In modern urbanized and densely populated societies - such as the contemporary Netherlands, which forms the geographical setting of the present analysis - hunting has lost its meaning as a mode of subsistence to become a symbolic strategy. Hunting is a cultural enclave in which the boundaries between humans and animals are blurred and the relations of dominance and submission symbolically reversed. Hunting challenges the legitimacy of apparently "given" power relations between humans and animals. Hunters construct, reproduce and legitimize hunting (...) by crossing the boundaries between humans and animals. Hunting "for pleasure" is regarded as truly pleasurable only if it allows a reversal of the asymmetrical power relations between humans and animals, attributing almost human characteristerics to the game-species. In theircognitive schemes hunters measure their power and abilities with strong, cunning and preferably male opponents. Game-species share an ambivalent status between the human and the animal realms, the tame and the wild, and between their instrumental and expressive signifccance. Hunting "for pleasure" is justified by this very ambivalence. (shrink)

We regularly wield powers that, upon close scrutiny, appear remarkably magical. By sheer exercise of will, we bring into existence things that have never existed before. With but a nod, we effect the disappearance of things that have long served as barriers to the actions of others. And, by mere resolve, we generate things that pose significant obstacles to others' exercise of liberty. What is the nature of these things that we create and destroy by our mere decision to do (...) so? The answer: the rights and obligations of others. And by what seemingly magical means do we alter these rights and obligations? By making promises and issuing or revoking consent When we make promises, we generate obligations for ourselves, and when we give consent, we create rights for others. Since the rights and obligations that are affected by means of promising and consenting largely define the boundaries of permissible action, our exercise of these seemingly magical powers can significantly affect the lives and liberties of others. (shrink)

Tocqueville pessimistically predicted that liberty and equality would be incompatible ideas. Robert Dahl, author of the classic _A Preface to Democratic Theory,_ explores this alleged conflict, particularly in modern American society where differences in ownership and control of corporate enterprises create inequalities in resources among Americans that in turn generate inequality among them as citizens. Arguing that Americans have misconceived the relation between democracy, private property, and the economic order, the author contends that we can achieve a society of real (...) democracy and political equality without sacrificing liberty by extending democratic principles into the economic order. Although enterprise control by workers violates many conventional political and ideological assumptions of corporate capitalism as well as of state socialism. Dahl presents an empirically informed and philosophically acute defense of "workplace democracy." He argues, in the light of experiences here and abroad, that an economic system of worker-owned and worker-controlled enterprises could provide a much better foundation for democracy, political equality, and liberty than does our present system of corporate capitalism. (shrink)

Therapieentscheidungen lösen in klinischen Teams häufig Unsicherheiten und Konflikte aus, insbesondere wenn es um schwerkranke Patienten geht. Fallen Entscheidungen vornehmlich situationsgeleitet, sind bestimmte Patientengruppen einem Risiko der Unter-, Über- oder Ungleichversorgung ausgesetzt. Der Metap-Leitfaden unterstützt Ärzte, Pfleger und Therapeuten daher in ihrer ethisch reflektierten Entscheidungskompetenz mit verschiedenen Orientierungs- und Entscheidungsinstrumentarien. Diese berücksichtigen eine gerechte Zuteilung der Ressourcen.

Written by the preeminent democratic theorist of our time, this book explains the nature, value, and mechanics of democracy. In a new introduction to this Veritas edition, Ian Shapiro considers how Dahl would respond to the ongoing challenges democracy faces in the modern world. “Within the liberal democratic camp there is considerable controversy about exactly how to define democracy. Probably the most influential voice among contemporary political scientists in this debate has been that of Robert Dahl.”—Marc Plattner, _New York Times_ (...) “An excellent introduction for novices, as well as a trusty handbook for experts and political science mavens.”—_Publishers Weekly_. (shrink)

In her paper, The case for physician assisted suicide: not proven, Bonnie Steinbock argues that the experience with Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act fails to demonstrate that the benefits of legalising physician assisted suicide outweigh its risks. Given that her verdict is based on a small number of highly controversial cases that will most likely occur under any regime of legally implemented safeguards, she renders it virtually impossible to prove the case for physician assisted suicide. In this brief paper, we (...) suggest some ways that may enable us to weigh the risks and benefits of legalisation more fairly and, hopefully, allow us to close the case for physician assisted suicide. (shrink)

