Nietzsche rompt son contrat d’enseignant à l’Université de Bâle en 1870, il abandonne sa toute récente nationalité helvétique, et apatride rejoint comme infirmier le conflit qui vient de s’ouvrir avec la France. Très vite blessé, il débute sur son lit d’hôpital la naissance de la tragédie. Née dans la guerre cette généalogie de la tragédie en porte t-elle les stigmates? Ou encore, comment la guerre peut-elle produire un tel livre? Alors qu’il pose les bases de sa théorie deux autres socles (...) le portent, sa relation à la famille Wagner et les enjeux esthétiques qui y sont discutés et un projet de communauté artistique, éthique et scientifique envisagé avec Rohde. La Naissance de la tragédie qui devait révolutionner la pensée occidentale porte en elle ces tiraillements entre la guerre, l’amour et l’amitié. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans L. Hébert (dir.), Signo, Rimouski (Québec), 2011. Nous remercions Louis Hébert de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. 1. Résumé Trois opérations sont nécessaires pour produire un rythme : la segmentation en unités, la disposition et la sériation de ces unités. « Disposition » désigne également la composante relative à la disposition des unités dans une étendue temporelle et/ou spatiale. Le rythme peut notamment être défini comme la configuration particulière que constituent au (...) (...) - Sur le concept de rythme – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Je voudrais partir de cette définition générale, comme une petite introduction, où l’architecture se donne comme le moment de la maîtrise absolue de l’espace et des forces invisibles qui le traversent, et j’ouvre sur un paradoxe. Forme de l’espace maitrisé, l’architecture perdure et défie le temps. Ce que nous admirons, dans les bâtiments anciens, c’est paradoxalement comment l’espace maîtrisé se manifeste dans une maîtrise du temps. Cette maîtrise dont, par exemple, Napoléon énonce la formul...

Les périodes de confinement sont des moments éprouvants. On a la sensation de perdre nos repères. Nous nous sentons déboussolés. On peut cependant saisir l’occasion de faire le point. Sous le regard de la réflexion philosophique, ce petit livre est une tentative pour éviter de perdre le nord. L’auteur propose de courtes réflexions puisées à même la littérature philosophique. Sans prétention, il s’agit de fournir des pistes rendant intelligibles nos conditions d’êtres confinés.

1 – Les insuccès de Mersenne et la réussite de Petit Au début de l’été 1644, Mersenne venait d’achever ses Cogitata et commençait la rédaction de ses Reflexiones, lorsqu’il reçut de Michel-Ange Ricci la copie des deux lettres de Torricelli. Celui-ci n’était nullement un inconnu pour le Minime : ils étaient en correspondance depuis 1643 et échangèrent de nombreuses lettres au cours de cette année 1644 et par la suite sur des questions de géométrie, d’acoustique, d’optique, sans qu’il s...

XXIX. Retour à Aphrodisias. Compléments à Documents XXV, BCH 1983. XXX. Ampoules chrétiennes. Ces petites ampoules, contenant un peu d'huile sainte, étaient portées sur le corps comme des objets de protection. Types trouvés en Asie Mineure : Saint André, Jean l'Évangéliste, la fuite en Egypte. XXXI. Pline VI 49, Démodamas de Milet et la reine Apamè. Démodamas de Milet, général de Séleucos I, connu par Pline et par des décrets de Milet en l'honneur d'Antiochos et d'Apamè. Son zèle pour le (...) Didymeion. Les décrets milésiens datant de 299, son expédition en Sogdiane se place vers 306. XXXII. Documents pergaméniens. 1. Un décret de Pergame : le décret OGI 332, trouvé près d'Élaia, à trois heures de Pergame, décrétant des honneurs à Attale III victorieux (érection de deux statues ; célébration régulière de l'anniversaire de son retour à Pergame, fête exceptionnelle pour l'entrée du roi dans «notre ville»), émane bien de Pergame et non d'Élaia comme on a cru pouvoir l'affirmer à cause de l'opposition entre « Pergame » et « notre ville » : en fait au moment du vote du décret Attale est bien arrivé sur le territoire de Pergame, et il se repose à l'Asclépieion avant son entrée solennelle dans la ville. Autres entrées solennelles de rois ou de Romains. 2. Un décret d'Élaia : dans le décret Syllogez 694, décidant de consacrer des stèles de bronze portant le traité d'alliance avec Rome, la prééminence de Déméter et Core dans les cultes de la cité montre que ce décret émane d'Élaia, dont les types monétaires montrent, à côté d'Athéna et de l'olivier, Déméter, le grain de blé, la torche. 3. Fabriques royales : les ergastéria mentionnés dans une lettre d'un roi de Pergame (Welles, Roy. Cor., 23) sur les droits et privilèges d'un prêtre ne sont pas des fabriques royales, mais simplement des ateliers-boutiques, construites par le roi, dans un portique du sanctuaire, et louées chaque année au bénéfice du prêtre. XXXIII. A Gaunos avec Quintus de Smyrne. Justesse de la description de « Gaunos la creuse » par Quintus de Smyrne. Les voyageurs et la description de la petite plaine, du lac, et du cadre de montagnes. Le Tarbélos est à identifier avec le massif Sandras Dag. Richesse du territoire, malgré les fièvres : les figues, l'encens, la forêt, la pêche. La place de Gaunos dans le monde hellénistique : Gauniens à l'étranger, notamment en Egypte, avec Zenon. (shrink)

