In recent years, a growing discussion about how we should design our cities has emerged, particularly for the more controversial modes of design such as “defensive,” “hostile,” or “disciplinary” architecture (i.e., benches on which one cannot sleep, or metal studs on which one cannot skate). Although this debate is relatively mature, many studies have argued that these design notions are undertheorized and are, thus, challenging to study from an empirical and normative perspective. In this paper, I will defne the most (...) common terms used in the literature and show how they are interconnected by utilizing a set of “conditions of adequacy” from philosophy to facilitate a more transparent and well-grounded discussion of them. Terms such as “hostile” and “defensive” design are underlined by several diferent phenomena, not just one as is sometimes commonly assumed. I will also show that these phenomena and their conceptualizations require—and sometimes force us to use—diferent moral reasons when justifying the utilization of diferent designs. (shrink)

Trust is often perceived as having great value. For example, there is a strong belief that trust will bring different sorts of public goods and help us preserve common resources. A related concept which is just as important, but perhaps not explicitly discussed to the same extent as “trust”, is “reliance” or “confidence”. To be able to rely on some agent is often seen as a prerequisite for being able to trust this agent. Up to now, the conceptual discussion about (...) the definition of trust and reliance has been rational in the sense that most people involved have offered arguments for their respective views, or against competing views. While these arguments rely on some criterion or other, these criteria are rarely explicitly stated, and to our knowledge, no systematic account of such criteria has been offered. In this paper we give an account of what criteria we should use to assess tentative definitions of “trust” and “reliance”. We will also offer our own well-founded definitions of “trust” and “reliance”. Trust should be regarded as a kind of reliance and we defend what we call “the accountability view” of trust, by appealing to the desiderata we identify in the first parts of the paper. (shrink)

The interest in "social sustainability" has recently increased in the field of urban development. We want societies, cities, and neighborhoods to be economically and environmentally sustainable, but we also want urban areas that are safe, diverse, walkable, and relaxing, just to mention a few examples. Strikingly, however, there is no consensus regarding what definition of "social sustainability" should be employed. Additionally, some people are skeptical about the prospect of finding a useful definition at all and claim it is impossible to (...) satisfactorily define the concept for various reasons, such as its complexity. A potential first step towards navigating this conceptual maze is to provide desiderata for a definition of social sustainability. We defend a list of nine desiderata and thereby create a theoretical framework for analyzing and constructing a definition of "social sustainability". We also examine the skeptical arguments and find that it is premature to conclude that the goal of finding a useful definition is hopeless. With the criteria in place, the future debate can proceed by assessing definitions of "social sustainability" in a more structured and transparent manner. This activity is of upmost importance if we want to create just cities. Keywords: Social Sustainability, Definition, Purposes and Aims, Conditions of Adequacy. (shrink)

For many years, some urban architecture has aimed to exclude unwanted groups of people from some locations. This type of architecture is called “defensive” or “hostile” architecture and includes benches that cannot be slept on, spikes in the ground that cannot be stood on, and pieces of metal that hinder one’s ability to skateboard. These defensive measures have sparked public outrage, with many thinking such measures lead to suffering, are disrespectful, and violate people’s rights. In this paper, it is argued (...) that these views are difficult to defend and that much more empirical research on the topic is needed. (shrink)

The increasing use of Artificial Intelligence for making decisions in public affairs has sparked a lively debate on the benefits and potential harms of self-learning technologies, ranging from the hopes of fully informed and objectively taken decisions to fear for the destruction of mankind. To prevent the negative outcomes and to achieve accountable systems, many have argued that we need to open up the “black box” of AI decision-making and make it more transparent. Whereas this debate has primarily focused on (...) how transparency can secure high-quality, fair, and reliable decisions, far less attention has been devoted to the role of transparency when it comes to how the general public come to perceive AI decision-making as legitimate and worthy of acceptance. Since relying on coercion is not only normatively problematic but also costly and highly inefficient, perceived legitimacy is fundamental to the democratic system. This paper discusses how transparency in and about AI decision-making can affect the public’s perception of the legitimacy of decisions and decision-makers and produce a framework for analyzing these questions. We argue that a limited form of transparency that focuses on providing justifications for decisions has the potential to provide sufficient ground for perceived legitimacy without producing the harms full transparency would bring. (shrink)

