A leitura do Itinerarium mentis in Deum de S. Boaventura requer que se leve em consideração a diferença que existe entre o pensamento dele e o de outros autores, principalmente Tomás de Aquino. Nesse sentido, o presente artigo aborda, em primeiro lugar, a teologia trinitária de S. Boaventura. Este não possui um tratado sobre a unidade de Deus, anterior ao De trinitate. Nisso ele se aproxima da tradição bíblico-antioquena, bem como da catequese e da liturgia da Igreja primitiva e abre (...) espaço para uma teologia que repense o significado fundamental da Trindade para a fé cristã. Em segundo lugar, a questão do Cristocentrismo. Com efeito, Cristo, como intermediário em todas as coisas, é visto como o médium metaphysicum que explica a produção e a compreensão dos seres, e que se coloca como princípio, meio e término da História. Em terceiro lugar, o artigo reflecte sobre o exemplarismo em S. Boaventura. As coisas são sinais, imagens, símbolos de uma realidade maior, à qual se referem; e o verdadeiro metafísico é aquele que sabe que tudo procede de um exemplar primeiro. Finalmente, a noção de transitus. A saída do Egipto e a peregrinação pelo deserto, rumo à Terra Prometida, são imagem da caminhada da Igreja e de cada um dos cristãos em direcção ao descanso do oitavo dia, o dia da paz sem fim. /// A reading of the Itinerarium mentis in Deum of Saint Bonaventure requires that we take into consideration the difference that exists between his thinking and the thought of other authors, especially Thomas of Aquinas. Taking this into consideration, the article analyses, in the first place, Bonavenrure's Trinitarian theology. He does not have a treatise on the unity of God that antecedes the De trinitate. In this, he is close to the biblical-antiochean tradition, as well as to the catechesis and the liturgy of the Primitive Church and opens space for a theology that restores the fundamental meaning of the Trinity for the Christian faith. Secondly, the question of Christocentrism. As a matter of fact, Christ, as intermediary in all things, is seen as the medium metaphysicum that explains the production and the comprehension of all beings, recognized as principle, median and end of History. In the third place, the article also reflects on the exemplarism in Saint Bonaventure. According to his thought, the things of the world are signs, symbols of a greater reality, to which they refer; therefore, the true metaphysician is the one who knows that everything proceeds from a first exemplar. Finaly, the notion of transitus. The exodus of Egypt and the peregrination through the desert, in the direction of the Promised Land, are for Bonaventure images of the peregrination of the Church and of each and every Christian in direction to the rest of the seventh day, the day of peace without end. (shrink)

A menudo, el destello de los beneficios que reporta la inteligencia artificial en numerosos espacios, eclipsa los impactos medioambientales de esta tecnología. En este sentido, en un contexto marcado por la superación de los límites planetarios, es conveniente iniciar una senda reflexiva que aspire a plantear una inteligencia artificial sostenible. El compromiso con la responsabilidad y el cultivo del cuidado modelan un marco ético para la realización de la sostenibilidad como un ideal moral indispensable para el presente y el futuro (...) de los intelectos sintéticos. El reconocimiento y la estimación de la vulnerabilidad de la biosfera constituyen dos piezas claves para comprender los efectos de una agencia moral mediada por la tecnología. (shrink)

I offer here a critical assessment of Beall and Ficara’s most recent take on Hegelian contradictions. By interpreting differently some key passages of Hegel’s work, I favor, unlike them, a no-gaps approach which leads to a different logic.

Entre Dezembro de 1755 e Fevereiro de 1796, a aspiração de erguer em Lisboa uma biblioteca pública tem várias expressões, e o Alvará de Fevereiro de 1796 que cria a Real Biblioteca Pública da Corte representa, em certa medida, o culminar desse processo. António Ribeiro dos Santos, como responsável pela biblioteca, mostra como se entendia o que devia ser uma Biblioteca da Corte, os seus objectivos, os seus princípios de organização, o cuidado colocado na sua actualização, confirmando a centralidade política (...) de uma instituição onde se materializa a relação entre o poder e o saber, e onde se define como prioridade a abertura das colecções à leitura pública. Neste processo convergem conceitos e políticas distintas, relativamente às noções de biblioteca pública e de Biblioteca Real, e percebe-se a importância política atribuída a uma biblioteca pública da Corte como elemento central das atribuições do Estado. (shrink)