— XIX, Un évêché de Lycie. Larnaia, qui apparaît dans les listes d'évêchés lyciens au début du xe siècle, doit être cherchée dans cette Lycie montagneuse dont M. Gollignon donne une vivante description. Or dans la longue liste de donateurs, ΤΑΜ II, 108, retrouvée à Ithisar-Hippoukomè sont mentionnés des Λυρνΐται : leur ville fit partie d'une petite sympolitie dans l'Antiquité avant de devenir l'évêché de la région. — XX, Plolémaïs de Troade. La découverte sur le site de Larissa de Troade (...) de monnaies à la tête d'Apollon et à l'amphore, avec l'ethnique Πτολεμαιέων, c'est-à-dire aux mêmes types que les bronzes déjà réattribués à Larissa de Troade par L. Robert, permet d'affirmer que ces monnaies n'appartiennent pas à Lébédos-Ptolémaïs où elles apparaissent comme un corps étranger, et que Larissa, absorbée un moment dans le synécisme d'Alexandrie de Troade, fut refondée sous le nom de Ptolémaïs. — XXI, Au Nord de Sardes: 1. Localisation de la légende d'Echidna dans la région de Sardes, au lac Gygaia ou Koloé, lac marécageux, encombré de roseaux, très poissonneux ; témoignages des Anciens et des voyageurs ; les îles flottantes chez Pline (Varron) et dans les recueils de Faits Merveilleux ; le culte rendu au roi des roseaux. Le lac Simav en Mysie Abbaïtide et l'utilisation des roseaux à la fabrication des nattes. 2. Publication d'une stèle du Ier s. ap. J.-C., trouvée sur la rive N. du lac, avec une dédicace à Μητρί Θεών Λυδίαι. 3. Publication d'un décret d'une association cultuelle en l'honneur d'un Sardien, τον επί των προσόδων ; culte d'Apollon Pleurènos ; noms iraniens ; le texte date de la 6e année, sans doute de l'ère d'Actium. 4. Description des carrières de marbre voisines et de la ville de Mermere ; la découverte d'une dédicace monumentale à l'Artémis persique et la localisation proposée par Chr. Habicht de la communauté des Maibôzanoi, au nom iranien, permettent de situer là une ancienne colonie militaire perse. — XXII, Un relief des Muses au Louvre. Un relief représentant les neuf Muses entre Apollon et Hercule, acheté au collectionneur H. P. Borrell, est attribué à un sanctuaire d'Apollon de Phrygie, aux environs d'Afyonkarahisar. La découverte d'autres reliefs avec le même décor de moulures assure l'identification. (shrink)

1 – Les insuccès de Mersenne et la réussite de Petit Au début de l’été 1644, Mersenne venait d’achever ses Cogitata et commençait la rédaction de ses Reflexiones, lorsqu’il reçut de Michel-Ange Ricci la copie des deux lettres de Torricelli. Celui-ci n’était nullement un inconnu pour le Minime : ils étaient en correspondance depuis 1643 et échangèrent de nombreuses lettres au cours de cette année 1644 et par la suite sur des questions de géométrie, d’acoustique, d’optique, sans qu’il s...

RésuméIl n'y a pas de sujet plus idoine à justifier la philosophie ouverte qui est celle de Dialectica que l'étude de l'évolution du concept de raison dans la pensée occidentale.C'est avec la création de la géométrie déductive que le mot raison prit un sens chez les Grecs du ***Ve siècle av. J.‐C. A l'évidence sensible qui résulte du témoignage de nos sens et ne constate que le comment d'un fait observé, les géomètres grecs substituent l'évidence intelligible qui en explique le (...) pourquoi, en montrant qu'il est la conséquence nécessaire d'un petit nombre de propositions admises comme évidentes. S'élevant du concret à l'abstrait, ils dégagent l'essence intelligible de l'accident sensible et substituent au réel le possible. Les disciplines empiriques des Orientaux font place aux sciences théoriques et explicatives: l'astronomie, la mécanique, l'optique, la théorie musicale. Toutefois, au lieu de voir dans les concepts mathématiques une création de l'esprit, les penseurs‐géomètres de la Grèce les assimilent à une découverte par les yeux de l'ǎme d'essences préexistantes. Ils méprisèrent, en outre, les applications pratiques qui seules peuvent stimuler les sciences expérimentales. De là procèdent les limites, puis l'arrět de la science hellénique.Les conquětes d'Alexandre déversèrent sur l'Occident méditerranéen les religions de salut de l'Orient. A la recherche désintéressée du vrai se substitue la gnose, la révélation de mystères transcendants à la raison. Lorsque le message chrétien devint une philosophie puis une théologie, on en vint à distinguer » la démonstration hellénique « par le raisonnement et la dialectique, et » la démonstration hébraique « par les prophéties et les miracles des articles de la foi. La Scolastique rechercha l'accord de la raison et de la foi, en entendant par raison l'apport de la science et de la philosophie helléniques, assimilées, à partir du XIIIe siècle dans la Latinité, à l'encyclopédie aristotélicienne. La Scolastique échoua dans cette tentative. La doctrine de » la double vérité « fut l'aveu de cette impuissance.Pour se libérer de la mentalité scolastique, il fallut s'affranchir dans l'étude des phénomènes naturels de l'autorité d'Aristote, du joug de la théologie et parvenir à une théorie correcte de la connaissance, en particulier de la valeur des idées abstraites et de la distinction des vérités formelles et des vérités empiriques. Il fallut interpréter comme une création de l'esprit ce que les Grecs assimilaient à une découverte de vérités préexistantes. La désagrégation de l'a priori synthétique, conçu à la façon des Cartésiens et des Kantiens, conduit à se demander ce qui subsiste des exigences a priori de la raison. C'est à quoi s'évertue de répondre la dernière partie de l'article.ZusammenfassungEs gibt keinen geeigneteren Gegenstand zur Rechtfertigung der offenen Philosophie, die von der Dialectica vertreten wird, als das Studium der Entwicklung des Vernunftsbegriffes im abendländischen Denken.Mit der Entstehung der deduktiven Geometrie erhält das Wort Vernunft bei den Griechen des 5. Jahrhunderts vor Christo einen Sinn. An Stelle der gefühlsmässigen Evidenz, die auf der Gewissheit unserer Sinne beruht und lediglich das Wieeiner beobachteten Tatsache feststellt, setzen die griechischen Geometer die logische Evidenz, die das Warum erklärt, indem sie zeigt, dass es eine Folge einer kleinen Zahl von Voraussetzungen ist, die als evident angesehen werden können. Sich vom Konkreten zum Abstrakten erhebend, befreien sie das intelligible Wesen von der Zufälligkeit des Sinnlichen und ersetzen das Reelle durch das Mögliche. Die empirischen Disziplinen der Morgenländer schaffen Platz für die theoretischen und erklärenden Wissenschaften wie Astronomie, Mechanik, Optik, Musiktheorie. Immerhin, anstatt in den mathematischen Konzepten eine Schöpfung des Geistes zu sehen, setzen die geometrischen Denker Griechenlands diese der Entdeckung präexistenter Essenzen durch die Augen der Seele gleich. Sie verachten im übrigen die praktischen Anwendungen, die nur die Experimentalwissen‐schaften anregen können. Daher kommt es, dass die griechische Wissenschaft bei einer gewissen Grenze Halt machen musste.Die Schlachten Alexanders verschlangen im Abendland des Mittelmeeres die Heilsreligionen des Orients. An Stelle des uneigennützigen Suchens nach der Wahrheit tritt die Gnosis, das Erheben des mysteriös‐Transzendenten in den Bereich der Vernunft. Als die christliche Botschaft eine Philosophie, darauf eine Theologie wurde, begann man zu unterscheiden zwischen der » griechischen Beweisführung « mittels Vernunft und Dialektik und der » hebräischen Beweisführung « mittels Prophezeiungen und Wundern des zu Glaubenden. Die Scholastik forschte nach dem Zusammenhang zwischen Vernunft und Glaube, indem sie unter Vernunft den Beitrag der griechischen Wissenschaft und Philosophie verstand, der Aristotelischen Enzyklopädie angeglichen in der Folgezeit des 13. Jahrhunderts im Römischen Reich. Die Scholastik scheiterte in diesem Versuch. Die Lehre der » doppelten Wahrheit « war das Geständnis dieses Unvermögens.Um sich von der scholastischen Mentalität zu befreien, hiess es sich im Studium der Naturereignisse von der Autorität des Aristoteles befreien, vom Joch der Theologie und zu einer korrekten Theorie der Erkenntnis zu gelangen, speziell des Wertes der abstrakten Ideen und der Unterscheidung zwischen formellen und empirischen Wahrheiten. Was die Griechen einer Entdeckung von präexistenten Wahrheiten gleichsetzten, musste als Schöpfung des Geistes interpretiert werden. Die Desagregation des synthetischen Apriori, aufgefasst im Sinne von Descartes und Kant, führte zur Frage, was vorhanden sei von den apriori‐Erfordernissen der Vernunft.Dies zu beantworten, bemüht sich der letzte Teil des Artikels.There is no subject more suitable to the open philosophy of Dialectica than the study of the development of the concept of reason in Western thought.The word » reason « acquired a meaning with the creation of deductive geometry by the Greeks of the Vth cent. B. C. These geometers substituted for the sensible evidence, which only establishes the » what « of an observed fact, the intelligible evidence which explains the » why « of such an observed fact, by showing that it is the necessary result of a small number of statements, accepted as self‐evident. Rising from the concrete to the abstract, the geometers isolated the intelligible essence from the sensible accident, and substituted for the real the possible. The empirical technics of the Orientals made place for the theoretical sciences of the Greeks: astronomy, mechanics, optics and musical theory. Instead, however, of seeing mathematical concepts as creations of the mind, the Greek geometers considered them as preexisting entities, discovered by the eyes of the soul. They furthermore disregarded the practical applications which alone can stimulate experimental sciences. These were the limitations and the causes of the eventual end of hellenic science.The conquests of Alexander brought to the Western Mediterranean the religions of salvation of the East. The gnose, revelation of mysteries transcending reason, took the place of the disinterested search for truth. As the Christian message became a philosophy and then a theology, the distinction came to be made between the » hellenic demonstration of the faith « by logic and dialectics, and the » hebrew demonstration « by the prophecies and the miracles. The scholastics sought to reconcile reason with faith, by defining reason as the legacy of Greek science and philosophy, identified, after the XIIIth century, with the Aristotelian Encyclopedia. They failed in this endeavour. The doctrine of the » double truth « was the admission of this failure.In order to progress beyond the scholastic outlook, it was necessary to reject the precepts of Aristotle in the study of natural phenomena, to become free of the tyranny of theology, to develop a correct theory of knowledge, especially as regards the role of abstract ideas and the distinction between formal and empirical truths. It was necessary to interpret as a creation of the mind what the Greeks considered the discovery of preexisting truths. The breakdown of the synthetic apriori of the Cartesians and the Kantians leads one to wonder what remains of the a priori requisites of reason. The last part of the article suggests an answer to this question. (shrink)

