The links between the philosophies of Montaigne and Bruno are explored here for the first time, in this speculative comparison that focuses as much on rhetoric and ethics as on ontology and anthropology.

While corporate social responsibility is recognized as taking on various national meanings and practices, research has not sufficiently investigated how multinational companies simultaneously achieve global CSR integration and local CSR adaptation. Building on a qualitative case study carried out at ASICS, an MNC headquartered in Japan, we show how this organizational dilemma may be solved through hybridization work, a form of institutional work performed by CSR managers in subsidiaries to combine and adapt different institutional approaches to CSR. By developing the (...) notion of hybridization work, we contribute by revealing a set of practices that contribute to institutional change within organizations and enriching the study of CSR organizational change and international business by showing how hybridization Work leads to a greater organizational integration between core and periphery, and by identifying the triggering factors for subsidiary initiative in CSR. (shrink)

The question whether AI systems have agency is gaining increasing importance in discussions of responsibility for AI behavior. This paper argues that an approach to artificial agency needs to be teleological, and consider the role of human goals in particular if it is to adequately address the issue of responsibility. I will defend the view that while AI systems can be viewed as autonomous in the sense of identifying or pursuing goals, they rely on human goals and other values incorporated (...) into their design, and are, as such, dependent on human agents. As a consequence, AI systems cannot be held morally responsible, and responsibility attributions should take into account normative and social aspects involved in the design and deployment of the said AI. My argument falls in line with approaches critical of attributing moral agency to artificial agents, but draws from the philosophy of action, highlighting further philosophical underpinnings of current debates on artificial agency. (shrink)

In a context of growing environmental challenges, circular economy (CE) business models appear necessary for business to contribute positively to the ecological transition. While platform business models have been identified as a new and promising model in CE, we still lack a fine-grained understanding of the critical capabilities involved in developing and scaling them. To fill this gap, we build on a single case study of Phenix, a French-based fast-growing start-up in the food industry, tackling the issue of food waste. (...) We identify three core managerial capabilities involved in the successful scaling of Phenix's business model. In addition to ecosystem orchestration capabilities, we identify two types of ambidextrous capabilities – forms of ambidexterity operating both at the organizational and at the institutional level. Our analysis highlights the importance of considering these capabilities in a bundle as they collectively contribute to the performance and scaling potential of the business model. We also call for an increased consideration of the role of institutional factors in shaping opportunities to design and scale profitable business models. (shrink)

Succinct representation and fast access to large amounts of data are challenges of our time. This unique book suggests general approaches of 'complexity of descriptions'. It deals with a variety of concrete topics and bridges between them, while opening new perspectives and providing promising avenues for the 'complexity puzzle'.

Most model checking techniques for security protocols make a number of simplifying assumptions on the protocol and/or on its execution environment that greatly complicate or even prevent their applicability in some important cases. For instance, most techniques assume that communication between honest principals is controlled by a Dolev-Yao intruder, i.e. a malicious agent capable to overhear, divert, and fake messages. Yet we might be interested in establishing the security of a protocol that relies on a less unsecure channel (e.g. a (...) confidential channel provided by some other protocol sitting lower in the protocol stack). In this paper we propose a general model for security protocols based on the set-rewriting formalism that, coupled with the use of LTL, allows for the specification of assumptions on principals and communication channels as well as of complex security properties that are normally not handled by state-of-the-art security protocol analysers. By using our approach we have been able to formalise all the assumptions required by the ASW protocol for optimistic fair exchange and some of its key security properties. Besides the previously reported attacks on the protocol, we report a new attack on a patched version of the protocol. (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty has long been known as one of the most important philosophers of aesthetics, yet most discussions of his aesthetics focus on visual art. This book corrects that balance by turning to Merleau-Ponty's extensive engagement with literature. From Proust, Merleau-Ponty developed his conception of "sensible ideas," from Claudel, his conjoining of birth and knowledge as "co-naissance," from Valéry came "implex" or the "animal of words" and the "chiasma of two destinies." Literature also provokes the questions of expression, metaphor, and truth (...) and the meaning of a Merleau-Pontian poetics. The poetic of Merleau-Ponty is, the book argues, a poetic of the flesh, a poetic of mystery, and a poetic of the visible in its relation to the invisible. Ultimately, theoretical figures or "figuratives" that appear at the threshold between philosophy and literature enable the possibility of a new ontology. What is at stake is the very meaning of philosophy itself and its mode of expression. (shrink)

