Il n'existe pas d'humanité sans musique. Celle-ci vient à chacun en le précédant, en lui ouvrant son mode d'existence et en lui donnant forme et rythme. Nos affects, nos désirs et nos pensées sont musicaux. L'existence est musicale. La musique constitue donc notre condition, si bien qu'elle est plus antérieure et plus intérieure à nous que nous-mêmes. Toutefois, comme nous, elle est sans origine assignable et sans commencement. Ceci n'est donc pas un livre de musicologie. Pour le lire, nulle expertise (...) n'est requise, seulement l'expérience d'exister. Nous sommes par ailleurs nécessairement pris dans l'Histoire faite de catastrophes mais aussi de marques d'espérance. Que dit alors très concrètement la musique de nous, de nos existences actuelles et du présent? Et comment dans ces conditions recevons et entendons-nous notre être-musical?"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Dans le livre que j’ai consacré à Hélène Schjerfbeck, je relis cette formule : « C’est l’existence qui peint » dont, à la réflexion, il m’apparaît aujourd’hui qu’il convient d’en vérifier la pertinence. La formule est en effet à la fois évidente et obscure, paradoxale même, ne serait-ce qu’en raison de l’impersonnalité dont elle fait état. Contre une représentation naïve du portrait et de l’autoportrait, elle semble vouloir signifier, en tout cas en premier lieu et tout ensemble, que ce n’est...

En prenant en compte l’article de Freud sur le Moïse de Michel-Ange et son dernier ouvrage L’homme Moïse et le monothéisme, il est possible de montrer comment le renoncement pulsionnel ouvre la voie à la sublimation et à la réalité spirituelle.

Czech translation of Marguerite Léna’s Choisir l’ Europe: Constantin Sigov et la dignité humaine.

Lucrezia Marinella's (1571–1653) most important contributions to philosophy were two polemical treatises: The Nobility and excellence of Women, and the Defects and Vices of Men, and the Exhortations to Women and to Others if They Please. Marinella argues for the superiority of women over men in every respect: psychologically, physiologically, morally, and intellectually. She is particularly effective in using the resources of ancient philosophy to support her various arguments, in which she draws conclusions about the souls and the bodies of (...) women, the nature and significance of women's beauty, the virtue of women and the liberty to which women as well as men are entitled. This Element showcases that her claim of superiority is intended ultimately to justify the possibility of political rule by women. (shrink)

L'epoque est troublee: les mutations anthropologiques sont si contraignantes qu'un nouveau concept juridique, la dignite humaine, a fait son apparition. Si le droit en fait un usage intensif, c'est dans la mesure ou face aux exces des Etats criminels comme aux avancees des biotechnologies, il a besoin de fixer les limites entre l'humain et ce qui ne le serait plus. Chacun pressent que la dignite n'est pas une notion objective. Son invention est nouee aux religions monotheistes et aux inflexions que (...) la philosophie d'abord, la psychanalyse ensuite, lui font subir. L'aspect psychanalytique de la dignite humaine sera ici privilegie. Comment la dignite serait-elle compatible avec la sauvagerie de la vie psychique? L'auteur met en tension les travaux de Freud, sur la religion et la culture, avec les ecrits d'Etty Hillesum qui, dans les trois annees precedant son extermination a Auschwitz, se livre a une reflexion, au bord de l'abime, sur la destructivite liee au destin de masse. Grace a la revolution psychique qu'elle effectue, il devient possible de resister en tant qu'individu singulier a l'emprise des masses sur l'esprit, de construire l'humain en chaque homme, rien n'etant acquis a cet egard par la seule appartenance a l'espece humaine. (shrink)

Ce qui a été n'est plus possible. Ce qui a disparu existe peut-être encore. Mais rien ne nous est plus accordé. Dans des temps plus anciens, l'existence pouvait se soutenir, par la croyance et la prière, par la simple attente ou par la présence du mystère, d'un espoir en une grâce. Celle-ci pouvait être concédée, malgré l'ignorance dans laquelle on se trouvait de la décision divine et de son libre vouloir, ou méritée par le travail de la vertu. Rien de (...) tout cela, de cette sanction de l'existence, de son évaluation propre, ne constitue plus le plan ou la perspective par rapport auxquels les hommes perçoivent le sens de leur vie. Ce n'est pas qu'il n'y ait plus "la grâce", nous n'en savons strictement rien, c'est que l'idée elle-même s'est évanouie au pire dans la superstition, au mieux dans ce qui reste, chez certains, de croyance. Les créatures et le monde se sont désormais repliés sur eux-mêmes, ils ne sont plus portés, ou enveloppés dans un orbe qui en définitive sublimerait ce monde déchu. La grâce, en somme, est désormais désaccordée. Il reste à savoir si elle est capable d'infléchir son sens originellement théologique, et si, devenue au mieux douloureusement profane, elle possède une chance de nous délivrer envers et contre tout un bonheur, celui vers lequel tend l'oeuvre paradoxale de Kleist, et une "vraie vie" comme l'a désiré Proust. (shrink)

