While participation in social media has become everyday practice among young people, there have been few studies examining how youth as social media users are represented in the media discourse. Focusing on the promotional materials of an award-winning and widely-viewed documentary film, The Social Dilemma, this paper examines the media depictions of youth that attract the public’s attention. Through a social semiotic analysis, we analyzed the representational, interactive, and compositional meanings in the poster and trailer to identify how young people (...) have been represented in the media discourse. Our findings show that they are constructed as vulnerable social media users who are manipulated by social media companies. We argue that such depictions of youth not only negate their sense of agency but also ignore their active engagement in the participatory culture afforded by social media. The implications of such depictions propagate a protectionist perspective of youth. This can undermine efforts towards the development of an empowerment approach in digital literacy education. (shrink)

The Criminalization series arose from an interdisciplinary investigation into criminalization, focussing on the principles that might guide decisions about what kinds of conduct should be criminalized, and the forms that criminalization should take. Developing a normative theory of criminalization, the series tackles the key questions at the heart of the issue: what principles and goals should guide legislators in deciding what to criminalize? How should criminal wrongs be classified and differentiated? How should law enforcement officials apply the law's specifications of (...) offences? The sixth volume in the series offers a philosophical investigation of the relationship between moral wrongdoing and criminalization. Considering the justification of punishment, the nature of harm, the importance of autonomy, inchoate wrongdoing, the role of consent, and the role of the state, the book provides an account of the nature of moral wrongdoing, the sources of wrongdoing, why wrongdoing is the central target of the criminal law, and the ways in which criminalization of non-wrongful conduct might be permissible. (shrink)

This book provides a systematic, philosophically informed account of criminal responsibility. It begins by providing a general account of criminal responsibility based on the relationship between the action that the defendent has performed and their character. It then moves on to reconsider some of the central doctrines of criminal responsibility in the light of that account.

A widespread view in moral, legal, and political philosophy, as well as in public discourse, is that responsibility makes a difference to the fair allocation or distribution of things that are valuable or disvaluable independently of responsibility. For example, the fairness of punishing a person for wrongdoing varies with her responsibility for wrongdoing; the fairness of requiring a person to pay compensation varies with her responsibility for the harm that she caused; the fairness of one person being worse off than (...) another varies with her responsibility for being worse off; the fairness of inflicting defensive harm on a person to avert a threat varies with her responsibility for causing or posing the threat; and so on. (shrink)

This project explored what constitutes “ethical practice of mathematics”. Thematic analysis of ethical practice standards from mathematics-adjacent disciplines (statistics and computing), were combined with two organizational codes of conduct and community input resulting in over 100 items. These analyses identified 29 of the 52 items in the 2018 American Statistical Association Ethical Guidelines for Statistical Practice, and 15 of the 24 additional (unique) items from the 2018 Association of Computing Machinery Code of Ethics for inclusion. Three of the 29 items (...) synthesized from the 2019 American Mathematical Society Code of Ethics, and zero of the Mathematical Association of America Code of Ethics, were identified as reflective of “ethical mathematical practice” beyond items already identified from the other two codes. The community contributed six unique items. Item stems were standardized to, “The ethical mathematics practitioner…”. Invitations to complete the 30-min online survey were shared nationally (US) via Mathematics organization listservs and other widespread emails and announcements. We received 142 individual responses to the national survey, 75% of whom endorsed 41/52 items, with 90–100% endorsing 20/52 items on the survey. Items from different sources were endorsed at both high and low rates. A final thematic analysis yielded 44 items, grouped into “General” (12 items), “Profession” (10 items) and “Scholarship” (11 items). Moreover, for the practitioner in a leader/mentor/supervisor/instructor role, there are an additional 11 items (4 General/7 Professional). These results suggest that the community perceives a much wider range of behaviors by mathematicians to be subject to ethical practice standards than had been previously included in professional organization codes. The results provide evidence against the argument that mathematics practitioners engaged in “pure” or “theoretical” work have minimal, small, or no ethical obligations. (shrink)

This article explores the moral significance of consent in an unjust world by developing the view that the validity of consent depends on its causes. It defends the view that the causes of consent make it valid or invalid. It then shows how this idea helps us to distinguish different ways in which consent might matter morally where it has problematic causes. Finally, it uses this analysis to explore the moral significance of a range of problematic causes of consent, including (...) objectification, arranged marriage, and third-party threats of violence. (shrink)