The importance of emotions is supported by many authors of the ethics of care in contrast to the rationalistic paradigm of justice. However, the reference to the emotions remains generic. By focusing on three paradigmatic typologies, I propose to investigate this aspect further, and distinguish between the different emotions that motivate care. I will try, first, to offer a reflection on which emotions are likely to motivate ethical action within an ethics of care; second, to survey different potential obstacles to (...) these emotions and propose how they might be overcome to more successfully achieve good care and ethical action. (shrink)

Approaching mental health on a global scale with particular reference to low- and mid-income countries raises issues concerning the disregard of the local context and values and the imposition of values characteristic of the Global North. Seeking a philosophical viewpoint to surmount these problems, the present paper argues for a value-laden framework for psychiatry with the specific incorporation of value pluralism, particularly in relation to the Global South context, while also emphasizing personal values such as the choice of treatment. In (...) sketching out this framework, the paper aims to overcome the clash between universalism and relativism about psychiatric categories by focusing on how overlaps between cultures can contribute to ontology-building. A case study analyzing ethnopsychiatric research in the context of South India will illustrate the proposed view, while also pointing out avenues for further research on the causal efficacy of local shared beliefs about mental disorder. If approaches across different traditions and theoretical frames are shown to work in treating similar ailments, causal connections appear to cut across the different ontologies. Ethnopsychiatry would play a central role in such research, namely in disclosing the variables and mechanisms at work within the local approaches. (shrink)

This paper takes a critical stance on Tallis’s separation of causation and agency. While his critique of the causal theory of action and the assumptions about causation underlying different versions of determinism, including the one based on neuroscience is right, his rejection of causation (of all sorts) has implausible consequences. Denying the link between action and causation amounts to overlooking the role action plays in causal inference and in the origin of causal concepts. I suggest that a weaker version of (...) Tallis’ claim, compatible with causation understood as agency, would work better. (shrink)

The Russian invasion of 2022 was based on an organized process of influence on the Ukrainian population, aimed at obtaining their support or neutralizing their possible resistance, in concert with the state apparatus. We find, in the backdrop of this process, the memorial conflict between these two countries and their neighbours, concerning World War II and the Soviet Union. This war of influence, or political warfare, which falls within new forms of contemporary hybrid warfare, profoundly has to do with images, (...) especially moving images. The cinematic images, the debauchery of their propaganda during the Second World War and throughout the existence of the USSR, still weighs on the bodies and minds; the new media has in many ways inherented them and their way of reenacting or extending propaganda on an individual or group scale. We will then question the place of images, and in particular those in motion, in the war between Russia and Ukraine since 2014 to describe the way in which they have served or still serve the military-memorial device deployed by the Russian invader. (shrink)

This paper investigates the concept of behavioral autonomy in Artificial Life by drawing a parallel to the use of teleological notions in the study of biological life. Contrary to one of the leading assumptions in Artificial Life research, I argue that there is a significant difference in how autonomous behavior is understood in artificial and biological life forms: the former is underlain by human goals in a way that the latter is not. While behavioral traits can be explained in relation (...) to evolutionary history in biological organisms, in synthetic life forms behavior depends on a design driven by a research agenda, further shaped by broader human goals. This point will be illustrated with a case study on a synthetic life form. Consequently, the putative epistemic benefit of reaching a better understanding of behavioral autonomy in biological organisms by synthesizing artificial life forms is subject to doubt: the autonomy observed in such artificial organisms may be a mere projection of human agency. Further questions arise in relation to the need to spell out the relevant human aims when addressing potential social or ethical implications of synthesizing artificial life forms. (shrink)

Assessments of animal experience and consciousness are embedded in all issues of animal welfare policy, and the field of animal welfare science has been developed to make these evaluations. In light of modern studies of the social construction of scientific knowledge, it is surprising how little attention has been paid to date on how crucial evaluations about animals are made. In this paper, I begin to fill that gap by presenting a historical case study of the attempt to define the (...) pain and distress of one common practice in animal research-the use of the tabletop guillotine to decapitate laboratory rodents. I describe the negotiations involved in reaching consensus on the meaning of the available data and caution animal care and use committees that they should always work with the realization that our scientific knowledge of what animals experience is partial and provisional knowledge at best. (shrink)

