As members of the fetal surgery advisory board at a large tertiary care center, we read with great interest Hendriks’ et al. target article proposing a new ethical framework for fetal therap...

We examine the degree structure $\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {ER}}}$ of equivalence relations on $\omega $ under computable reducibility. We examine when pairs of degrees have a least upper bound. In particular, we show that sufficiently incomparable pairs of degrees do not have a least upper bound but that some incomparable degrees do, and we characterize the degrees which have a least upper bound with every finite equivalence relation. We show that the natural classes of finite, light, and dark degrees are (...) definable in $\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {ER}}}$. We show that every equivalence relation has continuum many self-full strong minimal covers, and that $\mathbf {d}\oplus \mathbf {\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {Id}}}_1}$ needn’t be a strong minimal cover of a self-full degree $\mathbf {d}$. Finally, we show that the theory of the degree structure $\operatorname {\mathrm {\mathbf {ER}}}$ as well as the theories of the substructures of light degrees and of dark degrees are each computably isomorphic with second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

Rips et al. claim that the principles underlying the structure of natural numbers cannot be inferred from interactions with the physical world. However, in their target article they failed to consider an important source of interaction: finger counting. Here, we show that finger counting satisfies all the conditions required for allowing the concept of numbers to emerge from sensorimotor experience through a bottom-up process.

In this article, I focus on the reading of Heidegger's Kant that Derrida offers in his recently published 1978-9 seminar Donner le temps II (§§12–3). Here Derrida tracks across Heidegger's text the auto-affective or auto-dative structure (namely, the originary synthesis of spontaneity and receptivity) in which the Kantian conceptions of the experience of time and of transcendental imagination converge, and which is seen as scandalously underpinning the conception of respect. In particular, I draw attention to the moment in which Derrida (...) originally accounts for the structure of the Kantian respect as the movement of abandonment or delivery over to the event which he also ascribes to other figures of freedom (or unconditionality without sovereignty) explored in his later writings. My hypothesis is that, in doing so, Derrida may be building a bridge between two thoughts of imagination: on the one hand, imagination as a figure of his early differance, and, on the other hand, imagination as the non-sovereign freedom that undergirds his late work on sovereignty. (shrink)

In his remarkable new book, Emotion and Virtue, Sreenivasan defends the view that, in the case of many virtues, in order for an exemplar of each of these virtues to be a reliable judge of what that virtue requires in specific circumstances, she must possess a particular, morally rectified, emotional trait. In this article, I raise two challenges to “the argument from salience” that Sreenivasan offers in favor of this view. First, I argue that, although Sreenivasan wishes to remain neutral (...) about different philosophical theories of emotions, the success of his argument depends, in fact, on the outcome of the debate about the nature of emotions. Second, I challenge the central claim of Sreenivasan's argument from salience, namely, that the possession of a morally rectified emotional trait, cleverness, and supplementary moral knowledge is sufficient to explain an agent's ability to reliably judge what a given virtue requires in specific circumstances. (shrink)

In 1993, Agostini and Proffitt showed that perceptual belongingness causes simultaneous lightness contrast to be seen in configurations in which the inducing elements are not adjacent to the target. The aim of the present research was to measure the strength of belongingness in determining the contrast phenomenon when the numbers of the inducing and induced elements and their relative positions are manipulated in Agostini-and-Proffitt-type configurations. In the first experiment, by using a forced choice paradigm, naïve observers indicated which gray disks (...) arranged to form the letter T in two rows appeared lighter/darker. In the second experiment, expert observers performed two nulling tasks: 1) the lightness of gray disk was adjusted until it was perceived equal to that of gray target aligned with white/black inducers; 2) the lightness of target organized with white/black inducers was adjusted to match the target organized with black/ white inducers. We found that also when there are few inducers, perceptual belongingness causes the contrast effect to propagate spatially on all the induced elements. Spatial position does not influence the induction effect. Low-level theories cannot account for these phenomena, but higher-level processes must be factored in to explain them. (shrink)

