Scientific Realism and Antirealism Debates about scientific realism concern the extent to which we are entitled to hope or believe that science will tell us what the world is really like. Realists tend to be optimistic; antirealists do not. To a first approximation, scientific realism is the view that well-confirmed scientific theories are approximately true; … Continue reading Scientific Realism and Antirealism →.

Essays by L.H. Silberman and others originally presented as lectures at Vanderbilt University in 1967. Bibliographical footnotes.

This article focusses on corporate attitudes to stakeholder environmental pressures in Argentina. It uses a cross section survey of 505 CEOs of Argentinean firms to gather information on environmental attitudes and a stakeholder theory framework to design and interpret the statistical analyses. It is underpinned by theoretical and empirical findings in the literature on stakeholder management, targeting in particular studies that deal with corporate social responsibility (CSR) in Latin America. Its general aim is to gain a deeper empirical understanding of (...) the coherence between managers' perceptions of stakeholder pressures and the importance they are given in corporate CSR strategies through an empirical investigation of environmental management (EM) decisions. In doing so, it uncovers general differences in the way firms perceive and treat groups of stakeholders. It also detects variations across firms, observing that some are typically proactive in their response to stakeholder pressures whilst others are less responsive. Profiling the various stakeholder networks and the corporate response strategies in this way encourages the development of stakeholder-focussed policies and corporate strategies that emphasise communications, awareness and a clear sense of direction. It concludes that CSR appears to be more effective in the protection of the environment than previously reported. Although this study focusses on EM in Argentina, the findings are more generally applicable. (shrink)

Does the export orientation of a firm affect the likelihood that it adopts an environmental management certification? We use meta-regression methods to analyze systematically the corpus of published research on export-led adoption of the largest and most prominent certification, ISO 14001. We show that the explanatory variables authors choose to include in their models reflect the tenets of stakeholder and institutional theories. We also find that the literature suffers from substantial publication bias but that, once this is accounted for appropriately, (...) a genuine effect remains. The evidence from 20 years of published studies taken as a whole is that export does incentivize the adoption of the standard as often hypothesized by proponents of voluntary approaches and self-regulation. (shrink)

Firms are spending billions annually in the name of corporate social responsibility (CSR). Whilst markets are increasingly willing to reward good and responsible firms, they lack the instruments to measure corporate social performance (CSP). To convince investors and other stakeholders, firms invest heavily in building a reputation for good corporate behaviour. This article argues that reputations for CSP are often unrepresentative of true CSP and investigates how differences in 'perceived' and 'actual' – as measured by the Fortune and KLD databases, (...) respectively – can partly be explained by firm characteristics. Amongst other things, it finds that overrated firms are more likely to be relatively big, profitable, operating in non-polluting but competitive industries and with no history of wrong doings to their primary stakeholders. They will also typically spend a lot of effort satisfying the claims of their secondary stakeholders. Above all, the results emphasise the need for researchers to recognise that the databases measure different phenomenon and are not interchangeable. (shrink)

In this review essay Kevin Murray and Dan Liston examine three texts in what this symposium has deemed the recent resurgence in neo-Marxist accounts of schooling: David Blacker's The Falling Rate of Learning and the Neoliberal Endgame, Mike Cole's Marxism and Educational Theory, and John Marsh's Class Dismissed. Murray and Liston argue that Blacker, Cole, and Marsh provide a much-needed structural delineation of schooling in capitalist society. All three works have substantial merit and are in need of minor (...) adjustments. Blacker's vision is telling and chilling but may need some fine-tuning; Cole's defense of Marxism is commendable but tends toward the disembodied abstract; and Marsh's text capably highlights educationists' blinders but seems to miss elements of a critical structural account. While recognizing real limitations on transformative education under capitalism, Murray and Liston nevertheless elaborate a variation of the radical humanist project. It is their skeletal attempt at an educationally and morally defensible reparative theory. (shrink)

I argue on the basis of an example, Fourier theory applied to the problem of vibration, that Field's program for nominalizing science is unlikely to succeed generally, since no nominalistic variant will provide us with the kind of physical insight into the phenomena that the standard theory supplies. Consideration of the same example also shows, I argue, that some of the motivation for mathematical fictionalism, particularly the alleged problem of cognitive access, is more apparent than real.

