This paper analyses the activities of five organizations shaping the debate over the global governance of genome editing in order to assess current approaches to public engagement (PE). We compare the recommendations of each group with its own practices. All recommend broad engagement with the general public, but their practices vary from expert-driven models dominated by scientists, experts, and civil society groups to citizen deliberation-driven models that feature bidirectional consultation with local citizens, as well as hybrid models that combine elements (...) of both approaches. Only one group practices PE that seeks community perspectives to advance equity. In most cases, PE does little more than record already well-known views held by the most vocal groups, and thus is unlikely to produce more just or equitable processes or policy outcomes. Our exploration of the strengths, weaknesses, and possibilities of current forms of PE suggests a need to rethink both “public” and “engagement.”. (shrink)

We review some of the major accounts in the current epistemology of modality and identify some shared issues that plague all of them. In order to provide insight into the nature of modal statements in science, philosophy, and beyond, a satisfactory epistemology of modality would need to be suitably applicable to practical and theoretical contexts by limited beings. However, many epistemologies of modality seem to work only when we have access to the kind of knowledge that is at least (...) currently beyond our reach. Or, in the extreme case, it is argued that even if we knew all the relevant information about the respective domain – or even the entire state of the world – there would still remain a special class of modal truths that would be left unaccounted for. Neither picture bodes well for practical applicability, nor for the philosophical justification of these epistemologies. This is especially the case as we hold that one of the main motivations for modal inquiry typically arises in cases of imperfect information and limited cognitive resources. We close by providing a partial remedy to the situation by suggesting an overall framework of relative modality (RM) that can be used to both unify some existing modal epistemologies and, at the same time, make them more metaphysically modest. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Decline of Literary CriticismRichard A. PosnerRónán McDonald, a lecturer in literature at the University of Reading, has written a short, engaging book the theme of which is evident from the title: The Death of the Critic. Although there is plenty of both academic and journalistic writing about literature, less and less is well described by the term "literary criticism." The literary critics of the first two-thirds or so (...) of the twentieth century, now dead, including poets and other creative writers, such as T. S. Eliot, journalists such as Edmund Wilson, and academic literary critics, as distinct from literary scholars, such as F. R. Leavis in England and Cleanth Brooks in the United States, have so few successors that the very genre, if not yet dead, is moribund.1 McDonald deplores the decline of literary criticism and seeks to explain its causes.In place of literary criticism, McDonald (and many others, such as John Ellis) argue, we have postmodern literary theory, an animal of quite a different color from literary criticism.2 "Texts... are interpreted and analysed with a view to unlocking the social norms and attitudes encoded therein, not assessed or evaluated as integral, self-contained creations" (McDonald, p. 21). "The 'best' [is regarded] as a politically dubious category, with selections made in its name often nurturing hidden and hierarchical agendas"(p. ix). "In a comparatively short time, [End Page 385] academic literary criticism has been transformed. Many [literary critics] now regard social activism as the major purpose of literary criticism." And "people who write about literature now write in a prose thick with impenetrable jargon," which erects a barrier between literary theory and literature.3 The well documented decline in the reading of literature has many causes but one may be the obscurantist and politicized style of teaching literature that is in vogue in many colleges.4But something deeper is involved. After all, most literary teachers are not postmodernists. What has happened is the professionalization, in not altogether a good sense, of literary studies. Let me illustrate. More than half a century ago, Cleanth Brooks published what became a famous book of literary criticism, consisting of close readings of famous poems.5 The New Critics were much taken with the metaphysical poets, the most prominent of whom was John Donne, and the high point of Brooks's book was his brilliant close reading of "Canonization," one of Donne's most famous love poems. Just this year (2008) a professor of literature named Ramie Targoff published John Donne, Soul and Body, which has an extensive treatment of Donne's love poetry, though it does not mention "Canonization." As far as I can judge, Targoff's book is a fine scholarly achievement—well written (and not defaced by jargon), thoroughly researched, thoughtful, imaginative. She argues that contrary to some scholars who have regarded Donne as a Neoplatonist who therefore believed that the highest love is purely spiritual (as it was for Plato), he was, throughout his career—even when he became a fiercely devout Anglican cleric writing fervid religious verse—a believer that body and soul were one in all activities, including sexual love; hence the religious imagery in "Canonization," emphasized by Cleanth Brooks, who would I think have found Targoff's analysis congenial. Her book is I would guess a model of modern literary scholarship.But here is the difference between Brooks's book, and specifically his discussion of Donne's poem, and Targoff's. Brooks, who though a distinguished Yale English professor did not have a Ph.D., wrote for a mixed audience—academics, students, the general reader—and he made the nonacademic members of that audience want to read Donne, or read more Donne, or re-read Donne with greater understanding and enjoyment. Targoff writes for other scholars of early modern English literature. Someone else who chances on the book (like me) may read it and think well of it, but unless one has esoteric religious or philosophical interests the experience of reading her book will not quicken one's [End Page 386] interest in reading Donne's poetry—which is a great shame, given the state of the literary culture... (shrink)