We consider the implications for the ethical evaluation of research programs of two fundamental changes in the revised research ethical guideline of the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences. The first is the extension of scope that follows from exchanging “biomedical” for “health‐related” research, and the second is the new evaluative basis of “social value,” which implies new ethical requirements of research. We use the example of antibiotic resistance interventions to explore the need to consider the instances of what (...) we term the pragmatic risks of such interventions to evaluate the social value of certain kinds of health‐related research. These (pragmatic) risks severely threaten the social value of interventions in every area where human and social responses significantly impact on their effectiveness. Thus, the social value of health‐related research needed to demonstrate its effectiveness depends on the extent and successful management of such risks. Research designed to take into account the management of pragmatic risks also gives rise to similar types of risks, and the potential for social value in light of those risks needs to be considered in ethical reviews based on the new guidelines. We argue that, to handle this new expanded task, the international system of research ethical review addressed by the guidelines needs institutional development. (shrink)

Carbon nanotubes (CNTs) are one of the first examples of nanotechnology, with a history of promising uses and high expectations. This paper uses the recent debate over their future to explore both ethical and value-laden statements which unsettle the notion of CNTs as a value-free nanotechnology and their regulation as purely a technical affair. A point of departure is made with the inclusion of CNTs on the Substitute-It-Now list by the Swedish NGO ChemSec, an assessment process that anticipates and complements (...) the Registration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals (REACH) regulation in Europe. An argument map is constructed to illustrate the core contention in the debate—should CNTs be substituted or not—which follows from a systematic literature review and content analysis of sampled journal articles. Nine arguments are articulated that bolster one of two camps: the pro-substitution camp or the contra-substitution camp. Beneath these arguments are a set of three implicit values that animate these two camps in prescribing competing interventions to resolve the dispute: (i) environmental protection and human safety, (ii) good science, and (iii) technological progress. This leads to a discussion around the regulatory problem of safeguarding conflicting values in decision-making under sustained scientific uncertainty. Finally, the study suggests further empirical work on specific nanomaterials in a pivot away from the abstract, promissory nature of nanotechnology and other emerging technologies in science, technology, and innovation policy. The examination of ethics and values is useful for mapping controversies in science and technology studies of regulation, even amongst experts in cognate research fields like nanomedicine and nanotoxicology. (shrink)

For many years, some urban architecture has aimed to exclude unwanted groups of people from some locations. This type of architecture is called “defensive” or “hostile” architecture and includes benches that cannot be slept on, spikes in the ground that cannot be stood on, and pieces of metal that hinder one’s ability to skateboard. These defensive measures have sparked public outrage, with many thinking such measures lead to suffering, are disrespectful, and violate people’s rights. In this paper, it is argued (...) that these views are difficult to defend and that much more empirical research on the topic is needed. (shrink)

_The interest in "social sustainability" has recently increased in the field of urban development. We want societies, cities, and neighborhoods to be economically and environmentally sustainable, but we also want urban areas that are safe, diverse, walkable, and relaxing, just to mention a few examples. Strikingly, however, there is no consensus regarding what definition of "social sustainability" should be employed. Additionally, some people are skeptical about the prospect of finding a useful definition at all and claim it is impossible to (...) satisfactorily define the concept for various reasons, such as its complexity. A potential first step towards navigating this conceptual maze is to provide desiderata for a definition of social sustainability. We defend a list of nine desiderata and thereby create a theoretical framework for analyzing and constructing a definition of "social sustainability". We also examine the skeptical arguments and find that it is premature to conclude that the goal of finding a useful definition is hopeless. With the criteria in place, the future debate can proceed by assessing definitions of "social sustainability" in a more structured and transparent manner. This activity is of upmost importance if we want to create just cities._ _Keywords:_ Social Sustainability, Definition, Purposes and Aims, Conditions of Adequacy. (shrink)

Senza una filosofia della storia, la storia non è altro che un incomprensibile susseguirsi di eventi che non trasmette le autentiche motivazioni umane ad agire. Capire il fine ultimo della storia significa porsi in un'ottica assoluta, metafisica, abbandonando la concezione del corpo sociale come semplice lotta per la sopravvivenza. In questo senso la filosofia è sorella della teologia come dimostrano, secondo Karl Lowith, le tappe fondamentali del pensiero europeo. Dalla Bibbia a sant'Agostino, da Voltaire a Marx, da Vico (...) a Hegel, l'interpretazione filosofica della storia rimane ancorata a un'originaria matrice religiosa. Anche quando alla fede e all'idea di provvidenza sostituisce quella di progresso. (shrink)

