennzeichnet: In semantischer Hinsicht hat er negativen Charakter, in seinem pragmatischen Status als Begriff hingegen positiven Charakter. Ist die Bedeutung insbesondere die eines negativen Selbstbezugs, führt die Ambivalenz zur antinomischen Konstellation einer negativen Selbst-Bedingung – das ist hier der springende Punkt! Der Begriff besitzt so die durch ihn definierte Eigenschaft genau dann, wenn er sie nicht besitzt und umgekehrt. Die nähere Analyse zeigt, dass hierbei die Funktion reflexiver Strukturen für das Auftreten von Antinomien weitaus differenzierter zu beurteilen ist, als bisherige Auffassungen nahelegen. Nicht nur dass in diesem Kontext vier Formen von Reflexivität – ontische, semantische, pragmatische Reflexivität und insbesondere auch die Form negativer Selbstbedingung – unterschieden werden müssen; es zeigt sich auch, dass diese in schwer durchschaubarer Weise ineinander verschränkt sind. Die damit verbundene erstaunliche Beziehungsvielfalt läßt die Irritation, die seit je vom Antinomienproblem ausging, begreiflicher erscheinen. In der entwickelten pragmatischen Perspektive werden ferner Parallelen zur Struktur von Selbstbewußtsein sichtbar (Kap.7). Ich schließe mit Überlegungen zur Bedeutung der antinomischen Struktur für das Problem der Dialektik, insbesondere zur Synthesebildung einander ausschließender Bestimmungen (Kap.8). (shrink)

[[[ (Here only the chapters 3 – 8, see *** ) First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmatically presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). ]]] The central question here is that about the (...) actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). (shrink)

Previous efforts to bring the Hegelian dialectic closer to a clarification give reason for skepticism. The question: "What is dialectic", according to Dieter Henrich, "has remained without an answer so far". Hegel's objective-idealistic program is, however, so much linked to the possibility of a dialectical logic that it is an urgent desideratum to gain clarity about the stringency of dialectical argumentation. But this is only possible on the basis of a theory of dialectic. Hegel's own reflection on methods cannot (...) be considered sufficient in this respect. It does not enable us to defend the dialectical procedure against objections or to answer questions of method. In the following, a detailed reconstruction of the dialectic of 'being' and 'nothing' in Hegel's 'Science of Logic' will reveal basic structures of dialectical argumentation. As will be shown, antinomic structures play a key role. Such a 'reconstruction', however, will not be a simple confirmation of Hegelian texts, but will always have the character of a critique. In fact, it will turn out that in comparison with Hegel's development of categories, radical revisions are to be expected. ----- Bisherige Bemühungen, das Verfahren Hegelscher Dialektik einer Klärung näherzubringen, geben Anlass zur Skepsis. Die Frage: „Was ist Dialektik?“, so Dieter Henrich, sei „bisher ohne Antwort geblieben“. Das objektiv-idealistische Programm Hegels ist indes so sehr mit der Möglichkeit einer dialektischen Logik verknüpft, daß über die Stringenz dialektischer Argumentation Klarheit zu gewinnen ein dringliches Desiderat darstellt. Das aber ist nur auf der Grundlage einer Theorie der Dialektik möglich. Hegels eigene Methodenreflexion kann diesbezüglich nicht als zureichend erachtet werden. Sie versetzt uns nicht in die Lage, das dialektische Verfahren gegen Einwände zu verteidigen oder Methodenfragen zu beantworten. Im Folgenden sollen in einer detaillierten Rekonstruktion der Dialektik von ‘Sein’ und ‘Nichts’ in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’ Grundstrukturen dialektischer Argumentation sichtbar gemacht werden. Wie gezeigt wird, kommt dabei antinomischen Strukturen eine Schlüsselfunktion zu. Eine solche 'Rekonstruktion' wird allerdings nicht eine umstandslose Bestätigung der Hegelschen Textvorlage sein können, sondern immer auch den Charakter einer Kritik haben. In der Tat wird sich ergeben, daß im Vergleich mit Hegels Kategorienentwicklung einschneidende Revisionen zu gewärtigen sind. (shrink)

Thanks to the editorial work of David Pacini, the lectures appear here with annotations linking them to editions of the masterworks of German philosophy as they ...

