RESUMEN Introducción: El mundo enfrenta un acelerado envejecimiento poblacional y tasas de fecundidad por debajo de los niveles de reemplazo, situación a la que no son ajenos la población y el servicio de Salud cubanos. Objetivo: Valorar las implicaciones sociales de los resultados del Servicio Provincial de Reproducción Asistida de Baja Complejidad de Camagüey, durante el bienio 2016-2017, dados en el incremento del número de embarazos logrados por Estimulación Ovárica Controlada e Inseminación Intrauterina. Métodos: En la contribución se emplearon los (...) métodos investigativos pertinentes, así como procedimientos diagnósticos y terapéuticos. Resultados: En el período estudiado, se logró un número significativo de embarazos por técnicas de baja complejidad, así como un número superior de embarazo en mujeres mayores de 36 años con respecto a años anteriores. Discusión: El Estado cubano ha trazado estrategias de trabajo para brindar atención diferenciada a las parejas que presenten alteraciones de la reproducción, en favor de solucionar la problemática mediante alternativas cuyos resultados se correlacionan con los obtenidos a nivel mundial. ABSTRACT Introduction: The world faces an intensive population aging and valuations of fecundity below the levels of substitution, situation which is not foreign to the Cuban population and health service. Objective: To value the social implications of the results of the Provincial Service of Assisted Reproduction of Low Complexity of Camagüey, during the two-year period 2016-2017, given for the increase of the number of pregnancies achieved by Controlled Ovarian Stimulation and Intrauterine Insemination. Methods: In the contribution thepertinent,investigative methods were used as well as diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Results: In the studied period, a significant number of pregnancies was achieved by skills of low complexity, as well as a top number of pregnancy in women older than 36 years old with regard to previous years. Discussion: The Cuban State has planned work strategies to offer attention differentiated to the couples that present alterations of the reproduction, in favor of solving the problems by means of alternatives which results are correlated by the obtained ones on a global scale. (shrink)

Across the European research area and beyond, efforts are being mobilized to align research and innovation processes and products with societal values and needs, and to create mechanisms for inclusive priority setting and knowledge production. A central concern is how to foster a culture of “Responsible Research and Innovation” (RRI) among scientists and engineers. This paper focuses on RRI teaching at higher education institutions. On the basis of interviews and reviews of academic and policy documents, it highlights the generic aspects (...) of teaching aimed at invoking a sense of care and societal obligation, and provides a set of exemplary cases of RRI-related teaching. It argues that the Aristotelian concept of phronesis can capture core properties of the objectives of RRI-related teaching activities. Teaching should nurture the students’ capacity in terms of practical wisdom, practical ethics, or administrative ability in order to enable them to act virtuously and responsibly in contexts which are often characterized by uncertainty, contention, and controversy. (shrink)

Contemporary development goals of the Philippines, like those of many post-colonial states in the Third Word, strongly emphasize the need to catch up with the living standards of western industrialized countries. This article argues that following the western model of development through industrialization can only exacerbate existing socio-economic and ecological problems. The article contends that an historically appropriate and total development should aim for a reconstitution of natural, social, and moral ecologies. Drawing from historical sources, the first part of the (...) article examines the ecological consequences of Spanish colonization in order to provide the rationale for a definition of development as a reconstitution of damaged ecologies. The second part propose that the ethics of post-colonial development should be based on equality of access to life-sustaining resources and the transformation of values. The article conceptualizes ethics as a social discourse that defends human communities from further environmental and social degradation. (shrink)

As physicians encounter an increasingly diverse patient population, socioeconomic circumstances, religious values and cultural practices may present barriers to the delivery of quality care. Increasing cultural competence is often cited as a way to reduce healthcare disparities arising from value and cultural differences between patients and providers. Cultural competence entails not only a knowledge base of cultural practices of disparate patient populations, but also an attitude of adapting one's practice style to meet patient needs and values. Gender roles, relationship dynamics (...) and boundaries are culture specific, and are frequently shaped by religious teachings. Consequently, religion may be conceptualised as a cultural repertoire, or dynamic tool-kit, by which members of a faith adapt and negotiate their identity in multicultural societies. The manner in which Islamic beliefs and values inform Muslim healthcare behaviours is relatively under-investigated. In an effort to explore the impact of Islam on the relationship between patients and providers, we present an Islamic bioethical perspective on cross-gender relations in the patient-doctor relationship. We will begin with a clinical scenario highlighting three areas of gender interaction that bear clinical relevance: dress code, seclusion of members of the opposite sex and physical contact. Next, we provide a brief overview of the foundations of Islamic law and ethical deliberation and then proceed to develop ethicolegal guidelines pertaining to gender relations within the medical context. At the end of this reflection, we offer some practice recommendations that are attuned to the cultural sensitivities of Muslim patient populations. (shrink)

Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and how (...) the rose is is not an entity over and above the rose. It is against this view that I shall argue in this paper. I shall argue that a significant class of true propositions, including inessential predications like the proposition that the rose is red, are made true by entities. "No truthmaking without truthmakers" is my slogan. Although I have my view about what kinds of entities are truthmakers, I shall not argue for or presuppose that view here. All I shall argue for here is that if a proposition is made true by something, it is made true by some thing, but my argument will leave it open what kind of thing that thing is: it could be a fact or state of affairs, a trope, or any other sort of entity. (shrink)

This collection of essays represents a ground-breaking collaboration between moral philosophers, action theorists, lawyers and legal theorists to set a fresh research agenda on agency and responsibility in negligence. The complex phenomenon of responsibility in negligence is analysed from multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives, shedding light on key ethical and legal issues related to agency and negligence to impact substantive law and policy-making in different jurisdictions. The volume introduces new debates and questions old assumptions, inviting the reader to rethink substantive law (...) and practical ethical reflection. (shrink)

JANET DELGADO RODRIGUEZ | : The concept of vulnerability is central to current developments in bioethics, not only because of its analytic nature, but also due to its capacity for criticism. However, this concept has not been sufficiently developed, neither in the area of moral philosophy nor in bioethics. For this reason, it is necessary to define and analyze the conceptual framework in which the notion of vulnerability has been developed within the scope of bioethics. Thus, the purpose of this (...) paper is to indicate how the concept of vulnerability in the field of bioethics has been developed and what the main problems that derive from this approach are. Secondly, the paper analyzes some of the main philosophical approaches that I consider should be articulated in the expansion of a critical bioethics approach focused on the notion of vulnerability. To address this issue, I analyze the reflections that we find in the work of Martha Fineman, emphasizing the main relevant aspects for bioethics. Finally, I highlight the main implications of a theory of vulnerability for bioethics. | : Le concept de vulnérabilité est au coeur des développements actuels de la bioéthique, non seulement en raison de sa nature analytique, mais aussi en raison de son potentiel critique. Cependant, ce concept n’a pas été suffisamment développé, que ce soit dans le domaine de la philosophie morale ou de la bioéthique. Pour cette raison, il est nécessaire de définir et d’analyser le cadre conceptuel dans lequel la notion de vulnérabilité a été développée en bioéthique. Ainsi, le but de cet article est d’indiquer comment le concept de vulnérabilité a été développé dans le domaine de la bioéthique et quels sont les principaux problèmes découlant de cette approche. Deuxièmement, l’article analyse certaines des principales approches philosophiques qui devraient selon moi être articulées à une approche bioéthique critique centrée sur la notion de vulnérabilité. Pour traiter ce problème, j’analyse la réflexion de Martha Fineman, en soulignant les principaux aspects pertinents pour la bioéthique. Enfin, je souligne les principales implications d’une théorie de la vulnérabilité pour la bioéthique. (shrink)

Across the European research area and beyond, efforts are being mobilized to align research and innovation processes and products with societal values and needs, and to create mechanisms for inclusive priority setting and knowledge production. A central concern is how to foster a culture of “Responsible Research and Innovation” among scientists and engineers. This paper focuses on RRI teaching at higher education institutions. On the basis of interviews and reviews of academic and policy documents, it highlights the generic aspects of (...) teaching aimed at invoking a sense of care and societal obligation, and provides a set of exemplary cases of RRI-related teaching. It argues that the Aristotelian concept of phronesis can capture core properties of the objectives of RRI-related teaching activities. Teaching should nurture the students’ capacity in terms of practical wisdom, practical ethics, or administrative ability in order to enable them to act virtuously and responsibly in contexts which are often characterized by uncertainty, contention, and controversy. (shrink)