Die Debatte über Inhalt, Begründung und Tragfähigkeit eines universalistischen Begriffs von Vernunft wird zunehmend zur zentralen Debatte der Philosophie. Hat die Tradition des ”okzidentalen Rationalismus“ (Max Weber) den Vernunftbegriff lediglich intern differenziert - in ”theoretische“ und ”praktische“ Vernunft (Kant), in ”Verstand“ und ”Vernunft“ (Hegel), in ”Zweckrationalität“ und ”Wertrationalität“ (Weber) -, so wurde im Lichte der Erfahrung zweier Weltkriege in diesem Jahrhundert mit der Kritik an der Irrationalität einer verselbständigten ”instrumentellen“ Vernunft (Horkheimer/Adorno) eine Dialektik skeptisch reflektiert die heute im Zeichen einer (...) ”radikalen Vernunftkritik“ diese Tradition als ganze in Frage gestellt hat: statt der ”zwanglosen Geltung von Vernunft“ nur Macht (Foucault), statt der ”einen“ Vernunft ein Plural von nicht mehr vermittelbaren Rationalitäten (MacIntyre, Lyotard), statt der ”Selbstbegründung“ nur kontingente Konventionen (Rorty), statt der ”Handlungsrationalität“ von Menschen die Rationalität sozialer Systeme (Luhmann), statt ”idealtypischer Rationalitätsstandards“ nur kontextrelative und fallspezifische Handlungsgründe (Toulmin). Der vorliegende Band, zu dem sechzehn angelsächsische und deutsche Philosophen beigetragen haben, widmet sich dieser Diskussion mit dem Ziel einer vertieften Bestandsaufnahme der Problemstellung. Darüber hinaus wird die Integrationskraft eines typologisch differenzierten, diskurstheoretischen Vernunftkonzepts erprobt. (Quelle: buchhandel.de). (shrink)

In this highly innovative book Robert Fine compares three great studies of modern political life: Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Marx's Capital and Hannah Arendt's Origins of Totalitarianism, and argues that they are all profoundly radical texts, which jointly contribute to our understanding of the modern world. Fine maintains that these works are far more revealing when read together than in opposition, and draws a direct parallel between Hegel's critique of social forms of right and Marx's (...) critique of social forms of value. Fine shows how fruitfully their work can and should be combined. Hannah Arendt was in turn critical of what she saw as the historicism of both Hegel and Marx, but Fine argues that her study of the origins of totalitarianism directly picks up on their insights into the modern potential for fanaticism and destructiveness. Arendt never disavowed any of the nineteenth century thinkers who prefigured the catastrophes to come, but Fine shows her indebtedness to Hegel and Marx. This fascinating book offers a re-reading of these texts as three pivotal moments in the construction of a critical humanist tradition. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the sustained and multifaceted attempt of Jürgen Habermas to reconstruct Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right for our own times. In a series of articles written in the post‐1989 period, Habermas has argued that the challenge posed both by the catastrophes of the twentieth century, and by social forces of globalization, has given new impetus to the idea of cosmopolitan justice that Kant first expressed. He recognizes that today we cannot simply repeat Kant's eighteenth‐century vision: that (...) if we are to grapple with the complexities of present‐day problems, it is necessary to iron out certain inconsistencies in Kant's thinking, radicalize it where its break from the old order of nation‐states is incomplete, socialize it so as to draw out the connections between perpetual peace and social justice, and modernize it so as to comprehend the “differences both in global situation and conceptual framework that now separate us from him.”1 His basic intuition, however, is that Kant's idea of cosmopolitan right is as relevant to our times as it was to Kant's own. If it was Kant's achievement to formulate the idea of cosmopolitanism in a modern philosophical form, Habermas takes up the challenge posed by Karl‐Otto Apel: to “think with Kant against Kant” in reconstructing this idea. What follows is a critical assessment of Habermas's response to this challenge. We focus here on the dilemmas he faces in grounding his normative commitment to cosmopolitan politics and in reconciling his cosmopolitanism with the national framework in which he developed his ideas of constitutional patriotism and deliberative democracy. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the sustained and multifaceted attempt of Jürgen Habermas to reconstruct Kant's theory of cosmopolitan right for our own times. In a series of articles written in the post‐1989 period, Habermas has argued that the challenge posed both by the catastrophes of the twentieth century, and by social forces of globalization, has given new impetus to the idea of cosmopolitan justice that Kant first expressed. He recognizes that today we cannot simply repeat Kant's eighteenth‐century vision: that (...) if we are to grapple with the complexities of present‐day problems, it is necessary to iron out certain inconsistencies in Kant's thinking, radicalize it where its break from the old order of nation‐states is incomplete, socialize it so as to draw out the connections between perpetual peace and social justice, and modernize it so as to comprehend the “differences both in global situation and conceptual framework that now separate us from him.”1 His basic intuition, however, is that Kant's idea of cosmopolitan right is as relevant to our times as it was to Kant's own. If it was Kant's achievement to formulate the idea of cosmopolitanism in a modern philosophical form, Habermas takes up the challenge posed by Karl‐Otto Apel: to “think with Kant against Kant” in reconstructing this idea. What follows is a critical assessment of Habermas's response to this challenge. We focus here on the dilemmas he faces in grounding his normative commitment to cosmopolitan politics and in reconciling his cosmopolitanism with the national framework in which he developed his ideas of constitutional patriotism and deliberative democracy. (shrink)