Summary Recent studies explored the contribution of auditory information in ecological contexts to biological motion perception and its influence on movement execution. This work provides an overview of the most influential scientific contributions in this domain and analyzes the most recent findings, both in sport and motor rehabilitation. Overall, the literature indicates that ecological sounds associated with movements are relevant for perceiving some important features of sport movements. Auditory information is also relevant during performance execution, and can be used to (...) create training protocols. Also, similarly auditory information can be used in clinical contexts to provide rhythmic information to enhance the efficacy of motor rehabilitation protocols. In conclusion, we can say that the role of ecological sounds of movements is examined in conveying complexity of information from a gestalt perspective. (shrink)

According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, I (...) focus on Goldman’s latter claim. After updating Goldman’s account of how ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons in the light of Goldman’s newest formulation of his simulation theory of mental ascription (Goldman, Simulating Minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), I develop and assess Goldman’s arguments in favour of the reliability of simulation for interpersonal comparisons. I argue that, under certain conditions, there may be room for a scientifically acceptable solution to the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. (shrink)

According to the orthodox view, it is impossible to know how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and whether they are interpersonally comparable at all. Against the orthodox view, Donald Davidson (1986, 2004) argues that the interpersonal comparability of preferences is a necessary condition for the correct interpretation of other people's behaviour. In this paper I claim that, as originally stated, Davidson's argument does not succeed because it is vulnerable to several objections, including Barry Stroud's (1968) objection against (...) all transcendental arguments of a 'strong' kind. However, I argue that Davidson's strategy can still achieve results of anti-sceptical significance. If we reformulate Davidson's argument as a 'modest' transcendental argument and if we embrace an 'internal' account of epistemic justification, it is in fact possible to have at least justified beliefs about how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and about their interpersonal comparability. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that, in everyday life, we compare different people’s preferences with respect to content and strength. We typically make such comparisons with relatively little difficulty. Furthermore, we often do not find inter-personal comparisons of preferences more difficult than intra-personal comparisons, that is,comparisons involving our own preferences. This contrasts with the difficulties that comparing preferences across individuals pose at the theoretical level. Since preferences are typically represented numerically through a utility function, the problem is known as the problem (...) of interpersonal utility comparisons (IUCs for short). In this paper, I examine the most common solution to the problem of IUCs. According to it, we can assume that preferences are interpersonally comparable on pragmatic grounds (i.e. explanatory power, parsimony and simplicity) I argue that, contrary to our intuitions, the assumption of interpersonal comparability is not pragmatically advantageous. I conclude that this strategy to solve the problem of IUCs fails. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to summarize some aspects of utilitarianism and to provide a general overview of Hare's preference utilitarianism, followed by a critique of Hare's preference theory.

O objetivo deste texto é participar do debate sobre uma filosofia da migração. Em uma época que se destaca pela discussão sobre o fechamento de fronteiras e se procura estabelecer critérios para aceitação de refugiados e migrantes, a filosofia pode auxiliar na compreensão do que se passa na atualidade. Nesse sentido, o tema das migrações, dos estrangeiros, da soberania e das atribuições do estado-nação ganham contornos demasiado importantes e que merecem um tratamento renovado. Mais do que fornecer ferramentas para a (...) solução de problemas políticos específicos, pragmáticos, a análise que se pretende aqui tem mais a ver com um exercício de compreensão de um tema que já se tornou clássico: o tema das migrações. A primeira parte deste trabalho busca, então, reconstruir as teorias que justificaram – e ainda justificam – um tratamento desigual entre cidadão e estrangeiro, entre o autóctone e o residente. Teorias da soberania, do Estado e da cidadania terão lugar especial para, em seguida, na segunda parte, propor que essas não são mais suficientes para dar conta do tema em questão. O soberanismo e a cidadania precisa ceder lugar para o tema da acolhida e da comunidade, horizontes que possibilitam como se pode encarar a demanda de coabitação com o estrangeiro, com o migrante, com o estrangeiro-residente. (shrink)

I aim to present a solution to the apparent paradox of the Tractatus by means of a minimalist reading grounded in the idea that the correct logical symbolism alone “finally solves” in essentials the philosophical problems. I argue that although the sentences of the Tractatus are nonsensical, rules presented in its symbolism are not. The symbolism itself expresses only a priori rules of logic through schematic variables that do not say anything. I argue that this reading correctly expresses the ladder (...) structure of the book, and that it can account for Wittgenstein's critique of the Tractatus in Some Remarks on Logical Form. (shrink)