Fictional names present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. The theory developed in this paper is motivated by a puzzle that depends on four assumptions: our intuitive assessment of the truth values of certain sentences, the most straightforward treatment of their syntactic structure, semantic compositionality, and metaphysical scruples strong enough to rule out fictional entities, at least. It is shown that these four assumptions, taken (...) together, are inconsistent with referentialism, the common view that names are uniformly associated with ordinary individuals as their semantic value. Instead, the view presented here interprets names as context-sensitive expressions, associated in a context of utterance with a particular act of introduction, or dubbing, which is then used to determine their semantic value. Some dubbings are referential, which associate names with ordinary individuals as their semantic values; others are fictional, which associate names, instead, with sets of properties. Since the semantic values of names can be of different sorts, the semantic rule interpreting predication must be complex as well. In the body of the paper, I show how this new treatment of names allows us to solve our original puzzle. I defend the complexity of the semantic predication rule, and address additional worries about ontological commitment. (shrink)

Empathy is one of the most talked about and widely studied concepts of recent years. Some argue it can help create a more just society, improve medical care and even avert global catastrophe. Others object that it is morally problematic. Who is right? And what is empathy anyway? Is it a way of feeling with others, or is it simply feeling sorry for them? Is it a form of knowledge? What is its evolutionary origin? In this thorough and clearly-written introduction (...) to the philosophy of empathy Heidi Maibom explores these questions and more, examining the following topics: The nature of empathy and key themes in the literature Empathy as a way of understanding others, particularly 'simulation theory' and 'perspective-taking' Empathy, emotional contagion, and sympathy Empathy's role in moral understanding or motivation Empathy and art appreciation, with examples from film, music and fiction Empathy and mental disorder, such as psychopathy and autism. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary, Empathy is an excellent resource for students of philosophy of mind and psychology, psychology, and cognitive science, as well as for those in related subjects such as art, literature and politics. (shrink)

Some societies tolerate or encourage high levels of chickenpox infection among children to reduce rates of shingles among older adults. This tradeoff is unethical. The varicella zoster virus (VZV) causes both chickenpox and shingles. After people recover from chickenpox, VZV remains in their nerve cells. If their immune systems become unable to suppress the virus, they develop shingles. According to the Exogenous Boosting Hypothesis (EBH), a person’s ability to keep VZV suppressed can be ‘boosted’ through exposure to active chickenpox infections. (...) We argue that even if this hypothesis were true, immunization policies that discourage routine childhood varicella vaccination in order to prevent shingles for other people are unethical. Such policies harm children and treat them as mere means for the benefit of others, and are inconsistent with how parents should treat their children and physicians should treat their patients. These policies also seem incompatible with institutional transparency. (shrink)

In “Semantics of Fictional Terms,” Garcia-Carpintero critically surveys the most recent literature on the topic of fictional names. One of his targets is realism about fictional discourse. Realists about fictional discourse believe that: (a) it contains true sentences that have fictional names as their subjects; (b) sentences containing names can be true only if those names have referents; (c) fictional names have fictional characters – abstract objects – as their referents. The fundamental problem that arises for realists is that not (...) all true sentences containing fictional names are plausibly about abstract objects. This leads to the need to introduce disjunctive conceptions of property attribution that Garcia-Carpintero claims are implausible, and that realism should therefore be rejected. He also maintains, however, that (a) is correct. I agree. Furthermore, I am also committed to anti-realism about fictional discourse – that fictional names have no referents. Garcia-Carpintero claims that my view is simply a notational variant of realism. I argue that this is false – that my view could not possibly be a notational variant of any extant realist theory. (shrink)

Whilst Kolbe and de Melo-Martin (2023) appropriately identify a range of concerns about the validity of existing instruments to measure moral distress, one additional limitation that the authors di...

This book identifies a need to move beyond discussions of ownership, power and control in favour of exploring new kinds of partnerships between museums and the peoples or countries of origin, partnerships based on equitability and reconciliation.