Alerte! La malscience se répand aussi vite que la malbouffe! D'apparence de plus en plus sophistiquée mais produite en masse, de plus en plus vite et de moins en moins fiable. Interrogés de manière anonyme, 2 % des scientifiques reconnaissent avoir inventé ou falsifié des données. Soit pas moins de 140 000 chercheurs fraudeurs de par le monde. Biologie et médecine sont, de loin, les plus touchées. Et ces fraudes manifestes ne sont rien à côté des petits arrangements avec la (...) rigueur qui sont devenus fréquents dans les laboratoires. Est-ce grave? Très grave. Car la biologie et la médecine traitent de la santé, de la vie, de la mort. Est-il acceptable que de nouveaux médicaments soient testés, et peut-être autorisés, sur la base d'expériences plus ou moins truquées? Comme le secteur financier miné par ses créances irrécupérables, la littérature scientifique en biologie et en médecine s'avère de plus en plus gangrenée par des articles toxiques. Ce livre revient sur une série de scandales internationaux - des frères Bogdanoff à des cas moins médiatiques mais non moins dangereux - et se propose de réfléchir aux causes d'une telle dérive et aux moyens d'y remédier. A la fois enquête de terrain et essai critique, il met en lumière un aspect fondamental et trop ignoré de l'évolution actuelle des pratiques scientifiques. (shrink)

Georges Kalinowski, né en 1916 à Lublin, est dédédé le 21 octobre 2000 à Dijon, où, depuis la mort de son épouse, il s'était retiré auprès de sa fille, son gendre et ses petits-enfants.