http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n1p99 This paper presents a possible but controversial characterization of two periods in Rudolf Carnap’s work: foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. I will argue that even with the identification of two periods, it is possible to argue in favor of the unity of Carnap’s work concerning the unity of science and the principle of linguistic tolerance. To do so, I will count on the analysis of some revisionist views advocated by Friedman and Uebel. Therefore I intend to contribute to a discussion that, (...) since the second half of the twentieth century, seemed to have been overcome, but that, at the end of that century is resumed due to the importance of issues such as the unity of science, observability and interpretation of the scientific language for the philosophy of science. (shrink)

In recent years, Sir Jack Goody has published a series of essays criticizing Norbert Elias’s theory of ‘civilizing processes’. In all of them, Goody — himself a West African specialist — makes clear that his disagreement with Elias dates back to their acquaintance in Ghana. The date is highly significant for it is unlikely that Goody’s opinions of Elias’s ideas were initially formed by his reading of Elias’s publications. There were also important differences between them in their approaches to theories (...) of long-term social development. Despite appearances to the contrary, Elias and Goody have in fact much in common intellectually. Goody is one of the most historically orientated of anthropologists, and many points of contact with Elias are evident in his work on literacy, food, or The Domestication of the Savage Mind. Both swam against the ahistorical current of their respective disciplines and both rejected the old notion of ‘progress’. Elias’s fault is that occasionally his formulations may appear to give the opposite impression. Goody’s fault, perhaps, is that — in spite of his own historical perspective — under any model of a structured process he suspects there lurks a vision of progress and of European superiority. (shrink)

In this study Daniel Lister assesses the radical critiques of state schooling in America and criticises reliance on functional explanations to articulate the connection between schools and society.

SummaryBenacerraf challenges us to account for the reliability of our mathematical beliefs given that there appear to be no natural connections between mathematical believers and mathematical ontology. In this paper I try to do two things. I argue that the interactionist view underlying this challenge renders inexplicable not only the reliability of our mathematical beliefs, construed either platonistically or naturalistically , but also the reliability of most of our beliefs in physics. I attempt to counter Benacerraf's challenge by sketching an (...) alternative conception of reliability explanations which renders explicable the reliability of our beliefs in physics and in mathematics but in which mathematical and formal considerations themselves play a central role. My main thesis is that abstract objects do not strike us, but that this is irrelevant to the reliability of our mathematical and physical beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper I argue three things: (1) that the interactionist view underlying Benacerraf's (1973) challenge to mathematical beliefs renders inexplicable the reliability of most of our beliefs in physics; (2) that examples from mathematical physics suggest that we should view reliability differently; and (3) that abstract mathematical considerations are indispensable to explanations of the reliability of our beliefs.

It is well known that microbial pathogens are able to subvert the host immune system in order to increase microbial replication and propagation. Recent research indicates that another arm of the immune response, that of the chemokine system, is also subject to this sabotage, and is undermined by a range of microbial pathogens, including viruses, bacteria, and parasites. Currently, it is known that the chemokine system is being challenged by a number of mechanisms, and still more are likely to be (...) discovered with further research. Here we first review the general mechanisms by which microbial pathogens bypass mammalian chemokine defences. Broadly, these can be grouped as viral chemokine interacting proteins, microbial manipulation of host chemokine and chemokine receptor expression, microbial blockade of host chemokine receptor signalling, and the largely hypothetical mechanisms of microbial enhancement of host anti‐chemokine networks (including digestion, antagonism, and neutralisation of host chemokines and chemokine receptors). We then discuss the potential results of these interactions in terms of outcome of infection. BioEssays 25:478–488, 2003. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This paper presents a possible but controversial characterization of two periods in Rudolf Carnap’s work: foundationalism and anti-foundationalism. I will argue that even with the identification of two periods, it is possible to argue in favor of the unity of Carnap’s work concerning the unity of science and the principle of linguistic tolerance. To do so, I will count on the analysis of some revisionist views advocated by Friedman and Uebel. Therefore I intend to contribute to a discussion that, since (...) the second half of the twentieth century, seemed to have been overcome, but that, at the end of that century is resumed due to the importance of issues such as the unity of science, observability and interpretation of the scientific language for the philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss lessons that metaphysicians might learn from Duhem. Given Duhem’s well known antipathy to metaphysics, you will likely think that this is a fairly inauspicious beginning with a predictable ending: i.e., physics is one thing, metaphysics another, and never the twain shall meet. If you will bear with me, however, I hope to persuade you differently. On the contrary, I will argue, Duhem was both a common sense and metaphysical realist, his nuanced views about the relationship (...) between physics and metaphysics are poorly understood, and properly understood contain important lessons for contemporary metaphysics. I’ll spend most of the paper rehabilitating Duhem and finish with some lessons for metaphysicians. (shrink)