Most people in the United States agree they want some income inequality but debate exactly how much is fair. High‐status people generally prefer more inequality than low‐status individuals. Here we examine how much preferences for inequality are (or are not) driven by self‐interest. Past work has generally investigated this idea in two ways: The first is by stratifying preferences by income, and the second is by randomly assigning financial status within lab‐constructed scenarios. In this paper, we develop a method that (...) combines both experimental control and the social experience of inequality—a simulated society experiment. Across two experiments (N = 138, observations = 690), participants voted on the distribution of rewards—first behind a veil of ignorance, and then when they were randomly assigned a status within a game of chance. Status varied repeatedly across five rounds, allowing us to measure dynamic preferences. Under the veil of ignorance, people preferred inequality favoring the top status. When the veil of ignorance disappeared, self‐interest immediately influenced inequality preferences. Those who randomly landed in top positions were satisfied with the status quo established under the veil of ignorance, whereas those who randomly landed in bottom positions wanted more equality. Yet these preferences were not stable; decisions about the optimal level of inequality changed according to changes in social status. Our results also showed that, when inequality grows in a society, preferences regarding inequality become polarized by social status. Individuals in low‐status positions, particularly, tend to demand more equality. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that it’s impossible for there to be a single universal theory of meaning for a language. First, I will consider some minimal expressiveness requirements a language must meet to be able to express semantic claims. Then I will argue that in order to have a single unified theory of meaning, these expressiveness requirements must be satisfied by a language which the semantic theory itself applies to. That is, we would need a language which can express (...) its own meaning. It has been well-known since Tarski that theories of meaning whose central notion is truth can’t be expressed in a language which they apply to. Here, I develop Quine’s formulation of the Liar Paradox in grammatical terms and use this to extend Tarski’s result to all theories of meaning. This general version of the paradox can be formalised as a special case of the Lawvere Fixed-Point Theorem applied to a categorial grammar. Taken together with the initial arguments, I infer that a universal theory of meaning is impossible and conclude the paper with a brief discussion on what alternatives are available. (shrink)

While Henry and Levinas are often juxtaposed, little attention has been given to their shared views on pain and pleasure. Both phenomenologists converge on the argument that an adequate account of pain and pleasure requires a critical confrontation with the theory of intentionality. This raises further questions. What roles do interiority and exteriority play in pain and pleasure? Should they be conceived as different tonalities of one essence or as heterogenous phenomena? Despite their shared critique of intentionality, Henry and Levinas (...) respond differently to these questions. We argue that Henry’s account suffers from an imprisonment in immanence, leading to a homogenous account of pain and pleasure as derivatives of one essence. In our view, Levinas points toward a more fruitful phenomenological account, both in so far as he does not divorce pain and pleasure from exteriority, and also in the way his phenomenology preserves the heterogeneity of pleasure and pain. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the benefits of anxiety. Among these is the proposal that anxiety is a moral emotion. If it is, we ought to cultivate it. But people who are anxious are also less happy. So it seems that asking people to be morally better persons involves asking them to be less happy than they might otherwise be. In this paper, I consider ways to avoid this consequence, all of which rely on emotion regulation. (...) Emotion regulation is supposed to balance one’s anxiety sufficiently so as to have relatively little impact on one’s happiness. As it turns out, emotion regulation is not as simple a solution as one might think. People who are very good at regulating their moral emotions do so at a cost: they assist others in need less and think of other people in demeaning or dehumanizing ways. This shows that using emotion regulation to maximize aspects of happiness—particularly happy feelings—reduces, rather than enhances, one’s moral goodness. One might therefore think that aiming towards equanimity instead promises a better solution since we avoid the over-exertion of emotion regulation and its consequent negative effects. Although that is true, we are still stuck with the problem that the ways people typically reduce their negative reactions to others that suffer—which I show is a form of moral emotions—are highly morally problematic. If we are to hope to solve the apparent conflict between cultivating anxiety and being happy, I argue, we need to take a different approach. Instead of proceeding by thinking about emotions in an almost atomistic way, according to which we experience only one definable type at a time, which can be understood statically, we must think of emotion more holistically. That is, we should consider more carefully the context in which an emotion occurs, how it unfolds over time, what other emotions arise alongside it or are otherwise connected to it, and the significance to the person of the experience as a whole. Such a richer picture of person’s affective experience in morally relevant situations shows how emotion regulation can be deployed without leading to the morally problematic thoughts and actions described earlier. I use empathic distress as an example of moral emotions to exemplify why such an approach does more justice to the phenomena, in addition to being friendlier to anxiety-positive views. (shrink)

