Este artículo se inscribe en el cruce de la crítica de la cultura, la filosofía política y el pensamiento utópico, y se propone tres objetivos muy concretos: 1º) Mostrar cómo el ejercicio de la dominación implica el control de la temporalidad. 2º) Dar a conocer el diagnóstico efectuado al respecto por la distopía (o utopía negativa, o utopía satírica), subgénero de la ciencia ficción especializado en esbozar representaciones de sistemas políticos explícita o implícitamente totalitarios sitos en el futuro. 3º) Valorar (...) los aciertos y errores de dicho diagnóstico contrastándolo con las transformaciones recientes de la temporalidad ligadas a las formas postmodernas de dominación. (shrink)

El libro de Alex Ibarra, Filosofía chilena. La tradición analítica en el periodo de la institucionalización de la filosofía, plantea la discusión sobre las líneas filosóficas, demostrando la existencia de cierta tradición analítica en Chile. A partir de allí, reflexionamos en torno a los procesos de constitución del campo de la filosofía en Chile como una historia atravesada por la necesidad de préstamos y cruces que impiden una delimitación clara de sus límites, lo que tornaría necesaria la atención a (...) ciertas políticas de la lectura que el libro soslaya. La productividad de la filosofía producida en Chile surgiría gracias -y no pese- a su inscripción en sus tiempos y espacios, a partir de recepciones cuya ausencia de retraso no impide el gesto de cierto re-trazo de lo leído. Alex Ibarra's exposition in his book Filosofía chilena. La tradición analítica en el periodo de la institucionalización de la filosofía, places the discussion on the philosophical traditions, showing the existence of a certain kind of analytical tradition in Chile. From there, we expose the processes of constitution of the field in Chile as a history crossed by the need of importations and intersections that contest the clear delimitation of its boundaries, what makes necessary the attention of the politics of readings that the book avoid. The productivity of the philosophic production in Chile, arises thanks to -but not in spite of- its inscription in its age/times and spaces, coming from its receptions and its differences. (shrink)

El artículo analiza el problema de la expulsión de extranjeros sospechosos de ser delincuentes o anarquistas, tomando como marco temporal la acción de la policía de Buenos Aires durante la jefatura de Francisco Beazley (1896-1904). A partir del cruce de dos tradiciones historiográficas diferentes —aquella que toma como objeto a la institución policial y el mundo del delito y la que se ha preocupado por el surgimiento del anarquismo—, busca reflexionar sobre los mecanismos de deportación de inmigrantes antes y (...) después de la aprobación de la Ley de Residencia en 1902. Si bien el foco está puesto en el accionar de la policía de Buenos Aires, una de las ideasvertebradoras del análisis es que la comprensiónde la acción policial frente a la expulsión de extranjeros requiere un estudio detenido en los enlaces entre las ciudades portuarias del litoral atlántico sudamericano y europeo. De esta manera, el artículo se propone reconstruir una cartografía de la actuación transnacional de la policía,conectando a Buenos Aires con Rio de Janeiro, Montevideo y la costa española. Para ello, se ha consultado un heterogéneo conjunto de fuentes que van desde informes consulares y prensa policial, hasta periódicos de Brasil y Argentina, pasando por escritos anarquistas y socialistas. (shrink)

How can science be brought to connect with experience? This book addresses two of the most challenging problems facing contemporary neurobiology and cognitive science. Firstly, understanding how we unconsciously execute habitual actions as a result of neurological and cognitive processes that are not formal actions of conscious judgment but part of a habitual nexus of systematic self-organization. Secondly, attempting to create an ethics adequate to our present awareness that there is no such thing as a transcendental self, a stable subject (...) or soul. The author combines researches in cognitive science and phenomenology with two representatives of what he calls the 'wisdom traditions': Confucianism and Buddhist epistemology. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is analyzing to which extent the multiverse hypothesis provides a real explanation of the peculiarities of the laws and constants in our universe. First we argue in favor of the thesis that all multiverses except Tegmark’s “mathematical multiverse” are too small to explain the fine tuning, so that they merely shift the problem up one level. But the “mathematical multiverse" is surely too large. To prove this assessment, we have performed a number of experiments with (...) cellular automata of complex behavior, which can be considered as universes in the mathematical multiverse. The analogy between what happens in some automata (in particular Conway’s “Game of Life") and the real world is very strong. But if the results of our experiments can be extrapolated to our universe, we should expect to inhabit—in the context of the multiverse—a world in which at least some of the laws and constants of nature should show a certain time dependence. Actually, the probability of our existence in a world such as ours would be mathematically equal to zero. In consequence, the results presented in this paper can be considered as an inkling that the hypothesis of the multiverse, whatever its type, does not offer an adequate explanation for the peculiarities of the physical laws in our world. (shrink)