There would be, beyond the work carried out with Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe on the Jena Romantics—the first phase of German Romanticism—in The Literary Absolute (1978; trans. 1988), a “romanticism”, recurrent and yet problematised, of Jean-Luc Nancy. Set forth in a little-known text on Flaubert, this “romanticism” reveals itself to be, not of a school of thought nor of a fantasy, but of a form insofar as it is conveyed by a very new regime of thinking. Moreover, it must itself be overcome, (...) by following the infinity of sense that the fragmentation of totalities qua the world imposes. (shrink)

La musique comme chemin d'existence et pour la penser... En effet, les moments d'intervention de la musique, de toutes les musiques, au fil des jours et au long de la vie ne manquent pas d'être signifiants. Ils instruisent autant sur la musique elle-même que sur la pensée et sur l'existence. Il serait prétentieux d'en produire une théorie générale. Toutefois, la voie de la chronique, jour après jour, aura tissé des fils permettant de s'attarder sur le sens, nécessairement ponctuel et subjectif (...) (chacun pourra substituer son écoute et ses pratiques propres), de l'Adieu en musique, des affinités qu'elle manifeste et peut-être révèle, de ses rapports avec telle image ou peinture, plus étonnamment avec la photographie, avec le son en général, la vérité ou encore le style. On verra aussi comment la musique s'entend dans le rêve et comment elle nous porte à considérer les animaux. Des oeuvres, des musiciens, et quelques philosophes et écrivains s'imposeront (Le Voyage d'Hiver, Le Boléro, Le Sacre du Printemps, Pelléas ; Haydn, Schubert, Mahler, Chostakovitch ; Descartes, Nietzsche, Adorno ; Goethe, Gerhard Meier, Sandor Maraï...). C'est pourtant davantage une vie dans la musique et par elle que la théorisation sur la musique qui inspire chacun des textes présentés ici. En s'efforçant de relever et de piquer leur objet, donc en le séparant et le thématisant staccato, peut-être la chance sera-t-elle donnée d'entrevoir l'existence dans sa continuité, legato. (shrink)

Envy and resentment are generally thought to be unpleasant and unethical emotions which ought to be condemned. I argue that both envy and resentment, in some important forms, are moral emotions connected with concern for justice, understood in terms of desert and entitlement. They enable us to recognise injustice, work as a spur to acting against it and connect us to others. Thus, we should accept these emotions as part of the ethical life.

This work examines Aristotle's discussions of definition in his logical works and the Metaphysics, and argues for the importance of definitions of simple ...

Jeûner comme écrire. Jeûner, écrire. Jeûner non pour maigrir ou pour quelque raison de santé, même si l’on peut relever, çà et là dans les pages du Journal ou des correspondances de Kafka, des préoccupations concernant la vie au grand air, les régimes, même et surtout le naturisme. Cependant, rien de tout cela ne saurait encore désigner l’essentiel, car ces motivations se retirent assez vite devant des exigences tout autres, celles d’un appel et même d’une convocation subjective bien plus imp...