Un “philosophe des cultures” appelé Louis Gardet est devenu un “islamologue catholique” de renommée mondiale après avoir vécu, de 1933 à 1945, dans la “khalwa” des Petits Frères de Jésus à El-Abiodh Sidi Cheikh, en Algérie. Frère André “en religion”, disciple du bienheureux Charles de Foucauld et ami fidèle de Jacques Maritain, s'est employé, par ses ouvrages, à faire connaître l'islam aux chrétiens. En thomiste convaincu, il s'est interrogé sur les relations de la philosophie avec les diverses formes de (...) la mystique de l'Inde, du judaïsme, du christianisme et de l'islam : comment y apprécier la “mystique du Soi” et la “mystique de l'Autre”? Personnellement engagé dans le dialogue islamo-chrétien, il a ouvert la voie à une meilleure compréhension entre les disciples du Christ et les fidèles du Coran. Ardent défenseur d'un monothéisme personnaliste, commun aux uns et aux autres, il demeure, pour tous, un modèle d'humanisme œcuménique qui s'enracine dans la transcendance du Dieu d'Abraham. (shrink)

Du travail des femmes dans la viticulture nous connaissions au mieux l’article de 1979 de Laura Frader sur les femmes et leurs familles dans les luttes viticoles de l’Aude avant la guerre de 1914 ou encore les entretiens recueillis par un collectif d’historiennes et d’anthropologues de Toulouse, publiés en 1981 dans un petit livre à couverture jaune par l’Atelier du Gué. C’est dire à quel point la synthèse de Jean-Louis Escudier envisagée dans la longue durée vient combler un (...) manque. En se ré... (shrink)

The years immediately after the final downfall of Napoleon Bonaparte could easily have been years of anti-climax in French science. In 1815, after two decades of undoubted greatness, the time, I feel, was ripe for decline. And decline might well have occurred if the traditions and the style of science as practised in France in the period of Napoleon's rule had been carried on unchanged by the disciples of the two great men who had dominated work in the physical sciences (...) for so many years. These men, of course, were the chemist Claude Louis Berthollet and the mathematician and physicist Pierre Simon Laplace. (shrink)

Ce petit livre engagé propose une anthologie de textes grecs et latins relatifs au désir et à la sexualité, à l’érotisme et, plus particulièrement, à l’homosexualité, un concept né au xixe siècle et sans équivalent direct grec ou latin. Alors que se multiplient, ces dernières années (au moins depuis la fin du xxe siècle), les travaux de recherche sur ces thématiques, le plus souvent dans le cadre d’analyses consacrées à la construction des rapports de genre, l’objet dudit recueil est (...) de « fai... (shrink)

Some metaphysicians believe that existence debates are easily resolved by trivial inferences from Moorean premises. This paper considers how the introduction of negative Moorean facts—negative existentials that command Moorean certainty—complicates this picture. In particular, it shows how such facts, when combined with certain plausible metaontological principles, generate a puzzle that commits the proponents of this method to a contradiction.

Ce livre de Michel Freitag interpelle "tous ceux qui s'interrogent sur la place qu'ils tiennent ou le rôle qu'ils jouent dans l'aventure de l'Université contemporaine." (Georges Leroux, Spirale) Une des constantes des écrits contenus dans ce livre "réside dans la comparaison systématique que Michel Freitag établit entre les caractéristiques de la modernité et celles de la postmodernité et les conséquences de celle-ci sur le traitement des enjeux et des problèmes actuels." (Louis Guay, Anthropologie et société) "Dans une société réduite (...) au bavardage, à l'insignifiance, à la poursuite de petits bonheurs mesquins, le tout sous contrôle bureaucratique de plus en plus envahissant, une telle réflexion est devenue essentielle. Voici un livre de bonne foi qui n'attend que ses lecteurs, qu'on souhaite nombreux." (Robert Major, Voix et images). (shrink)

David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature is famous for its extreme skepticism. Louis Loeb argues that Hume's destructive conclusions have in fact obscured a constructive stage that Hume abandons prematurely. Working within a philosophical tradition that values tranquillity, Hume favors an epistemology that links justification with settled belief. Hume appeals to psychological stability to support his own epistemological assessments, both favorable regarding causal inference, and unfavorable regarding imaginative propensities. The theory's success in explaining Hume's epistemic distinctions gives way (...) to pessimism, since Hume contends that reflection on beliefs is deeply destabilizing. So much the worse, Hume concludes, for placing a premium on reflection. Hume endorses and defends the position that stable beliefs of unreflective persons are justified, though they would not survive reflection. At the same time, Hume relishes the paradox that unreflective beliefs enjoy a preferred epistemic status and strains to establish it. Loeb introduces a series of amendments to the Treatise that secures a more positive result for justified belief while maintaining Hume's fundamental principles. In his review of Hume's applications of his epistemology, Loeb uncovers a stratum of psychological doctrine beyond associationism, a theory of conditions in which beliefs are felt to conflict and of the resolution of this uneasiness or dissonance. This theory of mental conflict is also essential to Hume's strategy for integrating empiricism about meaning with his naturalism. However, Hume fails to provide a general account of the conditions in which conflicting beliefs lead to persisting instability, so his theory is incomplete. Loeb explores Hume's concern with stability in reference to his discussions of belief, education, the probability of causes, unphilosophical probability, the belief in body, sympathy and moral judgment, and the passions, among other topics. (shrink)

In Polo’s anthropology, the personal transcendentals constitute the first act of the human being. To achieve an understanding of the contribution to the natural growth of the person of human actions performed in space and time, it is required to investigate how the intensity of this act can increase naturally in the context of the doctrine of act and potency. Review of the constitution of human beings in Aristotle, Aquinas and Polo and the real distinction between their ontological components, together (...) with the concept of instrumental causality served to propose an explanation of the natural growth of the person. (shrink)

