In this comment, I indicate several challenges and opportunities—out of the many—for an integrated science–humanities approach to emotions, from the perspective of a historian of the modern science...

This reflection attends to Paul White's call in his introduction to this Focus section for a history of science that is informed by the history of emotions. It offers a succinct historical exemplification of the possibilities of studying the history of science in terms of the history of emotions. It draws on Raymond Williams's concept of “structure of feeling” in arguing for the emergence of an adrenaline structure of feeling during the early twentieth century. It provides a mosaic of different (...) views of the immanence of the adrenaline structure of feeling in diverse scientific realms by broaching some of the major themes that appear in the individual essays in this Focus section. -/- . (shrink)

In this contribution, I examine several key publications on the physiology of emotions from the 1860s to the 1930s. I focus on physiologists who studied the emotions prior to and following William James’s 1884 Mind article, by critically reflecting on the conceptual and practical origins and constituents of the Cannon–Bard thalamic theory of emotions. I offer a historical corrective to several major assumptions in our histories of the scientific study of emotions.

In this contribution, I interrogate the historical-intellectual narrative that dominates the history of the Schachter–Singer two-factor theory of emotion. In the first part, I propose that a social influence model became generalized to a cognitive view. I argue that Schachter and Singer presented a cognitive theory of emotions in enacting inside the laboratory Schachter’s preceding “social influence” model of emotions and that Schachter’s adoption of a cognitive model of emotion was driven by and was necessary for his previous research on (...) social influence. In the second part, I argue that the Schachter–Singer theory is remarkable not because it introduced a cognitive turn in emotion, but because it presented sympathetic nervous system activation as an essential constitutive element of every emotion. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that the integration of the humanities into “medical humanities” has implicitly medicalized the humanities. This medicalization of the humanities suppresses those dimensions of the humanities that can most significantly contribute to medicine. I present my argument by studying the critical and crucial gap between the humanities as they are presented and taught in the context of medical schools, often as a set of skills, sensitivities, and competencies, and the humanities as they are experienced and lived (...) in the humanities—as an ideological-ethical calling, which saturates and infuses daily life with an ethicizing, politicizing, and ideological critique. It is this core essence of the humanities that is abrogated and annulled in medical humanities. After presenting my argument, I exemplify some of the ways in which my colleagues and I attempt to imbue medical students with the critical and ethicizing outlook and calling of the humanities. (shrink)

In this reply, I focus on the question of whether Cannon’s theory was a “centralized” version of James’s. Due to space limitations, I briefly present six observations that problematize this assertion. One of my guiding principles is that theories acquire their meaning within a particular context. From this historical perspective, and in their historical contexts, the theories were quite distinct.

In this essay, I examine the genealogy of the numeral transformation of emotions from its earliest beginnings in the late nineteenth century. My main thesis is that the historical encounter between emotion and number should not be viewed solely as a particular instantiation of more general trends in the development of objectifying, quantifying, or trust-building technologies. Rather, emotion-as-number provided an alternative medium for the circulation and expression of emotions in a culture that emphasized restraint. It also empowered the experimenter to (...) produce forbidden emotions inside the modern laboratory; it participated in the construction of a uniquely scientific - in contradistinction to a poetic or feminized - emotion; and it attenuated the tensions that arose when "sublime" emotion was animalized in a Darwinian universe. In making this argument, I wish, among other things, to challenge recent claims concerning the repression of emotion in modern public culture. Emotion, I argue, was not restraint in post-Victorian culture, but rather communicated through a new medium - the number. (shrink)

Dichotomizing perceptions, by those that have an objective reality and those that do not, is rejected. Perceptions are suggested to fall along a multidimensional continuum in which neither end is totally “pure.” At the extreme ends, perceptions neither have an objective reality without some subjectivity, nor, at the other end, even as hallucinations, are they totally dissociated from reality.

Decision making theory in general, and mental models in particular, associate judgment and choice. Decision choice follows probability estimates and errors in choice derive mainly from errors in judgment. In the studies reported here we use the Monty Hall dilemma to illustrate that judgment and choice do not always go together, and that such a dissociation can lead to better decision-making. Specifically, we demonstrate that in certain decision problems, exceeding working memory limitations can actually improve decision choice. We show across (...) four experiments that increasing the number of choice alternatives forces people to collapse choices together, resulting in better decision-making. While choice performance improves, probability judgments do not change, thus demonstrating an important dissociation between choice and probability judgments. We propose the Collapsing Choice Theory (CCT) which explains how working memory capacity, probability estimation, choice alternatives, judgment, and regret all interact and effect decision quality. (shrink)

Based upon the Decision Field Theory (Busemeyer and Townsend 1993), we tested a model of dynamic reasoning to predict the effect of time pressure on analytical and experiential processing during decision-making. Forty-six participants were required to make investment decisions under four levels of time pressure. In each decision, participants were presented with experiential cues which were either congruent or incongruent with the analytical information. The congruent/incongruent conditions allowed us to examine how many decisions were based upon the experiential versus the (...) analytical information, and to see if this was affected by the varying degrees of time pressure. As expected, the overall accuracy was reduced with greater time pressure and accuracy was higher when the experiential and analytical cues were congruent than when they were incongruent. Of great interest was the data showing that under high time pressure participants used more experiential cues than at other time pressures. We suggest that the dynamic reasoning paradigm has some future potential for predicting the effects of experiential biases in general, and specifically under time pressure. (shrink)