In this paper I undermine the Entailment Principle according to which if an entity is a truthmaker for a certain proposition and this proposition entails another, then the entity in question is a truthmaker for the latter proposition. I argue that the two most promising versions of the principle entail the popular but false Conjunction Thesis, namely that a truthmaker for a conjunction is a truthmaker for its conjuncts. One promising version of the principle understands entailment as strict implication but (...) restricts the field of application of the principle to purely contingent truths (i.e. those that contain no necessary proposition at any level of analysis). But a conjunction of purely contingent truths strictly implies its conjuncts. So this version of the principle is committed to the Conjunction Thesis. The same is true of the version of the principle where entailment is understood in the sense of systems T, R, and E of relevant logic, since in these systems conjunctions entail their conjuncts. I argue that the Conjunction Thesis is false because a truthmaker is that in virtue of what a certain proposition is true and it is false that, for example, what the proposition that Peter is a man is true in virtue of is the conjunctive fact that Peter is man and Saturn is a planet (or the facts that Peter is a man and that Saturn is a planet taken together). I also argue against other versions of the principle. (shrink)

En los últimos treinta años se ha transitado desde una concepción del capital humano como una macromagnitud económica a una idea de capital humano corporeizada en el individuo. Hemos asistido a una progresiva infiltración de dicha ideología del capital humano también en la vida de la juventud precaria. Nos centramos aquí en los jóvenes universitarios, para quienes el capital humano, ya de forma hegemónica, dirige y marca sus recorridos laborales y vitales. El análisis de los discursos de estos jóvenes nos (...) permitirá explorar desde la imposición de la lógica de la movilidad laboral, a la sujeción a las formas de "emprendedor de sí mismo" y a la normalización, como parte del proceso de incorporación de capital humano, de formas de empleo progresivamente al margen de los derechos y garantías laborales clásicas del trabajo salariado.In the last thirty years it has been gone from a conception of the human capital as an economic macro magnitude to an idea of human capital embodied in the individuals. We have been witnesses of the progressive infiltration of this ideology of the human capital also in the life of precarious youth. We focus in the university young people, for those who the human capital, already of hegemonic form, directs and marks its labour and vital routes. The analysis of the discourses of these young people will allow us to explore the imposition of the logic of labour mobility, the subjection to the forms of «entrepreneur of itself» and also the normalization of forms of work progressively excluded from the rights and classic labour guarantees as a part of the process of incorporation of human capital. (shrink)

In this chapter I shall reply to a pair of articles in which the main contention of my “Why truthmakers” – namely, that an important class of synthetic true propositions have entities as truth-makers – is rejected. In §§1–5 I reply to Jennifer Hornsby’s “Truth without Truthmaking Entities” (2005) and in §§6–7 I reply to Julian Dodd’s “Negative Truths and Truthmaker Principles” (2007).

I believe in metaphysical nihilism, the thesis that there could have been no concrete objects, because I believe in a version of the subtraction argument, the subtraction argument*, that proves it. But both Jonathan Lowe (2002) and Alexander Paseau (2002) express doubts about the subtraction argument*. Paseau thinks the argument is invalid, and Lowe argues that invoking concrete* objects is unnecessary. Furthermore Lowe attempts to rebut my objections (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2000) to his anti-nihilist argument (Lowe 1998). In this paper I defend (...) the subtraction argument* from Paseau's and Lowe's criticisms as well as show that the premises of Lowe's anti-nihilist argument are still lacking support. (shrink)

In this article I address the Problem of Universals by answering questions about what facts a solution to the Problem of Universals should explain and how the explanation should go. I argue that a solution to the Problem of Universals explains the facts the Problem of Universals is about by giving the truthmakers (as opposed to the conceptual content and the ontological commitments) of the sentences stating those facts. I argue that the sentences stating the relevant facts are those like (...) 'a has the property F', that is, sentences stating that a particular has a certain property. Finally I show how answering these questions in this way transforms the Problem of Universals, traditionally conceived as the One over Many, that is, the problem of explaining how different particulars can have the same properties, into the Many over One, that is, the problem of explaining how the same particular can have different properties. The Problem of Universals is the problem of the Many over One. (shrink)

Peter Milne has tried to refure Truthmaker Maximalism. the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker, by producing a simple and direct counterexample to it, the sentence M: This sentence has no truthmaker. I argue that, contrary to what Milne argues, on Truthmaker Maximalism M is equivalent to the Liar, which gives the truthmaker maximalist a way to defend his position from Milne's counterexample: to argue that M expresses no proposition.