The institution of crimes against humanity at Nuremberg in 1945 was an event which marked the birth of cosmopolitan law as a social reality. Cosmopolitan law has existed as an abstract idea at least since the writings of Kant in the late eighteenth century, but Nuremberg turned the notion of humanity from a merely regulative idea into a substantial entity. Crimes against humanity differ significantly from the traditional categories of international law: war crimes and crimes against peace. While the latter (...) generally treats states as subjects of right and upholds the principle of national sovereignty, the former treats individuals as subjects of right and encroaches on national sovereignty. I focus here on the writings of Hannah Arendt on the Nuremberg trials, the Eichmann trial and the actuality of crimes against humanity perpetrated in totalitarian regimes. I explore her relation to the optimistic and naive cosmopolitanism of Karl Jaspers, as well as to the two prevailing forms of critical thought: the cynical realism towards the law adopted by many of the defendants, including Carl Schmitt, and the deconstructive attitude to humanism and technology adopted by Martin Heidegger. I maintain that Arendt's rugged cosmopolitanism, tested against its critics, remains exceptionally revealing on the issue of crimes against humanity now that this issue has re-emerged, after many years of silence, as arguably the most important question of our own day. (shrink)

Excerpt from Der Echte: Und der Xenophontische Sokrates Der xen0phontische Sokrates selbst wieder zwang, die Fuh rung der Untersuchung weit mehr, als bisher geschehen, zu ver breitem. Die Memorabilien sind das Gegentheil eines selbst herrlichen Kunstwerks, weisen an allen Ecken und Enden uber sich hinaus, stehen als ein schwaches Glied in der Kette der sokratischen Literatur und zunachst in der der xenophontischen Schriften. Es galt, sie zunachst als solches zu begreifen und das volle Licht der Parallelen bei Xenophon auf (...) sie einwirken zu lassen. Dabei enthullten sich die Mem. Oft nur als durftiger Abklatsch anderer xenophontischen Schriften, von denen sie erst die farbige Beleuchtung, die Erklarung ihrer Motive, die Auf hellung ihrer Ordnung erhalten. So ward nun moglichst psycho logisch aus Xenophon erklart, was sich aus ihm erklaren liess. Indessen fur die Hauptsache, das Philosophische, stellte Xeno phon's notorische Unselbstandigkeit neue Fragen und Aufgaben, und hier ergab nun eine weitschichtige Vergleichung seine fast vollige philosophische Abhangigkeit im Ganzen wie im Einzelnen vom Kynismus, die in Grad und Art und plausiblen Motiven genau der Abhangigkeit der romischen Praktiker von den stoischen Nachfolgern der Kyniker_ entspricht. Nicht nur die Memorabilien, auch die andern Socratica Xenophon's, sowie vor Allem Cyropadie Hiero Agesilaus, de rep. Lac. Prolog und Epilog des Oynegeticus offenbarten sich mehr und mehr als durchaus kynisirende Schriften, und auch hier liegt dem Verf. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