We prove a categoricity transfer theorem for tame abstract elementary classes. Theorem 0.1. Suppose that K is a χ-tame abstract elementary class and satisfies the amalgamation and joint embedding properties and has arbitrarily large models. Let λ ≥ Max{χ.LS(K)⁺}. If K is categorical in λ and λ⁺, then K is categorical in λ⁺⁺. Combining this theorem with some results from [37], we derive a form of Shelah's Categoricity Conjecture for tame abstract elementary classes: Corollary 0.2. Suppose K is a χ-tame (...) abstract elementary class satisfying the amalgamation and joint embedding properties. Let μ₀:= Hanf(K). If χ ≤ ‮ב‬(2μ0)+ and K is categorical in some λ⁺ > ‮ב‬(2μ0)+, then K is categorical in μ for all μ > ‮ב‬(2μ0)+. (shrink)

We prove the following main theorem: Let be an abstract elementary class satisfying the joint embedding and the amalgamation properties with no maximal models of cardinality μ. Let μ be a cardinal above the the Löwenheim‐Skolem number of the class. If is μ‐Galois‐stable, has no μ‐Vaughtian Pairs, does not have long splitting chains, and satisfies locality of splitting, then any two ‐limits over M, for, are isomorphic over M.

How do we assign values to virtual items, which include virtual objects, properties, events, subjects, worlds, environments, and experiences? In this article, I offer a framework for answering this question. After considering different value theses in the literature, I argue that whether we think these theses mutually exclusive or not turns on our view about the number of value-salient kinds virtual items belong to. Virtual monism is the view that virtual Xs belong to only one value-salient kind in relation to (...) X. Virtual pluralism is the view that they belong to more than one value-salient kind. I argue for two claims. First, virtual monism is mistaken. Minimally some virtual Xs are Xs, while others are not. Second, dualistic virtual pluralism is also mistaken because it is too coarse grained. Instead, I argue for fourfold pluralism: virtual items either represent an original's properties or reproduce essential properties and do so to lesser or greater extents. This gives us four value-salient kinds of virtual X: virtual reproductions, simulations, representations, and simulacra of X. I apply this view to various debates in the literature and conclude with a discussion of less basic hybrid kinds. (shrink)

Luck (2009) argues that gamers face a dilemma when it comes to performing certain virtual acts. Most gamers regularly commit acts of virtual murder, and take these acts to be morally permissible. They are permissible because unlike real murder, no one is harmed in performing them; their only victims are computer-controlled characters, and such characters are not moral patients. What Luck points out is that this justification equally applies to virtual pedophelia, but gamers intuitively think that such acts are not (...) morally permissible. The result is a dilemma: either gamers must reject the intuition that virtual pedophelic acts are impermissible and so accept partaking in such acts, or they must reject the intuition that virtual murder acts are permissible, and so abstain from many (if not most) extant games. While the prevailing solution to this dilemma has been to try and find a morally relevant feature to distinguish the two cases, I argue that a different route should be pursued. It is neither the case that all acts of virtual murder are morally permissible, nor are all acts of virtual pedophelia impermissible. Our intuitions falter and produce this dilemma because they are not sensitive to the different contexts in which games present virtual acts. (shrink)

