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  1. added 2019-11-04
    Are There Epistemic Conditions Necessary for Demonstrative Thought?Michael Barkasi - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    Starting with Gareth Evans, there’s an important tradition of theorizing about perception-based demonstrative thought which assigns necessary epistemic conditions to it. Its core idea is that demonstrative reference in thought is grounded in information links, understood as links which carry reliable information about their targets and which a subject exploits for demonstrative reference by tokening the mental files fed by these links. Perception, on these views, is not fundamental to perception-based demonstrative thought but is only the information link exploited in (...)
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  2. added 2019-06-05
    Object-Dependent Thoughts.Sean Crawford - 2005 - In Keith Brown (ed.), The Encyclopaedia of Language and Linguistics, 2nd ed. Elsevier.
    The theory of object-dependent singular thought is outlined and the central motivation for it, turning on the connection between thought content and truth conditions, is discussed. Some of its consequences for the epistemology of thought are noted and connections are drawn to the general doctrine of externalism about thought content. Some of the main criticisms of the object-dependent view of singular thought are outlined. Rival conceptions of singular thought are also sketched and their problems noted.
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  3. added 2019-02-14
    Puzzling Pierre and Intentional Identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):861-875.
    This paper concerns Kripke’s puzzle about belief. I have two goals in this paper. The first is to argue that two leading approaches to Kripke’s puzzle, those of Lewis and Chalmers, are inadequate as they stand. Both approaches require the world to supply an object that the relevant intentional attitudes pick out. The problem is that there are cases which, I argue, exhibit the very same puzzling phenomenon in which the world does not supply an object in the required way. (...)
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  4. added 2018-12-17
    Singular Thoughts and de Re Attitude Reports.James Openshaw - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):415-437.
    It is widely supposed that if there is to be a plausible connection between the truth of a de re attitude report about a subject and that subject’s possession of a singular thought, then ‘acquaintance’-style requirements on singular thought must be rejected. I show that this belief rests on poorly motivated claims about how we talk about the attitudes. I offer a framework for propositional attitude reports which provides both attractive solutions to recalcitrant puzzle cases and the key to preserving (...)
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  5. added 2018-10-15
    Secondary Belief Content, What is It Good For?Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1467-1476.
    Some use the need to explain communication, agreement, and disagreement to argue for two-dimensional conceptions of belief content. One prominent defender of an account of this sort is David Chalmers. Chalmers claims that beliefs have two kinds of content. The second dimension of belief content, which is tied to what beliefs pick out in the actual world, is supposed to help explain communication, agreement, and disagreement. I argue that it does not. Since the need to explain these phenomena is the (...)
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  6. added 2018-02-05
    An Object-Dependent Perspective on Joint Attention.John Campbell - forthcoming - In Axel Seemann (ed.), Joint Attention: New Developments in Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience. The MIT Press.
  7. added 2018-02-05
    Schiffer's Puzzle: A Kind of Fregean Response.Ray Buchanan - forthcoming - In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things. Oxford University Press.
    In ‘What Reference Has to Tell Us about Meaning’, Stephen Schiffer argues that many of the objects of our beliefs, and the contents of our assertoric speech acts, have what he calls the relativity feature. A proposition has the relativity feature just in case it is an object-dependent proposition ‘the entertainment of which requires different people, or the same person at different times or places, to think of [the relevant object] in different ways’ (129). But as no Fregean or Russellian (...)
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  8. added 2018-02-05
    Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory.Sean Crawford - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):439-457.
    The paper presents a new theory of perceptual demonstrative thought, the property-dependent theory. It argues that the theory is superior to both the object-dependent theory (Evans, McDowell) and the object-independent theory (Burge).
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  9. added 2018-02-05
    Object‐Dependent Thought Without Illusion.Solveig Aasen - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):68-84.
    When unknowingly experiencing a perceptual hallucination, a subject can attempt to think specifically about what is, as far as he or she can tell, the perceived object. Is the subject then deceived about his or her cognitive situation? I answer negatively. Moreover, I argue that this answer is compatible with holding that thought specifically about a certain object – singular thought – is object-dependent. By contrast, both critics and advocates of the view that singular thought is object-dependent have assumed this (...)
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  10. added 2018-02-05
    Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective.Assaf Weksler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):91-103.
