Artykuł przedstawia Deborę Vogel jako jedną z najważniejszych krytyczek i teoretyczek sztuki lat trzydziestych XX wieku. Po polsku oraz w jidysz stworzyła ona system, w którym sztuka jawi się jako poetycko-programowa reakcja na rzeczywistość. Jest ona elitarna, ale też ściśle związana z codziennością. Jest niezbędna dla życia, ale też jest „samym życiem”, w sensie banalnej i wiecznej ballady. Za tą konstrukcją myślową kryje się malarstwo Marca Chagalla. To na przykładzie jego obrazów Vogel dowodzi głównej tezy awangardy o jedności (...) formy i treści. Na tożsamość życia i sztuki Vogel spogląda przez pryzmat aktualności rozumianej nie jako manifestowanie poglądów politycznych, lecz jako konstruowanie rzeczywistości w dziele sztuki. Punktem wyjścia jest dla lwowskiej intelektualistki estetyka Hegla, od której stopniowo przesuwa się ku dialektyce materialistycznej, rozwijając m. in. tezy Lu Märten, pionierki estetyki marksistowskiej. Poetyka życia oraz koncepcje sztuki były u Vogel szeroko zakorzenione w filozofii, m.in. w teorii subiektywnego postrzegania Jakoba von Uexkülla. W artykule omówiona zostaje jego koncepcja koła funkcjonalnego, jak i mająca duży wpływ na artystów awangardowych teza, iż rzeczywistość stanowi dla indywiduum wyłącznie konstrukcję własnych doznań zmysłowych. Na koniec stawiane są pytania dotyczące znaczenia myśli Bergsona i Simmla dla rozumienia sztuki w ujęciu proponowanym przez Deborę Vogel. (shrink)

Der Reader versammelt programmatische Ansätze der kulturwissenschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Problem der Evidenz aus dem Blickpunkt der Sprach-, Geschichts-, Kunst- und Literaturwissenschaft, Medientheorie, Anthropologie und Soziologie. Mit Beiträgen u.a. von Rüdiger Campe, Iris Daermann, Egon Flaig, Peter Geimer, Vinzenz Hediger, Caspar Hirschi, Ludwig Jäger, Albrecht Koschorke, Helmut Lethen, Jakob Moser, Inka Mülder-Bach, Jan-Dirk Müller, Karl Schlögel, Florian Sprenger, Jakob Tanner, Marcus Twellmann, Juliane Vogel und Claus Zittel.

Autism spectrum disorder is characterised by differences in unimodal and multimodal sensory and proprioceptive processing, with complex biases towards local over global processing. Many of these elements are implicated in versions of the rubber hand illusion, which were therefore studied in high-functioning individuals with ASD and a typically developing control group. Both groups experienced the illusion. A number of differences were found, related to proprioception and sensorimotor processes. The ASD group showed reduced sensitivity to visuotactile-proprioceptive discrepancy but more accurate proprioception. (...) This group also differed on acceleration in subsequent reach trials. Results are discussed in terms of weak top-down integration and precision-accuracy trade-offs. The RHI appears to be a useful tool for investigating multisensory processing in ASD. (shrink)

In this paper I explore how intellectual humility manifests in mathematical practices. To do this I employ accounts of this virtue as developed by virtue epistemologists in three case studies of mathematical activity. As a contribution to a Topical Collection on virtue theory of mathematical practices this paper explores in how far existing virtue-theoretic frameworks can be applied to a philosophical analysis of mathematical practices. I argue that the individual accounts of intellectual humility are successful at tracking some manifestations of (...) this virtue in mathematical practices and fail to track others. There are two upshots to this. First, the accounts of the intellectual virtues provided by virtue epistemologists are insightful for the development of a virtue theory of mathematical practices but require adjustments in some cases. Second, the case studies reveal dimensions of intellectual humility virtue epistemologists have thus far overlooked in their theoretical reflections. (shrink)

A teoria convergente da verdade de Peirce é uma abordagem intuitiva e razoável da verdade. No seu sentido mais geral, vincula a verdade aos resultados da investigação. De acordo com a máxima pragmática, Peirce percebeu que as consequências práticas de afirmações verdadeiras são de trazer investigações à fruição e resolver opinião. No entanto, a teoria da verdade de Peirce é muitas vezes difamada e mal-entendida. Argumenta-se, aqui, que uma vez que se entende que a teoria convergente é uma inferência e (...) generalização oriunda do notável teorema matemático conhecido como a Lei dos Grandes Números, e como esse teorema fornece certeza matemática à indução como o cerne do método científico, muitos dos problemas desaparecem. Parte do mal-entendido também se deve ao fato que Peirce tinha três sentidos distintos de convergência, os quais muitos comentadores confundem ou interpretam erroneamente. Com esse entendimento, será mostrado que ao contrário das análises de Cheryl Misak e Christopher Hookway, Peirce argumenta que investigação persistente por bons métodos não é apenas um ideal regulador para atingir a verdade – uma esperança intelectual – mas uma possibilidade comprovada matematicamente que já resultou em verdades estabelecidas. (shrink)

