The citation index of Thomas Kuhn’s work may strike any imagination. “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” is undoubtedly a twentieth-century record-breaker in the field of philosophy of science in terms of such a scientometric parameter. But such fame has been bitter in many ways and placed a heavy burden on the author. For several decades he has been the target of the harshest and most severe criticism. Often the concept of “normal science” and the “scientific revolution” as a “Gestalt switch” (...) was declared ridiculous and absurd. The paper analyses three lines of criticism of Kuhn’s concept: the first came from practicing scientists, the second from specialists in the philosophy of science, and the third from the field of social epistemology. Reproaches about the political bias of Kuhn’s concept were taken to extremes, since his views were widely popular. In our opinion, Kuhn should be called a victim of spontaneous hypercriticism. This circumstance did not allow him to improve the original model of scientific revolutions. In this respect, replacing the concept of “paradigm” with the concept of “disciplinary matrix” was a step backwards, not forwards. However, it is impossible to deny that in the field of the historiography of science, he acted as a real reformer. With the courage of Don Quixote, he defended the rights of historical reconstruction, the preservation of the historical past of science, which should not be completely assimilated within the framework of the modern system of knowledge. His motto was – “penetrate the minds of other people who lived in the past.” He boldly argued that in the process of historical development, science changes not only ideas about the object of knowledge, but also the reference of its ideas and concepts. Such a formulation of the question has not yet been fully reflected in modern epistemological concepts. (shrink)

This article, for which the focus is an intellectual autobiography, examines the development of worldview of a young person who graduated from the Moscow University Faculty of Philosophy in 1970. I...

Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason remains one of the most opaque of Kant's published writings. Though this opacity belongs, partly, to the text itself, a key claim of this article is that this opacity stems also from the narrow lenses through which his readers view this text. Often read as part of Kant's moral philosophy or his universal history, the literature has thus far neglected a different vantage point on the Religion, one that does not refute the utility (...) of these lenses but complements them. This paper places the Religion alongside parts of Kant's corpus that it is less typically paired with, namely his natural history writings—in particular, his writings on the concept of race and the development of the human races. I argue that by doing so, we can shed much light on Kant's infamous claim that there is a radical evil in the human species. More precisely, we will come to appreciate that this evil is not, as it is usually understood, a static property or fixed characteristic of human beings. Instead, radical evil concerns a dynamic, changing defect in human nature that increasingly threatens our aspirations to collective moral perfection. (shrink)

The goal of the following paper is to consider the development and viability of Korsgaard’s latest work, Self-Constitution. More specifically, I show that we should understand this book as a response to difficulties with both Korsgaard’s argument in 1996’s The Sources of Normativity and Korsgaard’s earlier attempts to explain what marks the difference between realist and constructivist approaches to ethical theory. I begin by focusing primarily on her essay “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy.” Here I consider exactly how (...) Korsgaard defines constructivism and what makes constructivism different from realist approaches to ethics. I then examine Korsgaard’s two most influential books – Sources and Self-Constitution – in light of this definition. Looking at Sources I argue that there is a serious problem with Korsgaard’s attempt to develop a constructivist moral theory; more specifically, I expose a tension in Korsgaard’s claim that ethical concepts both are rooted in a philosophy of action and exist only as the solution to a concrete practical problem. I then turn to Self-Constitution. I show that a different account of the distinction between realism and constructivism is proposed, one that not only seems designed to avoid the problems that plagued Sources but also forces Korsgaard to significantly revise and retreat from earlier attempt to distinguish constructivism from realism. Finally, I argue that obstacles remain for even this more moderate account. -/- . (shrink)

Many Kantians dismiss Kant’s claim that we have a duty to promote the highest good – an ideal world that combines complete virtue with complete happiness – as incompatible with the core of his moral philosophy. This dismissal, I argue, raises doubts about Kant’s ability to justify the moral law, yet it is a mistake. A duty to promote the highest good plays an important role in the justificatory strategy of the Critique of Practical Reason. Moreover, its analysis leads to (...) a new perspective on Kant’s conception of moral objectivity. (shrink)

