We amplify possible complications to the tidy division between early vision and later categorisation which arise when we consider the perception of human faces. Although a primitive face-detecting system, used for social attention, may indeed be integral to “early vision,” the relationship between this and diverse other uses made of information from faces is far from clear.

"For thirty-four years, from 1962 to 1996, the Open Court Publishing Company sold elementary math and reading textbooks that tried to combat the culture and bring about real school reform. Stories from the company's struggles help make this culture visible." "In Let's Kill Dick and Jane, Harold Henderson gives a historical, yet personal, portrait from the company's beginnings through all the financial and cultural travails and its sale in 1996 to McGraw-Hill. It shows how a company of idealistic (...) pragmatists can chip away at the edifice of mediocrity that has become American education."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

Transhumanism advances an ideology promising a positive human advance through the application of new and as yet unrealized technologies. Underlying the whole is a libertarian ethos married to a very Christian eschatology promising a miraculous transformation that will answer human needs and redress human failings. In this paper, the supposedly scientific basis on which transhumanist promises are built is critiqued as futurist imaginings with little likelihood of actualization. Transhumanists themselves are likened to the affable con man Professor Harold (...) class='Hi'>Hill who, in The Music Man, describes as dire social problems whose solution is a youth band he seeks to sell but has no intention of building. Even were some of the transhumanist imaginings to be realized, I argue, the result would be a dystopia in which the few received benefits denied to the many. In advancing imaginary technologies as a solution to human needs, transhumanists and their bioethical fellow travelers handily avoid discussion of or advocacy for the kind of pedestrian social actions that demonstrably could achieve many of their purported goals. So their enthusiasms, I conclude, are not merely fanciful but damaging to the humanist goals they pretend to advance. (shrink)

In recent years largely due to the seminal work of Kit Fine and that of Jonathan Lowe there has been a resurgence of interest in the concept of essence and the project of explaining de re necessity in terms of it. Of course, Quine rejected what he called Aristotelian essentialism in his battle against quantified modal logic. But what he and Kripke debated was a notion of essence defined in terms of de re necessity. The new Aristotelian essentialists regard essence (...) as entailing but prior in the order of explanation to de re necessity. In what follows I argue that the concept of essence so understood has not been adequately explained and that any attempt to explain it, at least along the lines most familiar from the literature, must be flagrantly circular or make use of de re modal notions. (shrink)

Examples suggest that one and the same A may be different Bs, and hence that there is some sort of incompleteness in the unqualified statement that x and y are the same which needs to be eliminated by answering the question “the same what?” One way to make this more precise is by appeal to Geach's idea that identity is relative. In this paper I evaluate Geach's relative identity thesis.

How is the debate between presentism and eternalism to be characterized? It is usual to suggest that this debate about time is analogous to the debate between the actualist and the possibilist about modality. I think that this suggestion is right. In what follows I pursue the analogy more strictly than is usual and offer a characterization of what is at the core of the dispute between presentists and eternalists that may be immune to worries often raised about the substantiality (...) of the debate. I suggest that the debate be characterized in Lewisean terms and define positions I call *Lewisean* eternalism and anti-*Lewisean*' presentism (analogous to Lewisean possibilism and anti-Lewisean actualism). I explain some advantages of the proposal and discuss some objections. I conclude that pursuing the analogy strictly offers the prospect of giving clear sense to a controversy which otherwise seems to many deeply obscure. (shrink)

There is a well-developed literature on trust. In his important article Faulkner, 424−429, 2015) distinguishes three-place, two-place and one-place trust predicates. He then argues that our more basic notions of trust are expressed by the one-place and two-place predicates. Three-place trust, contractual trust, is not fundamental. This matters. Having a clear understanding of our concepts of trust is important. The most important assumption of Faulkner’s argument is that the notion of trust expressed by the three-place predicate is not attitudinal; it (...) is a ‘metaphysical hybrid of attitude and action’. I argue that this is wrong. All three notions are attitudinal and no reason exists to deny that the one-place and two-place notions derive from the three-place one. Once one rejects Faulkner’s assumption that the three-place notion can be separated off from the others as a metaphysical hybrid argument for the priority of the one-place and two-place notions collapses. (shrink)

Divers presents a set of de re modal truths which, he claims, are inconvenient for Lewisean modal realism. We argue that there is no inconvenience for Lewis.