I present an outline of a normative and non selectionist theory capable of ascribing functional statements to biological items. Biological items are ussually exemplified by the organs as well as traits or behaviours. But we can consider representations too. In fact, my proposal is focused towards a teleosemantical theory of mental content. The teleosemantic approach explains the content of beliefs in terms of the biological functions of those states. Usually, teleosemantical theories of mental representation either ellaborate previously a general theory (...) of functions for biological items, this is the case for Millikan, Neander or Price, orassume a previous selectionist one, as Papineau does. But these proposals are frequently adaptationist in order to keep normatitvity in whatever functional adscription. The recent contributions to the state of the art show the problems of this kind of selectionist view. But they don’t consider the problem of normativity in functional adscriptions. And this problem become important when we pay attention to mental representations as biological facts. I propose an outline of a nonselectionist nor adaptationist account of biological functions capable of keeping normativity. My account is suitable to biological traits, in general, and mental representations characterized in terms of biological functions. (shrink)

Kelsen advanced a sophisticated naturalist conception of intention and adumbrated a methodological strategy that would enable the transformation of the sophisticated naturalist conception of ‘intention’ into a cognizable object of legal science while simultaneously providing an explanation of the legal ‘ought’. The methodological strategy is the ‘inversion thesis’ which establishes that legal norms enable us to objectively identify and determine the ‘will’ or the intention of legal authority. Contrary to nineteenth century psychologism, Kelsen argues that it is not the case (...) that the will or the intention of the sovereign determines what the norm is, rather it is the legal ought that ‘objectifies’ the will. However, it is argued that in spite of the fact that Kelsen advanced a sophisticated account of intentional action, he fails to understand the complexities of the notion of the ‘will’, intentional action and practical reason. What does he miss in his understanding of the notion of the practical? I will advance the view that the notion of the practical or deliberative involves, both in Kant and Aristotle, the transparency condition which establishes that the agent or deliberator intentionally acts for reasons that are self-evident or transparent to him or her. It is a recalcitrant feature of the deliberative standpoint that cannot be theorised. For Aristotle, Aquinas and Anscombe the deliberative standpoint can be known through the end or goal of the intentional action as this provides the form of the action. The end is presented as a good-making characteristic. As problematic as that might be, this means that the end needs to be presented as a good-making characteristic and therefore it involves evaluation. For Kelsen, the soundness of this conception is an insurmountable obstacle to theorise the ‘ought’ and therefore the ‘will’. Yet, surprisingly and contrary to Kelsen’s own notions, I will show that Kelsen’s ‘inversion thesis’ is parasitic on Aristotle–Anscombe’s ‘ought’. (shrink)

El presente artículo discute la obra pseudónima de Kierkegaard “El reflejo de lo trágico antiguo en lo trágico moderno”. El joven esteta A traza una distinción entre la “culpa antigua” y la “culpa moderna”. A utiliza esta distinción para formular una potente crítica a la ética moderna. No obstante, dicha polémica contra los conceptos éticos de la Modernidad no implican un retorno a la moralidad trágica antigua.