O presente artigo busca traçar um estudo político-filosófico e se dedica a articular as nuances do conceito arendtiano de ação, sobre o entendimento do agir humano dentro do espaço público. Observar as nuances e a imprevisibilidade pela qual a ação humana é expressa frente à convivência entre iguais e diferentes no espaço público é enxergar a forma com a qual as singularidades humanas e o fenômeno da revelação das identidades se tornam evidentes. Dessa maneira, o objetivo geral do presente trabalho (...) se perfaz em analisar como a dimensão política do conceito arendtiano de ação está ligada à busca da liberdade do indivíduo no espaço público. Dessa forma, busca-se entender as interações interpessoais em meio a pluralidade humana e a procura pela liberdade frente ao mundo das aparências. (shrink)

A normative power is a power to alter rights and duties directly. This paper explores what it means to alter rights and duties directly. In the light of that, it examines the kind of argument that might support the existence of normative powers. Both simple and complex instrumentalist accounts of such powers are rejected, as is an approach to normative powers that is based on the existence of normative interests. An alternative is sketched, where normative powers arise based on the (...) appropriateness of a person responding to a decision by limiting their freedom. (shrink)

It has been suggested that states have no right to directly discriminate against would-be immigrants on grounds of race or sex. However, while the discourse on cases of wrongful discrimination has largely focused on discrimination on grounds of gender, race, and sexual orientation, states frequently engage in discrimination of a different kind when it comes to admissions and naturalisation policies. It is assumed that the anti-discrimination principle does not include cases of talent-based discrimination, and that these fall well within the (...) rights of states. I wish to suggest, to the contrary, that selecting immigrants on the basis of talent is a form of wrongful discrimination. First, with reference to Deborah Hellman’s expressive theory of discrimination, I explain what is wrongful about particular forms of state discrimination between would-be migrants. Next, I tackle the issue of immigrant selection on grounds of talent, which I refer to as ‘talent-based selection’. Unlike gender or race-based selection, it is generally not regarded as wrongful discrimination, for the reason that it does not express disrespect in the same way that sexist or racist selection criteria does. I argue that this assumption is mistaken, as talent-based discrimination does involve the expression of disrespect. In the present context, it has the expressive effect of reproducing demeaning stereotypes about low-skilled foreigners. Finally, I anticipate four objections to my conclusion. (shrink)

This essay argues that culpability and responsibility are independent notions, even though some of the same facts make us both responsible and culpable. Responsibility for one’s conduct is grounded in the strength of the agential connection between oneself and one’s conduct. Culpability for one’s conduct is the vices that give rise to that conduct. It then argues that responsibility and culpability for causing a threat are each grounds of liability to defensive harm independent of the other.

A widespread view in moral, legal, and political philosophy, as well as in public discourse, is that responsibility makes a difference to the fair allocation or distribution of things that are valuable or disvaluable independently of responsibility. For example, the fairness of punishing a person for wrongdoing varies with her responsibility for wrongdoing; the fairness of requiring a person to pay compensation varies with her responsibility for the harm that she caused; the fairness of one person being worse off than (...) another varies with her responsibility for being worse off; the fairness of inflicting defensive harm on a person to avert a threat varies with her responsibility for causing or posing the threat; and so on. (shrink)

I argue that people are sometimes justified in participating in unjust wars. I consider a range of reasons why war might be unjust, including the cause which it is fought for, whether it is proportionate, and whether it wrongly uses resources that could help others in dire need. These considerations sometimes make fighting in the war unjust, but sometimes not. In developing these claims, I focus especially on the 2003 Iraq war.

The central argument for animalism is the thinking animal problem : if you are not an animal, there are two thinkers within the region you occupy, i.e., you and your animal body. This is absurd. So you are an animal. The main objection to this argument is the thinking brain problem : animalism faces a problem that is structurally analogous to TAP. Specifically, if animalism is true, you and your brain both think. This is absurd. So animalism is false. The (...) purpose of this paper is to propose strategies animalists can endorse to solve TBP. I first show that animalists can solve TBP by arguing that it is not sound. This solution to TBP raises questions about personal identity over time and the mereological relation between the person and the brain. I argue that animalists can answer the personal identity question by endorsing non-biological persistence conditions as well as biological ones. For the mereological question, I first show that animalism is incompatible with four-dimensionalism and eliminativism. I then argue that animalists should endorse the dominant sortal account to answer the mereological question. (shrink)

This chapter critically examines various proposals for liability of a person to defensive harm. Drawing on the idea that there is an important relationship between a person’s liability to be harmed and the enforceable duties that she incurs as a result of posing a threat to others, it demonstrates that no simple account of liability will be successful. As there are many considerations that bear on the duties that a person has, there are many considerations which bear on a person’s (...) liability to be harmed. This general claim is supported through a demonstration both that culpability without causation can ground liability, and that causal contribution without culpability can ground liability. (shrink)