This essay systematically reformulates an earlier argument about Locke and new world slavery, adding attention to Indians, natural law, and Locke's reception. Locke followed Grotian natural law in constructing a just-war theory of slavery. Unlike Grotius, though, he severely restricted the theory, making it inapplicable to America. It only fit resistance to “absolute power” in Stuart England. Locke was nonetheless an agent of British colonialism who issued instructions governing slavery. Yet they do not inform his theory—or vice versa. This creates (...) hermeneutical problems and raises charges of racism. If Locke deserves the epithet “racist,” it is not for his having a racial doctrine justifying slavery. None of this makes for a flattering portrait. Locke's reputation as the champion of liberty would not survive the contradictions in which new world slavery ensnared him. Evidence for this may be found in Locke's reception, including by Southern apologists for slavery. (shrink)

The principles of liberal political theory are often said to be “freestanding.” Are they indeed sufficiently detached from the cultural setting where they emerged to be intelligible to people with other backgrounds? To answer this question, this essay examines the Indian secularism debate and develops a hypothesis on the process whereby liberal principles crystallized in the West and spread elsewhere. It argues that the secularization of western political thought has not produced independent rational principles, but transformed theological ideas into the (...) “topoi” of a culture. Like all topoi, the principles of liberalism depend on other clusters of ideas present in western societies. When they migrate to new settings, the absence of these surrounding ideas presents fundamental obstacles to the interpretation and elaboration of liberal principles. The case of Indian secularism illustrates the cultural limitations of liberal political theory rather than showing its universal significance. (shrink)

The field of philosophical psychopathology is basically the philosophical study of mental disorders such as schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, depression, autism, as well as more specific symptoms and signs such as Capgras’ delusion (the delusion that your spouse, for example, is an impostor) or the anarchic hand sign (where your hand seems to act on its own intentions). This simple epithet covers a multitude of approaches: how can philosophy help to explain mental disorder? What does mental disorder tell us about consciousness, (...) cognition, emotion and ‘self’? What does the study of mental disorder tell us about phenomenology? What does philosophical phenomenology tell us about mental disorder? What do mental disorders tell us about reasoning, rationality and belief formation? What are the particular ethical aspects of mental disorder and its treatment? If philosophical.. (shrink)

The practice of corporate social responsibility has often been described as a balance of profitability and social or societal responsibility by scholars as well as practitioners. It is assumed that regulations and guidelines of CSR practices link competitiveness and responsibility together. While recognising that formal CSR statements represent a goal-oriented managerial approach to CSR, we argue based on the description of a qualitative case study that the relationship between profitability and social or societal responsibility is not as clear and simple (...) as it is often described. Instead, CSR should be considered as a continuously negotiated process between companies and stakeholders. Hence, the creation of a constructive link between profitability and social or societal responsibility is dependent on the amount of effort that has been put into exploring the concerns of the stakeholders, vis-a-vis the company, while simultaneously accepting changes when they are necessary. (shrink)

Background conditions are thought to explain how objects can have value in virtue of certain features and how reasons can consist in certain facts. The following paper provides an account of what background conditions are and what effect they have on normative features. It defends the idea that if values depend on reasons, then there is nothing really surprising or mysterious about the presence of background conditions in normative explanations. Background conditions turn out to be a natural and predictable result (...) of normative hierarchies that treat reasons as metaphysically fundamental relative to other normative features. The account is also shown to have advantages over competing accounts in that it is able to capture the functional criteria that characterize background conditions while remaining theoretically parsimonious. (shrink)

Originally published in 1992 in Portuguese, the English translation of the 2015, updated edition of Kósmos Noetós will open Ivo Ibri's fine book to a wider audience. The book ventures into the most difficult territory of Peirce's body of work. The topics of Prof. Ibri's study include the more recondite matters of Peirce's objective idealism, synechism, tychism, cosmology, and the accounts of reality. Starting with the phenomenology, Ibri attempts a coherent picture of Peirce's metaphysics, using the results to provide an (...) interesting interpretation of Peirce's pragmatism.The book is divided into three major sections: the World as Appearance, the World as Reality, and the Knowable World. In a very nice exegesis of... (shrink)