For the past decade and a half, Aristotelians have tried to counter the following criticism articulated by John Doris: if we look at personality and social psychology research, we must conclude that we generally neither have, nor have the capacity to develop, character traits of the kind envisioned by Aristotle and his followers. Some defenses of Aristotelian virtue ethics proceed by trying to insulate it from this challenge, while others have tried to dissipate the force of Doris's critique by showing (...) how virtue ethics and recent findings in personality psychology share surprisingly extensive common ground. For example, in their 2009 books, Daniel Russell and Nancy Snow both argue that the empirical research regarding character complements - not undermines - virtue ethics. Specifically, each argues that the situationally sensitive Cognitive-Affective Personality System developed by Walter Mischel and Yuichi Shoda can be integrated into a virtue ethical moral philosophy and theory of character. In this paper, I raise several objections to their attempts to use the CAPS model to rehabilitate Aristotelian virtue ethics and argue that, as a result, this model has not been shown to have the promise Snow and Russell allege it has. (shrink)

Kant’s moral proof of the postulate of immortality in the Critique of Practical Reason is often dismissed as a failed argument that trades on illicit conceptual shifts. I argue that Kant’s argument is more interesting and less problematic than is usually thought. I first examine its role in the second Critique’s Dialectic. I then point out that the standard interpretation, according to which the argument presupposes God’s intuitive grasp of the moral equivalence between the disposition to pursue holiness and its (...) attainment, faces a number of philosophical and textual problems. I offer an alternative reading that avoids these problems. In particular, I stress the importance of Kant’s mathematized conception of the relationship between infinite progress towards an ideal goal and its attainment and argue that appealing to this conception allows Kant to meet a well-known criticism that his proof illegitimately substitutes the endless progress towards holiness for holiness itself. (shrink)

Two generalizations can be made regarding Kant’s account of imperatives of skill and prudence. First, Groundwork 4:412-420 remains the locus classicus for reconstructions of Kant’s view. Second, it is widely agreed that Kant’s treatment of these imperatives is confusing, incomplete, and lacking the requisite argumentation. I agree that Groundwork 4:412-420 lacks a clear and defensible account of imperatives of skill and prudence. But while many think this spells trouble for Kant’s theory of non-moral practical imperatives more generally, and that Kant (...) never really clarified his position, on this point I differ. Groundwork II is problematic, yet it’s not Kant’s final word on the non-moral imperatives of practical reason. In fact, there is substantial and broadly overlooked evidence that Kant later rejected much of the account he laid out in this text. This evidence is found primarily in the third Critique, and I explore this evidence and the virtues of Kant’s revised account. (shrink)

The article touches upon the problem of concept “Indian tradition of rationality”. The author recalls a genetic link of the concept with Western philosophy. She notices the complexity of its application to Indian material, gives some examples in which the use of Western concepts of “reason”, “methods of cognition”, etc., leads to a distortion of the text’s meaning, and when an application of the criteria of Western logic to analysis of Indian philosophical discourse gives the readers an impression of its (...) absurdity. However, according to the author’s mind, the difficulties with the applying of Western concepts are not the sufficient grounds to abandon them. This conclusion follows from the presence of comparative studies by researchers belonging to both traditions, who compare successfully Western and Indian kinds of logico-epistemological type of rationality. The difficulties just bring up the questions about new instrumental concepts and methods of comparative studies more adequate to Indian culture. There are two possible directions for the studies of Indian tradition of rationality in connection with the revision of contents of the concepts in Western post- modern philosophy. In the first of them the concept of rationality can not to be used at all, then the phenomenology of practices of Indian discourse becomes the subject of research, i.e. the discourse images in different contexts, its explicit and implicit foundations and aims, which aren’t coincide with Western ones. In the second case Indian rationality can be analyzed in accordance with the criteria of transversal reason and transversal rationality. (shrink)