Animalism is the view that we human individuals are animals. And standard animalists claim that if we are animals, we are animals essentially. This is because they believe that if we are animals, we are essentially members of the human kind (e.g., human animal, Homo sapiens), and as a result, we have the criterion of identity by virtue of that kind. The goal of this paper is to reject the claim that our being animals implies our essentially being animals. I (...) begin by reformulating the standard animalist’s argument for the claim that we are essentially biological entities of some sort. I then argue that the very same argumentative strategy can be applied against standard animalism. Specifically, the standard animalist’s reasoning for the claim that we are contingently psychological beings faces a dilemma that undermines the claim that we are animals essentially. In the remainder of the paper, I reply to various objections to my argument and consider a strategy that animalists can pursue in attempting to block the dilemma. (shrink)

Rational constructivism is one of the leading theories in developmental psychology. But it is not a purely psychological theory: rational constructivism also makes a number of substantial epistemological claims about both the nature of human rationality and several normative principles that fall squarely into the ambit of epistemology. The aim of this paper is to clarify and defend both theses and several other epistemological claims, as they represent the essential epistemological dimensions of rational constructivism.

When, why, and in what ways, do a person's errors have a bearing on whether they validly consent to another person's conduct?

This paper proposes that Levinas's philosophy of alterity and infinitude – based upon the ethical relation between Self and Other – is both profound and limited in its ability to account for social practice. Instead of simply accepting the common criticism of Levinas, however, that he places an intolerable ethical burden of infinitude upon human relations, this paper aims to move beyond this impasse by placing Levinas's metaphysics within a frame that privileges the dynamic between the Self and the Other (...) as a socially oriented, participative practice of teaching and learning. It is suggested that Etienne Wenger's work on the emergence of identity as a constant negotiation between the Others and the Self provides a conceptual framework for how business ethics may be owned, negotiated and learned within organizational communities without sacrificing the horizon of infinitude bestowed upon us by Levinas's ethical philosophy. Finally, the practical implications of such a comparative approach for the teaching of alterity in business ethics are discussed. (shrink)

When, why, and in what ways, do a person's errors have a bearing on whether they validly consent to another person's conduct?

This review article discusses Arthur Ripstein’s Kantian account of rights. Our most important rights, Ripstein argues, are determined by our independence rather than our interests. And a significant group of these rights—our rights over external things—is enforceable only in virtue of state membership. I argue that whilst independence is an important source of rights, we cannot exclude interests from an adequate account of rights, and that once this is acknowledged we will conclude that the state is less important than Ripstein (...) believes in rendering our rights enforceable. (shrink)

The central case for animalism is the ‘thinking animal problem’: if I am not an animal, this leads to an absurd multiplication of thinkers. One objection to this argument is that animalism faces a structurally analogous problem called the ‘thinking parts problem’: animalism ends up with an absurdity that any part of an animal that includes a brain can be a candidate for being a thinker. Some leading animalists try to avoid the thinking parts problem by eliminating the brain (and (...) other alleged thinking parts) from the animalist’s ontology. There are two versions of eliminativism that animalists endorse: biological eliminativism and causal eliminativism. I argue that these theories are incompatible with animalism and so do not solve the thinking parts problem. (shrink)

In this paper I explore Antony Duff’s claim that there are categorical constraints on the scope of the criminal law that are set by its internal standards. I argue against his view that such constraints are categorical, and I suggest that his account of the nature of the criminal law is partial, and narrows the focus of our enquiry into the scope of the criminal law too much. However, I suggest that the project is an important contribution to our understanding (...) of one central element of the criminal law. (shrink)

Non-Reductive Physicalism is similar in many ways with, what I will call, Orthodox Theism. This strongly suggests that Non-Reductive Physicalist solutions to the Supervenience Argument can be adapted to offer Orthodox Theistic solutions to the Conservation is Continuous Creation Argument. One particular Non-Reductive Physicalist solution will be examined in detail and then applied in the debate over Occasionalism.