Early feminist or pro-woman works often combine the claim that the rational souls of men and women are the same with an argument for the superiority of women. This article considers two such works, Lucrezia Marinella's The Nobility and Excellence of Women and the Defects and Vices of Men (Venice, 1601 [1999]) and Marguerite Buffet's In Praise of Illustrious Learned Women, both Ancient and Modern (Paris, 1668), in order to show the continuities and distinctive features of feminist arguments for (...) superiority, to emphasize the differences in the conceptions of reason and physiology that distinguish them, and to demonstrate that claims of superiority persisted even as those defending women's worth began to adopt egalitarian positions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 12.1 (2004) 71-75 [Access article in PDF] Response to Kingsley Price's "How Can Music Seem to be Emotional" Marguerite Nering Calgary, Canada Kingsley Price argues that music, since it is not personal, cannot be emotional but can only seem emotional. In an earlier draft of this paper he described it more fully: "Music is not a person, cannot possibly harbor an inward life, (...) and cannot possibly be emotional." He then sets out to discover how music, since for him it is not emotional, can seem to be so. Through a step-by-step process of philosophical inquiry, he first looks within perception and not finding an answer there, searches without, mainly focusing on meaning and Susanne Langer's theory of emotion and music. His search is unrewarded, leaving him to conclude that the answer to his question remains an incomprehensible mystery.His logic at first seems impervious to dispute. Had he not strictly limited his meaning of music and emotion-particularly emotion-it may have simplified responding to his query. For him, "music" refers to instrumental music that is heard or perceived. "Emotion" means conscious feelings we find ourselves in when undergoing emotion.The major question one must ask is whether his basic premise is accurate. Is he correct in stating that music unequivocally is not emotional but only seems so? [End Page 71] Is he correct in stating that music does not harbor an inward life? After all, he is talking about instrumental music that is perceived. While one cannot deny that notated music on paper is not emotional, does this hold for instrumental music being performed and transmitted? The source is a live human, someone who has an inward life, or at least did have at the time of production. The receptor is alive and has an inward life. The human source is sending living music imbued with emotion and energy. The airwaves transport these vibrations. Can we really say that the living or live music reaching the receiver's ears is not carrying real emotion?Returning to Price's analysis, we find he looks first at perception itself, in this case sense perception, and determines that it has two major constituents: awareness and the object of awareness. He argues that awareness cannot seem to exist; it must exist. It is always simple; therefore, there can be no characteristic that makes it seeming and not real. I question whether the latter conclusion necessarily follows, that is, that reality is a consequence of simplicity, but I must agree that awareness by virtue of its existence must be real.Music heard is the object of awareness. He states that the distinction between seeming and reality does apply to some things-for example, to Macbeth seeing a dagger that really is not there-but declares that this cannot apply to music heard, for it actually exists. Does this mean that one cannot hear music that really is not there? The illusion should work for hearing if it works for vision. Back to his argument, because music heard exists, he reasons that one cannot say that the seeming emotionality in music can be traced to the character of the music that bears it. I wonder then how this would apply to a person playing music with real emotion for his or her own enjoyment? In this case the human receptor of music is also the human source of the music. They are one and the same, and this person of course has an inward personal life. Does this music only seem emotional or is it really emotional? It would make sense that it is really emotional.He then looks at whether the seemingness of emotionality can be traced to emotionality itself and deduces that it cannot. Emotions are real. If we feel joy, it is real joy we are feeling and not seeming joy. One cannot debate this. Again, however, I am not convinced of the seemingness of the emotionality of music. Because music comes from a living person, it is an extension... (shrink)

Aristotle's remarks about the differences between the sexes have become infamous for their implications for the social status of women. In his observations on female biology, Aristotle claims that "the female nature is, as it were, a deformity." In describing women's role in the public sphere, he claims that women are naturally subordinate because, while they possess a deliberative faculty, that capacity is "without authority." While both claims express the "inferiority" of female bodies/women relative to male bodies/men, it is not (...) self-evident that the defects Aristotle identifies in female biology have cognitive or moral manifestations that would justify the rule of men over women in political life. Marguerite Deslauriers here aims to construct a coherent picture of Aristotle's views on sexual and gender-based difference from these remarks and to show the extent to which his views on female biology and women's role in politics are causally connected. Without exculpating Aristotle from charges of misogyny, Deslauriers contextualizes his explanations of the role and origin of female animals in his biology and the role of women in his political philosophy; she shows how Aristotle developed these views and the importance they hold for his wider philosophical commitments. She then explores how Aristotle might have seen the link between the physiology of sex and the bearing it has on political life. She ultimately argues that in Aristotle's conception of sexual difference in biology and politics, there is a tension between his view of the inferiority of female bodies and women and his commitment to the idea that females and women are valuable both for generation and for the political life characteristic of human beings. In this tension she finds a difference between Aristotle and his predecessors: while previous accounts associate sexual difference with affliction, Aristotle sees sexual difference as a benefit, both to a species and a political community. This volume will be of interest to philosophers and students interested in ancient philosophy, feminist philosophy, as well as those studying moral and political philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy of Music Education Review 12.1 (2004) 71-75 [Access article in PDF] Response to Kingsley Price's "How Can Music Seem to be Emotional" Marguerite Nering Calgary, Canada Kingsley Price argues that music, since it is not personal, cannot be emotional but can only seem emotional. In an earlier draft of this paper he described it more fully: "Music is not a person, cannot possibly harbor an inward life, (...) and cannot possibly be emotional." He then sets out to discover how music, since for him it is not emotional, can seem to be so. Through a step-by-step process of philosophical inquiry, he first looks within perception and not finding an answer there, searches without, mainly focusing on meaning and Susanne Langer's theory of emotion and music. His search is unrewarded, leaving him to conclude that the answer to his question remains an incomprehensible mystery.His logic at first seems impervious to dispute. Had he not strictly limited his meaning of music and emotion-particularly emotion-it may have simplified responding to his query. For him, "music" refers to instrumental music that is heard or perceived. "Emotion" means conscious feelings we find ourselves in when undergoing emotion.The major question one must ask is whether his basic premise is accurate. Is he correct in stating that music unequivocally is not emotional but only seems so? [End Page 71] Is he correct in stating that music does not harbor an inward life? After all, he is talking about instrumental music that is perceived. While one cannot deny that notated music on paper is not emotional, does this hold for instrumental music being performed and transmitted? The source is a live human, someone who has an inward life, or at least did have at the time of production. The receptor is alive and has an inward life. The human source is sending living music imbued with emotion and energy. The airwaves transport these vibrations. Can we really say that the living or live music reaching the receiver's ears is not carrying real emotion?Returning to Price's analysis, we find he looks first at perception itself, in this case sense perception, and determines that it has two major constituents: awareness and the object of awareness. He argues that awareness cannot seem to exist; it must exist. It is always simple; therefore, there can be no characteristic that makes it seeming and not real. I question whether the latter conclusion necessarily follows, that is, that reality is a consequence of simplicity, but I must agree that awareness by virtue of its existence must be real.Music heard is the object of awareness. He states that the distinction between seeming and reality does apply to some things-for example, to Macbeth seeing a dagger that really is not there-but declares that this cannot apply to music heard, for it actually exists. Does this mean that one cannot hear music that really is not there? The illusion should work for hearing if it works for vision. Back to his argument, because music heard exists, he reasons that one cannot say that the seeming emotionality in music can be traced to the character of the music that bears it. I wonder then how this would apply to a person playing music with real emotion for his or her own enjoyment? In this case the human receptor of music is also the human source of the music. They are one and the same, and this person of course has an inward personal life. Does this music only seem emotional or is it really emotional? It would make sense that it is really emotional.He then looks at whether the seemingness of emotionality can be traced to emotionality itself and deduces that it cannot. Emotions are real. If we feel joy, it is real joy we are feeling and not seeming joy. One cannot debate this. Again, however, I am not convinced of the seemingness of the emotionality of music. Because music comes from a living person, it is an extension... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 96 Heft: 1 Seiten: 304-310.