    According to an influential philosophical view I call “the relational properties view”, “perspectival” properties, such as the elliptical appearance of a tilted coin, are relational properties of external objects. Philosophers have assessed this view on the basis of phenomenological, epistemological or other purely philosophical considerations. My aim in this paper is to examine whether it is possible to evaluate RPV empirically. In the first, negative part of the paper I consider and reject a certain tempting way of doing so. In (...)
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  11. added 2018-02-05
    Representationalism and the Perspectival Character of Perceptual Experience.René Jagnow - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):227-249.
    Perceptual experiences inform us about objective properties of things in our environment. But they also have perspectival character in the sense that they differ phenomenally when objects are viewed from different points of view. Contemporary representationalists hold, at a minimum, that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content. Thus, in order to account for perspectival character, they need to indentify a type of representational content that changes in appropriate ways with the perceiver’s point of view. Many representationlists, including Shoemaker and Lycan, (...)
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  12. added 2018-02-05
    Perspectival Truth and Perspectival Realism.Giuliano Torrengo - 2010 - In François Recanati, Isidora Stojanovic & Neftali Villanueva (eds.), Context-Dependence, Perspective and Relativity. Mouton de Gruyter. pp. 6--333.
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  13. added 2018-02-05
    Do Object-Dependent Properties Threaten Physicalism?Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (11):610-614.
    Thomas Hofweber argues that the thesis of direct reference is incompatible with physicalism, the claim that the nonphysical supervenes on the physical. According to Hofweber, direct reference implies that some physical objects have object-dependent properties, such as being Jones’s brother, which depend on particular objects for their existence and identity. Hofweber contends that if some physical objects have object-dependent properties, then Local-Local Supervenience (the physicalist doctrine on which he concentrates) fails. In this note, we argue that Hofweber has failed to (...)
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  14. added 2018-02-05
    The Role of Object-Dependent Content in Psychological Explanation.Sarah Sawyer - 2006 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):181-192.
    This is a defence of the role of object-dependent content in psychological action. I argue against the two-list argument against object-dependent content as articulated by Noonan.
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  15. added 2018-02-05
    Evans and the Sense of "I".José Luis Bermúdez - 2005 - In Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press.
    This paper focuses on two enduring features of Gareth Evans’s work. The first is his rethinking of standard ways of understanding the Fregean notion of sense and the second his sustained attempt to undercut the standard opposition between Russellian and Fregean approaches to understanding thought and language.I explore the peculiar difficulties that ‘I’ poses for a Fregean theory and show how Evans’s account of the sense of the first person pronoun can be modified to meet those difficulties.
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  16. added 2018-02-05
    Thought, Reference and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans.José Luis Bermúdez (ed.) - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Thought, Reference, and Experience is a collection of important new essays on topics at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. The starting-point for the papers is the brilliant work of the British philosopher Gareth Evans before his untimely death in 1980 at the age of 34. Evans's work on reference and singular thought transformed the Fregean approach to the philosophy of thought and language, showing how seemingly technical issues in philosophical semantics are inextricably linked (...)
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  17. added 2018-02-05
    Frege and Object Dependent Propositions.Heimir Geirsson - 2002 - Dialectica 56 (4):299–314.
    Gareth Evans and John McDowell have challenged the traditional reading of Frege according to which Frege accepted propositions that are not object dependent, i.e., propositions that can exist even though the proper names that occur in the sentences that express them do not refer. A consequence of the Evans‐McDowell interpretation of Frege is that if someone hallucinates that there is an oasis in front of her, then there is no thought of an oasis but only an illusion of a thought. (...)
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  18. added 2018-02-05
    On the Individuation of Fregean Propositions.João Branquinho - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:17-27.
    The aim of the paper is to sketch a principle of individuation that is intended to serve the Fregean notion of a proposition, a notion I take for granted. A salient feature of Fregean propositions, i.e. complexes of modes of presentation of objects, is that they are fine-grained items, so fine-grained that even synonymous sentences might express different Fregean propositions. My starting point is the principle labelled by Gareth Evans the Intuitive Criterion of Difference for Thoughts, which states that it (...)
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  19. added 2018-02-05
    Object Dependent Thoughts, Perspectival Thoughts, and Psychological Generalization.Max F. Adams, R. Stecker & G. Fuller - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (1):47-59.
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  20. added 2018-02-05
    Object Dependent Thoughts, Perspectival Thoughts, and Psychological Generalization.R. Stecker Max F. Adams - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (1):47-59.
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  21. added 2018-02-05
    Object Dependent Thoughts, Perspectival Thoughts, and Psychological Generalization.Max F. Adams, R. Stecker & G. Fuller - 1999 - Dialectica 53 (1):47–59.