Resumo: Este artigo apresenta a crítica de Nietzsche à metafísica tradicional, priorizando a análise do conceito de verdade. Partimos da suposição de que é necessário delinear a crítica feita por Nietzsche à tradição metafísica a partir de sua análise sobre a verdade. De acordo com Nietzsche, nossa possibilidade de conhecer as coisas não atinge um “em si”. O sentido do verdadeiro se faz para garantir a paz e abolir a guerra de todos contra todos. De acordo com o filósofo alemão, (...) o critério de verdade não é a correta nomeação da realidade. A instituição do “verdadeiro” é produto de um único propósito, o de garantir a vida em sociedade. Para tanto, procuramos realizar a verificação das considerações críticas de Nietzsche procurando refazer o registro dos conceitos presentes no capítulo primeiro de Além do bem e do mal . Também utilizamos os escritos póstumos produzidos no período da juventude. Nosso intento, portanto, é apontar, em linhas gerais, algumas das críticas que Nietzsche faz as ideias modernas.: This paper presents Nietzsche's critique of traditional metaphysics, prioritizing the analysis of the concept of truth. We start from the assumption that it is necessary to outline the critique of Nietzsche's metaphysical tradition from his analysis of the truth. According to Nietzsche, our ability to know things do not reach a "per se". The true meaning of it is to ensure peace and to abolish war of all against all. According to the German philosopher, the criterion of truth is not the correct naming of reality. The institution of "true" is the product of a single purpose, to ensure life in society. Therefore, we perform the verification of critical considerations Nietzsche's looking to redo the record of the concepts presented in the first chapter of beyond the good and the evil. We also use the posthumous writings produced in the period of youth. Our intent, therefore, is to point out, in general terms, some of the criticism that Nietzsche modern ideas. Keywords : Metaphysics. Truth. Modern ideas. (shrink)

The paper argues against the growing tendency to interpret Brentano’s conception of inner consciousness in self-representational terms. This trend has received support from the tendency to see Brentano as a forerunner of contemporary same-order theories of consciousness and from the view that Brentano models intransitive consciousness on transitive consciousness, such that a mental state is conscious insofar as it is aware of itself as an object. However, this reading fails to take into account the Brentanian concept of object, which is (...) ultimately derived from ancient and medieval philosophy, as well as the secondary, elusive character that Brentano attributes to inner perception. According to Brentano, we have an aspectual but transparent consciousness of transcendent objects, whereas our awareness of our own mental acts is always complete but incidental, and ultimately opaque. Reversing the relationship between intentionality and consciousness faces difficulties at the textual interpretative level, but also raises theoretical problems, for it risks treating Brentano’s theory of mind as a form of subjectivism and idealism. (shrink)

In the preface of the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein says that his “most fruitful ideas” are due to the stimulus of Sraffa's criticism, but Sraffa is not mentioned anywhere else in the book. It remains a puzzle in the literature how and why Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein. This paper presents a solution to this puzzle. Sraffa's criticism led Wittgenstein away from the calculus conception of language of the Big Typescript (arguably, an adaptation of the calculus of the Tractatus), and towards the “anthropological (...) view,” which structures both the opening sections of the Philosophical Investigations and Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn is mostly known for his contributions to the philosophy of science. However, it was chiefly to investigations in philosophy of language that he dedicated the last part of his career. The aim of this paper is to present a systematic view of Kuhn’s main ideas on this subject. I start by describing his theory of concept, in particular what he says about kind terms. Such terms, acquired in blocks that form contrast sets or “taxonomies,” are learned through ostensible (...) definitions. Next, I analyze Kuhn’s concepts of “meaning” and “truth.” Finally, I discuss a second type of kinds terms, not fully investigated by him, which is learned together with scientific laws. Resumo Thomas Kuhn é conhecido principalmente por suas contribuições para a filosofia da ciência. No entanto, foi em grande medida à filosofia da linguagem que ele dedicou a última parte de sua carreira. O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar uma visão sistemática das principais ideias de Kuhn sobre esse assunto. Começo descrevendo sua teoria do conceito, em particular o que ele diz sobre termos para espécie. Tais termos, aprendidos em blocos que formam conjuntos de contraste ou “taxonomias”, são aprendidos através de definições ostensivas. Em seguida, analiso as concepções de Kuhn de “significado” e “verdade”. Finalmente, discuto um segundo tipo de termo para espécies, não totalmente investigado por ele, que é aprendido junto com as leis científicas. (shrink)