Encouraging people to consider multiple alternatives appears to be a useful debiasing technique for reducing many biases (explanation, hindsight, and overconfidence), if the generation of alternatives is experienced as easy. The present research tests whether these alternative generation procedures induce a mental simulation mind-set (cf. Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000), such that debiasing in one domain transfers to debias judgments in unrelated domains. The results indeed demonstrated that easy alternative generation tasks not only debiased judgments in the same domain but also (...) generalized to debias judgments in unrelated domains, provided that participants were low in the need for structure. The alternative generation tasks (even when they were easy to perform) showed no evidence of activating a mental simulation mind-set in individuals high in need for structure, as these individuals displayed no transfer effects. Implications of the results for understanding the role of the need for structure, ease of generation, and mental simulation mind-set activation for debiasing are discussed. (shrink)

Marie de Gournay, in a central argument in the pamphlet Égalité des hommes et des femmes [The Equality of Women and Men], offers an interpretation of an argument for equality that she attributes to ‘the School.’ I argue that Gournay is drawing on Aristotle’s Metaphysics to formulate an argument for the equality of women; that she does not temper that argument with claims for the superiority of women, which makes her unique for some time; and that her alleged misrepresentation of (...) her authorities – Aristotle in particular – is itself an interesting and suggestive phenomenon. Moreover, while some of her contemporaries would have agreed that the soul of a person has no sex, Gournay was unusual in arguing that the social implication of this was intellectual equality for women and men, just so long as education should be provided to women as well as men. (shrink)

ABSTRACTIn the debate about the worth of women in sixteenth and seventeenth century Italy three pro-woman authors of the period, Moderata Fonte, Lucrezia Marinella, and Arcangela Tarabotti, develop...

The newly private corporation challenges scholars to re-examine corporate social responsibility under a markedly different governance system. We theorize regarding the implications of public corporations going private through use of private equity. The new governance system includes few owners and an expert, involved board of directors; combined with a greatly reduced public presence, public-to-private firms are proposed to place greater emphasis on financial performance and lesser emphasis on social performance. Several variables are proposed to moderate the lesser emphasis on social (...) performance. (shrink)

Previous research has suggested that an effective strategy for debiasing judgments is to have participants "consider the opposite." The present research proposes that considering any plausible alternative outcome for an event, not just the opposite outcome, leads participants to simulate multiple alternatives, resulting in debiased judgments. Three experiments tested this hypothesis using an explanation task paradigm. Participants in all studies were asked to explain either 1 hypothetical outcome (single explanation conditions) or 2 hypothetical outcomes (multiple explanation conditions) to an event; (...) after the explanation task, participants made likelihood judgments. The results of Studies 1 and 2 indicated that debiasing occurred in all multiple explanation conditions, including those that did not involve the opposite outcome. Furthermore, the findings indicated that debiased judgments resulted from participants' spontaneous consideration of additional alternatives in making their likelihood judgments. The results of Study 3 also identified the perceived plausibility of the explained alternative as an important moderating variable in debiasing. (shrink)