O presente texto versa e discute a tese há muito defendida nas ciências sociais de que haveria um predileção dos pentecostais pelos pobres. Em outro tempo, houve mesmo e fez parte de seu processo constituinte enquanto uma religião recente que precisava encontrar espaço para se expandir nos grandes centros urbanos. Contudo, com o passar dos anos essa predileção foi mudando e o pentecostalismo adentrou no interior de outros estratos sociais de renda ganhando espaço e força. O cuidado com os mais (...) pobres, daqueles que percebem rendimentos inferiores a 1 salário mínimo, não foi deixado de lado, e ganhou espaço em seus templos o atendimento à indivíduos que situam-se nos estratos de renda que vão de 1 a 2 salários mínimos, além de outros, mais abastados. A Igreja Católica, por sua fez, ao mesmo tempo em que via seus fiéis saindo pela porta de suas Igrejas investiu nesse segmento, os pobres, e tomou para si o lido para com estes. Dez anos se passaram deste o Censo de 2000 e, hoje, olhando para os dados da contagem censitária de 2011, torna-se praticamente impossível diferenciar, no que se refere a sua distribuição nos diferentes estratos de renda, católicos e pentecostais. Palavras-chave : Censo 2010. Religião. Renda. Pentecostalismo. Catolicismo.This article examines and discusses the preference of Pentecostals for individuals of low income. The author affirms that such preference was true some time ago, but it has changed nowadays. Some years ago this new religion needed to find its space in large urban centers. However, through the years, their predilection for people with low income started changing and as the Pentecostalism got space and strength it started to move to others incomes population, mainly to the higher ones. Though, the assistance to that population whose incomes range below 12 minimum salaries per year wasn’t left aside, their assistance gained spaces in the temples. Not only low income got assistance but it was also provided to the ones who receive incomes around 12 to 24 minimum salaries per year. The Catholic Church, for its part, as it saw its faithful leaving the churches, it started to invest in the poor segment of society, by given them spiritual assistance. After ten years of the last census in 2000, looking at the new data released in 2011, it becomes quite impossible to make a difference in the distribution of Catholics and Pentecostals in different income strata. Keywords: Census 2010. Religion. Income. Pentecostalism. Catholicism. (shrink)

The paper introduces Vailati’s life and works, investigating Vailati’s education, the relation to Peano and his school, and the interest for pragmatism and modernism. A detailed analysis of Vailati’s scientific and didactic activities, shows that he held, like Peano, a a strong interest for the history of science and a pluralist, anti-dogmatic and anti-foundationalist conception of definitions in mathematics, logic and philosophy of language. Vailati’s understanding of mathematical logic as a form of pragmatism is not a faithful interpretation of Peano’s (...) conception, but it is essential to understand the relations of Peano’s logic with other philosophical traditions and some epistemological aspects of Peano’s perspective, such as the search for a universal language. (shrink)

In this paper two new combinatorial principles in nonstandard analysis are isolated and applications are given. The second principle provides an equivalent formulation of Henson's isomorphism property.

We introduceself-divisibleultrafilters, which we prove to be precisely those$w$such that the weak congruence relation$\equiv _w$introduced by Šobot is an equivalence relation on$\beta {\mathbb Z}$. We provide several examples and additional characterisations; notably we show that$w$is self-divisible if and only if$\equiv _w$coincides with the strong congruence relation$\mathrel {\equiv ^{\mathrm {s}}_{w}}$, if and only if the quotient$(\beta {\mathbb Z},\oplus )/\mathord {\mathrel {\equiv ^{\mathrm {s}}_{w}}}$is a profinite group. We also construct an ultrafilter$w$such that$\equiv _w$fails to be symmetric, and describe the interaction between the (...) aforementioned quotient and the profinite completion$\hat {{\mathbb Z}}$of the integers. (shrink)