A central debate in the philosophy of virtual reality (VR) focuses on the reality of virtual items. Broadly, there are two main disagreements. Some views accept a metaphysical orientation to VR, and disagree on the reality of virtual items. For instance, David Chalmers (Disputatio 9(46):309-352, 2017, Disputatio 11(55):453- 486, 2019, 2022) defends digitalism, the view that virtual items are real digital items. Neil McDonnell & Nathan Wildman (Disputatio 11(55):371-397, 2019), by contrast, defend fictionalism, which maintains that virtual items are unreal (...) fictions. Other views, like Grant Tavinor’s (2021), reject the metaphysical orientation, argu- ing that focusing on the reality of virtual items is a mistake. In what follows I evalu- ate these two disagreements. I argue that experiences of virtual items depend on episodes of picture perception. Recognizing this reveals that the current debates are either easily resolved in favor of one view, or are not disagreeing about the reality of virtual items, but about what virtual items are. (shrink)

The gamer’s dilemma offers three plausible but jointly inconsistent premises: (1) Virtual murder in video games is morally permissible. (2) Virtual paedophelia in video games is not morally permissible. (3) There is no morally relevant difference between virtual murder and virtual paedophelia in video games. In this paper I argue that the gamer’s dilemma can be understood as one of three distinct dilemmas, depending on how we understand two key ideas in Morgan Luck’s (2009) original formulation. The two ideas are (...) those of (1) occurring in a video game and (2) being a virtual instance of murder or paedophelia. Depending on the weight placed on the gaming context, the dilemma is either about in-game acts or virtual acts. And depending on the type of virtual acts we have in mind, the dilemma is either about virtual representations or virtual partial reproductions of murder and paedophelia. This gives us three dilemmas worth resolving: a gaming dilemma, a representation dilemma, and a simulation dilemma. I argue that these dilemmas are about different issues, apply to different cases, and are susceptible to different solutions. I also consider how different participants in the debate have interpreted the dilemma in one or more of these three ways. (shrink)

A natural starting point for theories of perceptual states is ordinary perception, in which a subject is successfully related to her mind-independent surroundings. Correspondingly, the simplest theory of perceptual states models all such states on perception. Typically, this simple, common-factor relational view of perceptual states has received a perfunctory dismissal on the grounds that hallucinations are nonperceptual. But I argue that the nonperceptual view of hallucinations has been accepted too quickly. I consider three observations thought to support the view, and (...) argue that all three are dealt with equally well by an alternative view, illusionism, on which hallucinations do involve perception. Since this is so, adopting a common-factor relational view of all perceptual states remains a tenable option. (shrink)

Este artículo pretende dar a conocer un curso manuscrito inédito sobre el Arte de Llull que dictó Fray Agustín Núñez Delgadillo en la Universidad de Zaragoza en 1610. Por tales enseñanzas fue acusado ante el Tribunal de la Inquisición. El curso es una de las manifestaciones más claras del lulismo hispano del siglo XVII, que enlaza los comentarios tardomedievales y renacentistas al Arte de Llull con el lulismo lógicomnemotécnico posterior.

This paper presents the design and development of intelligent tutoring system for teaching Oracle. The Oracle Intelligent Tutoring System (OITS) examined the power of a new methodology to supporting students in Oracle programming. The system presents the topic of Introduction to Oracle with automatically generated problems for the students to solve. The system is dynamically adapted at run time to the student’s individual progress. An initial evaluation study was done to investigate the effect of using the intelligent tutoring system on (...) the performance of students. (shrink)

The predicate view on proper names opts for a uniform semantic representation of proper nouns like ‘Alfred’ as predicates on the level of logical form. Early defences of this view can be found in Sloat (Language, vol. 45, pp. 26–30, 1969) and Burge (J. Philos. 70: 425–439, 1973), but there is an increasing more recent interest in this view on proper names. My paper aims to provide a reconstruction and critique of Burge’s main argument for the predicate view on proper (...) names, which is still used by several current philosophers in defence of this view. I have called this argument the unification argument. I will present a stepwise interpretation and reconstruction of this argument, consider several possible responses to it and defend a specific response to it in detail. (shrink)

We present a self-contained exposition of the basic aspects of simple theories while developing the fundamentals of forking calculus. We expound also the deeper aspects of S. Shelah's 1980 paper Simple unstable theories. The concept of weak dividing has been replaced with that of forking. The exposition is from a contemporary perspective and takes into account contributions due to S. Buechler, E. Hrushovski, B. Kim, O. Lessmann, S. Shelah and A. Pillay.