The present investigation brings into view the philosophy of nature of German Idealism, a philosophical movement which emerged around the beginning of the nineteenth century. German Idealism appro- priated certain motivations of the Kantian philosophy and developed them further in a "speculative" manner (Engelhardt 1972, 1976, 2002). This powerful philosophical movement, associated above all with the names of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel - and moreover having nothing whatsoever to do with the "subjective idealism" of George Berkeley - was replaced by (...) philosophical positions designated roughly as metaphysics of the will, Marxism, life-philosophy, phenomenology and existentialism, as well as positivism, empiricism, philosophy of science, the linguistic turn, and analytic philosophy. These philosophical positions more or less still shape us today. German Idealism amounts to a virtual intellectual-historical antithesis to these movements and thus presents itself in retrospect as a striking alternative. The basis of Idealism - in its various respective forms - is the ideal <Ideelle>, and thus the opposite of that which is real. It continually takes as its task explaining the real in terms of the ideal, and this is especially true of the Idealists' philosophy of nature.' Is this a hopeless undertaking? Does Idealism not lack an empirical basis? Can one secure any solid ground whatsoever in the ether of the ideal? In what follows, I explain how, more than anyone else, Schelling and Hegel sought to handle this problem and to cope with it. By way of anticipation, a clear preference for the Hegelian philosophy of nature will emerge in what follows, a preference which may come as some surprise considering how much controversy has surrounded the significance of that view. The project of renewing a thoroughgoing philosophy of nature can meaningfully begin here. (shrink)

It is shown that the class of Kolmogorov-Loveland stochastic sequences is not closed under selecting subsequences by monotonic computable selection rules. This result gives a strong negative answer to the question whether the Kolmogorov-Loveland stochastic sequences are closed under selecting sequences by Kolmogorov-Loveland selection rules, i.e., by not necessarily monotonic, partial computable selection rules. The following previously known results are obtained as corollaries. The Mises-Wald-Church stochastic sequences are not closed under computable permutations, hence in particular they form a strict superclass (...) of the class of Kolmogorov-Loveland stochastic sequences. The Kolmogorov-Loveland selection rules are not closed under composition. (shrink)

The study ties in with former considerations concerning the problem of phenomenal perception of higher animals. Accordingly the phenomenal character, qualia included, results from the adjustment of perceptions to (typal) behavioral dispositions under the principle of self-preservation: an emergence phenomenon provided by the constitutive system unity of perception and behavior, here characterized as percept-act-system. Thereby the subject of behavior can be explained as an emergent instance of the – system-theoretically highest rank – percept-act-level. In terms of the principle of self-preservation (...) it subjects all sensations to an valuation. Perception thus gaining existential sense for the subject, a psychic sense-dimension is spanned which as such does not own physical but ideal character. Accessing Hegel this is further interpreted: Accordingly the ontological basis of this view is the lawfulness of nature, understood as the ideal essence underlying it. In virtue of this – basically Hegelian-type idealistic – conception the material being of nature always encloses the possibility of the psychic, according to that ideal substratum of nature. (shrink)

"Dieter Jähnig's life's work has been devoted to uncovering and exploring the field of tension between philosophy and art. The combination of comprehensive expertise in the field of the arts, together with the willingness of philosophy to radically question itself, has yielded a wealth of critical insights that can have a liberating and objectifying effect on the subject sciences. The many years of study with Jacob Burckhardt have produced an analysis of the different presences of the arts in time (...) that may be considered groundbreaking for the understanding of their 'relation to the world'. This differentiation of the character of works not only touches on methodological questions of reception aesthetics, but also has repercussions on the concept of history in general, which guides the historical-critical sciences." Robert Kudielka. (shrink)