In their enthusiasm for programming, computational linguists have tended to lose sight of what humansdo. They have conceived of conversations as independent of sound and the bodies that produce it. Thus, implicit in their simulations is the assumption that the text is the essence of talk. In fact, unlike electronic mail, conversations are acoustic events. During everyday talk, human understanding depends both on the words spoken and on fine interpersonal vocal coordination. When utterances are analysed into sequences of word-based (...) forms, however, these prosodic aspects of language disappear. Therefore, to investigate the possibility that machines might talk, we propose acommunion game that includes this interpersonal patterning. Humans and machines would talk together and, based on recordings of them, a panel would appraise the relevant merit of each machine's simulation by how true to life it sounded. Unlike Turing's imitation game, the communion game overtly focuses attention, not on intelligence, but on language. It is designed to facilitate the development of social groups of adaptive robots that exploit complex acoustic signals in real time. We consider how the development of such machines might be approached. (shrink)

Contents/Inhalt: Preface. Vorwort. Abbreviations/Siglen. I. JASPERS ON WORLD PHILOSOPHY AND WORLD HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY/JASPERS ÜBER WELT-PHILOSOPHIE UND WELTGESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. Nekrolog von Karl Jaspers selbst verfaßt. Obituary by Karl Jaspers himself. Karl JASPERS: Weltgeschichte der Philosophie - Zweites Buch: Geschichte der Gehalte: Einleitung. Karl JASPERS: World History of Philosophy - Second Volume: History of the Substantive Contents of Philosophic Thought. Introduction. II. INTRODUCTION/EINLEITUNG. Leonard H. EHRLICH: Opening Remarks. Introduction of Jeanne Hersch, Honorary President of the Conference. (...) Jeanne HERSCH: Von der Wirkung einer "philosophia negativa". III. LEGACY AND TASK. VERMÄCHTNIS UND AUFGABE. Leonard H. EHRLICH: Ausblick: Vernunft, Geist, Geschichte. Sawako HANYU: the Concept of the "Encompassing" in World Philosophy. Andreas RINOFNER: Periechontologie und Weltgeschichte der Philosophie. Systematische Bemerkungen zu einem aufschlußreichen Verhältnis. Richard WISSER: Projekt und Vision einer "Weltgeschichte der Philosophie" und "Weltphilosophie" als Folgen der "Grundverfassung" von Karl Jaspers. IV. DIMENSIONS OF COMMUNICATION/RÄUME DER KOMMUNIKATION. Andreas CESANA: Grenzen der Rationalität und Kommunikation. Brenio ONETTO-BÄCHLER: Existentielle Kommunikation bei Jaspers. Czes_awa PIECUCH: Es ist gleichgültig, wer die Wahrheit ausspricht. Über die Uneigennützigkeit der existentiellen Kommunikation. Oswald O. SCHRAG: Existence, Existenz, and Social Organization. Vladimir KATASONOV: The Gadfly, Stinging the Sluggish Horse: The Socratic Mission of Jaspers's Philosophy. V. COMMUNICATIVE WORLD HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY/KOMMUNIKATIVE WELTGESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE. Albrecht KIEL: Die Weisen des Umgreifenden, die der Mensch ist: Wege zu Jaspers' Periechontologie. Maria Luisa BASSO: K. Jaspers - N. Berdiaeff: une confrontation entre deux philosophies de l'histoire. Convergence et divergence d'affirmations. Inigo BOCKEN: Kommunikation und Mutmaßung. Versuch eines Vergleichs zwischen Jaspers' Idee einer Philosophie der Kommunikation und Nikolaus von Kues' Kunst der Mutmaßungen. Boles_aw ANDRZEJEWSKI: Jaspers' Stellung zur Romantik im Lichte seiner Sprachphilosophie. Endre KISS: Karl Jaspers' Auslegung Nietzsches als eines Metaphysikers der Immanenz. Danièle MOYAL-SHARROCK: Genie et Folie selon Jaspers. Milan UZELAC: The World and Existence. Pablo LÓPEZ-LÓPEZ: Das Studium der Philosophie als Studium der Weltgeschichte der Philosophie. VI. COMMUNICATIVE WORLD PHILOSOPHY: EAST AND WEST/KOMMUNIKATIVE WELTPHILOSOPHIE: OST UND WEST. Wonjae LEE: Karl Jaspers und das Weltproblem des interreligiösen Dialogs. Silvia MARZANO: Comunicazione mondiale, kantismo e frattura dell'essere in Karl Jaspers. Una "terza via" fra Occidente e Oriente? Indu SARIN: Jaspers's Quest for Existential Communication. Mohammed MARUF: Jaspers and Iqbal on Self, Freedom and Communication. Subhadr PANYADEEP: Ich und Nicht-Ich bei Jaspers und im Buddhismus. Kazuteru FUKUI: Das Wesen des Buddhismus und Jaspers' Philosophie. Yukio MASUBUCHI: Jaspers und Nishida. Eine Theorie des "Topos" in der Lehre von der Kommunikation. Hans SANER: Weltphilosophie und Globalkultur im interkulturellen Vergleich mit den Konzepten "Weltmusik" und "Weltkunst". Gerhard RAUCHE: The Paradox of " Das Scheitern " as a World Formula. VII. COMMUNICATIVE WORLD PHILOSOPHY: FREEDOM AND TOLERANCE/KOMMUNIKATIVE WELTPHILOSOPHIE: FREIHEIT UND TOLERANZ. Anna MASÓ-MONCLÚS: Libertad y autoridad en Hannah Arendt y Karl Jaspers. Otmar KLEIN: "Weltverabsolutierung" und Verantwortungsverlust. Kurt SALAMUN: Grenzen der Toleranz. Zum Offenheits- und Toleranzparadigma in der Philosophie von Karl Jaspers. Giorgio PENZO: Politik als Ethos und das Problem der Freiheit bei Jaspers. Gerhard KNAUSS: Von der Weimarer Republik zur Weltpolitik. Wandlungen in Jaspers' Auffassung und Wertung der Politik von der Heidelberger Frühschrift "Die geistige Situation der Zeit" bis zu den Basler Spätschriften. Hermann-Josef SEIDENECK: Freiheit und Wiedervereinigung auf dem Prüfstand. Prognose und Ergebnis unter dem Blickwinkel von existentieller Kommunikation im Welthorizont. Appendix/Anhang. (shrink)