This paper is chiefly aimed at individuating some deep, but as yet almost unnoticed, similarities between Aristotle's syllogistic and the Stoic doctrine of conditionals, notably between Aristotle's metasyllogistic equimodality condition and truth-conditions for third type conditionals. In fact, as is shown in §1, Aristotle's condition amounts to introducing in his metasyllogistic a non-truthfunctional implicational arrow '', the truth-conditions of which turn out to be logically equivalent to truth-conditions of third type conditionals, according to which only the impossible follows from the (...) impossible. Moreover, Aristotle is given precisely this non-Scotian conditional logic in two so far overlooked passages of Themistius' Paraphrasis of De Caelo. Some further consequences of Aristotle's equimodality condition on his logic, and notably on his syllogistic, are pointed out and discussed at length. A extension of Aristotle's condition is also discussed, along with a full characterization of truth-conditions of fourth type conditionals. (shrink)

We study combinatorial principles related to the isomorphism property and the special model axiom in nonstandard analysis.

A definition of nonstandard universe which gets over the limitation to the finite levels of the cumulative hierarchy is proposed. Though necessarily nonwellfounded, nonstandard universes are arranged in strata in the likeness of superstructures and allow a rank function taking linearly ordered values. Nonstandard universes are also constructed which model the whole ZFC theory without regularity and satisfy the $\kappa$-saturation property.

El uso descriptivo que exhibe la categoría de “normalidad filosófica” en el discurso de Francisco Romero sintetiza las representaciones y expectativas que el campo filosófico argentino tenía del desarrollo de la disciplina en el medio local, mostrándose como un índice de su propia experiencia histórica en tanto colectivo social. Las tensiones de esa experiencia se expresan en una paradoja inscripta dentro de la categoría, según la cual la situación presente de la filosofía en Iberoamérica se concibe a la vez como (...) una continuidad y como una novedad respecto del pasado filosófico. Esa paradoja acaba revelándose como un síntoma de las operaciones retóricas que están a la base del uso descriptivo de la categoría, y que apuntan a la fijación de una nueva identidad en la trama social del lenguaje, tal que aquel colectivo gane simbólicamente vida propia, legitimidad al interior de la cultura local y reconocimiento por parte del resto de las esferas sociales. Francisco Romero’s descriptive use of the term “philosophical normality” synthesizes the representations and hopes that the Argentinean philosophical field had regarding its own development in the local arena. So this term is an expression of the historical experience of this academic community, and shows the paradoxical tensions between continuity and change regarding the philosophical past. This paradox was a symptom of the rhetorical operations which underlay the descriptive use of “philosophical normality” and tried to establish a new identity in the social language. Consequently that field could symbolically obtain its vital strength, legitimacy in the local culture and the recognition from the other social spheres. (shrink)

The metaphor of culture as a space or environment of meaning is widely employed. Going beyond metaphor, we present a model of culture as a 3-dimensional Euclidean space, using data from Brazil on cultural models of life goals. The dimensions of this space are defined by degree of sharing of culture (cultural competence); alternate configurations of that shared meaning (residual agreement); and social practice (cultural consonance). A cultural distance metric calculated within those dimensions identifies an individuals’ proximity to prototypical goals; (...) greater distance from these goals is associated with higher psychological distress. Cultural distance is in turn influenced by one’s sense of personal agency. Finally, in a set of open-ended interviews, the more individuals employ spatial metaphors in talking about culturally defined life goals, the higher their sense of personal agency and cultural consonance. This model moves the discussion of culture as a space of meaning from metaphor to measurement. (shrink)

In this article, I focus on the reading of Heidegger's Kant that Derrida offers in his recently published 1978-9 seminar Donner le temps II (§§12–3). Here Derrida tracks across Heidegger's text the auto-affective or auto-dative structure (namely, the originary synthesis of spontaneity and receptivity) in which the Kantian conceptions of the experience of time and of transcendental imagination converge, and which is seen as scandalously underpinning the conception of respect. In particular, I draw attention to the moment in which Derrida (...) originally accounts for the structure of the Kantian respect as the movement of abandonment or delivery over to the event which he also ascribes to other figures of freedom (or unconditionality without sovereignty) explored in his later writings. My hypothesis is that, in doing so, Derrida may be building a bridge between two thoughts of imagination: on the one hand, imagination as a figure of his early differance, and, on the other hand, imagination as the non-sovereign freedom that undergirds his late work on sovereignty. (shrink)