Résumé Cet article explore les significations de l’expression « formes de vie » chez Horkheimer et le rôle qu’elle joue dans son projet d’une Théorie critique de la société développée au cours des années 1930. Horkheimer considère les formes de vie comme des comportements et des habitudes qui se constituent dans le cadre de rapports de production spécifiques. Mais il utilise « forme de vie » également pour désigner la culture et ses domaines propres qui, imbriqués les uns dans les (...) autres, sont des forces capables de maintenir ou de briser une forme sociale déterminée. En outre, par « forme de vie », il entend le résultat des relations entre les processus matériels d’une société et le développement des phénomènes culturels qui influencent les institutions et les hommes. (shrink)

Les cours sur la Logique transcendantale sont l'un des lieux de la production fichtéenne dans lequel le philosophe de Rammenau réfléchit sur le langage et en particulier sur la capacité performative de la parole. A travers la déconstruction du discours de la logique commune, déjà durement frappée dans les leçons de Zurich de 1794, articulée en trois moments principaux (identifiés comme processus ironique, inventio et ruse du langage), la Doctrine de la Science révèle le lien entre le mot, le concept (...) et l'intuition intellectuelle et exprime le besoin de subsumer le premier au concept correctement compris, de sorte qu'il puisse révéler la présence d'une pensée synthétique, dont le mot lui-même est l'image. (shrink)

The Philosopher and the Moviemaker.Merleau-Ponty and the Thinking of CinemaAs its subtitle indicates, the present article is devoted to the relations between Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy and the thinking of cinema. The first section focuses on two topics, each underlying the lecture on cinema given by Merleau-Ponty in 1945. On the one hand, we find the reflection about the peculiarities of expression in film and cinematic image; on the other, we see the convergence between the inspiration of cinema and that of (...) philosophy, which Merleau-Ponty sees as a significant characteristic of his time. This is a convergence in which the nouvelle vague’s cinema will recognise itself and which Christian Metz will retrospectively confirm. Moreover, by developing both of these topics, the author finds a way to interpret Merleau-Ponty’s lecture as an undeclared polemical response to Henri Bergson’s famous negative judgement on cinema. The second section focuses on the question of movement in cinema, putting together further references to cinema made by Merleau-Ponty in posthumous or unpublished writings such as the notes for the 1952-53 course on “The Sensible World and the World of Expression.” The third section focuses on Merleau-Ponty’s later reflection about vision and images. This section shows how the peculiar noveltyof cinema is more and more understood by Merleau-Ponty not only as historically convergent with a new way of conceiving philosophy, but as a symptom of the new ontology he was trying to formulate philosophically.Il filosofo e il cineasta.Merleau-Ponty e il pensiero del cinemaCome sottolinea il suo sottotitolo, il presente articolo è dedicato alle relazioni fra la filosofi a di Maurice Merleau-Ponty e il pensiero del cinema. La prima sezione si concentra su due argomenti, ognuno ravvisabile nella conferenza sul cinema tenuta da Merleau-Ponty nel 1945. Da una parte, troviamo la riflessione sulle peculiarità dell’espressione filmica e dell’immagine cinematografica; dall’altra, la convergenza fra l’ispirazione del cinema e quella della filosofia, che Merleau-Ponty vede come una significativa caratteristica del proprio tempo: una convergenza in cui il cinema della nouvelle vague riconoscerà se stesso e che Christian Metz retrospettivamente confermerà. Inoltre, sviluppando entrambi gli argomenti, l’autore trova modo di interpretare la conferenza di Merleau-Ponty come una non dichiarata risposta polemica al celebre giudizio negativo sul cinema formulato da Henri Bergson. La seconda sezione si concentra sulla questione del movimento nel cinema, riunendo ulteriori riferimenti di Merleau-Ponty al cinema in scritti postumi o inediti, come le note per il corso del 1952-1953 su “Il mondo sensibile e il mondo dell’espressione”. La terza sezione si concentra sulla riflessione dell’ultimo Merleau-Ponty sulla visione e le immagini. Ciò mostra come la peculiare novità del cinema sia sempre più compresa da Merleau-Ponty non solo come storicamente convergente con un nuovo modo di concepire la filosofia, ma come un sintomo della nuova ontologia che egli stava cercando di formulare filosoficamente. (shrink)