Was bringt einen Menschen dazu, sich auf das einzulassen, was man "Glauben" nennt, sein Leben also auf anderes zu setzen als auf das, dessen man sich verfügend sicher sein kann? Hermann Pius Siller macht deutlich: In der Theologie ist die Beachtung der eigenen Lebenserfahrung und der Lebenserfahrung des Gesprächspartners unverzichtbar. Für das, was das Wort "Gott" benennen soll, muss eine bestimmte Erfahrung beschrieben werden können. Mit "Gewissen", "Geheimnis" und "reine Gabe" benennt er dabei exemplarisch drei elementare Zugänge zu "letzten Erfahrungen", (...) wie sie im Leben von John Henry Newman, Karl Rahner und Paulus von Tarsus gemacht, gelebt und theologisch durchdacht wurden. Vor dem Hintergrund der gegenwärtigen Gottes- und Kirchenkrise, also der fehlenden Glaubwürdigkeit kirchlicher Rede von Gott in der Gesellschaft, leistet er damit einen wichtigen Beitrag verantworteter, die lebensgeschichtlichen Voraussetzungen berücksichtigender Gottesrede. (shrink)

Die Reihe formaler Sprachen, die im Verständnis von M.J. Cresswell "sinnvoll" als Modelle für natüriiche Sprachen anzusehen sind und die dabei auch semantische Vagheiten zu erfassen gestatten, nämlich die dreiwertige Logik (U. Blau), die Superbewertung (B.C. van Fraassen, K. Fine, M. Pinkal, J. Ballweg) und die unscharfe Logik (L.A. Zadeh), legt nahe, daß bei der Sprachanalyse Zadehs "Prinzip der Inkompatibilität" gilt: Hohe Präzision ist inkompatibel mit hoher Komplexität. Je komplexer man das Vagheitsproblem angeht, desto verschwommener wird der benutzbare Geltungswert. (...) Zudem wird die Sprachanalyse auf Empirie verwiesen: Die Superbewertung erfordert eine Beschreibung von Kontexten, die unscharfe Logik eine sprachempirische Untersuchung aller Geltungswerte. (shrink)