Descartes maintained substance dualism, the thesis that no substance has both mental and material properties. His main argument for this thesis, the so-called separability argument from the Sixth Meditation (AT VII: 78) has long puzzled readers. In this paper I argue that Descartes’ independence conception of substance (which Descartes presents in article 51 of the Principles) is crucial for the success of the separability argument and that Descartes used this conception of substance to defend his argument for substance dualism from (...) an important objection. (shrink)

People sometimes resist the idea that racist humor fails on aesthetic grounds because they find it funny. They make the case that we can enjoy its comic aspects by controlling our attention, by focusing on a joke’s rhythm or delivery rather than on its racist content. Ironic intent may reside with the joke teller and/or the audience. I discuss how arguments for the immorality of racist jokes fall short. Ironic racist jokes may be acceptable to an audience that already rejects (...) racism but is comfortable with such ironic racist joking precisely because as individuals they feel confident in their own rejection of genuine racism. Distinguishing between straightforward racist humor and ironically framed racist humor reveals a price that must be paid. The controlled attention demanded, or even extorted, by ironic racist humor is possible only by forsaking empathy as the listener divorces himself from the feelings of those affected and thereby becomes a complicit if impartial spectator. Thus, if I say that a joke is not good because it is racist, it does not necessarily follow that the joke is not funny. What does result, however, is that appreciating such humor entails a lack of empathy for it insists upon numbing the heart. (shrink)

1. The Bundle Theory I shall discuss is a theory about the nature of substances or concrete particulars, like apples, chairs, atoms, stars and people. The point of the Bundle Theory is to avoid undesirable entities like substrata that allegedly constitute particulars. The version of the Bundle Theory I shall discuss takes particulars to be entirely constituted by the universals they instantiate.' Thus particulars are said to be just bundles of universals. Together with the claim that it is necessary that (...) particulars have constituents, the fundamental claim of the Bundle Theory is: (BT) Necessarily, for every particular x and every entity y, y constitutes x if and only ify is a universal and x instantiates y. 2 The standard and supposedly devastating objection to the Bundle Theory is that it entails or is committed to a false version of the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (Armstrong 1978: 91, Loux 1998: 107), namely: (Pll) Necessarily, for all particulars x and y and every universal z, if z is instantiated by x if and only if z is instantiated byy, then x is numerically identical with y. The most famous counterexample to the Identity of Indiscernibles is that put forward by Max Black, consisting of a world where there are only two iron spheres two miles apart from each other, having the same diameter, temperature, colour, shape, size, etc (Black 1952: 156). Let us from now on think of the properties of the spheres in this world as universals. The possibility of this world, which I shall hereafter refer to as 'Black's world', makes (Pll) false.' And according to common philosophical opinion this means that the Bundle Theory is false.. (shrink)

In this paper we provide a simplified, possibilistic semantics for the logics K45, i.e. a many-valued counterpart of the classical modal logic K45 over the [0, 1]-valued Gödel fuzzy logic \. More precisely, we characterize K45 as the set of valid formulae of the class of possibilistic Gödel frames \, where W is a non-empty set of worlds and \ is a possibility distribution on W. We provide decidability results as well. Moreover, we show that all the results also apply (...) to the extension of K45 with the axiom, provided that we restrict ourselves to normalised Gödel Kripke frames, i.e. frames \ where \ satisfies the normalisation condition \ = 1\). (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Modal Realism, the thesis that there exist non-actual possible individuals and worlds, can be made compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism, the thesis that it is possible that nothing concrete exists. Modal Realism as developed by Lewis rules out the possibility of a world where nothing concrete exists and so conflicts with Metaphysical Nihilism. In the paper I argue that Modal Realism can be modified so as to be compatible with Metaphysical Nihilism. Such a modification makes (...) Modal Realism neither incur further theoretical costs nor lose its theoretical benefits. Thus such a modification constitutes an improvement of Modal Realism. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell argued that any attempt to get rid of universals in favor of resemblances fails. He argued that no resemblance theory could avoid postulating a universal of resemblance without falling prey to a vicious infinite regress. He added that admitting such a universal of resemblance made it pointless to avoid other universals. In this paper I defend resemblance nominalism from both of Russell's points by arguing that (a) resemblance nominalism can avoid the postulation of a universal of resemblance without (...) falling into a vicious infinite regress, and (b) even if resemblance nominalism had to admit a universal of resemblance, this would not make it pointless to avoid postulating other universals. (shrink)