  22. added 2018-02-05
    The Role of Object-Dependent Singular Thought in Visual Cognition.Gregory David Gilson - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison
    This dissertation investigates various theoretical defenses or explanations which have been provided to the classic philosophic question: what are the objects of perception? Traditionally two general answers have been provided: direct and indirect realism. Direct realists maintain that the objects of perception are external, medium sized material objects. The arguments from illusion and secondary qualities are thought to provide counterexamples to this common sense approach. Indirect realism has grown out of the perceived difficulty posed by illusions and secondary qualities. According (...)
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  23. added 2018-02-05
    Object‐Dependent and Property Dependent Contents.Gianfranco Soldati Manfred Bruns - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):185-208.
    SummaryIn a theory of representational or intentional states content is generally supposed to play various roles. It has to be the bearer of a truth‐value, it has to determine the way a representation is about something , and finally it has to 6e used in order to give intra‐ and interpersonal psychological explanations. It has been argued that no unique kind of content can play all these roles. What criterion should one adopt in order to draw the dividing line? We (...)
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  24. added 2018-02-05
    Perspectival Thoughts and Psychological Generalizations.Eros Corazza - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):307-36.
    SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalizations in a straightforward way; do not need to be fully articulated and, as such, fit with an economical (...)
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  25. added 2018-02-05
    Object-Dependent and Property Dependent Contents.Manfred Bruns - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3):185.
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  26. added 2018-02-05
    Perspectival Thoughts and Psychological Generalizations.Eros Corazza - 1994 - Dialectica 48 (3-4):307-336.
    SummaryAgainst an externalist view popularized, among others, by Evans and McDowell I shall show fiat object‐dependent thoughts are psychologically spurious. This version of externalism is contrasted with the picture that thoughts are object‐independent. It is argued that object‐independent thoughts are perspectival and context‐sensitive and that these perspectival thoughts, unlike object‐dependent thoughts: deal with delusion in an intuitive and elegant way; support psychological generalizations in a straightforward way; do not need to be fully articulated and, as such, fit with an economical (...)
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  27. added 2018-02-05
    Object-Dependent Thoughts: A Case of Superficial Necessity but Deep Contingency?Harold W. Noonan - 1993 - In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
  28. added 2018-02-05
    Object-Dependent Thoughts and Psychological Redundancy.Harold W. Noonan - 1991 - Analysis 51 (1):1.
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  29. added 2018-02-05
    Object-Dependent Thoughts.Steven E. Boër - 1990 - Philosophical Studies 58 (1):51-85.
  30. added 2018-02-05
    Object-Dependent Thoughts and Psychological Redundancy.Harold W. Noonan - 1990 - Analysis 50 (1):1-9.
  31. added 2018-01-13
    Propositionalism Without Propositions, Objectualism Without Objects.Angela Mendelovici - 2018 - In Alex Grzankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. Oxford, UK: Oxford, UK. pp. 214-233.
    Propositionalism is the view that all intentional states are propositional states, which are states with a propositional content, while objectualism is the view that at least some intentional states are objectual states, which are states with objectual contents, such as objects, properties, and kinds. This paper argues that there are two distinct ways of understanding propositionalism and objectualism: (1) as views about the deep nature of the contents of intentional states, and (2) as views about the superficial character of the (...)
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  32. added 2017-09-08
    Fregean de Re Thoughts.Marco Aurelio Sousa Alves - 2014 - Cognitio-Estudos 11 (1):1-12.
    This papers aims at clarifying some misunderstandings that seem to block an adequate account of de re thoughts within the Fregean framework. It is usually assumed that Fregean senses cannot be de re, or dependent upon objects. Contrary to this assumption, Gareth Evans and John McDowell have claimed that Fregean de re senses are not just possible, but in fact the most promising alternative for accounting for de re thoughts. The reasons blocking this alternative can be traced back to Russellian (...)
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  33. added 2016-12-08
    The Particularity and Phenomenology of Perceptual Experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (1):19-48.
    I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the (...)
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  34. added 2016-10-05
    Which Witch is Which? Exotic Objects and Intentional Identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):721-739.
    This paper is about intentional identity, the phenomenon of intentional attitudes having a common focus. I present an argument against an approach to explaining intentional identity, defended by Nathan Salmon, Terence Parsons and others, that involves positing exotic objects. For example, those who adopt this sort of view say that when two astronomers had beliefs about Vulcan, their attitudes had a common focus because there is an exotic object that both of their beliefs were about. I argue that countenancing these (...)