Die Reihe formaler Sprachen, die im Verständnis von M.J. Cresswell "sinnvoll" als Modelle für natüriiche Sprachen anzusehen sind und die dabei auch semantische Vagheiten zu erfassen gestatten, nämlich die dreiwertige Logik (U. Blau), die Superbewertung (B.C. van Fraassen, K. Fine, M. Pinkal, J. Ballweg) und die unscharfe Logik (L.A. Zadeh), legt nahe, daß bei der Sprachanalyse Zadehs "Prinzip der Inkompatibilität" gilt: Hohe Präzision ist inkompatibel mit hoher Komplexität. Je komplexer man das Vagheitsproblem angeht, desto verschwommener wird der benutzbare Geltungswert. (...) Zudem wird die Sprachanalyse auf Empirie verwiesen: Die Superbewertung erfordert eine Beschreibung von Kontexten, die unscharfe Logik eine sprachempirische Untersuchung aller Geltungswerte. (shrink)

The fine arts are considered as one of several pathways toward insight, knowledge, and understanding. My reflections on this are deliberately not based on aesthetics or on philosophy of art. Speculations on fine art observe two characteristics of specific epistemic processes: first, a tacit knowledge that is not enunciated by ordinary language and, second, a present and effective logic, which has a different pattern from the logic of scientific knowledge. The latter leads to change because it is built (...) upon accumulated knowledge, whereas in the arts, change leads to knowledge as creative processes guide us toward what we do not know, and this challenges what we do know. (shrink)

A number of philosophers have recently become receptive to the idea that, in addition to scientific or causal explanation, there may be a distinctive kind of metaphysical explanation, in which explanans and explanandum are connected, not through some sort of causal mechanism, but through some constitutive form of determination. I myself have long been sympathetic to this idea of constitutive determination or ‘ontological ground’; and it is the aim of the present paper to help put the idea on a firmer (...) footing - to explain how it is to be understood, how it relates to other ideas, and how it might be of use in philosophy. (shrink)

This classic remains one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history.

I lay down a system of structural rules for various notions of ground and establish soundness and completeness.

Karl Philipp Moritz (1756-1793) ist bekannt als Autor des Anton Reiser und als Ästhetiker der Klassik. Heute vergessen hingegen ist der Arbeitsbereich, der ihm neben seiner Beschäftigung mit dem Schönen der wichtigste war: seine Auseinandersetzung mit der Sprache. Das vorliegende Buch zeigt Moritz als originellen Grammatiker und Sprachphilosophen vor dem Hintergrund der europäischen Geistesgeschichte. Und es beleuchtet, wie sich in den Sprachreflexionen diejenigen Denkfiguren entwickeln, die er später seiner Ästhetik zu Grunde legt: So wird das Theorem des "in sich (...) selbst vollendeten Schönen" auf die Erklärung der Verba neutra zurückgeführt, die Figur des "Gesichtspunktes] auf die Erkenntnisse über die Taubstummensprache und das zentrale Theorem der "bildenden Nachahmung des Schönen" auf die Sprachursprungshypothese. Das Buch ergänzt damit die Disziplingeschichte der Linguistik um einen eigenwilligen Sprachforscher und erfüllt, indem es Moritz' Sprachschriften in den Kontext des Gesamtwerkes stellt, eine seit 20 Jahren erhobene Forderung der Moritzforschung. "Die Sprache und das Schöne" zeigt Moritz in einem neuen Licht. (shrink)

Kit Fine develops a Fregean theory of abstraction, and suggests that it may yield a new philosophical foundation for mathematics, one that can account for both our reference to various mathematical objects and our knowledge of various mathematical truths. The Limits ofion breaks new ground both technically and philosophically.