According to the presentist the present time is the only one that there is. Nevertheless, things persist. Most presentists think that things persist by enduring. Employing E. J. Lowe’s notion of identity-dependence, Jonathan Tallant argues that presentism is incompatible with any notion of persistence, even endurance. This consequence of Lowe’s ideas, if soundly drawn, is important. The presentist who chooses to deny persistence outright is a desperate figure. However, though Lowe’s notion is a legitimate and worthwhile one, this application is (...) faulty. The incompatibility of presentism and persistence is not part of Lowe’s heritage. A positive conclusion can be drawn. A form of persistence is compatible with presentism. It is one on which persistence is defined in tensed terms using an adverbial tense operator: x persists iff x exists and existed or will exist. Unsurprisingly, so understood persistence is endurance. The commonly held view is correct. (shrink)

Mysteries: remains of a hidden life -- Words on paper -- In search of a person behind the words -- A France of broken families -- Families -- Politiques -- Breaking with his father -- Aristocratic Paris -- Libertine Paris -- A political education -- Gearing up for war: mathematical inspirations -- Breda -- Military engineering -- Meeting Isaac Beeckman -- The Holy Roman empire -- Anxious dreams -- Curious meetings -- War and diplomacy in Europe -- Into Bohemia -- (...) To Hungary and disaster -- The Baltic and return to the Netherlands -- Again in France -- Paris and the rosicrucian scare -- The Valtellina and Rome -- The struggle for France -- Problems with the cardinal -- The campaign for La Rochelle -- Confrontation and departure -- The meetings -- Confrontation and conversation -- Becoming a sectarian -- Feeling threatened -- Exile -- Not yet concluded. (shrink)

What is the difference between the complex view of personal identity over time and the simple view? Traditionally, the defenders of the complex view are said to include Locke and Hume, defenders of the simple view to include Butler and Reid. In our own time it is standard to think of Chisholm and Swinburne as defenders of the simple view and Shoemaker, Parfit, Williams and Lewis as defenders of the complex view. But how exactly is the distinction to be characterized? (...) One difference between the two camps is that defenders of the simple view emphasize the difference between diachronic personal identity and the identity of other objects; they insist that in the case of the other familiar types that figure in philosophical puzzle cases about identity – ships, statues, plants and so on – the correct view is the complex one. On the other hand, defenders of the complex view do not hold a simple view of other things; rather they think that the complex view is correct across the board. We therefore need an account of the distinction which allows us to speak generally of ‘the complex/simple view of the diachronic identity of things of sort S’ where ‘S’ is a sortal term. A respectable view about problems of identity in general is that there aren’t any: any genuine philosophical puzzles can be rephrased so that the language of identity drops out. In what follows, I offer an account of the simple/complex contrast which conforms to this Lewisean view. 1 We can begin by distinguishing two types of constraint on personhood. Type, or synchronic constraints, are capturable in the form: If x is a person, then if x exists at t, Fxt where ‘ F represents a term for a non-historical property, a property …. (shrink)