The present text reviews the treatment of psychologism after the ‘Logical Investigations’. Its aim is to fill a gap in the Husserl an research about this topic, which focusing on the above-mentioned work, provides a homogenous treatment of the later position without considering the possibility of evolution. A primary result of our investigatión is the distinction of six stages in the above-mentioned development. These are established in correlation to the development in connected themes such as the theory of psychology, of (...) the reduction and of the self-constitution of subjectivity. In this context, the Husserlian around 1927 concerning the idea of an final understanding and final overcoming of the transcendental psychologism stands out, as does the later identification in ‘Crisis’ between transcendental phenomenology and psychology. Such identification revises the presupposition present :from 1906 onwards that· included in the context of a regional ontology, which puts aside the idea, decisive in 1927 of a ‘refined’ transcendental psychologism made possible by the development of this psychology. (shrink)

A filosofia alemã do século XIX posterior a Hegel está bastante estudada em três direções. A primeira, que surge da luta entre hegelianos de esquerda e direita, acaba por conduzir ao materialismo e ao marxismo; a segunda, que se expressa na vertente irracionalista e anti-sistemática, passa por Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard e Nietzsche; a terceira é constituída pelo neo-kantismo e suas derivações, cuja versão oficial teria suas raízes fincadas pelo famoso discurso inaugural de Zeller e pelo livro de Otto Liebmann, que deram (...) o impulso ao movimento “Zurück zu Kant”. Em tal visão de conjunto, o grande ausente é um movimento contínuo, ainda quando irregular e multifacetado, que terminará conduzindo à filosofia contemporânea. Este movimento tem em Trendelenburg uma figura chave. É com suas “Investigações Lógicas” que se inicia a reformulação das relações entre filosofia e ciência e, neste sentido, o verdadeiro retorno a Kant. O fato de sua obra principal ter exatamente o mesmo nome que a coleção de ensaios temáticos de Frege, a obra de ruptura de Husserl e as dissertações de doutorado de Cohen, Dilthey e Brentano significa algo mais que curiosas coincidências. “Zurück zu Kant” (Adolf Trendelenburg the overcoming of idealism and the roots of contemporary philosophy) Abstract Considering history of philosophy as a whole, the two main traditions of thought from the 20th century (analytic and phenomenological-hermeneutic) can be regarded as being variants of one same fundamental turn. This systematic relation is connected to a common historical root. To highlight it implies to review the ideas that are deeply in the basis of the historiography of the German thought in the 19th century. Beyond names, problems and theses that may appear to have at first sight no relationship whatsoever, we can notice a continuous unitary development that has not yet received all the attention it deserves. In this movement, Adolf Trendelenburg stands out, once the beginners of both the abovementioned traditions and of neokantianism (Frege, Brentano, Dilthey and Cohen) received a decisive impulse from his reflections. (shrink)

According to a popular strategy amongst economists and philosophers, in order to solve the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons, we have to look at how ordinary people make such comparisons in everyday life. The most recent attempt to develop this strategy has been put forward by Goldman in his “Simulation and Interpersonal Utility” (Ethics 4:709–726, 1995). Goldman claims, first, that ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons by simulation and, second, that simulation is reliable for making interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, I (...) focus on Goldman’s latter claim. After updating Goldman’s account of how ordinary people make interpersonal comparisons in the light of Goldman’s newest formulation of his simulation theory of mental ascription (Goldman, Simulating Minds. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006), I develop and assess Goldman’s arguments in favour of the reliability of simulation for interpersonal comparisons. I argue that, under certain conditions, there may be room for a scientifically acceptable solution to the problem of interpersonal utility comparisons. (shrink)