_Sustainable development, as explained through the three pillars of environment, society and economy, is a well-known concept and has been used extensively in recent decades. There is finally a growing acknowledgement that environmental sustainability is the prerequisite for achieving the other two pillars of societal and economic sustainability. Nevertheless, there is a tendency to not explicate the negative interactions between the pillars of sustainability, as in the interlinkages between the UN’s sustainable development goals. In this paper, we draw attention to (...) a method for explicating both reinforcing and counteracting goals. This is a conceptual paper but with short, illustrative examples from different levels of the R&D sphere on how this method can be used: one example is at the project level, two are from financiers of R&D projects, and the other is at the UN level. Finally, a longer discussion on relevant ethical guidelines is presented. This paper addresses the responsibility to recognize when and how sustainability goals counteract each other through two key actions. The first action is to identify transgressions of global ecological system boundaries and the resulting serious consequences for trading on environmental sustainability. The second involves bringing to the fore relevant ethical guidelines from the Norwegian National Research Ethics Committee. An update of these guidelines is suggested to reflect recent research on the transgression of planetary boundaries and the consequences for a safe operating space for humans on Earth_. _Keywords:_ Environmental sustainability, ethical guidelines for research, UN sustainable development goals, counteracting goals. (shrink)

Having enjoyed more than twenty years of development, feminist epistemology and philosophy of science are now thriving fields of inquiry, offering current scholars a rich tradition from which to draw. In addition to a recognition of the power of knowledge itself and its effects on women’s lives, a central feature of feminist epistemology and philosophy of science has been the attention they draw to the role of power dynamics within knowledge-seeking practices and the implications of these dynamics for our understandings (...) of knowledge, science, and epistemology. Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: Power in Knowledge collects new works that address today’s key challenges for a power-sensitive feminist approach to questions of knowledge and scientific practice. The essays build upon established work in feminist epistemology and philosophy of science, offering new developments in the fields, and representing the broad array of the feminist work now being done and the many ways in which feminists incorporate power dynamics into their analyses. (shrink)

Any plausible account of the act of pretending, either by presupposition or constitution, involves an assumption that the facts are other than what they are. An examination of various accounts of pretence shows this to be the feature that distinguishes it from other actions such as imagining, fantasizing, creating, or hypothesizing. This discovery has implications for standard analyses of the nature of fiction. To wit, whatever is occurring when engaged in reading a work of fiction, it is not an act (...) of pretence, since in reading a work of fiction, whether the facts are other than what they are is irrelevant to understanding and enjoying the story. The rather long history of appeals to pretence to explain the nature of fiction and our engagement with it, then, fail. (shrink)

Combines insights from philosophy, psychology, and the biographies of ordinary people to identify principles to guide our ethical development and provide concrete models for an ethical life.

In the final year of his long life, eminent Thomist philosopher Jacques Maritain prepared a final book for publication: a collection of previously unpublished writings entitled Approaches san entraves, later translated into English as Untrammeled Approaches. That collection, both in its conversational yet reverent tone and in its weighty topics - faith, love, truth, beauty - gives the reader the sense that she is receiving from a great teacher and friend the most important nuggets of wisdom for the next generation. (...) Throughout the book, Maritain shares with his readers, from his heart as well as his intellect, regarding the things that really matter; that book - and those things - are the primary inspiration for the present volume. This volume, comprised of original essays by twenty English-speaking Thomists on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of Untrammeled Approaches' first English appearance, explores several of Maritain's still-untrammeled (or at least less-trammeled) themes. While following his unbeaten paths, the contributing authors find and refine hidden treasures at every turn. They develop some of his more speculative ideas regarding the spiritual world - including the last things, the fate of the fallen angels, and a possible angelic role in evolution. They reflect deeply on a few of Maritain's recurring themes: for example, the nature of beauty and intuition. They analyze the implications - positive and negative - of Maritain's philosophy of love, marriage, and sexuality. And they consider and apply his arguments regarding appropriate roles and interactions of Church and state. The volume concludes with big-picture reflections on Maritain, his thought, and his enduring relevance. The contributors to this volume are: Michael Breidenbach, Romanus Cessario, OP, John Conley, SJ, Mario O. D'Souza, CSB, Travis Dumsday, Heather Erb, Lawrence Feingold, Megan Furman, Marie George, James Hanink, Gregory Kerr, William McCormick, SJ, Matthew Minerd, Mark Moes, Michael Novak, Michael Pakuluk, Alice Ramos, Walter Schultz, Michael Torre, Nikolaj Zunic. (shrink)