The increasing frequency and scope of financial crises has made global financial stability one of the major concerns of economic policy and decision makers. Under this highly complex environment, supervision of the financial system has to be thought of as a systemic task, focusing not only on the strength of the institutions but also on the interdependent relations among them, unraveling the structure and dynamic of the system as a whole. In recent years, network science has emerged as a leading (...) tool for the investigation of complex systems. Here we review several applications of network science in finance and economics, and discuss existing challenges and future directions which will substantiate network science as a key tool for financial academics, practitioners, and policy and decision makers. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization is a revision of his early hedonism presented in his early papers from the 1930’s, a revision necessitated by the challenge Freud’s psychoanalysis posited to the possibility of hedonism. In the first section of the paper, I present Marcuse’s critical hedonist position, mainly in “On Hedonism” (1938), where he develops a social and objective hedonism that should be set as a main political goal of a society. Accordingly, the key to (...) a transformation of society is located at the social-political level. However, Freud’s metapsychology shows that the barriers that prevent a transformation of society are located at a much deeper level and are found in the relation between the psychological structure of individuals and social pressure, between the dynamics of the instincts and society’s material welfare. Thus, the possibility of a society that asserts happiness as its principle depends on the possibility of a transformation of human metapsychology and its social manifestation. This challenge, and the manner in which Marcuse dealt with it is the subject of the second section in which I analyze Eros and Civilization as Marcuse’s rethinking of his hedonism in light of Freud. (shrink)

Do the oppressed have an epistemic advantage when it comes to knowing about the systems that oppress them? If so, what explains this advantage? In this paper, I consider whether an epistemic advantage can be derived from the oppressed's contingent tendency to have more relevant experiences and motivation than the non‐oppressed; or, alternatively, whether an advantage derives from the oppressed's very lived experience, thus being in principle unavailable to the non‐oppressed. I then explore the potential role of knowledge‐how for explaining (...) an epistemic advantage. Ultimately, I conclude that the oppressed tend to have a contingent advantage, while rejecting that they have one in principle, except for when their phenomenological experience has an effect on the veracity of the claims they make. This has the important upshot that privileged people are not epistemically disadvantaged in principle and are thus often blameworthy for their ignorance about oppression. (shrink)

Clinical psychologists' and nonpsychiatric physicians' attitudes and behaviors in sexual and confidentiality boundary violations were examined. The 171 participants' responses were analyzed by profession, sex, and status (student, resident, professional) on semantic differential, boundary violation vignettes, and a version of Pope, Tabachnick, and Keith-Spiegel's (1987) ethical scale. Psychologists rated sexual boundary violation as more unethical than did physicians (p<.001). Rationale (p<.01) and timing (p<.001) influenced ratings. Psychologists reported fewer sexualized behaviors than physicians (p<05). Professional experience (p<.01) and sex (p<.05) were (...) associated with confidence-violating behavior. Overall, 78% of the sample reported attitudes or behaviors associated with boundary violations. The behavior violations were correlated (r=.49). Actual violators rated vignette violators more leniently than did nonviolators (p<.01). (shrink)

The Concept “hope,” (Greek), appears in two of Heraclitus’s fragments. This essay offers an attentive reading of these fragments and examines the role of hope in Heraclitus’s thinking. The essay is divided into two parts. The first part examines the meaning of the Greek notion for hope, (Greek), by looking into archaic and classical sources, particularly the myth about the origin of hope in Hesiod’s Works and Days. Based upon the renewed understanding of the concept, the second part of the (...) essay examines Heraclitus’s use of the concept of hope and demonstrates the central role of hope in Heraclitus’s thinking. (shrink)

In his Sefer ha-'Ikkarim [Book of Principles] R. Joseph Albo discusses Maimonides' proofs for the existence of God. The following paper offers an analysis of Albo's discussion of the proofs, advancing two theses: Albo's main argument in his central discussion is that proofs for the existence of God cannot be based on the theory of the eternity of the universe. This argument, however, is contradicted by his other remarks on the topic, which appear elsewhere in the Sefer ha-'Ikkarim . Albo's (...) discussion of this issue includes several expressions of independent and critical thought. (shrink)

The film The Survivalist portrays a dystopic world, wherein the most valuable asset is seeds. The 'seeds' metaphor applies both in the context of agriculture and in that of fecundity. The Survivalist's hostile hospitality toward a pair of nomads -- a mother and her daughter -- results in the pregnancy of the latter. In the last raid on his compound, the Survivalist allows the daughter to escape at the expense of his own life. This sacrifice manifests a severe critique against (...) the preference given today to the well-being of the individual at the expense of the survival of the species. (shrink)

In a quest after the essence of memory, a crucial distinction is made between the notions of memory and remembrance, following Plato’s distinction between mneme and hypomnesis. T...

Se sostiene en este ensayo que los efectos combinados de los cambios radicales que afectan la dirección de la historia comprometen nuestra habilidad de reconocer patrones vigentes tanto en el pasado como en el futuro, reduciendo con ello las posibilidades de previsión y llevándonos ante la posibilidad de lo inconcebible. Frente a ello el autor propone ayudarnos con la imaginación, y colocar la "inconcebibilidad" en el centro de las consideraciones futuras.

Studies in Abraham Joshua Heschel's Oeuvre.