Kant’s account of moral feeling is continually disputed in the secondary literature. My goal is to focus on the Religion and make sense of moral feeling as it appears in this context. I argue that we can best understand moral feeling if we note its place in Kant’s concerns about the possibility of moral conversion. As Kant notes, if the new, morally upright man is of a different character than the man he used to be, then it remains unclear how (...) the new man can properly bear the debts of his old self. To address this issue, we need the presupposition that a person is both continually conscious of her empirical, bodily identity and capable of experiencing a felt recognition of the moral law; without this presupposition, I argue that fair punishment and the just payment of evil debts is impossible. (shrink)

Laura Papish’s Kant on Evil, Self-Deception, and Moral Reform is an ambitious attempt to breath new life into old debates and a welcome contribution to a recent renaissance of interest in Kant’s theory of evil. ​The book has eight chapters, and these chapters fall into three main divisions. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the psychology of nonmoral and immoral action. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 focus on self-deception, evil, and dissimulation. And chapters 6, 7, and 8 focus on (...) self-cognition, moral reform, and moral progress. I shall begin with a brief summary of these chapters. Then I shall turn to commentary. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant's _Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals_ is widely regarded as one of the most influential works in the history of moral philosophy. Indeed, any student of ethics will soon encounter a translation of the book, although trying to read it is likely to cause bewilderment. What, one may ask, is Kant trying to say? This book provides the answers. Here, seven highly regarded teachers and scholars of Kant's ethics offer remarkably clear explanations of the most important concepts in (...) the _Groundwork_: the good will, happiness, duty, hypothetical and categorical imperatives, the Formula of Universal Law, the Formula of Humanity, and freedom._ Contents:_ Preface _The Good Will_, Nataliya Palatnik _Happiness_, Anne Margaret Baxley _Duty_, Laura Papish _Imperatives_, Tamar Schapiro _The Formula of Universal Law_, Kyla Ebels-Duggan _The Formula of Humanity_, Japa Pallikkathayil _Freedom_, Lucy Allais About the Contributors Index. (shrink)

Gömülü Teori, sosyal bilimler alanında yapılan çalışmalarda teorik olarak toplanan verilerin analiz edilmesi yöntemiyle sistematik boyut kazanan bir metodolojidir. Bu metodolojik yaklaşımda, sonuca ulaşma biçimi olarak tümdengelim modelinin yerine, tümevarımsal akıl yürütme modeli kullanılır. Gömülü Teori ile yapılan çalışmalar ağırlıklı olarak bir soru ile, hatta bazen yalnızca nitel verilerin toplanmasıyla başlamaktadır. Araştırmacılar toplanan verileri analiz ederken, tekrar eden düşünce, kavram veya öğeleri belirtir ve bu unsurlar verilerden elde edilen kodlarla etiketlenir. Daha fazla veri elde edilip çalışma tekrar kontrol edildikçe kodlar; (...) kavram ve daha sonra kategorilere ayrılabilir. Böylece yeni bir teorinin temelleri atılmış olur. Bu nedenle, Gömülü Teori, araştırmacının mevcut bir teorik çerçeveyi seçtiği ve ancak o zaman teorinin incelenen fenomene nasıl uygulandığını veya uygulanmadığını göstermek için veri topladığı geleneksel araştırma modelinden oldukça farklıdır. Yani yapılan çalışmalarda elde edilen sonucu mevcut teoriler açıklayamadığı veya açıklamada yetersiz kaldığı durumlarda Gömülü Teori ile yeni bir teori elde edilmiş olmaktadır. Bu anlamda Gömülü Teori bir teori olmaktan çok yeni bir teorinin çıkışına zemin hazırlayan metodolojik bir yöntem olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Bu çalışmada Gömülü Teori’nin metodolojik boyutu bilgiye nasıl ulaşabileceğine ilişkin; “Araştırmanın amacı nedir?/ Araştırma yöntemi nasıl olmalıdır?/ Araştırmacının rolü nedir - ne olmalıdır? Değerlerin rolü nedir?/ Araştırma raporunun dili nasıl olmalıdır?” sorularına verilecek cevaplar üzerinden ele alınacaktır. Ayrıca Gömülü Teori’nin tarihçesi ve uygulama biçimi gözden geçirilerek bu teorinin Din Sosyolojisi çalışmalarına ne şekilde taşınıp taşınamayacağı tartışılacaktır. (shrink)