Issu de la thèse de l'auteur soutenue en 1987, cet ouvrage a pour visée de redéfinir l'anthropologie, en dissipant le malentendu instauré par le modèle galiléen de scientificité appliqué aux sciences sociales afin d'opérer un retour à la fondation historique de la discipline dans l'epistêmê politikê des anciens Grecs. Trois voies d'accès sont parcourues : G. Dumézil, M. Heidegger et G. Guillaume. ©Electre 2018.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Visions of Damietta:St. Francis, Robert Grosseteste, and the Crusades, 1219–1253Rosamund M. Gammie (bio)A peculiar and under-explored event in Robert Grosseteste's (d. 1253) life is that of his supposed dream-vision in 1249, reported posthumously and in only one source, the Lanercost chronicle.1 The vision foreshadows the loss of Damietta in Egypt the following year, during the Seventh Crusade (1249–54) under the leadership of Louis IX. The parallels to St. (...) Francis's vision at Damietta in 1219 during the Fifth Crusade (1215–21) are immediately noticeable yet the vision has remained largely dismissed as an afterthought in the scholarship of Grosseteste. Considering that Grosseteste wrote, in 1236, what has been described by Michael Lower as "surely the best defence of the cross petition a crusader ever had," in addition to his association with the Franciscans and his relationship with Richard, earl of Cornwall, brother of Henry III and nephew of celebrated crusader Richard I and a (if not the) principal leader of the Baron's Crusade, it is surprising that there is no fuller account of his support for the movement; rather there are piecemeal references to certain acts of interference such as that noted by Lower.2 This paper seeks to establish Grosseteste's position on the crusades, in light of a thoroughly Franciscan influence, beginning with Damietta. [End Page 141]Robert Grosseteste and the FranciscansMuch has been written about the relationship between Robert Grosseteste and the early Franciscan movement in England.3 As Giles Gasper writes in a recent study of Grosseteste and the Franciscan school at Oxford, "Robert Grosseteste is well-known for his support for the Franciscan order, and his warm relations with many brothers of the English province."4 James McEvoy concludes in his examination of Grosseteste's affinity with the nascent movement that "there can be no doubt that Grosseteste was well acquainted with the personality and ideals of St. Francis, the circumstance of the Franciscans' foundation, and the nature of their vocation."5 Grosseteste's Letters are full of admiration for the Franciscans and involvement in their affairs, so much so that a clear and uncompromisingly affectionate relationship can be traced during the bishop's lifetime. Indeed, Grosseteste, in Letter 41, ca. 13 March, 1236, declares to Elias of Cortona, third minister of the Franciscan Order, that "there are no assistants I know of … so effective as your friars."6 The Friars themselves reciprocated their love for Grosseteste; the same letter states, "your sons, the Friars Minor in England, out of kindness in a special way embrace me tightly with arms of love." A letter from 1238 (Letter 58) to Pope Gregory IX asks for help in preserving the reputation of the Brothers, who "illuminate our whole land with the brilliant light of their preaching and teaching" with the warning that "the glory of such an important religious order will vanish and the masses will be scandalized in them."7 [End Page 142]The Dominican Brother Hubert perhaps best expresses the affection between the religious orders and Grosseteste, writing the celebratory Life of Grosseteste shortly after the bishop's death in 1253.8 According to Brother Hubert, Grosseteste was the "father and guardian" of both orders, whose presence "pleased him, as did their / Arrival, their multitude, and frequent conversation," and that just "as a mother to her new-born, he fostered, loved / Protected, fed, and valued them."9 Gasper continues, "English Franciscan historiography leaves no doubt as to the high esteem in which the order held Grosseteste from the mid-13th century onwards, honored in particular for his teaching and learning."10 Chosen personally by Agnellus of Pisa to teach the first Franciscans at Oxford, his influence cannot be underestimated. Indeed, there were Franciscan (and Dominican) contributions to the ultimately unsuccessful attempt to canonize the bishop; a ten-lined letter from Nicholas, guardian of the Greyfriars at Lincoln, penned on 26 June, 1289, extolls the exemplary actions of the bishop.11The relationship between Grosseteste and this first generation of Franciscans was one of mutual respect and love. What is harder to trace is Grosseteste's appreciation of St. Francis himself. When Servus Gieben asks... (shrink)

In "Delusion, Reality, and Intersubjectivity," Thomas Fuchs offers a superb presentation of an enactive/phenomenological approach to schizophrenic delusions—an approach that is clearly superior to the poor-reality-testing formula that has dominated thinking about delusion in psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and cognitive-behavioral theory. As he convincingly argues, two key tendencies go a long way toward accounting for the distinctive features of delusion in schizophrenia: 1) withdrawal from practical, sensori-motoric interaction with the physical environment; and 2) failure to experience reality in intersubjective terms—as a realm (...) of "participatory... (shrink)

Les principes fondamentaux régissant les rapports entre l’espace, le temps, l’objet et la causalité sont présentés et examinés. Il est découvert, par des expériences de pensée successives, que l’abandon de l’un ou l’autre de ces principes permettrait peut-être de résoudre de façon neuve des difficultés classiques de la philosophie comme la flèche de Zénon, Achille et la tortue ou le bateau de Thésée. Sont révélés à cette occasion plusieurs asymétries importantes existant entre l’espace et le temps, dans leurs rôles respectifs (...) vis-à-vis des objets matériels et de la relation causale. Le rapport entre le temps et la causalité est, enfin, plus particulièrement étudié. (shrink)

There is a large amount of scientific work on emotion in psychology, neuroscience, biology, physiology, and psychiatry, which assumes that it is possible to study emotions and other affective states, objectively. Emotion science of this sort is concerned primarily with 'facts' and not 'values', with 'description' not 'prescription'. The assumption behind this vision of emotion science is that it is possible to distinguish factual from evaluative aspects of affectivity and emotion, and study one without the other. But what really is (...) the basis for distinguishing fact and value in emotion and affectivity? And can the distinction withstand careful scientific and philosophical scrutiny? The essays in this collection all suggest that the problems behind this vision of emotion science may be more complex than is commonly supposed. (shrink)

Through a study of argument, science, art, and human intelligence, Louis Groarke explores and builds on a line of Aristotelian thought that traces the origins of logic and knowledge to a mental creativity that is able to leap to insightful and truthful conclusions on the basis of restricted evidence. In an Aristotelian Account of Induction Groarke discusses the intellectual process through which we access the "first principles" of human thought - the most basic concepts, The laws of logic, The (...) universal claims of science and metaphysics, And The deepest moral truths. Following Aristotle and others, Groarke situates the first stirrings of human understanding in a creative capacity for discernment that precedes knowledge, even logic. Relying on a new historical study of philosophical theories of inductive reasoning from Aristotle To The twenty-first century, Groarke explains how Aristotle offers a viable solution To The so-called problem of induction, while offering new contributions to contemporary accounts of reasoning and argument and challenging the conventional wisdom about induction. In recovering and developing philosophical ideas that have been largely overlooked or misrepresented by more recent sources, An Aristotelian Account of Induction makes a major contribution To The historical study of philosophy and to critical debate. (shrink)