Seen from the point of view of evaluation conditions, a usual way to obtain a connexive logic is to take a well-known negation, for example, Boolean negation or de Morgan negation, and then assign special properties to the conditional to validate Aristotle’s and Boethius’ Theses. Nonetheless, another theoretical possibility is to have the extensional or the material conditional and then assign special properties to the negation to validate the theses. In this paper we examine that possibility, not sufficiently explored in (...) the connexive literature yet.We offer a characterization of connexive negation disentangled from the cancellation account of negation, a previous attempt to define connexivity on top of a distinctive negation. We also discuss an ancient view on connexive logics, according to which a valid implication is one where the negation of the consequent is incompatible with the antecedent, and discuss the role of our idea of connexive negation for this kind of view. (shrink)

A dimensional reduction algorithm is applied to an intelligent classification model with the purpose of improving the efficiency and accuracy. The proposed classification model, used to distinguish the operating mode: Hard- and Soft-Switching, is presented and an analysis of the synchronized rectified step-down converter is done. With the aim of improving the accuracy and reducing the computational cost of the model, three different methods for dimensional reduction are applied to the input dataset of the model: self-organizing maps, principal component analysis (...) and correlation matrix. The obtained results show how the number of variable is highly reduced and the performance of the classification model is boosted: the results manifest an improve in the accuracy and efficiency of the classification. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to understand the transition from a constitutionalism of the common – already proposed previously – to the field of cosmotechnical struggles, in the sense that it would no longer be possible to think and constitute a cosmopolitical project except from them. To this end, what is proposed, based on the limits and crises of State and the constitutionalism that accompanies it, seek the construction of cosmopolitical projects through the resizing of constitutionalism, proposing this in (...) the work from the perspective of the common and human rights, it is essential constitute the common beyond the limits of constitutionalism – state-based or not – since the constitution of the common today takes place in a field in dispute over techno-political practices through cosmotechnical struggles and processes of insurrection, against the backdrop of the impacts of globalization neoliberalism and the disruption of the digital age. (shrink)

Falar de formas da História das Ideias significa assumir que não nos referimos a uma área monolítica. É verdade que a designação foi, tendencialmente, associada a uma só experiência específica e que serviu de identificação a escolas e correntes, em diferentes contextos: na relação entre a História da Literatura e a História da Filosofia, em França; na História Conceptual, na Alemanha; na História das Ideias Políticas, na Grã-Bretanha; na História de ideias singulares, próxima dos Estudos Filo...

Filologia será uma palavra forte. Em todo o caso, como se procura demonstrar e como a tradição nos impõe, é apropriada para caracterizar uma das dimensões dos estudos sobre o livro. O conceito remete o leitor para estudos textuais, onde a língua é com frequência elemento central. Será também vista como disciplina que procura a “autenticidade” dos textos. Mas há outro mundo a considerar. Para os estudos sobre os livros, as leituras, a história da cultura escrita, o olhar do filólogo (...) interessa... (shrink)

Dentro da relação entre a necessidade humana de compreensão e os “murros fechados do mundo” que o absurdo camusiano ocorre. O absurdo, vindo dessa dicotomia entre ser humano e mundo, decorrente dessa impossibilidade, ou com maior precisão, da irracionalidade do mundo descoberto pelo ser humano, é o que pauta a filosofia de Camus. Nesse contexto, a relação do absurdo com a ciência se torna um tema central de um dos ensaios de Camus, O mito de Sísifo. O autor expressa toda (...) sua revolta com a ciência moderna por nunca lhe oferecer o mundo, a ciência apenas descreve e elucida, nunca fornece o mundo à compreensão do ser humano. Essa situação pode ser esclarecidase atendo aos livros de alguns cientistas do século XX, principalmente Werner Heisenberg, o qual elucida, em A parte e o Todo, uma discussão ao redor do tema da compreensão na física moderna. Sendo assim, o propósito deste artigo é estabelecer uma relação entre o absurdo e a revolta de Camus com a ciência com o que Heisenberg demostra como os limites da compreensão na física. No final, parece que ambos autores convergem a conclusão de que o ser humano não é capaz de chegar a compreensão do mundo por meio da ciência. (shrink)

To most of us – believers and non-believers alike – the possibility of a perfect God co-existing with the kinds of evil that we see calls out for explanation. It is unsurprising, therefore, that the belief that God must have justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see has been a perennial feature of theistic thought. Recently, however, a growing number of authors have argued that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with the existence of gratuitous (...) evil. Given powerful, millenia-long sensibilities about power and love and justice, it isn’t hard to find that suggestion simply incredible. Nonetheless, in this paper I will argue that the most prominent theistic alternatives to what has seemed incredible to most of us throughout most of history are themselves patently unacceptable for the theist as well. On any of the most widely accepted accounts of how God could have justifying reasons for permitting some evils, God’s existence means that we have justifying reasons for perpetrating and allowing every evil that we see. That's hard to swallow too. If I’m right about all of this, then two competing outcomes seem to present themselves as a possible result. On the one hand, for the theist, the apparently outrageous suggestion that the existence of a perfect God is compatible with gratuitous evil no longer looks like it faces a formidable, hard-to-resist alternative. On the other hand, some like me might think that my arguments go no distance at all towards dispelling the incredibility of the gratuitous evil nouvelle vague. On this line, theism may seem now to be between the rock and the hard place: it seems hard to make sense of the existence of a perfect God whether or not He has justifying reasons for allowing all the evil that we see. (shrink)