Scientists often diverge widely when choosing between research programs. This can seem to be rooted in disagreements about which of several theories, competing to address shared questions or phenomena, is currently the most epistemically or explanatorily valuable—i.e. most successful. But many such cases are actually more directly rooted in differing judgments of pursuit-worthiness, concerning which theory will be best down the line, or which addresses the most significant data or questions. Using case studies from 16th-century astronomy and 20th-century geology and (...) biology, I argue that divergent theory choice is thus often driven by considerations of scientific process, even where direct epistemic or explanatory evaluation of its final products appears more relevant. Broadly following Kuhn’s analysis of theoretical virtues, I suggest that widely shared criteria for pursuit-worthiness function as imprecise, mutually-conflicting values. However, even Kuhn and others sensitive to pragmatic dimensions of theory ‘acceptance’, including the virtue of fruitfulness, still commonly understate the role of pursuit-worthiness—especially by exaggerating the impact of more present-oriented virtues, or failing to stress how ‘competing’ theories excel at addressing different questions or data. This framework clarifies the nature of the choice and competition involved in theory choice, and the role of alternative theoretical virtues. (shrink)

من نعم الله على عباده أنه شرع لهم ما يصلحهم وحرم عليهم ما يفسدهم؛ فجعل رضاه حيث منفعتهم، وجعل سخطه حيث مضرتهم؛ ومن هنا لا يخفى على عاقل لِمَ حرم الله الغرور وجعله من الحوائل دون دخول الجنة -كما أخبر بذلك المعصوم صلى الله عليه وسلم- وما كان لامرئ أن يدخل الغرور قلبه إذ الملك كله لله والعباد مستخلفون في الأرض يعمرونها لا ليتفاخروا ولا ليتكبروا وإنما لتعلو كلمة الله -تعالى- التي تقضي بالحق لكل العباد. في هذا الكتاب إطلالة على (...) الذنب الأول )الغرور( الذي من أجله تكبر إبليس عَلى السجود لآدم فاستحق لعنة الله -عز وجل- عبرة لمن أراد السلامة من هذه الآفة الكبرى، فيعرض الكتاب في فصوله الثلاثة: مفهوم الغرور وماهيته التي يخلط كثير من الناس بينها وبين الثقة بالنفس والإخبار بالواقع. ثم يطوف في نماذج من الرسل الكرام الذين لم يقعوا في هذه الآفة مع أنهم لهم كل كمال بشري. ثم يسرد الكتاب عواقب الغرور ومآله ليتبين الخيط الأبيض من الخيط الأسود، ويظهر الصبح لذي عينين. (shrink)