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

Kant's Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant’s conception of reason and its philosophical significance, focusing on two claims. First, it argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or “comprehension”). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and practical rationality, without reducing either to the other. In particular, through it, we see why the (...) activities of both theoretical and practical reason are governed by a version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, while also seeing why reason is essentially autonomous. At the same time, Kant's Reason also reads Kant as presenting us with a compelling picture of the role that reason (as a capacity or power) should play in a systematic approach to foundational philosophical questions. In doing so, it argues for an account of the fundamental norms that apply to rational beings that treats as fundamental neither substantive reasons or values nor merely structural rationality, but instead a robust conception of reason as a power or capacity — namely, the capacity for theoretical and practical understanding. The result is a form of “rational constitutivism” – one which contrasts both with the forms of “reasons fundamentalism” that are currently fashionable and the forms of “agency-first constitutivism” that have dominated much of Kantian metaethics. In this sense, the aim of the book is to vindicate Kant’s insistence that his philosophy represents nothing more or less than reason’s implicit self-understanding coming to explicit and systematic self-consciousness. (shrink)

Popper formulates and explains his non-justificationist theory of knowledge. Science--empirical science--aims at true explanatory theories, yet it can never prove, finally establish, or justify any of its theories as true, not even if it is in fact a true theory. Science must continue to question and criticize all its theories, even those which happen to be true.

I propose formulating identity criteria as generic statements of ground, thereby avoiding objections that have been made to the more usual formulations.

Are there, in addition to the various actual objects that make up the world, various possible objects? Are there merely possible people, for example, or merely possible electrons, or even merely possible kinds? We certainly talk as if there were such things. Given a particular sperm and egg, I may wonder whether that particular child which would result from their union would have blue eyes. But if the sperm and egg are never in fact brought together, then there is no (...) actual object that my thought is about. Or again, in the semantics for modal logic we presuppose an ontology of possibilia twice over. For first, we countenance various possible worlds, in addition to the actual world; and second, each of these worlds is taken to be endowed with its own domain of objects. These will be the actual objects of the world in question, but they need not be actual simpliciter, i.e., actual objects of our world. What are we to make of such discourse? There are four options: (i) the discourse is taken to be unintelligible; (ii) it is taken to be intelligible but nonfactual, i.e. as not in the business of stating facts; (iii) it is taken to be factual but reducible to discourse involving no reference to possibilia; (iv) it is taken to be both factual and irreducible. These options range from a full-blooded form of actualism at one extreme to a full-blooded form of possibilism at the other. The two intermediate positions are possibilist in that they accept the intelligibility of possibilist discourse but actualist in that they attempt to dispense with its prima facie commitment to possibilia. All four positions have found advocates in the literature. Quine, in his less irenic moments, favours option (i); Forbes advocates option (ii), at least for certain parts of possibilist discourse; many philosophers, including Adams and myself, opt for (iii); while Lewis and Stalnaker have endorsed versions of (iv), that differ in how full-blooded they take the possible objects to be.. (shrink)

Ganzheitslehren haben Hochkonjunktur. Einer ihrer scharfsten Kritiker war Karl Popper. Das Buch erzahlt die Geschichte eines Zerrissenen und wirft ein neues Licht auf einen der einflussreichsten Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts. Als einer der letzten Aufklarer zog Popper in einen aussichtslosen Kampf gegen die "holistische Verschworung", bei dem er sich immer tiefer in Widerspruche verstrickte. Hier wird zum ersten Mal das Grunddilemma in Poppers Oeuvre umfassend dargelegt. Es ist ein herausfordernder, gut lesbarer Streifzug durch unsere Geistesgeschichte zuruck zu den (...) Wurzeln der Ganzheitslehren mit einem besonderen Augenmerk auf die holistische Wende um 1900, die ihre Schatten bis in die Gegenwart wirft. (shrink)

Dieses Buch ist die erfolgreichste Einführung in die Philosophie der Nachkriegszeit. Ein klassischer Text eines bedeutenden Philosophen dieses Jahrhunderts. Ausgehend von der Strittigkeit der Philosophie werden in 12 Vorträgen Grundlagen und Bedingungen des Philosophierens entfaltet. Im Anhang werden Lektürevorschläge zum eigenen philosophischen Studium gegeben. (Ec).

First published in French, Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy (1847) was composed during his years in Brussels, when he was developing his economic views and, through confrontations with the chief leaders of the working-class movement, establishing his intellectual standing. In this classic work, which laid the foundation of ideas later developed in Capital, Marx polemicized against then premier French socialist, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon. Proudhon wanted to unite the best features of such contraries as competition and monopoly. He hoped to save the (...) good features of economic institutions while eliminating the bad. Marx, however, declared that no equilibrium was possible between the antagonisms in any given economic system. Social structures were transient historical forms determined by the productive forces: "The handmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the stream mill, society with the industrial capitalist.". (shrink)