Drawing on Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of double-voicedness and James Scott’s theory of public and hidden transcripts, this essay investigates the colonial context of Romans 13:1–7 with particular attention to the Roman imperial cult. It is my contention that Paul attempts to persuade the audience to resist the imperial cult, whilst negotiating colonial power and authority. It is assumed that colonial discourse is, by nature, a double-voiced discourse in that the public transcript of the dominant and the hidden transcript of the (...) suppressed coexist in a continued state of internal tension and conflict. Seen in this light, Paul as a colonised subject parodies the public transcript of the elites in his own hidden transcript. However, Paul’s doubled-voiced discourse finally turns out to be subversive against the dominant culture by suggesting that ultimate honour, fear, and authority should not be due to the rulers of the Roman Empire but to God. (shrink)

My main aims in this paper are to further clarify and defend the Duty View of punishment, outlined in my book The Ends of Harm, by responding to some objections to it, and by exploring some variations on that view. I briefly lay out some steps in the justification of punishment that I defend more completely in Chapter 12 of The Ends of Harm. I offer some further support for these steps. They justify punishment of an offender for general deterrence (...) reasons if the beneficiary of general deterrence is the victim of the crime. They do so firstly on the basis that offenders incur compensatory duties to victims. I then show that duties incurred through serious wrongdoing are not limited to the duty to provide full compensation. Because offenders incur the relevant duties, and the duties are enforceable, harming them to protect their victims does not wrong them. I then consider whether an offender can be harmed in order to protect people other than the victims of her crime. In this section, I respond to an important challenge to the general idea that we can justify punishment on the basis of duties incurred as a result of wrongdoing, a challenge that I had met only in part in The Ends of Harm. It might be argued that the duties that we incur through serious wrongdoing are owed only to victims of crime. In punishing offenders, in contrast, we aim to protect people in a society more generally, and not just crime victims. A plausible theory of punishment must demonstrate that we are justified in pursuing this aim. Hence, it might be argued, the Duty View fails. I will respond by showing that the duties incurred through wrongdoing are not limited to duties owed to victims, and hence this challenge to the Duty View can be met. (shrink)

This seventh volume of Collected Papers includes 70 papers comprising 974 pages on (theoretic and applied) neutrosophics, written between 2013-2021 by the author alone or in collaboration with the following 122 co-authors from 22 countries: Mohamed Abdel-Basset, Abdel-Nasser Hussian, C. Alexander, Mumtaz Ali, Yaman Akbulut, Amir Abdullah, Amira S. Ashour, Assia Bakali, Kousik Bhattacharya, Kainat Bibi, R. N. Boyd, Ümit Budak, Lulu Cai, Cenap Özel, Chang Su Kim, Victor Christianto, Chunlai Du, Chunxin Bo, Rituparna Chutia, Cu Nguyen Giap, Dao (...) The Son, Vinayak Devvrat, Arindam Dey, Partha Pratim Dey, Fahad Alsharari, Feng Yongfei, S. Ganesan, Shivam Ghildiyal, Bibhas C. Giri, Masooma Raza Hashmi, Ahmed Refaat Hawas, Hoang Viet Long, Le Hoang Son, Hongbo Wang, Hongnian Yu, Mihaiela Iliescu, Saeid Jafari, Temitope Gbolahan Jaiyeola, Naeem Jan, R. Jeevitha, Jun Ye, Anup Khan, Madad Khan, Salma Khan, Ilanthenral Kandasamy, W.B. Vasantha Kandasamy, Darjan Karabašević, Kifayat Ullah, Kishore Kumar P.K., Sujit Kumar De, Prasun Kumar Nayak, Malayalan Lathamaheswari, Luong Thi Hong Lan, Anam Luqman, Luu Quoc Dat, Tahir Mahmood, Hafsa M. Malik, Nivetha Martin, Mai Mohamed, Parimala Mani, Mingcong Deng, Mohammed A. Al Shumrani, Mohammad Hamidi, Mohamed Talea, Kalyan Mondal, Muhammad Akram, Muhammad Gulistan, Farshid Mofidnakhaei, Muhammad Shoaib, Muhammad Riaz, Karthika Muthusamy, Nabeela Ishfaq, Deivanayagampillai Nagarajan, Sumera Naz, Nguyen Dinh Hoa, Nguyen Tho Thong, Nguyen Xuan Thao, Noor ul Amin, Dragan Pamučar, Gabrijela Popović, S. Krishna Prabha, Surapati Pramanik, Priya R, Qiaoyan Li, Yaser Saber, Said Broumi, Saima Anis, Saleem Abdullah, Ganeshsree Selvachandran, Abdulkadir Sengür, Seyed Ahmad Edalatpanah, Shahbaz Ali, Shahzaib Ashraf, Shouzhen Zeng, Shio Gai Quek, Shuangwu Zhu, Shumaiza, Sidra Sayed, Sohail Iqbal, Songtao Shao, Sundas Shahzadi, Dragiša Stanujkić, Željko Stević, Udhayakumar Ramalingam, Zunaira Rashid, Hossein Rashmanlou, Rajkumar Verma, Luige Vlădăreanu, Victor Vlădăreanu, Desmond Jun Yi Tey, Selçuk Topal, Naveed Yaqoob, Yanhui Guo, Yee Fei Gan, Yingcang Ma, Young Bae Jun, Yuping Lai, Hafiz Abdul Wahab, Wei Yang, Xiaohong Zhang, Edmundas Kazimieras Zavadskas, Lemnaouar Zedam. (shrink)