In this paper I am concerned with an analysis of negative existential sentences that contain proper names only by using negative or neutral free logic. I will compare different versions of neutral free logic with the standard system of negative free logic (Burge, Sainsbury) and aim to defend my version of neutral free logic that I have labeled non-standard neutral free logic.

Several recent accounts of modeling have focused on the modal dimension of scientific inquiry. More precisely, it has been suggested that there are specific models and modeling practices that are best understood as being geared towards possibilities, a view recently dubbed modal modeling. But modalities encompass much more than mere possibility claims. Besides possibilities, modal modeling can also be used to investigate contingencies, necessities or impossibilities. Although these modal concepts are logically connected to the notion of possibility, not all models (...) are equal in their affordances for these richer modal inferences. This paper investigates the modal extent of selected models and argues that analyzing singular model-target pairings by themselves is typically not enough to explain their modal aptness or to identify the kinds of modalities they can be used to reason about. Furthermore, it is argued that some important concepts that are not explicitly modal - like biological robustness - can be understood modally through their relational nature to a background space of possibilities. In conclusion, it is suggested that the strategy of modal modeling is contrastive, situating particular possibilities in larger modal spaces and studying the structural relations within them. (shrink)

Recently, several critics of the multiple realizability thesis have argued that philosophers have tended to accept the thesis on too weak grounds. On the one hand, the analytic challenge has problematized how philosophers have treated the multiple realization relation itself, claiming that assessment of the sameness of function and the relevant difference of realizers has been uncritical. On the other hand, it is argued that the purported evidence of the thesis is often left empirically unverified. This paper provides a novel (...) strategy to answer these worries by introducing a role for multiple realizability in the context of biological engineering. In the field of synthetic biology, bioengineers redesign the evolutionary realizations of biological functions, even constructing artificial chemical surrogates in the laboratory. I show how in the rational design approach to biological engineering, multiple realizability can function as a design heuristic in which the sameness of function and difference of realizers can be controlled. Although practically motivated, this engineering approach has also a theoretical, exploratory component that can be used to study the empirical limitations of multiple realizability. Successful realization of the engineering designs would amount to a concrete demonstration of multiple realizability, taking evidence for MRT beyond what is readily found in nature. (shrink)

In this paper I am concerned with the semantic analysis of sentences of the form 'It is true that p'. I will compare different proposals that have been made to analyse such sentences and will defend a view that treats this sentences as a mere sytactic variation of sentences of the form 'That p is true'.

We introduce tame abstract elementary classes as a generalization of all cases of abstract elementary classes that are known to permit development of stability-like theory. In this paper, we explore stability results in this new context. We assume that [Formula: see text] is a tame abstract elementary class satisfying the amalgamation property with no maximal model. The main results include:. Theorem 0.1. Suppose that [Formula: see text] is not only tame, but [Formula: see text]-tame. If [Formula: see text] and [Formula: (...) see text] is Galois stable in μ, then [Formula: see text], where [Formula: see text] is a relative of κ from first order logic. [Formula: see text] is the Hanf number of the class [Formula: see text]. It is known that [Formula: see text]. The theorem generalizes a result from [17]. It is used to prove both the existence of Morley sequences for non-splitting and the following initial step towards a stability spectrum theorem for tame classes:. Theorem 0.2. If [Formula: see text] is Galois-stable in some [Formula: see text], then [Formula: see text] is stable in every κ with κμ=κ. For example, under GCH we have that [Formula: see text] Galois-stable in μ implies that [Formula: see text] is Galois-stable in μ+n for all n < ω. (shrink)

Let M be a given model with similarity type L = L(M), and let L' be any fragment of L |L(M)| +, ω of cardinality |L(M)|. We call $N \prec M L'$ -relatively saturated $\operatorname{iff}$ for every $B \subseteq N$ of cardinality less than | N | every L'-type over B which is realized in M is realized in M is realized in N. We discuss the existence of such submodels. The following are corollaries of the existence theorems. (1) If (...) M is of cardinality at least $\beth_{\omega_1}$ , and fails to have the ω order property, then there exists $N \prec M$ which is relatively saturated in M of cardinality $\beth_{\omega_1}$ . (2) Assume GCH. Let ψ ∈ L_{ω_1, ω, and let $L' \subseteq L_{\omega 1, \omega$ be a countable fragment containing ψ. If $\exists \chi > \aleph_0$ such that $I(\chi, \psi) , then for every $M \models \psi$ and every cardinal $\lambda of uncountable cofinality, M has an L'-relatively saturated submodel of cardinality λ. (shrink)