According to the orthodox view, it is impossible to know how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and whether they are interpersonally comparable at all. Against the orthodox view, Donald Davidson (1986, 2004) argues that the interpersonal comparability of preferences is a necessary condition for the correct interpretation of other people's behaviour. In this paper I claim that, as originally stated, Davidson's argument does not succeed because it is vulnerable to several objections, including Barry Stroud's (1968) objection against (...) all transcendental arguments of a 'strong' kind. However, I argue that Davidson's strategy can still achieve results of anti-sceptical significance. If we reformulate Davidson's argument as a 'modest' transcendental argument and if we embrace an 'internal' account of epistemic justification, it is in fact possible to have at least justified beliefs about how different people's preferences compare in terms of strength and about their interpersonal comparability. (shrink)

This paper argues that Deonna and Teroni's attitudinal theory of emotions faces two serious problems. The first is that their master argument fails to establish the central tenet of the theory, namely, that the formal objects of emotions do not feature in the content of emotions. The second is that the attitudinal theory itself is vulnerable to a dilemma. By pointing out these problems, our paper provides indirect support to the main competitor of the attitudinal theory, namely, the perceptual theory (...) of emotions. (shrink)

Mechanisms are a way of explaining how biological phenomena work rather than why single elements of biological systems are there. However, mechanisms are usually described as physiological entities, and little or no attention is paid to malfunction as an independent theoretical concept. On the other hand, malfunction is the main focus of interest of applied sciences such as medicine. In this paper I argue that malfunctions are parts of pathological mechanisms, which should be considered separate theoretical entities, conceptually having a (...) priority over physiological sequences. While pathological mechanisms can be described in terms of a Cummins-like mechanistic explanation, they show some unnoticed peculiarities when compared to physiological ones. Some features of pathological mechanisms are considered, such as outcome variability, ambivalence and dependence on a range. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to offer a new theory of moods, according to which moods are perceptual experiences that represent undetermined objects as possessing specific evaluative properties. I start by listing a series of features that moods are typically taken to possess and claim that a satisfactory theory of moods must be able either to explain why moods genuinely possess these features or to explain these appearances away in a non-ad hoc way. I show that my account provides (...) a plausible explanation of all the main features of moods. I conclude by addressing some objections against my account. (shrink)

These two volumes consist of a critical edition and English translation of the two earliest known Armenian sets of scholia on the Heavenly Hierarchy of Dionysius the Areopagite. Composed in the monastic schools of Erznka in the late thirteenth century, these scholia provide significant insight into how the Heavenly Hierarchy in particular, and Armenian translations of Greek texts in general, were understood by Armenian scholars in the Middle Ages. This editio princeps of the scholia represents a rare critical edition of (...) a native Armenian composition from the medieval period. In addition to the text and translation, these volumes include a textual commentary as well as a critical collation and English translation of a number of scholia from the Armenian version of the Greek scholia on the Heavenly Hierarchy. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that, in everyday life, we compare different people’s preferences with respect to content and strength. We typically make such comparisons with relatively little difficulty. Furthermore, we often do not find inter-personal comparisons of preferences more difficult than intra-personal comparisons, that is,comparisons involving our own preferences. This contrasts with the difficulties that comparing preferences across individuals pose at the theoretical level. Since preferences are typically represented numerically through a utility function, the problem is known as the problem (...) of interpersonal utility comparisons (IUCs for short). In this paper, I examine the most common solution to the problem of IUCs. According to it, we can assume that preferences are interpersonally comparable on pragmatic grounds (i.e. explanatory power, parsimony and simplicity) I argue that, contrary to our intuitions, the assumption of interpersonal comparability is not pragmatically advantageous. I conclude that this strategy to solve the problem of IUCs fails. (shrink)

Highlights Merleau-Ponty’s interest in film and connects it to his aesthetic theory.