Platonic discourses concerning the soul are incredibly rich and multitiered. Plato's own diverse and disparate arguments and images offer competing accounts of how we are to understand the nature of the soul. Consequently, it should come as no surprise that the accounts of Platonists who engage Plato’s dialogues are often riddled with questions. This volume takes up the theories of well-known philosophers and theologians, including Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, the emperor Julian, and Origen, as well as lesser-known but equally important figures (...) in a collection of essays on topics such as transmigration of the soul, the nature of the Platonist enlightenment experience, soul and gender, pagan ritual practices, Christian and pagan differences about the soul, mental health and illness, and many other topics. Contributors include Crystal Addey, Sara Ahbel-Rappe, Dirk Baltzly, Robert Berchman, Jay Bregman, Luc Brisson, Kevin Corrigan, John Dillon, John F. Finamore, Lloyd P. Gerson, Dorian Gieseler Greenbaum, Elizabeth Hill, Sarah Klitenic Wear, Danielle A. Layne, Ilaria L. E. Ramelli, Gregory Shaw, Svetla Slaveva-Griffine, Suzanne Stern-Gillet, Harold Tarrant, Van Tu, and John D. Turner. (shrink)

The famous eastern tour of inspection undertaken by Scipio Aemilianus, L. Metellus Calvus and Sp. Mummius is now generally dated 140/39 b.c., where Diodorus seems to put it. The accepted view, however, involves discounting an explicit statement by Cicero. It also presents historical difficulties. In 140 b.c. there was no need for such a high-powered Roman initiative, and scholars can discover only very minor political results. Sherwin-White indeed criticised the envoys severely, especially Scipio; they were culpably blind to the new (...) menace of Parthia, which was steadily dismembering the Seleucid Empire east of the Euphrates. This is fair criticism only on the 140/39 b.c. dating. Did Scipio and his colleagues fail to see what is patent to us today? It is time to reexamine rigorously the underlying assumption. In Acad. prior. 2.5 Cicero defends a Roman noble's love of Greek learning in the following terms: ego autem cum Graecas litteras M. Catonem in senectute didicisse acceperim, P. autem Africani historiae loquantur in legatione illa nobili, quam ante censuram obiit, Panaetium unum omnino comitem fuisse, nec litterarum Graecarum nee philosophiae iam ullum auctorem requiro. The date of the embassy must be 144/3 b.c., if we follow the logic of this passage. Scipio was censor with L. Mummius in 142/1 b.c. and their public quarrel was hardly less notable than the embassy, in which L. Mummius' brother shared. Another Ciceronian passage – written some six years earlier – seems to contradict the dating offered in 45 b.c. In de republica 6.11 the elder Africanus prophesies his grandson's future greatness in the famous dream. (shrink)

This short political pamphlet has survived to our day through the lucky chance of being included in the minor works of Xenophon, and for over 150 years it has been the subject of lively scholarly debate. The unknown author was a confirmed oligarch, but with an insider's insight into Athenian democracy. Though he cannot approve of this form of government, he is astute enough to see that the system works well on its own terms and that it is therefore popular; (...) it will prove very hard to overthrow. The work has proved difficult to tie down to an historical context. (shrink)

Strong pluralists hold that not even permanent material coincidence is enough for identity. Strong pluralism entails the possibility of purely material objects -- even if not coincident -- alike in all general respects, categorial and dispositional, relational and non-relational, past, present and future, at the microphysical level, but differing in some general modal, counterfactual or dispositional repscts at the macrophysical level. It is objectionable because it thus deprives us of the explanatory resources to explain why evident absurdities are absurd. A (...) second objection is to the suggestion that cases involving artefacts can illustrate strong pluralism. This offends against the principle that gien a complex intrinsic microphysical property instantiated in some regiion, the number of material things possessing it in that region cannot depend on the existence and nature of intentional activity taking place outside it. (shrink)

In Chapter 12 of his book Material Beings (Van Inwagen, Peter. 1990. Material Beings. Ithaca: Cornell University Press) van Inwagen argues that there are no artefacts, or very few, certainly fewer than most people believe. Artisans very rarely create, at least in the sense of causing things to come into existence. The argument in Chapter 12 is a very powerful one. I do not think that it establishes van Inwagen’s conclusion, but it does, I think, given its (plausible) premise, establish (...) that if there are not far fewer material things in the world than we ordinarily believe, then there are far more. In this sense it establishes, as Russell once said, ‘the truth about physical objects must be strange’. Furthermore, I argue at the end, we cannot avoid this conclusion even if we reject van Inwagen’s premise. Thus the defender of our common sense ontology is caught on the horns of a dilemma. So our commonsense ontology is indefensible. (shrink)