Recently, there have been debates in Portugal regarding the morality of assisted death. One of the leading opponents in Portuguese society against assisted death are Catholics. They argue that the right to life implies that assisted death is immoral and provide four key arguments they believe justify their position. In this article, we reply to these four articles and show that they all fail.

Paul Silva has recently argued that doxastic justification does not have a basing requirement. An important part of his argument depends on the assumption that doxastic and moral permissibility have a parallel structure. I here reply to Silva's argument by challenging this assumption. I claim that moral permissibility is an agential notion, while doxastic permissibility is not. I then briefly explore the nature of these notions and briefly consider their implications for praise and blame.

This letter responds to the essay “Digital Humans to Combat Loneliness and Social Isolation: Ethics Concerns and Policy Recommendation,” by Nancy S. Jecker, Robert Sparrow, Zohar Lederman, and Anita Ho, in the January‐February 2024 issue of the Hastings Center Report.

This work aims to make a critical and propositional exposition about the semantics of concepts in general, from the book Transcendental semantics of Kant (2000), by Loparic. In general terms, the exposition of the theme, by this author, focused on the general classification of the semantics of concepts, their meanings and referents. In turn, the critics was directed to several aspects of its exposition, such as: the precision of the nomenclature used, the introduction of new definitions and the correction of (...) others, the reformulation of the classification of the semantics of the concepts. Finally, the proposition highlighted three main points: (i) the conception of the equivalent epistemological status between logic and mathematics, as symbolic sciences with their own form and content; (ii) the weak and strong concept of sciences in general (formal and empirical) as pure and applied sciences, respectively; (iii) the possible metalinguistic conception of the semantics of concepts. (shrink)

This article aims to revisit the second essay of Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, in order to show some aesthetic-theoretical assumptions present in his genealogical investigation on memory and suffering. Central to the purposes of this analysis is Homer’s role, more precisely, the artistic strategies and procedures of his poetics.

Educational Social Responsibility (EduSR) is the voluntary provision of the educational institution that, as a natural space of social possibilities, favors the deployment of its members towards others, showing it with transparency based on observable indicators. The intention of this book is: a) to try to analyze what is essential that we all share in our respective experiences of EduSR, b) to illuminate so that everyone can make their interpretation in the most accurate way possible and their evaluations in the (...) most reasonable way, c) offer illustrative and convincing arguments, d) invite people to inhabit education with EduSR from their own originality. It is about being sensitive to the danger of corseting and also to the danger of not demanding, for fear of corseting. (shrink)

Contesting Extinctions: Decolonial and Regenerative Futures critically interrogates the discursive framing of extinctions and how they relate to the systems that bring about biocultural loss. The chapters in this multidisciplinary volume examine approaches to ecological and social extinction and resurgence from a variety of fields, including environmental studies, literary studies, political science, and philosophy. Grounding their scholarship in decolonial, Indigenous, and counter-hegemonic frameworks, the contributors advocate for shifting the discursive focus from ruin to regeneration. -/- .

Sustainable development is often framed as a social issue to which corporations should pay attention because it offers both opportunities and challenges. Through the use of institutional theory and the resource-based view of the firm, we shed some light on why, more than 20 years after sustainable development was first introduced, we see neither the adoption of this business model as dominant nor its converse, that is the total abandonment of the model as unworkable and unprofitable. We focus on multinational (...) corporations (MNCs) because they were among the organizations first called to take action. In order to illustrate the institutional pressures MNCs face and their strategic response to these pressures, we analysed four major oil and gas multinationals subject to similar sustainable development pressures – climate change, biodiversity, renewable energy development and social investment. We argue that normative and coercive isomorphism does not occur at the global level because sustainable development is largely a stakeholder-driven rather than a broad social pressure. That is, host country interpretation of sustainable development pressures varies across an MNC’s subsidiary network. Based on the analysis of the four major MNCs’ annual reports from 2000 to 2005, we argue that mimetic isomorphism may occur, but since it implies the use of complex and intangible resources, mimetic processes are slow, rare and discretionary. (shrink)