Critics of multiple realizability have recently argued that we should concentrate solely on actual here-and-now realizations that are found in nature. The possibility of alternative, but unactualized, realizations is regarded as uninteresting because it is taken to be a question of pure logic or an unverifiable scenario of science fiction. However, in the biological context only a contingent set of realizations is actualized. Drawing on recent work on the theory of neutral biological spaces, the paper shows that we can have (...) ways of assessing the modal dimension of multiple realizability that do not have to rely on mere conceivability. (shrink)

We present Saharon Shelah's Stability Spectrum and Homogeneity Spectrum theorems, as well as the equivalence between the order property and instability in the framework of Finite Diagrams. Finite Diagrams is a context which generalizes the first order case. Localized versions of these theorems are presented. Our presentation is based on several papers; the point of view is contemporary and some of the proofs are new. The treatment of local stability in Finite Diagrams is new.

Our sense of entitlement influences our interactions and attitudes in a range of specific relational contexts, one of them being aging parents’ relationships with their adult children. This study aimed to examine the factor structure of the Sense of Relational Entitlement—aging parents toward their offspring, an 11-item questionnaire that assesses aging people’s sense of relational entitlement toward their children, and examine the associations of its subscales with related personality and mental health constructs. One thousand and six participants, aged 65–99, with (...) at least one child, completed the SRE-ao, Brief Symptom Inventory, Loneliness Scale, and General Belongingness scale. The SRE-ao demonstrated good construct structure using confirmatory factor analysis. Both SRE-ao subscales were significantly and positively associated with anxiety, depression, somatization and sense of loneliness and negatively with sense of belonging. When all variables were entered into a regression model, age, anxiety, and low sense of belonging, but not sense of loneliness, positively predicted both restricted and inflated sense of entitlement. Somatization negatively predicted inflated sense of entitlement. The SRE-ao is a reliable and valid scale that can be used in clinical practice and research to enhance our understanding of parent–child relationships throughout the lifespan. (shrink)

In this paper, I will show that typical formal semantic reconstructions of the rigidity of proper names neglect the important aspect that the rigidity of names is determined by our ordinary use of a name relative to the actual world. This fact was clearly pointed out by Kripke, but overlooked by the subsequent discussion concerning this topic. Based on this diagnosis, I will distinguish three different actualized notions of rigidity. Firstly, I will introduce two different new varieties of known versions (...) of rigidity; namely, actualized persistent and actualized obstinate rigidity. Secondly, I will make use of the tools provided by free logic and introduce a new and overlooked version of rigidity, which I will call actually restricted rigidity. Against this background, I will argue that we have different options to formally model the rigidity of proper names in natural languages. Which option we choose, mainly depends on our philosophical background assumptions. For someone who believes in non-existent objects and the possibility of naming such objects, it is the best choice to hold that proper names are actually obstinately rigid designators. For someone who rejects non-existent objects and the possibility of naming such objects, actually restricted rigidity is a better choice than actualized persistent rigidity. (shrink)

In this essay I will defend a novel version of the indexical view on proper names. According to this version, proper names have a relatively sparse truth-conditional meaning that is represented by their rigid content and indexical character, but a relatively rich use-conditional meaning, which I call the (contextual) constraint of a proper name. Firstly, I will provide a brief outline of my favoured indexical view on names in contrast to other indexical views proposed in the relevant literature. Secondly, two (...) general motivations for an indexical view on names will be introduced and defended. Thirdly, I will criticize the two most popular versions of the indexical view on names: formal variable accounts and salience-based formal constant accounts. In the fourth and final section, I will develop my own use-conditional indexical view on names in three different steps by confronting an initial version of this view with three different challenges. (shrink)

Besides having potential medical and biosafety applications, as well as challenging the foundations of biological engineering, xenobiology can also shed light on the epistemological and metaphysical questions that puzzle philosophers of science. This paper reviews this philosophical aspect of xenobiology, focusing on the possible multiple realizability of life. According to this hypothesis, what ultimately matters in understanding life is its function, not its particular building blocks. This is because there should, in theory, be many different ways to build the same (...) function. The possibility of multiple realizability was originally raised in the context of AI’s hypothesized capacity to realize mental functions. Because we still do not have any incontrovertible examples of digital minds, not to mention alien life of foreign biochemistry, the best way to test this philosophical idea is to examine the recent results and practices of synthetic biology and xenobiology. (shrink)