Industrial animal agriculture is a significant driver of climate change, habitat loss, and the ongoing extinction crisis, all of which will continue to accelerate as global demand for animal products grows. Plant-based alternatives to animal products, which have existed for over a thousand years, offer a potential solution to this problem, as the intersection of recent technological innovation and shifting capital investment trends have ushered in a new era of alternative proteins that are redefining food categories like meat, eggs, and (...) milk. To better understand these evolving food forms, their attendant technologies, and the opportunities they afford for ameliorating the impacts of industrial animal farming, this article provides a genealogy of plant-based alternative proteins, with a particular focus on the current era and the role that design principles like biomimicry and skeuomorphism play in reproducing the organoleptic properties (the sensorial, experiential aspects) of animal products. Comparing the alternative protein market to other markets in which more sustainable foods and energy have failed to displace their environmentally destructive counterparts, it concludes by considering if whether creating novel new protein forms, rather than imitating conventional animal products, may afford a more promising path toward transformation of the food system. (shrink)

Part I: WHAT IS ETHICS? Plato: Socratic Morality: Crito. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part II: ETHICAL RELATIVISM VERSUS ETHICAL OBJECTIVISM. Herodotus: Custom is King. Thomas Aquinas: Objectivism: Natural Law. Ruth Benedict: A Defense of Ethical Relativism. Louis Pojman: A Critique of Ethical Relativism. Gilbert Harman: Moral Relativism Defended. Alan Gewirth: The Objective Status of Human Rights. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part III: MORALITY, SELF-INTEREST AND FUTURE SELVES. Plato: Why Be Moral? Richard Taylor: On the Socratic Dilemma. David Gauthier: Morality (...) and Advantage. Gregory Kavka: A Reconciliation Project. Derek Parfit: Later Selves and Moral Principles. Bernard Williams: Persons, Character, and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IV: VALUE. Jeremy Bentham: Classical Hedonism. Robert Nozick: The Experience Machine. Richard Taylor: Value and the Origin of Right and Wrong. Friedrich Nietzsche: The Transvaluation of Values. Derek Parfit: What Makes Someone’s Life Go Best? Thomas Nagel: Value: The View from Nowhere. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part V: UTILITARIANISM AND CONSEQUENTIALISM. John Stuart Mill: Utilitarianism. J.J.C. Smart: Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism. Kai Nielsen: Against Moral Conservatism. Bernard Williams: Against Utilitarianism. John Hospers: Rule-Utilitarianism. Robert Nozick: Side Constraints. Peter Singer: Famine, Affluence and Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VI: KANTIAN AND DEONTOLOGICAL SYSTEMS. Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysic of Morals. W. D. Ross: What Makes Right Acts Right? Onora O’Neill: Kantian Formula of the End in Itself and World Hunger. Thomas Nagel: Moral Luck. Philippa Foot: Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives. Judith Jarvis Thomson: Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VII: CONTRACTARIAN ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Thomas Hobbes: The Leviathan. David Gauthier: Why Contractarianism? John Rawls: Contractualism: Justice as Fairness. T.M. Scanlon: Contractualism and Utilitarianism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part VIII: VIRTUE-BASED ETHICAL SYSTEMS. Aristotle: The Ethics of Virtue. Bernard Mayo: Virtue and the Moral Life. William Frankena: A Critique of Virtue-Based Ethics. Walter Schaller: Are Virtues No More than Dispositions to Obey Moral Rules? Alasdair MacIntyre: The Nature of the Virtues. Susan Wolf: Moral Saints. Louis P. Pojman: In Defense of Moral Saints. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part IX: THE FACT/VALUE PROBLEM: METAETHICS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. David Hume: On Reason and the Emotions: The Fact/Value Distinction. G. E. Moore: Non-Naturalism. A. J. Ayer: Emotivism. R. M. Hare: Prescriptivism: The Structure of Ethics and Morals. Geoffrey Warnock: The Object of Morality. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part X: MORAL REALISM AND THE CHALLENGE OF SKEPTICISM. J.L. Mackie: The Subjectivity of Values. Jonathan Harrison: A Critique of Mackie’s Error Theory. Gilbert Harman: Moral Nihilism. Nicholas Sturgeon: Moral Explanations. Bernard Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Bruce Russell: Two Forms of Ethical Skepticism. Michael Smith: A Defense of Moral Realism. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XI: RELIGION AND ETHICS. Plato: Morality and Religion. Immanuel Kant: God and Immortality as Necessary Postulates of Morality. George Mavrodes: Religious and the Queerness of Morality. Kai Nielson: Ethics Without God. Suggestions for Further Reading. Part XII: CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO CLASSICAL ETHICAL THEORY. Part A. Sociobiology and the Question of Moral Responsibility. Charles Darwin: Ethics and the Descent of Man. E.O.Wilson: Sociobiology and Ethics. Michael Ruse: Evolution and Ethics: The Sociobiological Approach. Elliot Sober: Prospects for an Evolutionary Ethics. J.L. Mackie: The Law of the Jungle, Evolution and Morality. Suggestions for Further Readingon Sociobiology. Part B. The Challenge of Determinism to Moral Responsibility and Desert. Galen Strawson: The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility. Louis Pojman: Free Will, Determinism, and Moral Responsibility:A Response to Galen Strawson. Richard Taylor: A Libertarian Defense of Free Will and Responsibility. Suggestions for Further Reading on Moral Responsibility. Glossary of Ethical Terms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reflections on How the Theatre TeachesJonathan Levy (bio)PreambleTheatre is, famously, an imitation of an action. It presents the essence, the gist, of human experience, not a narration or recital of that experience. Therefore, any attempt to explain how the theatre works in words will be at best a translation or paraphrase. The real power of the theatre lies in our total experience of it before the mind begins to (...) turn that experience into words. Thus, when we write or speak about the theatrical experience, the best we can hope for is to fall short rather than mislead or, worse, overshadow and obliterate the original. I write what follows with that knowledge always in my mind.The QuestionMuch is said by the friends of theatres about what they might be; and not a few persons indulge the hope that the theatre may yet be made a school of morality. But my business at present is with it as it is, and as it has hitherto been. The reader will be more benefited by existing facts than sanguine anticipations, or visionary predictions.