Recent philosophical developments on personal indexicals reveal a disagreement between those who defend and those who deny the existence of a distinctive class of second person thoughts. In this piece, I tackle this controversy by highlighting two crucial constraints based on paradigmatic felicitous singular uses of the second person pronoun. On the one hand, the Addressing Constraint is brought out by the awareness and action capabilities displayed in successfully addressing another. On the other hand, the Merging Constraint arises, among other (...) things, from the fact that ‘I’/‘you’-exchanges ground intersubjective disagreement. Once these constraints are fully in view, I go on to show that they pose a challenging dilemma for any account of the second person and that the chasm between friends and foes of the distinctness of second person thought is better seen as endorsements of one of the horns of the dilemma. In reaction to this, I outline a way of accommodating both constraints in terms of ‘perspectives’, i.e. ways of thinking of a reference that do not individuate a thought. On the recommended approach, the second person perspective is cognitively distinctive but does not itself signal the existence of a distinctive second person type of thought. By contrast, a single type of thought about selves expressible with personal indexicals—the self-thought type—can be shown to comprise the third, the second and, perhaps surprisingly, the first person perspective. Unlike other perspectival approaches, the here proposed analysis relies on an elucidation of perspectives in terms of specific information on which a thinker draws made available by a concept-individuating reference rule. (shrink)

Victor Nuovo represents the philosophical thought of John Locke as the work of a Christian virtuoso: an empirical natural philosopher, who was also a practising Christian. Locke believed that the two vocations were not only compatible, but mutually sustaining, and he aspired to unite them in producing a system of Christian philosophy.

While many books on ethics contain a chapter discussing prisoners’ rights and the ethical dimensions of research involving incarcerated persons, Vulnerability and Incarceration is the first monograph devoted to the subject. Victor interrogates the concept of vulnerability to examine prisoners’ right to medical research from a novel point of view.

The Next Release Problem (NRP) is a combinatorial optimization problem that aims to find a subset of software requirements to be delivered in the next software release, which maximize the satisfaction of a list of clients and minimize the effort required by developers to implement them. Previous studies have applied various metaheuristics, mostly genetic algorithms. Estimation of Distribution Algorithms (EDA), based on probabilistic modelling, have been proved to obtain good results in problems where genetic algorithms struggle. In this paper we (...) propose to adapt three EDAs to tackle the multi-objective NRP in a fast and effective way. Results show that EDAs can be applicable to solve the NRP with rather good quality of solutions. Furthermore, we prove that their execution time can be significantly reduced using a per-iteration solution subset selection method while maintaining the overall quality of the solutions obtained, and they perform the best when limiting the search time as in an interactive tool that requires fast responsiveness. The experimental framework, code and datasets have been made public in a code repository. (shrink)

A central idea of public reason liberalism is that the exercise of political power is legitimate when supported only by reasons which all citizens accept. Public reason serves as a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of political decisions. In this paper, I examine the directive to employ public reason from the citizens’ perspective. I suggest that employing public reason potentially involves them engaging in different types of compromise. I consider how acknowledging these compromises sheds light on public reason liberalism. (...) Public reason may not offer a necessary standard for evaluating the legitimacy of decisions, and the evaluation it offers may not have great weight relative to other moral and political considerations. (shrink)

Our attitudes to wrongdoers, and what social and institutional practices we apply to them or engage them in, depend on whether (in our eyes) they are responsible for their wrongdoing. They also depend on whether we see them as fully or partially responsible agents more generally. Very crudely, we hold to account agents who are responsible for their conduct to account, where we treat the non-responsible. This chapter explores the relationship between treatment and accountability by critically engaging with P F (...) Strawson’s influential views on the issue. It argues that the appropriate distinction between treatment and accountability is based primarily on the content of interpersonal exploration of wrongdoing rather than the attitudes and practices that are involved in these practices. (shrink)