An infinite binary sequence X is Kolmogorov–Loveland random if there is no computable non-monotonic betting strategy that succeeds on X in the sense of having an unbounded gain in the limit while betting successively on bits of X. A sequence X is KL-stochastic if there is no computable non-monotonic selection rule that selects from X an infinite, biased sequence.One of the major open problems in the field of effective randomness is whether Martin-Löf randomness is the same as KL-randomness. Our first (...) main result states that KL-random sequences are close to Martin-Löf random sequences in so far as every KL-random sequence has arbitrarily dense subsequences that are Martin-Löf random. A key lemma in the proof of this result is that for every effective split of a KL-random sequence at least one of the halves is Martin-Löf random. However, this splitting property does not characterize KL-randomness; we construct a sequence that is not even computably random such that every effective split yields two subsequences that are 2-random. Furthermore, we show for any KL-random sequence A that is computable in the halting problem that, first, for any effective split of A both halves are Martin-Löf random and, second, for any computable, nondecreasing, and unbounded function g and almost all n, the prefix of A of length n has prefix-free Kolmogorov complexity at least n−g. Again, the latter property does not characterize KL-randomness, even when restricted to left-r.e. sequences; we construct a left-r.e. sequence that has this property but is not KL-stochastic and, in fact, is not even Mises–Wald–Church stochastic.Turning our attention to KL-stochasticity, we construct a non-empty class of KL-stochastic sequences that are not weakly 1-random; by the usual basis theorems we obtain such sequences that in addition are left-r.e., are low, or are of hyperimmune-free degree.Our second main result asserts that every KL-stochastic sequence has effective dimension 1, or equivalently, a sequence cannot be KL-stochastic if it has infinitely many prefixes that can be compressed by a factor of α<1. This improves on a result by Muchnik, who has shown that were they to exist, such compressible prefixes could not be found effectively. (shrink)

My argument is that Chalmers' zombie fiction and his rigid-designator-argument going back on Kripke comes down to a petitio principii. Rather, at the core it appears to be more related to the essential 'privacy' of the phenomenal internal perspective. In return for Chalmers I argue that the 'principle self-preservation' of living organisms necessarily implies subjectivity and the emergence of sense. The comparison with a robot proves instructive. The mode of 'mere physical' being is transcended if, in the form of phenomenal (...) perception, sense appears on the stage of higher animals – a transition explained here as an emergence phenomenon based on the systemic co-operation of perception, valuation and action ('perc-val-act system'). Some fundamental considerations are added: Those consequences implied by the principle self-preservation reveal the natural-biological origin of the organism – primarily seeming a more insignificant circumstance – as a momentous fundamental difference (end-in-itself-character, subjectivity, constitution of sense) compared to technical artefacts (robot). And the emergentist approach indicates the – maybe paradoxical – possibility of a dualism of physical and psychical phenomena in an overall physical system, that is not dualistic at the same time. (shrink)

The center of this investigation is the hard problem of phenomenal perception. To be clear, hereby it is thought of higher animals; accordingly the problem of Human consciousness will explicitly not be treated. The so-called explanatory gap (Levine), i.e. missing a neural explanation of experiences, here is emergence-theoretically countered: It is argued that systems own properties and laws different from those of their components. Applied to the brain the phenomenal character of perception is explained as an emergence effect from the (...) systemic cooperation of perception, valuation and behavior, whereby also an interpretation is opened to Davidson’s anomal monism. As is further shown, feelings are to be understood as a necessary completion of perception when, as in the case of higher animals, the behavior is primarily controlled by phenomenal perception. (shrink)

The zombie, mocking all nomological arguments, gives rise to axiological considerations that also result in a vindication of the nomological paradigm. So the ‘philosophical benefit of zombies’ ultimately proves to be that they lead to an understanding they were originally invented to refute.

Elvira Mayordomo and Wolfgang Merkle The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Volume 19, Issue 1, Page 135-136, March 2013.