In section 1 we present moral constructivism as a metaphysical project which grounds moral norms in the attitude of valuing by rational agents. In section 2 we establish that Kantian Constructivism – opposed to Humean Constructivism – seeks objective and universal moral norms through a process of rational construction and ratification of norms that does not draw on any kind of subjective attitude of valuing. In section 3 we explore whether Kant is a moral constructivist or moral realist, arguing that (...) he might be read as a proto-moral constructivist whose formulas impose standards of correctness upon our moral judgments, from which we formulate moral norms as necessary facts of reason. In section 4 we argue that: 1) vulnerabilities have moral relevance which adds merit to the project of finding objective moral norms, and 2) the inclusion of vulnerabilities as empirical contingencies is compatible with Kantian Constructivism. We do so by considering vulnerabilities a constitutive aspect of finite rational agents which must, therefore, be implied and considered in the process of moral construction. (shrink)

The new biotechnology raises expectations for modifying human behaviour through its use. This article focuses on the ethical analysis of the not so remote possibility of rehabilitating criminals by means of neurotechnological techniques. The analysis is carried out from a synthetic position of, on the one hand, the consequentialist conception of what is right and, on the other hand, the emphasis on individual liberties. As a result, firstly, the ethical appropriateness of adopting a general predisposition for allowing the neurorehabilitation of (...) prisoners only if it is safe and if they give their consent will be defended. But, at the same time, reasons will be given for requiring, in certain circumstances, the exceptional use of neurotechnology to rehabilitate severely psychopathic prisoners, even against their will, from the same ethical perspective. (shrink)

In his posthumous work Power and Prosperity , the economist Mancur Olson asked why the economies of many of those countries of the former Soviet Union and other emergent countries that had at last adapted to the theoretical and practical presuppositions of the market economy had not seen themselves, notwithstanding, recompensed with the prosperity that this economic model promises to all those who follow its rules. The core of the answer was in a long paragraph that is perhaps elemental to (...) a jurist but may be original and worth remembering as an innovative thesis in the world of economists. (shrink)

The target article concludes that it is essential to introduce the personal level in cognitive science. We propose to take this conclusion one step further. The personal level should consist of first-person accounts of specific, contextualized experiences, not abstract or imagined cases. Exploring first-person accounts at their own level of detail calls for the refinements of method that can link up with neural accounts.

El fracaso político de la Revolución francesa deja un regusto amargo de que el problema del ser humano se encuentra en la Modernidad y, concretamente, en la escisión radical que abre la conciencia. Los ideales del Bien y la Verdad son señaladas como formas muertas, carentes de potencia erótica, inservibles para movilizar al ser y, por tanto, anacrónicos para una época que quiere despertar bajo el signo de la Belleza. Un joven Schelling escribe bajo este sol naciente una obra en (...) la que el arte aparece como una praxis capaz de suturar aquella herida que abre la conciencia. La imaginación y la síntesis poética son elementos ineludibles en el transitar por una vida humana que busca su plenitud en el retorno a la unidad originaria con lo Absoluto. El gesto del genio artístico será el privilegiado para este tránsito al origen. (shrink)

El ensayo ofrece una lectura de la tragedia Woyzeck, del dramaturgo alemán del siglo XIX Georg Büchner. Se intenta mostrar que la obra de ficción constituye una suerte de antípoda respecto de su fuente de inspiración: el informe psiquiátrico que precipitó la condena del sujeto histórico que da título al drama. En esta perspectiva, se propone como clave de lectura el complejo de variaciones que aporta la obra en torno al tópico o la figura de la animalidad como fuerza neutra, (...) impensable e incontrolable que no solo arrastra al protagonista hacia la desgracia, sino que además opera como principio dinámico de toda la galería de personajes. The essay offers a reading of the Woyzeck tragedy, by the XIX century German playwright Georg Büchner. It intends to portray that the fictional work constitutes a sort of antipodes in relation to its source of inspiration: the psychiatric report that precipitated the sentence of the historical subject, which gives the title to the drama. On this point of view, a reading codeis proposed from the set of variations that the play contributes to the subject or the figure of animality. As a neutral, inconceivable, and uncontrollable force, which not only pulls the protagonist towards tragedy, but also functions as a dynamic principle of the complete rangeof characters. (shrink)

En este trabajo me propongo comparar el patrón argumentativo de los sofistas del siglo V a. C. tal como son retratados en la obra de Platón con el de los erísticos del _Eutidemo_. Defenderé que ninguno de estos sofistas es presentado por Platón como experto en dialéctica refutativa, actividad discursiva que caracteriza a la erística. Por el contrario, el retrato platónico de Pródico, Hipias, Gorgias y Protágoras los muestra como incapaces, desinteresados u hostiles a la argumentación de tipo dialéctica.