In the formation of vernacular North Indian literature in “Hindavī,” an important role is played by “Sufi romance” (premākhyān). The earliest love narrative known as Cāndāyan, written in 1379–80, by Maulānā Dāūd has been cited as evidence supporting arguments about the rise of literary vernaculars by scholars foregrounding religious and political factors in that process. The purpose of this article is to rethink the broader arguments by revisiting the historical circumstances at the time and through a close reading for affect. (...) It invites a shift in perception by demonstrating Cāndāyan’s roots in folk narrative performativity. Concurrent with that, it is a revision of the view that the author, Dāūd, was a member of the sultanate elite. Closely reading the text’s aesthetic elements also creates a new perspective regarding who its audience was. Finally, the article explores what constitutes a vernacular emotional regime and the role of emotional communities in the emergence of Hindavī. It goes beyond the specific case study in looking for new ways to conceptualize the connections between regional centers of power and early devotional communities, highlighting their deployment of interlinkages through multiple networks of cultural production. (shrink)

This study examines how individual members of the public make moral sense of the potentially conflicting “economic problem” or “public health problem” representations of the COVID-19 crisis when judging responsible business behavior. The data are based on a qualitative survey involving a thought experiment with 119 participants in the United States conducted at the initial stage of the pandemic. This article proposes a typology matrix using the theories of cognitive polyphasia and cognitive dissonance to understand better individual moral sensemaking of (...) responsible business behavior in the context of a societal paradox in which there are contradictory and interdependent demands between important social objectives. The typology, referred to as the 4R Model of Moral Sensemaking of Competing Social Problems, provides insights for how companies may be perceived when responding to competing social problems, expanding the micro-CSR (corporate social responsibility) and paradox literatures. (shrink)

I suggest a revised meta-linguistic account that distinguishes between the language used to talk about a particular language -- the meta-language -- from direct speech reports made within a language -- the object language. Making this distinction leads to a kind of meta-linguistic analysis of competence with names that is not simply tautologous, so long as competence with names is not construed as knowing this: 'Tyler' is whatever is called 'Tyler'. Rather, it should be this: the name 'Tyler' is whatever (...) speakers of an object language call "Tyler," where the double quotes represent direct speech acts. This makes it possible that the schema, 'X' is whatever speakers of an object language call "X," could very well be informative, and serve as an explanation of what a speaker understands when competent with a name. Well, it would insofar as a speaker could learn something about the meaning of the the name 'Tyler' by examining its utterances. In fact, something like this must have to have some truth to it. After all, even non-fluent children learn to speak a language, in part, by attending to utterances of certain expressions in particular situations. The major difference is that when we are finally competent with the expression 'duck' it is not because we have grasped the previous schema. It is because we will engage in duck-awareness behaviors when our environment has something to with ducks at a certain time. In contrast, simply understanding the previous schema is exactly what competence with names consists in. (shrink)

In recent years, multifetal pregnancy reduction has increasingly been a subject of debate in Norway. The intensity of this debate reached a tentative maximum when the Legislation Department delivered their interpretative statement, Section 2 - Interpretation of the Abortion Act, in 2016 in response to a request from the Ministry of Health that the Legislation Department consider whether the Abortion Act allows for MFPR of healthy fetuses in multiple pregnancies. The Legislation Department concluded that the current abortion legislation [as of (...) 2016] allows for MFPR subject to the constraints that the law otherwise stipulates. The debate has not subsided, and during autumn 2018 it was further intensified in connection with the Norwegian Christian Democratic "crossroads" policy and signals from the Conservatives to consider removing section 2.3c and to forbid MFPR. Many of the arguments in the MFPR debate are seemingly similar to arguments put forward in the general abortion debate, and an analysis to ascertain what distinguishes MFPR from other abortions has yet to be conducted. The aim of this article is, therefore, to examine whether there is a moral distinction between abortion and MFPR of healthy fetuses. We will cover the typical arguments emerging in the debate in Norway and exemplify them with scholarly articles from the literature. We have dubbed the most important arguments against MFPR that we have identified the harm argument, the slippery-slope argument, the intention argument, the grief argument, the long-term psychological effects for the woman argument, and the sorting argument. We conclude that these arguments do not measure up in terms of demonstrating a morally relevant difference between MFPR of healthy fetuses and other abortions. Our conclusion is, therefore — despite what several discussants seem to think — that there is no morally relevant difference between the two. Therefore, on the same conditions as we allow for abortions, we should also allow MFPR. Keywords: abortion, ethics, medical ethics, MFPR, selective MFPR. (shrink)