Em uma nota originalmente publicada em 1974 somente em italiano, Gilles Deleuze cunhou a expressão filosofia-cinema, aparentemente significando um novo estilo de fazer filosofia, a ser desenvolvido sob a luz das novidades do cinema. A fim de melhor entender o que uma “filosofia-cinema” poderia ser, antes de tudo devemos imaginar o que seria uma “filosofia antiquada”. Proponho caracterizá-la como uma “filosofia-pintura” baseada na noção de “representação”. Por sua vez, essa noção sugere uma concepção peculiar de visão baseada no modelo ótico (...) de “janela”, introduzido na pintura por Leon Battista Alberti e usado também na filosofia moderna. Esse modelo ainda funciona em nossa época? Apesar de numerosas referências recentes ao modelo janela, em minha opinião o modelo na ativa atualmente é aquele da “tela”. É claro que nossas relações diante das telas das mídias eletrônicas de hoje são diferentes daquele relacionamento que mantemos com a tela cinematográfica. Todavia, acho que esta última é a predecessora mais próxima dos modelos anteriores. De modo a entender os componentes da continuidade e da descontinuidade entre esses dois tipos de relacionamento, engajei-me numa investigação dos dois caminhos respectivos para mostrar o sonho de viver em uma tela. De fato, acho que esta investigação pode nos fornecer elementos importantes que permitam o desenvolvimento de uma “cinema-filosofia” na escala de hoje. (shrink)

El presente texto pretende reivindicar agencias materiales en las prácticas de la pintura al óleo. El artículo comienza presentando algunos debates sobre la importancia de la materialidad desde una estética posthumana, relacional y ecológica inspirada por las teorías de los nuevos materialismos y sus distintos anclajes (la teoría del actor-red, las epistemologías feministas de la tecno-ciencia, la ontología orientada a los objetos o la cultura material post fenomenológica). A continuación, presentaré algunos ejemplos de mediaciones o hibridaciones socio-técnicas en la pintura (...) al óleo donde agencias humanas y no humanas se involucran para articular y sostener los cuadros; pero también para traicionar, interrumpir y asombrar las intenciones de sus autores, la estabilidad de sus pigmentos y la autenticidad de su apreciación estética. Finalmente, desplegaré un proceso de ontogénesis material de un instrumento pictórico, la paleta, como agenciamiento esperanzador para abandonar los dualismos de la modernidad estética. (shrink)

This article provides a conceptual account of causal understanding by connecting current psychological research on time and causality with philosophical debates on the causal asymmetry. I argue that causal relations are viewed as asymmetric because they are understood in temporal terms. I investigate evidence from causal learning and reasoning in both children and adults: causal perception, the temporal priority principle, and the use of temporal cues for causal inference. While this account does not suffice for correct inferences of causal structure, (...) I show it to serve as a preliminary understanding of causal concepts as asymmetric, that later incorporates other types of evidence. This approach supplies causal models with an asymmetric concept of causation that underlies hypotheses about causal structure, as I will illustrate from the framework of the knowledge-based causal induction model. I further argue for an integrating perspective, showing how the understanding of causes as preceding their effects underlies both psychological models and philosophical debates over time and the causal asymmetry, particularly regarding problem cases such as simultaneous causation or backwards causation, and the conceptual connection between causation and action. (shrink)

Ganeri's [2018] discussion of mental time travel and the self focuses on remembering the past, but has less to say with respect to the status of future-oriented mental time travel. This paper aims to disambiguate the relation between prospection and the self from the framework of Ganeri's interpretation of three Buddhist views—by Buddhaghosa, Vasubandhu, and Dignaga. Is the scope of Ganeri's discussion confined to the past, or is there a stronger assumption that future thought always entails self-representation? I argue that (...) if mental time travel towards the past and towards the future are continuous, both past and future thought should be possible independently of self-representation. An assumption of discontinuity however would enable the employment of the self as one of the defining differences between remembering the past and imagining the future. The two options can be further contrasted on the basis of distinct ways of constructing past/future scenarios (field vs. observer perspective), modes of experiencing time (known vs. lived), and the origin of mental time travel (episodic vs. semantic memory). I further assess the compatibility of future-oriented thought with the three Buddhist views on the basis of these coordinates. (shrink)