The Muhaddis have demonstrated their efforts for the identification and preservation of ḥadīths by compiling various types of works such as musnad, mucem, sunen, musannef, cami‘.‎ On the ṣaḥīḥs and Sunens in the golden age of classification, especially the works of Abū ʿAbdallāh Muḥammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī (d. 256/870) and Ebu'l-Hüseyn Müslim b. al-Ḥad̲j̲d̲j̲ād̲j̲ (d. 261/875) some studies have been done.‎ Mustedrek, Mustakhraj, zawâid, aggregation, summary and commentary are studies on the main ḥadīth sources. From the third century on, in (...) ḥadīth studies, it is seen that the works of the ḥadīths, which the ḥadīths gave importance to, have been dealt with depending on the subject of the authentic ḥadīth and some of their benefits have been explained. Based on the definitions in the method works, istihraj is the determination of the tariks of the narrations in a ḥadīth book by another scholar. The ‎tariq and the ‎producer he reached are sometimes combined with the sheikh of the author of the work, or with a sheikh who is higher up, sometimes even with a companion. In these works, expressions such as al-Muharrec, al-Musnad, es-Ṣaḥīḥ, ‎es-Ṣaḥīḥu'l-Muharrec, al-Müsnedü's-ṣaḥīḥ and al-Müsnedü'l-Mustakhraj are sometimes used instead of the concept of mustahrec. The words "Mustakhrajat has a great value in the eyes of the people of ḥadīth" reveal its value in the eyes of ḥadīth scholars. Scholars valued the genre of mustahraj, which is thought to have contributed significantly to the science of ḥadīth, and they intensified their studies on Bukhari and Muslim, who are considered the basis of ḥadīth science (umdetu'l-ilm). According to the Muhaddis, in order to be able to pass judgment on any narration, it is necessary to have knowledge about the narration and its narrators. Considering the contributions it has made to the ʿulūm al-ḥadīth, to convey more than one narration on the same subject is an important issue. Because, in cases such as its determination, interpretation and preference, determining that the ḥadīth comes from different tariqs (chain) is accepted as a fact that strengthens the narration. The primary goal of the works of the mustahrec type is to obtain the ālī isnād, but it is seen that the copyrighted works contain a significant amount of ‎abuses to the original text as well as to the individual texts. Considering that excess affect the ruling, it is considered important to focus on the mustakhraj type works, which contain different tariks, in terms of the discovery of the meaning and its contribution to the change of the ruling. In this study, an evaluation has been made about the nature of the mustakhraj, its benefits, the value of the mustakhraj as a species, their contribution to the ʿulūm al-ḥadīth in terms of promissory sanad and texts, and what they contain. In the research, the comparison of the narrations selected from the works of the mustakhraj type with the originals and whether the narrations in these works were used in the annotations were investigated. In the study, besides the ḥadīth method works, especially in determining the examples, due to the fact that it is one of the early period works and its reputation, Abū ‘Awāna Ya'kup al-Isferâyînî's ‎‎(d. 316/929) “Musned ṣaḥīḥu'l-muharrec 'ala kitâbi Müslim” In the context of his work named, the concept of mustakhraj has been emphasized. As a result of the research, it can be said that being knowledgeable about the tariqs of the ḥadīths made important contributions to the sanad and text, and that the ḥadīthists referred to the tariqs in the aforementioned literature in the interpretation of the ḥadīth. In summary, in the context of narration and wisdom sciences such as gharib al-hadīth, ıkhtilaf al-hadīth, mushkil al-ḥadīth, ʿIlal al-ḥadīth, nâsiḫu’l-ḥadīth ve mensûḫuh, fiqh al-ḥadīth, it is seen that it makes significant contributions the determination and evaluation of the ḥadīth. Each item mentioned about the benefits of the works in question has a comprehensive study and research field in the science of ḥadīth. It can be said that the methods used/offered in the current researches in which studies on the holistic approach style are carried out are applied by the hadith scholars in the tradition of ḥadīth science (partly in the differences of isnad and commentaries). It is possible to say that the ḥadīthists refer to the tariks in the aforementioned literature in the interpretation of the ḥadīth. As a result of the research, it is understood that the narrations in the mustakhraj support the originals in terms of wording and meaning. In addition to the aim of increasing the prestige of the original, the differences in the isnad and texts show the necessity of evaluating the narrations independently of the original. This study on the mustakhraj shows that extensive research can be done on the place of the related literature in the ʿulūm al-ḥadīth. (shrink)