What would it mean for an emotion to successfully “recognize” something about an object toward which it is directed? Although the notion of "emotional recognition" is central to Rick Furtak’s _Knowing Emotions_, the text does not provide an account of this concept that enables us to assess the extent to which a given emotional response is recognitive. This article draws from the text to articulate a novel account of emotional recognition. According to this account, emotional recognition can be assessed not (...) only in terms of the “accuracy” of an emotional construal in a strictly epistemological sense, but also in terms of the quasi-ethical ideal of responding emotionally to what we encounter in ways that are “specific,” “deep," and “balanced.". (shrink)

RESUMEN Una interpretación extendida del Eutidemo sostiene que la práctica erística de la cual Platón busca distanciarse en el diálogo constituye una referencia velada a la dialéctica desarrollada por el socrático Euclides y sus seguidores megáricos. No obstante, los expertos reconocen que la segunda demostración erística pone en boca de Eutidemo y Dionisodoro dos posiciones que fueron defendidas por Antístenes, según las cuales no es posible decir falsedades ni contradecir. Este trabajo busca analizar las refutaciones de dicha sección y confrontarlas (...) con los testimonios sobre Antístenes a fin de evaluar hasta qué punto nos encontramos en presencia de los mismos argumentos. Defenderé que si bien las refutaciones del Eutidemo poseen una inspiración antisténica, principalmente respecto de las tesis que buscan sostener, las mismas se basan en una serie de supuestos ambiguos que responden más a los lineamientos de la práctica erística que a los fundamentos del pensamiento antisténico. Argumentaré, asimismo, que esta diferencia podría explicarse a partir del hecho de que el Eutidemo puede ser leído como una respuesta al Encomio de Helena de Isócrates, en donde este ataca a los socráticos por dedicarse a la erística y al desarrollo de doctrinas paradójicas, entre las cuales incluye las tesis de Antístenes. ABSTRACT A widespread interpretation of the Euthydemus claims that the Eristic practice from which Plato seeks to distance himself in the dialogue constitutes a veiled reference to the dialectics developed by the Socratic Euclid and his Megarian followers. However, experts acknowledge that the second Eristic demonstration puts two positions in the mouth of Euthydemus and Dionysodorus which were defended by Antisthenes, according to which it is not possible to say falsehoods nor to contradict. This work seeks to analyze the refutations of this section and compare them with the testimonies about Antisthenes in order to evaluate to what extent they are the same arguments. I will defend that although the refutations of the Euthydemus have an Antisthenic inspiration, mainly with respect to the theses they seek to support, these are based on a series of ambiguous assumptions that correspond more to the principles of Eristics than to the grounds of Antisthenic thought. I will also argue that the difference could be explained by the fact that the Euthydemus can be understood as a response to Isocrates ’ Encomium of Helen, where he attacks the whole Socratic circle for devoting to Eristics and to the development of paradoxical doctrines, including the theses of the Antisthesis. (shrink)

This paper sets forth a familiar theme, that science essentially consists of two interdependent episodes, one imaginative, the other critical. Hypotheses and other imaginative conjectures are the initial stage of scientific inquiry because they provide the incentive to seek the truth and a clue as to where to find it. But scientific conjectures must be subject to critical examination and empirical testing. There is a dialogue between the two episodes; observations made to test a hypothesis are the inspiration for new (...) conjectures. Inductive generalizations may also inspire hypotheses, but cannot validate them. A hypothesis is empirically tested by ascertaining whether or not predictions about the world of experience deduced from the hypothesis agree with what is actually observed. This has been appropriately considered the 'criterion of demarcation' that distinguishes science from other knowledge. But scientific hypotheses must satisfy other tests as well, e.g., whether they have explanatory value and further understanding. I briefly explore such issues as verifiability and falsifiability, empirical content and truthfulness, contingency and certainty, fact and theory, error and fraud. Science like any human activity is subject to error and to the foibles and other failings of human beings. But severe attempts of empirical falsification and other trials yield knowledge that stands the test of time and provides a foothold for further knowledge. Moreover, scientists have developed social mechanisms, such as peer review and publication, to evaluate their work. Because the research of scientists depends on the validity of previous knowledge, it is of great consequence that they discern valid from invalid knowledge and thus scientists are inclined to transcend ideology, nationality, friendship, monetary interest and other prejudices when the mettle of scientific knowledge is at stake. I use historical examples to illustrate some relevant aspects of scientific practice: its success (Mendel), misrepresentation (Darwin), ideological abuse (Lysenko), arrogant violation of the requirement of testing (Koch), theory replacement (Priestly and Lavoisier, Newton and Einstein), and the indispensability of context (Oswald Avery and Alfred Wegener). (shrink)

Stephen Jay Gould’s monumental The Structure of Evolutionary Theory ‘‘attempts to expand and alter the premises of Darwinism, in order to build an enlarged and distinctive evolutionary theory . . . while remaining within the tradition, and under the logic, of Darwinian argument.’’ The three branches or ‘‘fundamental principles of Darwinian logic’’ are, according to Gould: agency (natural selection acting on individual organisms), efficacy (producing new species adapted to their environments), and scope (accumulation of changes that through geological time yield (...) the living world’s panoply of diversity and morphological complexity). Gould’s efforts to contribute something important to each of these three fundamental components of Darwinian Theory are far from successful. (shrink)

El presente artículo recoge una conferencia inédita. Por un lado, el autor se centra en examinar los usos impropios de la noción de dialéctica, rechazando su concepción como lógica alternativa a la formal, como ciencia o como método en un sentido estricto. Por otro lado, muestra una caracterización de la dialéctica como una «metódica» en sentido amplio que se propone captar totalidades concretas en su despliegue desde un punto de vista materialista, histórico y crítico, con finalidades emancipatorias, cuya cientificidad sólo (...) podría admitirse si se entiende en un sentido subordinado. (shrink)