It is commonly presupposed that all instances of the deflationary reference schema ‘F’ applies to x if and only if x is ‘are correct. This paper argues, mainly on the basis of concrete example, that we have little reason to be confident about this presupposition: our tendency to believe the instances is based on local successes that may not be globally extendible. There is a problem of semantic projection, Ii argue, and standard accounts that would resolve or dissolve the problem (...) are problematic. (shrink)

According to externalism, reference is a relation between uses of an expression and features of the environment. Moreover, the reference relation is normative , and the referential relata of our expressions are explanatory of successful language use. This paper largely agrees with the broad conception underlying externalism: it is what people do with words that makes them have the references they have, and the world constrains what people can successfully do with words. However, the paper strongly disagrees with the details (...) . A centrally important feature of what people do with words is how they use them in inferential contexts. When due attention is given to the reference-determining role played by inferential properties of expressions, I argue, we arrive at a more satisfactory account of semantic norms and explanations. Much of the argument is based on a detailed look at the language of chemical classification used in the late 19th century. (shrink)

We propose a model of planned corporate environmental behaviour that emphasises the values and attitudes of managers towards the environment, environmental intentions and the context in which these intentions are formed and translated into actual performance. In particular, we focus on the extent to which environmentally reactive managers influence the environmental performance of their firms. We identify the factors that mitigate or accentuate the effects of environmental “reactivism”—i.e. a mind-set shared by those who assign to the state the responsibility of (...) protecting the environment. We generate a series of hypotheses and use structural equation modelling to test them in the context of a unique dataset of Argentinean firms. Our system’s approach to corporate environmental behaviour explains approximatively 70 % of the variation in reported environmental performance across firms while highlighting elements of the model that may potentially be influenced by policy. Amongst other things, our empirical results suggest that stakeholder pressures can be an effective tool in the development of pro-environmental attitudes and in so doing offset some of the negative effects of environmental reactivism on environmental performance. Our paper highlights a number of other important implications for the design and implementation of environmental policies that account for human managerial determinants of corporate behaviour and social factors. (shrink)

Book Information Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism. Knowledge, Cause, and Abstract Objects: Causal Objections to Platonism Colin Cheyne , Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers , 2001 , xvi + 236 , £55 ( cloth ) By Colin Cheyne. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Pp. xvi + 236. £55.

Most science requires applied mathematics. This truism underlies the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument: we cannot be mathematical nominalists without rejecting whole swaths of good science that are seamlessly linked with mathematics. One style of response (e.g. Field’s program) accepts the challenge head-on and attempts to show how to do science without mathematics. There is some consensus that the response fails because the nominalistic apparatus deployed either is not extendible to all of mathematical physics or is merely a deft reconstrual equivalent to (...) standard mathematics. A second style of response (suggested, e.g., by Balaguer and Maddy) denies that indispensability entails realism: when we mathematize a physical problem we treat its physical content as if it were the mathematical representation; provided the two are sufficiently similar, we can use the mathematics to draw conclusions about the physics; even if we cannot represent physical facts without mathematical tools, as-if-fictionalism is reasonable. In this paper I argue that uses of mathematics in science reach deeper than is appreciated by this second response and, indeed, in the more general literature. More specifically, our confidence that we can use the mathematics to draw conclusions about the physics itself depends on mathematics. If the mathematical premises we employ in concluding that a certain application is trustworthy are false, we may lack a justification for supposing that the application will reliably lead us from correct input to correct output. For example, solutions to many physical problems require the determination of a function satisfying a differential equation. Sometimes (e.g., if the differential equation is linear) the existence of a solution for initial value problems can be established directly; where direct methods fail, the existence of a solution must be established indirectly, generally by constructing a sequence of functions that converges to a limit function that satisfies the initial value problem. Moreover, the solution often cannot be evaluated by analytic methods, and scientists must rely on finite element numerical methods to approximate the solution. Mathematical analysis of errors provides further useful information governing the choice of approximation method and of the step size and number of elements needed for the approximation to reach a desired precision. Mathematical physicists rely on the background mathematical theories (e.g., theory of differential equations) presupposed in proving the existence of the solutions and approximating them. It is difficult to see how they could do this while adding the fictionalist disclaimer, “But, you know, I don’t believe any of the mathematics I’m using”. It is difficult to see how a fictionalist pursuing the second strategy can account for the soundness of mathematical reasoning in mathematical physics and elsewhere in the sciences. The paper will fill out this argument by appeal to examples and attempt to make clear (a) how mathematics is indispensable to understanding – and thus underwriting our confidence in – applications that would otherwise be shaky approximations and idealizations and (b) how this role is difficult to square with fictionalism. (shrink)