—William A. Alcott, The Young Man's Guide1It is widely assumed that the theatre, particularly theatre for children, can and should teach. It is also widely assumed that the theatre can and does do harm, real harm, especially to children. And it is universally assumed that even if the theatre does not teach, it should do no harm.I believe that these assumptions are true: that the theatre does have the power to teach, and teach profoundly, and that the theatre can and often does do profound harm. However, I do not believe that how it teaches and [End Page 20] the nature of the real harm it does have yet been satisfactorily explained. My purpose in this paper is to reopen the discussion of how theatre teaches and what the real harm it can do is. These two complementary questions seem to me to be the most compelling and elusive questions facing students of theatre for children.The ProblemThere is no shortage of theories about how the theatre teaches. For at least the past two hundred and fifty years, authors of plays for children have felt the need to justify themselves and the odd genre they had chosen to write in. Frequently, these justifications appear in the prefaces and introductions to collections of their plays. Some of these justifications are original with the plays' authors. Others are borrowed from the classical authors, for in much of history classical precedent itself was thought to be powerful argument. Still others were borrowed from defenses of the adult theatre, which arose periodically in reaction to what Jonas Barish has called "the anti-theatrical prejudice."2What all these theories have in common is their insistence that the theatre was, somehow, a tool of instruction. They argued that the theatre taught and often argued that it taught more than one thing, usually a skill and a moral. For example, Louis Jauffret, the author of La Petite Thalie and other didactic plays for children, wrote that his intention in his plays was "to exercise the memory of their students while at the same time forming their hearts to virtue and sensibilité."3But my purpose in this essay is not historical. It is to try to isolate and examine the recurrent rationales and theories about how the theatre teaches. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, I will consider those rationales and theories separately. They sometimes overlap, but again for the sake of clarity, I will describe them separately. And although my purpose is not historical, I will often cite examples from early writers. I do so for three reasons: First, because it is useful for us to know that the discussions we are having today did not begin with us; second, because many of our distinguished predecessors in the field are not known to us, even by name, and deserve to be; and, third, because so much of what our predecessors said still makes such good sense.Eleven RationalesFirst, the theatre teaches by example, which prompts emulation. "The path by precept is long," the argument runs... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Political Philosophy of Fénelon by Ryan Patrick HanleyJohn J. Conley SJRyan Patrick Hanley. The Political Philosophy of Fénelon. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020. Pp. xvi + 306. Hardback, $41.95.In his monograph, Ryan Patrick Hanley offers a revisionist interpretation of the political philosophy of François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, archbishop of Cambrai. A series of Enlightenment commentators (Montesquieu, Rousseau, Hume, Jefferson) and their progeny have hailed Fénelon (...) as a political subversive who boldly attacked the injustices of the reign of Louis XIV and who prepared the arrival of an egalitarian society with socialist and pacifist traits. Hanley, however, argues that Fénelon actually defended a more moderate and realistic model of political society than his Enlightenment exegetes have suggested. Like earlier commentators, Hanley attempts to prove his argument primarily through an analysis of Telemachus, the pedagogical novel Fénelon had composed for Louis, duc de Bourgogne, the "petit Dauphin" and grandson of Louis XIV, when Fénelon served as his tutor.Three strong chapters demonstrate Hanley's thesis concerning Fénelon's moderate politics and philosophy. Hanley argues that Fénelon's philosophy of education rests on a distinction between true and false glory. True glory resides in virtue and a humble recognition of divine glory, while false glory is the self-centered glorification of the human agent, which easily deteriorates into vanity. Rather than simply condemn self-interest, in his treatment of the education of the prince Fénelon argues that self-interest must be gradually transformed into a broader interest for the good of one's subjects and a deeper recognition of the glory of God. Earning the praise of his Enlightenment acolytes and later feminist commentators, Fénelon defends a solid education for women, but he clearly wants this education to prepare women for their domestic role as wives and mothers; his celebrated treatise and letters on the education of women are not an exercise in gender equality.The economic theory of Fénelon has often been interpreted as a type of utopian socialism. This is largely based on the central place taken by Bétique in the Telemachus. In this mythical land, the happy citizens practice a communist economics; private property is foreign to them. All their basic needs are provided for through communal cooperation. Luxury is also foreign to them; precious metals like gold and silver are used in practical construction as if they were pieces of iron. But Hanley argues that the prosocialist exegetes ignore the varied economies presented in the passages concerning Egypt, Crete, and Tyre. Bétique does not stand alone as an economic ideal. When Fénelon details how the economy of contemporary France should be reformed, it is far from simple socialism. The state has a strong initial role in the state's economic reform, but it works in tandem with private initiatives that will gradually become the stronger partner. "Fénelon differs from later socialists in insisting that the use of state power is not an end in itself, but necessary only to establish the conditions whereby a free economic system can emerge and flourish—at which point direct intervention of the state into economic affairs will diminish, and a free (though hardly unbridled) pursuit of self-interest will be encouraged" (81).Hanley also attacks the common argument that Fénelon is a pacifist who excoriates all recourse to war. Fénelon does indeed condemn war in the most graphic terms. As Archbishop of Cambrai in northern France, he had witnessed the brutal carnage and attendant famines that had decimated the population in repeated wars in this border area. But his nuanced critique of war rests on a distinction between false and true courage. False courage is found in the warrior who initiates war for the sake of his own false glory. True courage lies in those who defend the innocent out of a proper sense of duty; this courage contrasts with cowardice disguised as pacificism. Hanley argues that the confederation of nations that Fénelon envisions as a mechanism to mediate conflict and reduce the recourse to war is less a species of international government than... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 11.1 (2004) 71-80 [Access article in PDF] Some Reflections on the (Analytic) Philosophical Approach to Delusion Louis A. Sass There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy." —Hamlet, Act I, Scene 5 The peculiar, often problematic phenome na of psychopathology have been attract ing the attention of analytic philosophers in recent years. The topic of delusion (...) has been a particular draw, with a number of analytic philosophers attempting to use their conceptual tools, usually combined with ideas from cognitive neuroscience, to criticize the traditional understanding and to clarify the nature of this central psychiatric topic. It is useful to have this kind of interdisciplinary dialogue. Indeed, there is good reason to hope that concepts honed in the philosophy of mind and other philosophical subfields will help to sort out our understanding of a phenomenon (or set of phenomena) for which contemporary psychiatric definitions and conceptualizations are clearly inadequate and, in some respects, downright misleading (see Parnas and Sass 2001; Spitzer 1990).1Here, however, I would like to call attention to some weaknesses that, it seems to me, are rather common (I do not say universal) in many analytic philosophical approaches to psychopathology. In my opinion, there is a tendency to formulate issues and arguments in overly polarized, even dichotomous terms, and then to rely too uncritically on these essentialistic formulations in exploring the domain of inquiry. Although this polarizing tendency sometimes has the salutary effect of clarifying conceptual domains, it can, when taken too far, actually hamper our understanding of phenomena that are often fraught with