Much of the literature concerning epistemic injustice has focused on the variety of harms done to socially marginalized persons in their capacities as potentialcontributorsto knowledge projects. However, in order to understand the full implications of the social nature of knowing, we must confront the circulation of knowledge and the capacity of epistemic agents to take up knowledge produced by others and make use of it. I argue that members of socially marginalized lay communities can sufferepistemic trust injusticeswhen potentially powerful forms (...) of knowing such as scientific understandings are generated in isolation from them, and when the social conditions required for aresponsibly-placed trustto be formed relative to the relevant epistemic institutions fail to transpire. (shrink)

This is what I hope is an illuminating, and to a certain degree, novel exposition of Montague Grammar. It is against many standard interpretations, and perhaps even against things Montague himself says at times. However, it makes more sense of how his various commitments fit together in a systematic way. Why, for instance, is it called "Montague Grammar" rather than "Montague Semantics," and what role does his commitment to Fregeanism plays in his conception of language? It is clear that he (...) is committed to the idea that function application is the fundamental mode of semantic composition, and that he is committed to an intensional framework. However, intensions have, since Carnap, been understood as nearly conceptually equivalent to functions from possible worlds to sets of individuals. But, in truth, possible worlds semantics is just dressed up extensional semantics. There are just more objects to go around to serve as inputs for functions, whatever we think of their ontological status. That is, possible worlds semantics is really a semantic reduction of intensional semantics achieved by expanding our ontological commitments. It would be difficult to make sense of Montague's strong commitment to Fregean semantics, if his notion of intension was that of Carnap's. According to my interpretation, Montague's notion of intension must be distinct from the version adopted by possible world semantics. Montague took seriously the idea that intensional semantics was something quite different from extensionalist semantics. The first was not reducible to the second semantically speaking. Just as Frege believed that meaning consisted of both sense and reference, so too did Montague. However, just as Frege also believed, Montague thought that sense and reference were systematically related. As I illustrate, interpreting Montague as adopting a different notion of intension can also resolve the apparent problem of distinguishing the difference in meaning between intensional equivalents. It might also enable us to draw a distinction in epistemic logic between an agent having contradictory beliefs and believing contradictions. (shrink)

In a time when worlds, communities and subjects are increasingly presented as ‘vulnerable’, much remains to be said about the distinctly feminine shapes of ‘vulnerability’; weakness, softness, permeability, a sense of being affected, imprinted upon, or entered and shattered. While this presumed vulnerability of the feminine body has often been the basis of feminist sexual politics, feminist goals of autonomy often presume an internal and external undoing of vulnerability as such. Drawing on ethnographic research with queer femmes and building on (...) Sara Ahmed’s (2004a) idea that vulnerability is a ‘particular kind of bodily relation to the world’, this experimental article challenges the popularised idea that to queer femininity requires action, intention, agency and strength. Extending the work of femme authors Dorothy Allison and Ann Cvetkovich, the article considers the cracks in such femme politics, and focuses on how femme feelings of vulnerability take shape and figure in movements, and become what sticks between femme bodies of flesh and knowledge. Attending to the sensuous canvas of skin, to high-heeled movement and desire for both sex and sisterhood, these are notes on the work of affect in what is here called femmebodiment towards a somatechnical understanding of femininity. (shrink)

Eye contact is an essential element of human interaction and direct eye gaze has been shown to have effects on a range of attentional and cognitive processes. Specifically, direct eye contact evokes a positive affective reaction. As such, it has been proposed that obstructed eye contact reduces emotional mimicry. So far, emotional mimicry research has used averted-gaze faces or unnaturally covered eyes to analyze the effect of eye contact on emotional mimicry. However, averted gaze can also signal disinterest/ disengagement and (...) censor bars obscure eye-adjacent areas as well and hence impede emotion recognition. In the present study, we used a more ecological valid approach by showing photos of actors who expressed either happiness, sadness, anger, or disgust while either wearing mirroring sunglasses that obstruct eye contact or clear glasses. The glasses covered only the direct eye region but not the brows, nose ridge, and cheeks. Our results confirm that participants were equally accurate in recognizing the emotions of their counterparts in both conditions. Further, in line with our hypotheses, participants felt closer to the targets and mimicked affiliative emotions more intensely when their counterparts wore glasses instead of sunglasses. For antagonistic emotions, we found the opposite pattern: Disgust mimicry, which was interpreted as an affective reaction rather than genuine mimicry, could be only found in the sunglasses condition. It may be that obstructed eye contact increased the negative impression of disgusted facial expressions and hence the negative feelings disgust faces evoked. The present study provides further evidence for the notion that eye contact is an important prerequisite for emotional mimicry and hence for smooth and satisfying social interactions. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Note.