Most science requires applied mathematics. This truism underlies the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument: we cannot be mathematical nominalists without rejecting whole swaths of good science that are seamlessly linked with mathematics. One style of response accepts the challenge head-on and attempts to show how to do science without mathematics. There is some consensus that the response fails because the nominalistic apparatus deployed either is not extendible to all of mathematical physics or is merely a deft reconstrual equivalent to standard mathematics. A (...) second style of response denies that indispensability entails realism: when we mathematize a physical problem we treat its physical content as if it were the mathematical representation; provided the two are sufficiently similar, we can use the mathematics to draw conclusions about the physics; even if we cannot represent physical facts without mathematical tools, as-if-fictionalism is reasonable. In this paper I argue that uses of mathematics in science reach deeper than is appreciated by this second response and, indeed, in the more general literature. More specifically, our confidence that we can use the mathematics to draw conclusions about the physics itself depends on mathematics. If the mathematical premises we employ in concluding that a certain application is trustworthy are false, we may lack a justification for supposing that the application will reliably lead us from correct input to correct output. For example, solutions to many physical problems require the determination of a function satisfying a differential equation. Sometimes the existence of a solution for initial value problems can be established directly; where direct methods fail, the existence of a solution must be established indirectly, generally by constructing a sequence of functions that converges to a limit function that satisfies the initial value problem. Moreover, the solution often cannot be evaluated by analytic methods, and scientists must rely on finite element numerical methods to approximate the solution. Mathematical analysis of errors provides further useful information governing the choice of approximation method and of the step size and number of elements needed for the approximation to reach a desired precision. Mathematical physicists rely on the background mathematical theories presupposed in proving the existence of the solutions and approximating them. It is difficult to see how they could do this while adding the fictionalist disclaimer, “But, you know, I don’t believe any of the mathematics I’m using”. It is difficult to see how a fictionalist pursuing the second strategy can account for the soundness of mathematical reasoning in mathematical physics and elsewhere in the sciences. The paper will fill out this argument by appeal to examples and attempt to make clear how mathematics is indispensable to understanding – and thus underwriting our confidence in – applications that would otherwise be shaky approximations and idealizations and how this role is difficult to square with fictionalism. (shrink)

Scientific Realism and Antirealism Debates about scientific realism concern the extent to which we are entitled to hope or believe that science will tell us what the world is really like. Realists tend to be optimistic; antirealists do not. To a first approximation, scientific realism is the view that well-confirmed scientific theories are approximately true; … Continue reading Scientific Realism and Antirealism →.

Russell’s views about the proper logical and epistemological treatment of names conspired to lead him to set aside considerations that support the claim that names are not definite descriptions. Though he appreciated those considerations, he famously argued that ordinary names are truncated definite descriptions. Nevertheless, his appreciation of the distinctive semantic behavior of ordinary names combined with his view that acquaintance comes in degrees led him to attempt to secure a semantically privileged status for ordinary names: only special kinds of (...) descriptions can go proxy for ordinary names “used as names”. The paper attempts to tell this story, filling in gaps where Russell doesn’t provide sufficient elaboration, and to draw some general conclusions about acquaintance-based approaches to names and singular thoughts. (shrink)