I respond to criticisms by David Mackie of my previous paper on animalism and Lockeanism. I argue that the ‘transplant intuition’, that a person goes where his brain (or cerebrum) goes, is compatible both with animalism and Lockeanism. I give three arguments for this conclusion, two of them developing lines of thought in Parfit's work. However, I accept that animalism and Lockeanism are incompatible, and I go on to consider the difficulties for Lockeanism that this raises. The principal difficulty, concerning (...) the reference of ‘I’, can be met by distinguishing the thinker of an ‘I’‐thought from the reference of an ‘I’‐thought. The reference is always the person thinking the thought, but when the thought is simultaneously that of an animal coincident but non‐identical with that person, there is not a unique thinker. Mackie's criticisms of this view are ineffective. (shrink)

Stephen Tracy's neat demonstration that IG I3 35—authorizing the building of a temple and appointment of a priestess for Athena Nike—was cut by the man responsible for the Promachos accounts at first seemed decisive for the traditional c. 448 B.C. against my radical down-dating. Ira Mark then argued that this decree provided for the naiskos and altar of his Stage III in the 440s: the marble temple belonged to Stage IV over twenty years later. Despite these two powerful interventions the (...) matter is not closed. David Gill has, I fancy, convincingly refuted Mark on archaeological and architectural grounds. And there is still more to be said from the epigraphic angle. IG I 36, cut on the back of the stele, looks like a delayed rider to 35. But just how delayed was it? It arranged for the regular payment of the priestess's salary by the kolakretai in office in the month Thargelion. On the traditional view the gap would be close to a quarter of a century, since 36 is firmly dated 424/3 B.C. This is quite extraordinary, though reasons have been found for it. More serious perhaps is some neglected epigraphic evidence. We have eighteen other examples in fifth-century Attic epigraphy where decrees are followed on the same stone by other texts; but virtually all the gaps are short, never more than a few years. The relevant texts are IG I 4, 11/12, 41, 42/43, 52 A–B, 59, 61, 66, 68, 71, 72, 73, 89, 93, 101, 127/II1, 156, 1454. It is true that 42/43 are dated c. 445–442 and c. 435–427 B.C. in IG I, but this is quite arbitrary. (shrink)

There can be no doubt of the primacy of Andronicus in Roman literature, but there is an interesting and unorthodox ancient tradition concerning his date. Modern scholars incline to place Andronicus' birth about 285 B.C. and to postulate either that he came to Rome as a slave from Tarentum in 272 B.C., or that the story of his captivity is a fiction. His first play was produced in 240 B.C.

I Should have known better than to revive Carcopino's heresy on the Lex Bembina Repetundarum. My attempt to rob C. Gracchus of this important measure and restore it to Glaucia met with universal disbelief. Soon a powerful counter-attack followed in learned publications. There may seem little left to say. Certainly it would be pointless to go over the old arguments yet again. My only excuse for perseverance is that I have new material. For my readers' convenience I group it under (...) five main heads. (shrink)

Two declarative sentences are synonymous if, and only if, the statements they can be used to make are. given certain assumptions about the truth or falsity of other statements, confirmed or disconfirmed to the same degree by the same evidence. This criterion of synonymy is Quinean in that it treats confirmation holistically. But unlike Quine's criterion of synonymy, it conforms to and explains our intuitions of sentence synonymy.

We wanted to gather recent results supporting the idea of the central role of sharing agency in socioaffective and motivational information processing. Here, we want to support the idea that this process is quite arbitrary, early in the temporal chain of processes and not only influence the psychological, but also the motor correlates of socioaffective information processes.