This paper discusses von Wright's theory of causation from Explanation and Understanding and Causality and Determinism in contemporary context. I argue that there are two important common points that von Wright's view shares with the version of manipulability currently supported by Woodward: the analysis of causal relations in a system modelled on controlled experiments, and the explanation of manipulability through counterfactuals - with focus on the counterfactual account of unmanipulable causes. These points also mark von Wright's departure from previous action-based (...) theories of causation. Owing to these two features, I argue that, upon classifying different versions of manipulability theories, von Wright's view should be placed closer to the interventionist approach than to the agency theory, where it currently stands. Furthermore, given its relevance in contemporary context, which this paper aims to establish, I claim that von Wright's theory can be employed to solve present problems connected to manipulability approaches to causation. (shrink)

While loneliness has been linked to various mental and physical health problems, the sense in which loneliness is a cause of these conditions has so far attracted little philosophical attention. This paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing research on health effects of loneliness and therapeutic interventions through current approaches to causality. To deal with the problem of causality between psychological, social, and biological variables, the paper endorses a biopsychosocial model of health and disease. I will investigate how three (...) main approaches to causality used in psychiatry and public health apply to loneliness: interventionism, mechanisms, and dispositional theories. Interventionism can specify whether loneliness causes specific effects, or whether a treatment works, incorporating results from randomized controlled trials. Mechanisms help explain how loneliness brings about negative health effects, spelling out psychological processes involved in lonely social cognition. Dispositional approaches help stress particular features of loneliness connected to negative social interactions, such as defensiveness. I will conclude by showing that previous research alongside emerging approaches to health effects of loneliness lend themselves to analysis in terms of the causal models under discussion. (shrink)

This article examines how specific realist and projectivist versions of manipulability theories of causation deal with the problem of objectivity. Does an agent-dependent concept of manipulability imply that conflicting causal claims made by agents with different capacities can come out as true? In defence of the projectivist stance taken by the agency view, I argue that if the agent’s perspective is shown to be uniform across different agents, then the truth-values of causal claims do not vary arbitrarily and, thus, reach (...) a satisfactory level of objectivity. My argument connects Price’s considerations on the situation of deliberation, whose structure, common to all agents, is the same with respect to both decision making and causal claims on a concept inspired by Douglas’s classification of objectivity of thought processes: the perspective of the detached agent. I further argue that, despite his agent-independent concept of intervention, Woodward’s claim of a stronger objectivity standard cannot be achieved, as the relativity of causal concepts to a variable set brings about the issue of the agent’s choice of variables. Consequently, a more permissive objectivity standard applies to both views. (shrink)

This paper discusses Simone de Beauvoir’s views on the meaning of life as presented in The Ethics of Ambiguity. I argue that Beauvoir’s view matches contemporary hybrid views on the meaning of life, incorporating both subjective and objective elements, while connecting them in a distinct way—through the tension between self and other. I then analyze the meaning of excessively competitive projects through Beauvoir’s ethics and conclude that success that amounts to denying other people’s access to the things one values is (...) absurd. I use the case of contemporary academia as an illustration of extreme competition, then employ Beauvoir’s views to suggest a shift towards more meaningful practices. (shrink)

This paper argues that there are notable similarities between Collingwood’s method of investigating absolute presuppositions and contemporary strands of pragmatism, focusing on two areas - the critique of realism and causation. It is first argued that there are methodological similarities between Collingwood’s argument against realism and his Kantian-inspired critique of metaphysics, and Putnam’s critique of externalism. Regarding causation, it is argued that Collingwood’s view and Price’s pragmatist approach have a common method – investigating causation in the context of specific human (...) practices. Both authors place causation in the framework of scientific inquiry as opposed to making it the subject of the inquiry itself. Thus, Collingwood’s work proves to be in line with current metaphilosophical debates, particularly in the philosophy of science. (shrink)