ambiguities and complexities that defy many standard conceptualizations.The relationship between philosophy and psychopathology is obviously a two-way street—we are familiar, for example, with disorders that challenge deep philosophical assumptions about self and mind (e.g., blindsight, split-brain phenomena, perhaps also Dissociative Identity Disorder, and the first rank symptoms of schizophrenia). I am suggesting that, in their work on delusions, philosophers may need to put more emphasis on moving from the natural phenomena [End Page 71] of psychopathology and to the domain of philosophical analysis.I believe that a greater sensitivity to the modes of knowing associated with the phenomenological tradition, and to the forms of conceptual self-critique fostered by Ludwig Wittgenstein, are crucial ingredients for any adequate approach to delusion as well as many other topics in psychopathology. In my opinion, the work of many analytic philosophers interested in psychopathology would be enriched if they spent more time trying to discover and imagine what it might be like to experience certain kinds of abnormal psychiatric conditions, and also speculating about what implications such experiential modalities might have for action and verbal expression. I believe they would also be wise to spend more time questioning, and attempting to transcend, the philosophically derived conceptual distinctions and dichotomies that appear to organize their conceptual universes. Phenomenological imagination and Wittgensteinian critique can show how to move outside the conceptual capsule and into the rich and strange realms of actual experience, both normal and abnormal.So far I have offered only slogans. Let me use the articles by Tim Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie (2004) and Robert Klee (2004) to flesh out the criticisms I have offered. There is much that is intelligent and much that is worthwhile in both their articles. (For example, I was largely convinced by the criticisms of John Campbell and of Donald Davidson that are central to the articles by Bayne and Pacherie and by Klee, respectively.) Here, however, I will focus only on issues that illustrate the above-mentioned tendencies—tendencies that, in my view, tend to infect even the best writings on the (analytic) philosophy of psychiatry. I will also make some remarks about the works of Campbell and Davidson, the two philosophers criticized in the articles by Bayne and Pacherie and by Klee. Because the article by Eugenie Georgaca (2004) is in a different tradition, I will say only a few words about it at the end. Bayne and Pacherie on the Preservation-Of-meaning... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 10.2 (2003) 125-132 [Access article in PDF] Incomprehensibility and Understanding:On the Interpretation of Severe Mental Illness Louis A. Sass Keywords hermeneutics, psychopathology, paradox, Wittgenstein, solipsism, delusion, principle of charity, phenomenological psychopathology. I would like to begin by thanking Rupert Read for the care he has put into reading my work, and into thinking through its implications in the context of the "new-Wittgensteinian" interpretation of (...) the thought of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This interpretation derives from an influential reading of this philosopher's early book, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1961), that is not explicitly discussed in Read's article, yet that lies behind much of his argument. Read does allude to this reading of the Tractatus when he refers to the concept of "logically alien thought" (see Conant [1992]), and by citing, in his endnotes, the Diamond, Conant, and Cerbone articles that appear in Crary and Read's edited collection, The New Wittgenstein (2000). In an earlier paper that also addresses my work, "On approaching schizophrenia through Wittgenstein," Read (2001) explicitly discusses the relevance of the new-Wittgensteinian interpretation of the Tractatus.According to this new-Wittgensteinian interpretation of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein took absolutely seriously his own realization (explicitly stated at the end of the Tractatus) that his book was internally self-contradictory, and he therefore realized that all or nearly all the sentences of the Tractatus must be totally devoid of any meaning or semantic reference. According to this austere view, the vast bulk of the Tractatus only pretends to be making meaningful statements about the nature of logic and semantics; its real purpose is to give the reader the illusion of meaning, and this it does in order to lead the reader to the eventual realization that there can in fact be no meaningful statements or thoughts at the level of self-referential abstraction at which the Tractatus pretends to be operating. Further, when Wittgenstein (1961) writes (in the famous last line of the book), "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent" (p. 189), this statement should, supposedly, not be taken as any kind of mystical pointing toward some ineffable realm or truth, but, rather, as an austere recognition that there just are no ineffable truths—that, so to speak, there just is no mystical there there. [End Page 125]Rupert Read sees an analogy between, on the one hand, the (supposedly mistaken) readers of Wittgenstein's Tractatus who think that Wittgenstein is exploiting self-contradiction to allude to some higher, ineffable truth (i.e., something that can be pointed at even if it cannot be said), and, on the other hand, my own elucidation of Schreber's contradictions (see especially Chapter 2 of Paradoxes of Delusion [1994]) to argue that Schreber can be said to be having particular kinds of experiences, which I refer to as solipsistic or quasi-solipsistic in nature. Just as Wittgenstein's self-contradictions can (supposedly) point nowhere other than to their own failure to mean, so Schreber's self-contradictory and other nonstandard statements cannot (according to Read) be used to illuminate in any meaningful way the form of experience that supposedly lies behind them—as I, for example, have tried to do by offering a phenomenological account of Schreber and schizophrenia. Patients like Schreber and Renée cannot really be understood, just as we cannot really understand logically alien thought—which, in fact, is not really thought at all; in both cases, there is only the illusion of meaning, only the mirage of an alternative mode of thinking or of living. This, at least, is Read's new-Wittgensteinian claim.Few readers of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology will, I suspect, be familiar with these discussions centering on Wittgenstein's Tractatus, which were introduced largely by the philosophers Cora Diamond and James Conant (see Crary and Read [2000]). (I myself have found their writings fascinating and inspiring in many ways, despite my ultimate disagreement on fundamental issues.) 1 Most readers of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology will have no way of assessing the validity of this austere reading of the Tractatus... (shrink)

The central claim of Kant's political philosophy is that rational agents sharing a territory can justifiably be forced to live under a state; they have, in Kant's words, a duty of right to leave the state of nature. Perhaps something along these lines is entailed by any theory of state legitimacy, but the point raises special difficulties for Kant. He believes that rational agents have a right to freedom; that is, he believes that a rational agent's external freedom - her (...) ability to set and pursue ends for herself without being subject to the choices of others - can justifiably be restricted only for the sake of external freedom itself. To establish that human beings can be forced to join a civil condition, it will therefore not do to show that the state promotes security, prosperity or any other such value: Kant has to show that human beings living side by side need a state to be free. (shrink)