There seem to be good reasons to think that there must be body representations or some kind of body content required for riding a bike or grabbing a cup of coffee. However, when I ride a bike or grab a cup of coffee, am I just representing the bike and the cup? Or am I actually also representing my body and bodily movements? The thesis of this paper is that the body not only figures in the content that guides everyday (...) activities but that it must. How is this possible? Exactly what elements of the subject’s body can be said to figure in this content? I will proceed in three steps: in the first, I bring together the conceptual resources that seem to be required; in the second, I discuss a couple of proposals about how to link the notion of affordance and the topic of bodily representations, arguing that they are misguided; finally, I propose a view according to which the body’s physical and spatial properties are an unavoidable part of the content that guides everyday activities. (shrink)

Aesthetic subjectivism takes the truth of aesthetic judgments to be relative to the individual making that judgment. Despite widespread suspicion, however, this does not mean that one cannot be wrong about such judgments. Accordingly, this does not mean that one cannot gain higher-order evidence of error and fallibility that bears on the rationality of the aesthetic judgment in question. In this paper, we explain and explore these issues in some detail.

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

Recent investigations surprisingly indicate that single RNA "stem-loops" operate solely by chemical laws that act without selective forces, and in contrast, self-ligated consortia of RNA stem-loops operate by biological selection. To understand consortial RNA selection, the concept of single quasi-species and its mutant spectra as drivers of RNA variation and evolution is rethought here. Instead, we evaluate the current RNA world scenario in which consortia of cooperating RNA stem-loops are the basic players. We thus redefine quasispecies as RNA quasispecies consortia (...) and argue that it has essential behavioral motifs that are relevant to the inherent variation, evolution and diversity in biology. We propose that qs-c is an especially innovative force. We apply qs-c thinking to RNA stem-loops and evaluate how it yields altered bulges and loops in the stem-loop regions, not as errors, but as a natural capability to generate diversity. This basic competence-not error-opens a variety of combinatorial possibilities which may alter and create new biological interactions, identities and newly emerged self identity functions. Thus RNA stem-loops typically operate as cooperative modules, like members of social groups. From such qs-c of stem-loop groups we can trace a variety of RNA secondary structures such as ribozymes, viroids, viruses, mobile genetic elements as abundant infection derived agents that provide the stem-loop societies of small and long non-coding RNAs. (shrink)

James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected position, as a non-theist myself, of defending the free will defense. In this paper, I will try to show that once we take care to focus on what the free will defense is trying to (...) accomplish, and by what means it tries to do so, we will see that Sterba’s criticism of it misses the mark. (shrink)

This is not a guide for your writing process. You should write in whatever way expressing and making sense of your ideas feels most natural and most productive to you. This is a guide for organizing your ideas, after you have captured some of them in fits and starts of prose, into a particular kind of final product: the basic philosophy paper.

One of the few points of agreement between most theists and non-theists working on the problem of evil is that the existence of a perfect God is incompatible with the existence of pointless evil. In a series of influential papers, however, Peter van Inwagen has argued that careful attention to the reasoning behind this claim reveals fatal difficulties related to the Sorites Paradox. In this paper, I explain van Inwagen’s appeal to sorites reasoning, distinguish between two different arguments in his (...) work, and argue that they both commit the same so-far-unnoticed mistake. (shrink)

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that S ought to form or maintain S’s beliefs in accordance with S’s evidence. A promising argument for this view turns on the premise that consideration c is a normative reason for S to form or maintain a belief that p only if c is evidence that p is true. In this paper, I discuss the surprising relation between a recently influential argument for this key premise and the principle that ought implies can. I argue (...) that anyone who antecedently accepts or rejects this principle already has a reason to resist either this argument’s premises or its role in support of deontological evidentialism. (shrink)

Deontological internalism is the family of views where justification is a positive deontological appraisal of someone's epistemic agency: S is justified, that is, when S is blameless, praiseworthy, or responsible in believing that p. Brian Weatherson discusses very briefly how a plausible principle of ampliative transmission reveals a worry for versions of deontological internalism formulated in terms of epistemic blame. Weatherson denies, however, that similar principles reveal similar worries for other versions. I disagree. In this article, I argue that plausible (...) principles of ampliative transmission reveal a worry for deontological internalism in general. (shrink)