Injustices in legal contexts are widespread, yet we usually tend to think of them through a social lens. The study of epistemic injustices increases the resolution of this lens; it identifies how we wrong others as "knowers." In this paper, I propose that the tradition of phenomenology may be invoked to describe and identify instances of epistemic injustice in legal contexts. In order to justify this claim, I establish a phenomenological methodology predicated on the synthesis of two ideas: (1) the (...) phenomenological recognition of the Other, and (2) society's duty to endow its members with an epistemic sphere of action. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente artículo constituye un estudio sobre el concepto de determinación trascendental temporal expuesto por Kant en el marco del esquematismo trascendental kantiano en KrV. Con este objeto, se exponen las razones de la preminencia de la definición de esquema como transzendentale Zeitbestimmung, frente a otras asociadas a la interpretación estática del esquematismo y, fundamentalmente, frente aquella donde se presenta como un proceso de subsunción o de aplicación de las categorías a las intuiciones puras, reconstruyendo a su vez el (...) alcance de dicha noción a partir del análisis del estatuto de la determinación temporal en otras obras del corpus kantiano. Abstract: In this paper, I focus on the concept of transcendental time-determination exposed by Kant in relation with the transcendental schematism in KrV. With this aim, I discuss why the definition of "schema" as transzendentale Zeitbestimmung is more relevant than other kinds of definitions: the one derived from a static interpretation of the schematism and the one where the schematism is understood as a process of subsumption or application of categories to pure intuitions. Finally, I reconstruct the role of the schema through an analysis of the time-determination as it is developed in the rest of Kant's corpus. (shrink)

Leibniz was a philosopher of principles: the principles of Contradiction, of Sufficient Reason, of Identity of Indiscernibles, of Plenitude, of the Best, and of Continuity are among the most famous Leibnizian principles. In this article I shall focus on the first three principles; I shall discuss various formulations of the principles (sect. 1), what it means for these theses to have the status of principles or axioms in Leibniz’s philosophy (sect. 2), the fundamental character of the Principles of Contradiction and (...) Sufficient Reason (sect. 3), some attempts to demonstrate the Principles of Contradiction and Sufficient Reason (sect. 4), and one attempt to demonstrate the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (sect. 5). The main results of the chapter are summarized in a short conclusion (sect. 6). (shrink)

In this paper I shall show how the Correspondence Theory of Truth can block Davidson’s Slingshot (Davidson 1984), which threatens to make the Correspondence Theory collapse. In particular I shall show that the Slingshot is unsound − and in so doing I shall show that the Correspondence Theory has some metaphysical commitments about the nature of facts.

In this paper I argue, contra Fraser MacBride, that conceptual analysis, and in particular the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity, can solve the Problem of Universals, whether understood as the One over Many or the as the Many over One. In this paper I show why the solutions needed to solve either version of the problem must be in terms of truthmakers, and that the distinction between numerical and qualitative identity is not sufficient to solve them.

I expose and discuss here the different arguments Bradley used against the tenability of relations as genuine entities, as well as the corresponding arguments against predicates, both in metaphysical and logical terms, and this always in the framework of his semantic general ideas on judgment and truth. Also, I have found useful to try to find similar arguments in Frege, in order to show that, no matter how different their respective goals and methods may have been, both philosophers tried to (...) solve very similar problems regarding the nature of judgment and the role of relations in explaining its deep unity. Then I shall point out the multiple nature of the general problem involved, and finish with some reflections about its importance for analytical philosophers, especially for Russell. (shrink)

Colemanand Shapiro have recently advanced a second at- tempt to reconcile Hart’s practice theory of rules and the idea of the normativity of law; i.e., the idea that legal rules qua social rules give reasons for actions and, in some circumstances create and impose duties and obligations. Their argumentative strategy is to resort to elements in Bratman’s work on shared agency and planning, though they introduce important and substantive modifications to Bratman’s own explanation. Bratman describes his own theory as a (...) modest theory of the will where the notion of planning plays a fundamental role. Both Shapiro’s and Coleman’s application of Bratman’s planning theory of agency to an authority structure such as law is impressive, but a number of objections can be levelled, with the intention of grasping both the nature of authority structures and the normativity of law. Although I have referred to Shapiro’s and Coleman’s applica- tions as being similar to one another, the differences are sub- stantive and important. I will scrutinise both Shapiro’s and Coleman’s explanations of ‘shared agency’ and discuss the objections that can be raised against each application. (shrink)