Alternative splicing (AS) is a widespread mechanism with an important role in increasing transcriptome and proteome diversity by generating multiple different products from the same gene. Evolutionary studies of AS have focused primarily on the conservation of alternatively spliced sequences or of the AS pattern of those sequences itself. Less is known about the evolution of the regulation of AS, but several studies, working from different perspectives, have recently made significant progress. Here, we categorize the different levels of AS evolution, (...) and summarize the studies on evolution of AS regulation, which point to a high level of evolutionary conservation of the regulation of AS events conserved between related species. This suggests that the quantitative regulation of AS is an intrinsic part of AS function. We discuss the potential role of changes in developmental regulation of AS as an additional layer in complex gene regulatory networks and in the emergence of genetic novelties. (shrink)

The spectrum of a first-order sentence is the set of natural numbers occurring as the cardinalities of finite models of the sentence. In a recent survey, Durand et al. introduce a new class of real numbers, the spectral reals, induced by spectra and pose two open problems associated to this class. In the present note, we answer these open problems as well as other open problems from an earlier, unpublished version of the survey. Specifically, we prove that every algebraic real (...) is spectral, every automatic real is spectral, the subword density of a spectral real is either 0 or 1, and both may occur, and every right-computable real number between 0 and 1 occurs as the subword entropy of a spectral real. In addition, Durand et al. note that the set of spectral reals is not closed under addition or multiplication. We extend this result by showing that the class of spectral reals is not closed under any computable operation satisfying some mild conditions. (shrink)

A provocative argument that environmental thinking would be better off if it dropped the concept of “nature” altogether and spoke instead of the built environment. -/- Environmentalism, in theory and practice, is concerned with protecting nature. But if we have now reached “the end of nature,” as Bill McKibben and other environmental thinkers have declared, what is there left to protect? In Thinking like a Mall, Steven Vogel argues that environmental thinking would be better off if it dropped the (...) concept of “nature” altogether and spoke instead of the “environment”—that is, the world that actually surrounds us, which is always a built world, the only one that we inhabit. We need to think not so much like a mountain (as Aldo Leopold urged) as like a mall. Shopping malls, too, are part of the environment and deserve as much serious consideration from environmental thinkers as do mountains. -/- Vogel argues provocatively that environmental philosophy, in its ethics, should no longer draw a distinction between the natural and the artificial and, in its politics, should abandon the idea that something beyond human practices (such as “nature”) can serve as a standard determining what those practices ought to be. The appeal to nature distinct from the built environment, he contends, may be not merely unhelpful to environmental thinking but in itself harmful to that thinking. The question for environmental philosophy is not “how can we save nature?” but rather “what environment should we inhabit, and what practices should we engage in to help build it?”. (shrink)

This study defends the view that Plato’s account of meaning and truth does not depend on strong Platonism. Strong Platonism is based, among other things, on the assumption that basic entities are pure and cannot mix with anything. In a semantic theory, such entities provide stability of reference to single terms and so keep the danger of fluctuating meanings at bay. Unfortunately, strong Platonism pays a heavy price for this stability in that it cannot explain how terms can be combined (...) into sentences and how statements can be true if truth consists in correspondence between the statement and how things really are. The book under review offers an account of a more restricted ontology. By doing so, it... (shrink)

A new theory is taking hold in neuroscience. It is the theory that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism, one that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about the sensory input it receives from the world. It is an attractive theory because powerful theoretical arguments support it, and yet it is at heart stunningly simple. Jakob Hohwy explains and explores this theory from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophy. The key argument throughout The Predictive Mind (...) is that the mechanism explains the rich, deep, and multifaceted character of our conscious perception. It also gives a unified account of how perception is sculpted by attention, and how it depends on action. The mind is revealed as having a fragile and indirect relation to the world. Though we are deeply in tune with the world we are also strangely distanced from it. (shrink)

I explore and develop the idea that (NA) knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. The applicable notion of non-accidentality differs from that of ‘epistemic luck’ discussed by Pritchard. Safety theories may be seen as a refinement of, or substitute for, NA but they are subject to a fundamental difficulty. At the same time, NA needs to be adjusted in order to cope with two counterexamples. The Light Switch Case turns on the ‘directionof-fit’ between a belief and the facts, while the Meson (...) Case concerns knowledge of nomological necessities. A proposed revision to NA is: (ENA) S knows that P when S’s belief that P is non-accidentally true because (i) it is based on good evidence, and (ii) in and of themselves, beliefs based on good evidence tend to be true. ‘knowledge-as-credit’ accounts have been offered as an alternative way of sharpening NA. I argue that such accounts face serious objections that don’t apply to ENA. Finally, I take up Lackey’s worry that the credit-based approach mishandles knowledge via testimony. ENA faces no difficulty on that score, which counts in its favor. (shrink)

Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte, Volume 45, Issue 1-2, Page 87-111, June 2022.