The idea that reason can justify induction was famously criticized by David Hume. Hume concluded that there is no rational justification for inductive inferences and hence, no rational justification for most of our daily beliefs. Many philosophers attempted to solve Hume's problem with no success. Bertrand Russell commented regarding Hume's problem: "[if we cannot justify induction] we have no reason to expect the sun to rise tomorrow, to expect bread to be more nourishing than a stone, or to expect that (...) if we throw ourselves off the roof we shall fall." The New Riddle of Induction was introduced by Nelson Goodman in his book Fact, Fiction and Forecast, published in 1954. Goodman's problem raised some serious doubts about our ability even to describe inductive principles. In this Book Rami Israel is attempting to solve Both Hume's and Goodman's philosophical problems by introducing a new approach to the subject and by drawing a new picture of our inductive practices. (shrink)

In this essay I will defend the thesis that proper nouns are primarily used as proper names—as atomic singular referring expressions—and different possible predicative uses of proper nouns are derived from this primary use or an already derived secondary predicative use of proper nouns. There is a general linguistic phenomenon of the derivation of new meanings from already existing meanings of an expression. This phenomenon has different manifestations and different linguistic mechanisms can be used to establish derived meanings of different (...) kinds of expressions. One prominent variation of these mechanisms was dubbed in Nunberg. (Linguist Philos 3:143–184, 1979, J Semant 12:109–132, 1995, The handbook of pragmatics. Blackwell, Oxford, 2004 meaning transfer.) In the essay I will distinguish two different sub-varieties of this mechanism: occurrent and lexical meaning transfer. Nunberg conceives of meaning transfer as a mechanism that allows us to derive a new truth-conditional meaning of an expression from an already existing truth-conditional meaning of this expression. I will argue that most predicative uses of proper nouns can be captured by the mentioned two varieties of truth-conditional meaning transfer. But there are also important exceptions like the predicative use of the proper noun ‘Alfred’ in as sentence like ‘Every Alfred that I met was a nice guy’. I will try to show that we cannot make use of truth-conditional meaning transfer to account for such uses and I will argue for a the existence of second variant of meaning transfer that I will call use-conditional meaning transfer and that allows us also to capture these derived meanings of proper nouns. Furthermore, I will try to show that the proposed explanation of multiple uses of proper nouns is superior to the view supported by defenders of a predicative view on proper names. (shrink)

Scholars studying the global diffusion of “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) practices and the associated rise of privatized forms of economic governance have tended to shift attention away from the role of corporations in motivating these processes to the one played by nonbusiness forces seeking social control of corporations. We bring corporate power back in by turning the spotlight to the agency of business classes, the business entities capable of pursuing transcorporate, societal-level, macro-political endeavors. Building on a comparative investigation of two (...) of the world’s earliest mass CSR adoptions, in postwar Venezuela and Britain, we argue that business classes responding to anti-capitalist challenges were the original diffusers of CSR practices and, interrelatedly, promoters of CSR-based, privatized forms of regulation and governance. Organized by peak business associations, the purpose of these “business-class CSR mobilizations” was to weaken the state in its relation to corporations and increase the control of business over social trends. We discuss the contribution of our historical perspective and analytical approach to a more complete and balanced picture of the global rise of CSR in late capitalism. (shrink)

The new result of this paper is that for θ-stable we have S1[θ] = D[θ, L, ∞]. S1 is Hrushovski's rank. This is an improvement of a result of Kim and Pillay, who for simple theories under the assumption that either of the ranks be finite obtained the same identity. Only the first equality is new, the second equality is a result of Shelah from the seventies. We derive it by studying localizations of several rank functions, we get the followingMain (...) Theorem. Suppose that μ is regular satisfying μ ≥ |T|+, p is a finite type, and Δ is a set of formulas closed under Boolean operations. If either R[p, Δ, μ+] < ∞ or p is Δ-stable and μ satisfies “for every sequence {μi : i < |Δ| + ℵ0} of cardinals μi < μ we have that equation image holds”, then S[p, Δ, μ+] = D[p, Δ, μ+] = R[p, Δ, μ+].The S rank above is a localized version of Hrushovski's S1 rank. This rank, as well as our systematic use of local stability, allows us to get a more conceptual proof of the equality of D and R, which is an old result of Shelah. A particular case of the theorem offers a new sufficient condition for the equality of S1 and D[·, L, ∞]. We also manage, due to a more general approach, to avoid some combinatorial difficulties present in Shelah's original exposition. (shrink)

This philosophical game changer looks critically at the Golden Rule in the context of game theory to see where it works and where it doesn’t, when it is applicable and when it isn’t. It shows you why knowing the difference can offer you a powerful way to transform your life from one driven by fear to one driven by love.