This volume explores questions about conceptual change from both scientific and philosophical viewpoints by analyzing the recent history of evolutionary developmental biology. It features revised papers that originated from the workshop "Conceptual Change in Biological Science: Evolutionary Developmental Biology, 1981-2011" held at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin in July 2010. The Preface has been written by Ron Amundson. In these papers, philosophers and biologists compare and contrast key concepts in evolutionary developmental biology and their (...) development since the original, seminal Dahlem conference on evolution and development held in Berlin in 1981. Many of the original scientific participants from the 1981 conference are also contributors to this new volume and, in conjunction with other expert biologists and philosophers specializing on these topics, provide an authoritative, comprehensive view on the subject. Taken together, the papers supply novel perspectives on how and why the conceptual landscape has shifted and stabilized in particular ways, yielding insights into the dynamic epistemic changes that have occurred over the past three decades. This volume will appeal to philosophers of biology studying conceptual change, evolutionary developmental biologists focused on comprehending the genesis of their field and evaluating its future directions, and historians of biology examining this period when the intersection of evolution and development rose again to prominence in biological science. (shrink)

The relationship between stress and unethical behaviour amongst non-tenured research staff in academia is a relatively unexplored phenomenon. The research reported herein was therefore carried out with the aim of exploring the relationship between stress, the socio-organisational factors which contribute to it, job satisfaction, perceptions of job instability, and the occurrence of unethical behaviour in research. 793 Italian researchers participated in the research—all of whom were working on fixed-term contracts—after being individually requested to complete an online questionnaire. The data indicate (...) that unethical behaviours occur with alarming frequency. The stress level reported is quite high, as is the level of perceived job insecurity, both of which impact upon levels of job satisfaction. Perceived stress levels also seem to play a role in the commission of unethical behaviours, but this relationship is irrelevant when one considers the role of social and organisational factors that are known to induce it. Indeed, it seems that there are various socio-organisational determinants of stress that have an obvious direct negative influence on the commission of unethical behaviours more than the stress level per se. This research paints a worrying picture in relation to the psycho-physical state of non-tenured researchers as a result of the working conditions in which they find themselves in Italian universities. (shrink)

The 1981 Dahlem conference was a catalyst for contemporary evolutionary developmental biology (Evo-devo). This introductory chapter rehearses some of the details of the history surrounding the original conference and its associated edited volume, explicates the philosophical problem of conceptual change that provided the rationale for a workshop devoted to evaluating the epistemic revisions and transformations that occurred in the interim, explores conceptual change with respect to the concept of evolutionary novelty, and highlights some of the themes and patterns in the (...) different contributions to the present volume, Conceptual Change in Biology: Scientific and Philosophical Perspectives on Evolution and Development. (shrink)

Exploring online criticisms of the ‘take the knee’ protest during ‘Euro 2020’, this article examines how alt- and far-right conspiracies were both constructed and communicated via the social media platform, Twitter. By providing a novel exploration of alt-right conspiracies during an international football tournament, a qualitative thematic analysis of 1,388 original tweets relating to Euro 2020 was undertaken. The findings reveal how, in criticisms levelled at both ‘wokeism’ and the Black Lives Matter movement, antiwhite criticisms of the ‘take the knee’ (...) protest were embroiled in alt-right conspiracies that exposed an assumed Cultural Marxist, ‘woke agenda’ in the tournament’s organization and mainstream media coverage. In conclusion, it is argued that conspiratorial discourses, associated with the alt-right, provided a framework through which the protest could be understood. This emphasises how the significance of conspiracy functions to promote the wider dissemination of alt-right ideology across popular cultural contexts, such as sport. (shrink)

Evolutionary developmental biology (or developmental evolution) is in the middle stages of its “development.” Its early ontogeny cannot be traced back to fertilization but pivotal developmental events included Gould’s (1977) treatment of heterochrony, Riedl’s (1978) analysis of “burden”, the Dahlem conference of 1981, a British Society of Developmental Biologists Symposium, as well as books that incorporated developmental genetics into older comparative themes. A major inductive process began with the discovery of widespread phylogenetic conservation in homeobox-containing genes. One interpretation of these (...) early developmental dynamics holds that an increasingly prominent problem agenda (e.g., how do novel structures and functions originate?), inherited from long-standing research programs in comparative embryology, morphology, and paleontology, was handed a powerful set of experimental tools from the lineage of experimental embryology. This allowed for an experimental probing of development and its evolution in an unprecedented fashion. Although the relationship between evolution and development has exhibited a protracted and complex history, we are still in the process of comprehending these early stages of “modern” EvoDevo’s ontogeny. (shrink)