This paper defends a novel account of how to determine the intrinsic value of possible worlds. Section 1 argues that a highly intuitive and widely accepted account leads to undesirable consequences. Section 2 takes the first of two steps towards a novel account by clarifying and defending a view about value-contribution that is based on some of W. D. Ross’ claims about the value of pleasure. Section 3 takes the second step by clarifying and defending a view about value-suppression that (...) is based on Ross’ claims about the interplay between prima-facie duties. Section 4 states and defends the account that I call Rossian Totalism. According to this account, the atoms of intrinsic value within a world only sometimes contribute their intrinsic value to the value of that world. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article maintains that in Stoicism physics depends epistemologically on ethics because the theological theses (which are part of stoic physics) about that the gods are beneficial and care about human beings depend on knowledge of the ethical realm of philosophy to be sustained or established forcefully. It is possible appreciate that dependence in the response Stoics would have given to the criticism of other philosophical schools to some of the Stoic theological theses. This is not a minor issue, (...) because the question about whether there are foundational relationships between ethics and physics or not depends on it. The proposal in this article intends to support the negative answer to this question under discussion in contemporary studies on Stoicism. (shrink)

My starting point is what I call the Normative Authority Conception of justification, where S is justified in their belief that p at t (to some degree n) if and only if their believing that p at t is not ruled out by epistemic norms that have normative authority over S at t. With this in mind, this paper develops an account of doxastic justification by first developing an account of the normative authority of epistemic norms. Drawing from work in (...) political philosophy, I argue that (a) the cognitive and evaluative commitments and concerns behind our actual practices of holding each other and ourselves accountable for our beliefs reveal which epistemic norms we have consented to be under, and that (b) it is because we have consented to be under the authority of these norms – by actually holding ourselves and others accountable to them – that they in turn have normative authority over us. By connecting the authority of epistemic norms to the authority we have over ourselves in this way, the resulting account of doxastic justification (i) explains why it can be appropriate to criticize, resent, or sanction someone for having unjustified beliefs, (ii) avoids the phenomena of normative alienation and normative parochialism, and (iii) respects the social and collective nature of epistemic justification. (shrink)

What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is not within S’s effective control at t, then it is false, at t, that ‘S ought to Φ at t’, (c) For all S, p, and t, having doxastic (...) attitude D towards p at t is not within S’s effective control at t. All three natural replies to the puzzle have been pursued. Some have claimed that doxastic attitudes like believing that p are, in fact, within our effective control, or sufficiently so. Others have claimed that doxastic ought-claims, strictly speaking, are always false. And some have denied that effective control is required for the adequacy of doxastic ought-claims in general. I here pursue and examine a different strategy. In the first part of this paper, I argue that these claims are not only each true but actually not in tension with each other in the first place. Instead of attempting to dispel the puzzle, this solution proposes to evade it instead: to solve it by properly understanding, and by thereby accepting without contradiction, all of its constitutive claims. In the second part of the paper, I argue that the evasive strategy forces us to re-think our understanding of the place of normative reasons in epistemology. More exactly, it seems to come at the cost of one central way of thinking about our reasons for having doxastic attitudes, one where such reasons are good-standing exemplars of normative reasons in general. The evasive strategy, that is, threatens to lead us very quickly to a deflationary picture of epistemic normativity: it rescues normative talk, but sacrifices normative substance. I conclude by explaining why I think this is more consequential than some have made it out to be, and by suggesting that these consequences are welcome nonetheless. (shrink)

W.K. Clifford’s famous 1876 essay The Ethics of Belief contains one of the most memorable lines in the history of philosophy: "it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." The challenge to religious belief stemming from this moralized version of evidentialism is still widely discussed today.

Potts et seq. presents an analysis of gap-containing supplements where the gap is modelled as a variable over the semantic type of the constituent that the as-clause adjoins to. This much allows the meaning of the gap to be resolved purely compositionally, by defining as as a function that allows the anchor to bind the gap variable. This article presents a class of as-clauses where Potts’s analysis seems to break down, in that the gap cannot be modelled as a variable (...) over the semantic type of the anchor. I propose that these cases can be unified with those in Potts’s work, as well as a larger class of ellipsis phenomena, by assuming that, under certain conditions, surface gaps are composite entities, containing a bound variable and a free variable that are resolved independently of each other. The bound variable is bound by the anchor, and the free variable is resolved by anaphora to a salient discourse object. (shrink)

Skeptical theism, broadly construed, is an attempt to leverage our limited cognitive powers, in some specified sense, against “evidential” and “explanatory” arguments from evil. Since there are different versions of these kinds of arguments, there are correspondingly different versions of skeptical theism. In this paper, I briefly explain three versions of these arguments from evil (two from William Rowe and one from Paul Draper) and the three versions of skeptical theism tailor-made to block them (from Stephen Wykstra, Michael Bergmann, and (...) Peter van Inwagen). (shrink)