For over 80 years, the National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) has been a leader in the promotion of ethical practice within the field of engineering. One of the Society's greatest contributions is the formation and adoption of the NSPE Code of Ethics. But the code, with its six "Fundamental Canons," is only truly instructive if engineers can bridge the gap between principles and action. Here there is no substitute for personal reflection on the ethical and philosophical issues that underlie (...) the code. If done well, such reflection provides an indispensable basis for moral problem solving. Beyond the Code: A Philosophical Guide to Engineering Ethics is designed to complement the NSPE Code of Ethics by helping readers "go beyond" in their understanding of the philosophical issues bound up in the code. Each chapter addresses one of the Fundamental Canons of the NSPE code, and provides a philosophical analysis of the various parts of each canon by employing contemporary and classical texts. This unique approach to engineering ethics guides students and professionals in their readings of the appended selections to refine their understanding of the code in order to apply it to the practical challenges of today's engineers. Key Features: Is the first introduction to engineering ethics that helps students understand and apply the NSPE Code of Ethics to engineering practice Includes a Preface from Arthur E. Schwartz, NSPE Deputy Executive Directorand General Counsel, and NAFE Executive Director As a hybrid text, includes primary philosophical texts with extensiveintroductions and guided reading questionsfrom the book's three authors Offers case studies from the NSPE Board of Ethical Review, allowing students to see a direct connection between the issues discussed in the text and real-world engineering practice Includes the following pedagogical aids: "Key Terms and Concepts" for each chapter "Preparing to Read" sections before each primary source reading "Guided Reading Questions" after each primary source reading "Going Beyond--Our Questions for a Deep Dive" after each case study. (shrink)

Flowers are placed on the altar in many Christian churches. However, while many other items on the altar have given rise to a vast body of theological research, this is not the case with altar flowers. In this article the author makes a constructive contribution to the theology of altar flowers and looks at the contexts in which altar flowers are imagined and how these can help to illustrate theological elements. Two initial contexts for altar flowers are assumed: the liturgical (...) and the extra-liturgical, suggesting that altar flowers hold particular meanings both for those who know the Christian story, and equally for those who do not. It is suggested that a role which seems merely decorative is not that after all, as deeper Christian meanings can be offered in both contexts. Moreover, altar flowers as objects of nature have the capacity to speak to new groups of people on urgent contemporary themes. Finally, it is suggested that altar flowers may also bridge a divide between the secular and sacred. Apart from contributing to the construction of a theology of altar flowers, a deeper understanding of the intersections of aesthetics, faith and reason is sought. (shrink)

In this article, I investigate the ethical potential of Victorian literature that markedly discourages readerly sympathy with the protagonists. Generating sympathy for fictional characters was, and often still is, considered to be the primary way in which the novel promotes ethical thoughts, feelings, and behavior in readers. For this reason, the ethical prospects of novels that fail or refuse to make their main characters appealing and instead inspire aversion in readers have received very little critical attention. Taking an unpopular novel (...) by Anthony Trollope as my primary example, I analyze how the formal narrative strategy of “disnarration” (theorized by Gerald Prince) creates profound dislike for the book’s protagonists. Further, I propose that these same passages of disnarration, by emphasizing the text’s fictionality, can encourage readers to seek the sympathetic fulfillment that the text refuses them by engaging with the real world. In this way, I argue, even Victorian realist novels that defy the conventions of sympathy might still share an investment in realizing the ethical potential of fiction. (shrink)

This paper takes issue with Slavoj Zizek's constructed opposition between Spinoza and Hegel. Where Zizek views Hegel's non-dualistic relational epistemology as a substantial improvement over Spinoza's purported dogmatic account of a reality which is external to the perceiver, I argue that Hegel inherited such an epistemology from Spinoza. Ultimately, it is Spinoza who provides Hegel with the conceptual tools for knowledge of the "transphenomenal" within the context of human finitude.