Introduction. A radical tendency in modern approaches to understanding the mechanisms of the brain is the tendency of some scientists to believe that the brain is a receptor capable of capturing thoughts; the nature of the occurrence of the thoughts themselves, however, is not to be clarified. However, speech expressing thoughts is undoubtedly the result of the work of the brain, so studies of the frequency structure of speech can be the basis for considering the material structure of the brain (...) as a kind of “antenna”. In this approach, the problem of noise protection against the background of the undeniable frequency similarity of speech and music appears to us from somewhat different positions. This study raises the question of how essential the overall height of the musical system is to the perception of music (are there musical systems that are harmful or useful, in terms of their effects on the psyche). This question is also relevant to speech perception.Methodology and sources. The main sources in which the work of the brain and the essence of consciousness are considered from the positions indicated above were for us the work of American and British neurophysiologists and psychiatrists (Sam Parnia, Peter Fenwick). These scientists are studying the phenomena that accompany clinical death, and argue that at these moments the brain functions to the greatest extent as a receiving “antenna”. Assuming that any antenna is to be tuned, we are trying to identify possible ways to “tune” the brain. To do this, we propose to study the frequency characteristics of speech (in the simplest case, when singing vowels in a calm state) for their belonging to a particular musical system, as well as the peculiarities of music perception depending on the musical system (on the height of the note “la”). Varying the frequency characteristics of speech in a particular musical system can be considered, in our opinion, the main way to “tune” the brain. The methodology of the method is based on the use of frequency analysis of sound and the basic provisions of the elementary theory of music.Results and discussion. The main conclusion made by Western psychiatrists is the brain is not an organ of thought, consciousness exists independently from outside, the work of consciousness cannot be explained by the functioning of the brain – it requires a hardware check. If the neural network is an “antenna” that captures thoughts, and its “adjustment” at the physical level can be carried out (and is carried out) through sensory systems (including the hearing organ), the study of the frequency structure of speech will answer a number of important questions, including including related and higher brain functions (insight, creativity). Our experiments (Saint Petersburg Electrotechnical University, FIBS, department of EUT) showed that the influence of the “increased” or “lowered” musical-speech system on brain activity is insignificant. The study revealed the equiprobability of the frequency structure of speech. Since our brain lacks some characteristic set of frequencies – elements of a uniformly temperamental system, it is not necessary to talk about the harmful (or any other noise) effect of the “raised” and “lowered” systems due to deviation from the “internal standard”.Conclusion. In response to the assumptions made by Western experts, we proposed a frequency interpretation of the processes occurring in the brain, which, perhaps, will explain in more detail such phenomena as inspiration, discovery, etc., which occur with minimal activity of consciousness. Despite the limited methods of hardware study of factors that influence the activity of the brain and largely determine its higher functions (for example, creativity), the results of the brain's work in relation to music (both in terms of its creation and in terms of our reaction to it) are quite analyzable, which was shown in this study. The “musicality” of speech is extremely vividly represented in its frequency structure and allows one to reveal, to one degree or another, the features of the brain. (shrink)

Commentary on Nūr al-Tahz̲īb, textbook taught in Maddrassa (religious schools) in Pakistan by religious scholar from Peshawar, Pakistan.

In this article, I examine the conceptual and methodological points of convergence and divergence of two intellectual currents frequently referred to as the decolonial and ontological turns in social and anthropological theory. Salient points considered are the ways both theoretical projects unsettle modernity’s dominant ontological and epistemological foundations by seriously engaging the conceptual potential of thinking with alterity (ethical dimension) and from exteriority (geopolitical dimension). I compare their subversive methodological contributions, examining, in particular, Enrique Dussel’s analectical hermeneutic approach and Eduardo (...) Viveiros de Castro’s ethnographic method of controlled equivocation. Lastly, I discuss how both theories and approaches complement each other’s efforts to destabilize Western modernity’s philosophical and anthropological foundations. (shrink)

Some argue that time’s causal arrow is grounded in an underlying thermodynamic asymmetry. Often, this is tied to Humean skepticism that causes produce their effects, in any robust sense of ‘produce’. Conversely, those who advocate stronger notions of natural necessity often reject thermodynamic reductions of time’s causal arrow. Against these traditional pairings, I argue that ‘reduction-plus-production’ is coherent. Reductionists looking to invoke robust production can insist that there are metaphysical constraints on the signs of objects’ velocities in any state, given (...) other—including far later—states’ properties. The Past Hypothesis may thus be a metaphysical condition, not a physical law. (shrink)

Nietzsche values intellectual honesty, but is dubious about what he calls the will to truth. This is puzzling since intellectual honesty is a component of the will to truth. In this paper, I show that this puzzle tells us something important about how Nietzsche conceives of our pursuit of truth. For Nietzsche, those who pursue truth occupy unstable ground, since being honest about the ultimate reasons for that pursuit would mean that truth could no longer satisfy the important human needs (...) it satisfies at present. We can pursue truth, or be honest about what in us is served by such a pursuit, but not both. Nietzsche aims to show that understanding and owning up to this instability is the sort of affirmation of human life to which we ought to aspire, and is the price we pay for being free from otherworldly morality. (shrink)