In the essay ‘To Speculate – On “Freud’”, which is published in The Postcards: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1980) and draws upon the last part of his unedited lecture course on La Vie la mort (taught in 1975), Jacques Derrida engages a close reading of Sigmund Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle. This article focuses on the deconstruction of the Freudian concept of drive (Trieb) that Derrida unfolds across his reading. It traces the analysis of the movement of autotelicity (...) (auto-télie) that, according to Derrida, underpins the drive's relation to itself, and argues that the French philosopher interprets a specific drive evoked (but not thematized) by Freud, the drive to power (Bemächtigungstrieb), as the figure of the deconstruction of that autotelicity. Furthermore, the article suggests that the implications of this argument extend beyond Derrida's early reading of Freud, since they cast a new light on the argument for replacing the concept of sovereignty with that of the drive to power, which Derrida elaborates in his late political analyses. (shrink)

Mechanisms are a way of explaining how biological phenomena work rather than why single elements of biological systems are there. However, mechanisms are usually described as physiological entities, and little or no attention is paid to malfunction as an independent theoretical concept. On the other hand, malfunction is the main focus of interest of applied sciences such as medicine. In this paper I argue that malfunctions are parts of pathological mechanisms, which should be considered separate theoretical entities, conceptually having a (...) priority over physiological sequences. While pathological mechanisms can be described in terms of a Cummins-like mechanistic explanation, they show some unnoticed peculiarities when compared to physiological ones. Some features of pathological mechanisms are considered, such as outcome variability, ambivalence and dependence on a range. (shrink)

Professor Steven Harvey has honored us with a 28-page critique of our 2012 paper, “Avicenna among medieval Jews.” In our opinion, his text is wanting in both form and substance.

Os anos 1964-1985 se caracterizam pela mobilização popular e pela emergência de uma poderosa vontade de mudança social. Queria-se uma libertação das opressões históricas que a maioria do povo vinha sofrendo. Paradoxalmente, foi um tempo de autoritarismo e desrespeito aos direitos sociais e humanos. Este trabalho pretende analisar o movimento do catolicismo brasileiro, especialmente sua luta por esses direitos. Diversos aspectos atuam e influenciam no contexto político-religioso desse período. A reconstrução do significado desse movimento valeu-se de ampla documentação. Apesar dos (...) entraves e das limitações, o catolicismo fez seu percurso e assinalou um passo importante na trajetória histórica desse período. Na compreensão e análise desse caminho, está a proposta deste estudo. Palabras clave: Catolicismo; Direitos sociais e humanos. ABSTRACT The years 1964-1985 were characterised by popular mobilisation and the emergence of a powerful wish for social change, in the sence of a liberation from historical oppressions suffered by most people. Paradoxically, it was a time of authoritarianism and disregard for social and human rights. This paper aims at analysing the movemnt of Brazilian Catholicism, especially its fight for those rights. Various aspects play a part in and influence the political and religious context of that period. A wide range of documents was used for reconstructing the meaning of that movement. Despite hindrances and constraints, Catholicism made its way and pointed out an important step in the historical development of the period. This paper aims at understanding and analysing that way. Key words: Catholicism; Social and human rights. (shrink)

What is the relation between virtue and wellbeing? Our claim is that, under certain conditions, virtue necessarily tends to have a positive impact on an individual’s wellbeing. This is so because of the connection between virtue and psychological happiness, on the one hand, and between psychological happiness and wellbeing, on the other hand. In particular we defend three claims: that virtue is constituted by a disposition to experience fitting emotions, that fitting emotions are constituents of fitting happiness, and that fitting (...) happiness is a constituent of wellbeing. What follows is that, under certain conditions, virtue disposes the individual to experience wellbeing-constituting states. We end with a discussion of two objections that may be raised against our proposal. (shrink)