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  35. added 2016-03-03
    Self-Ascription and Belief de Re.Neil Feit - 2000 - Philosophical Studies 98 (1):35-49.
  36. added 2016-02-25
    De Re Thought, Object Identity, and Knowing-Wh*.Ludovic Soutif - 2012 - Analytica (Rio) 16 (1-2):133-164.
    In this paper, I discuss a view of de re thoughts that can be naturally endorsed in the wake of Russell's account. This is the view that a thought is about the very thing (res) rather than a mere characterization of it if and only if it is constitutively tied, if not to the existence, at least to the identity of its object and the thinker knows which/who the object of his/her thought is. Faced with the challenge of accommodating far (...)
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  37. added 2015-10-26
    Frege's Puzzle for Perception.Boyd Millar - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):368-392.
    According to an influential variety of the representational view of perceptual experience—the singular content view—the contents of perceptual experiences include singular propositions partly composed of the particular physical object a given experience is about or of. The singular content view faces well-known difficulties accommodating hallucinations; I maintain that there is also an analogue of Frege's puzzle that poses a significant problem for this view. In fact, I believe that this puzzle presents difficulties for the theory that are unique to perception (...)
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  38. added 2014-03-30
    In Defence of Object-Dependent Thoughts.Sean Crawford - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):201-210.
    The existence of object-dependent thoughts has been doubted on the grounds that reference to such thoughts is unnecessary or 'redundant' in the psychological explanation of intentional action. This paper argues to the contrary that reference to object-dependent thoughts is necessary to the proper psychological explanation of intentional action upon objects. Section I sets out the argument for the alleged explanatory redundancy of object-dependent thoughts; an argument which turns on the coherence of an alternative 'dual-component' model of explanation. Section II rebuts (...)
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  39. added 2014-03-17
    Perspectival Thought: A Plea for Moderate Relativism.François Recanati - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
    Our thought and talk are situated. They do not take place in a vacuum but always in a context, and they always concern an external situation relative to which they are to be evaluated. Since that is so, François Recanati argues, our linguistic and mental representations alike must be assigned two layers of content: the explicit content, or lekton, is relative and perspectival, while the complete content, which is absolute, involves contextual factors in addition to what is explicitly represented. Far (...)
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  40. added 2014-03-14
    A Study in the Cognition of Individuals' Identity: Solving the Problem of Singular Cognition in Object and Agent Tracking.Nicolas Bullot - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):276-293.
    This article compares the ability to track individuals lacking mental states with the ability to track intentional agents. It explains why reference to individuals raises the problem of explaining how cognitive agents track unique individuals and in what sense reference is based on procedures of perceptual-motor and epistemic tracking. We suggest applying the notion of singular-files from theories in perception and semantics to the problem of tracking intentional agents. In order to elucidate the nature of agent-files, three views of the (...)
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  41. added 2014-03-14
    Where Should We Look for the Mind?Guy Longworth - 2003 - Think 2 (5):45-50.
    Is your mind in your head? The answer, surprisingly, may be . Guy Longworth sets out the philosophical case for accepting that our minds extend much further into the world than that.
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  42. added 2011-07-02
    Collected Papers.Gareth Evans - 1985 - Oxford University Press.
  43. added 2010-05-24
    The Content of Perceptual Experience.Michelle Montague - 2009 - In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
  44. added 2009-10-18
    Demonstrating in Mentalese.Joseph Levine - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (September):222-240.
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  45. added 2009-07-13
    Demonstrative Content: A Reply to John McDowell.Christopher Peacocke - 1991 - Mind 100 (1):123-133.
  46. added 2009-07-13
    Peacocke and Evans on Demonstrative Content.John McDowell - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):255-266.
  47. added 2008-12-31
    On an Argument of Segal’s Against Singular Object-Dependent Thoughts.Teresa Marques - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):19-37.
    This paper discusses and criticizes Segal’s 1989 argument against singular object-dependent thoughts. His argument aims at showing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant. My criticism of Segal’s argument has two parts. First, I appeal to common anti-individualist arguments to the effect that Segal’s type of argument only succeeds in establishing that object-dependent thoughts are explanatorily redundant for those aspects of subjects’ behaviour that do not require reference to external objects. Secondly, Segal’s view on singular thoughts is at odds with his (...)
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