Let κ and λ be infinite cardinals such that κ ≤ λ (we have new information for the case when $\kappa ). Let T be a theory in L κ +, ω of cardinality at most κ, let φ(x̄, ȳ) ∈ L λ +, ω . Now define $\mu^\ast_\varphi (\lambda, T) = \operatorname{Min} \{\mu^\ast:$ If T satisfies $(\forall\mu \kappa)(\exists M_\chi \models T)(\exists \{a_i: i Our main concept in this paper is $\mu^\ast_\varphi (\lambda, \kappa) = \operatorname{Sup}\{\mu^\ast(\lambda, T): T$ is a theory (...) in L κ +, ω of cardinality κ at most, and φ (x, y) ∈ L λ +, ω }. This concept is interesting because of THEOREM 1. Let $T \subseteq L_{\kappa^+,\omega}$ of cardinality ≤ κ, and φ (x̄, ȳ) ∈ L λ +, ω . If $(\forall\mu then $(\forall_\chi > \kappa) I(\chi, T) = 2^\chi$ (where I(χ, T) stands for the number of isomorphism types of models of T of cardinality χ). Many years ago the second author proved that $\mu^\ast (\lambda, \kappa) \leq \beth_{(2^\lambda)^+}$ . Here we continue that work by proving. THEOREM 2. $\mu^\ast (\lambda, \aleph_0) = \beth_{\lambda^+}$ . THEOREM 3. For every κ ≤ λ we have $\mu^\ast (\lambda, \kappa) \leq \beth)_{(\lambda^\kappa)}^+$ . For some κ or λ we have better bounds than in Theorem 3, and this is proved via a new two cardinal theorem. THEOREM 4. For every $\kappa \leq \lambda, T \subseteq L_{\kappa^+,\omega}$ , and any set of formulas $\Lambda \subseteq L_{\lambda^+,\omega}$ such that $\Lambda \subseteq L_{\kappa^+,\omega}$ , if T is (Λ,μ)-unstable for μ satisfying μ μ * (λ, κ) = μ then T is Λ-unstable (i.e. for every χ ≥ λ, T is (Λ, χ)-unstable). Moreover, T is L κ +, ω -unstable. In the second part of the paper, we show that always in the applications it is possible to replace the function I(χ, T) by the function IE(χ, T), and we give an application of the theorems to Boolean powers. (shrink)

My dissertation contributes to a central and ongoing debate in the philosophy of perception about the fundamental nature of perceptual states. Such states include cases like seeing, hearing, and tasting, as well as cases of merely seeming to see, hear, and taste. A central question about these states arises in light of misperceptual phenomena. While a commonsensical view of perceptual states construes them as simply relating us to the external and mind independent world, some misperceptual cases suggest that these states (...) fall short of such world-contact. The result is that perceptual states are either thought to fundamentally consist in a highest common factor that falls short of perceptual contact with the world, or are thought to be disjunctive in nature, with some cases involving perceptual contact, and others receiving a different analysis. Contrary to these views, I argue that no misperceptual cases compromise perceptual contact with the world. So perceptual starts should be thought in terms of a relation to the external and mind-independent world. I call this view I defend 'pure relationalism', and the view of misperceptual cases that makes pure relationalism possible 'illusionism'. (shrink)

Este texto analizará críticamente la actual fase económica para mostrar la importancia de los bienes comunes intangibles. Sondea la tesis de un nuevo modo de producción «en ciernes», basado en la gestión colaborativa. Analiza los intangibles de acuerdo a su calidad y carácter. Compara los sistemas de patentes y derechos de propiedad intelectual que permiten su apropiación y las resistencias a su «comoditización» desde el software libre y las propuestas de flexibilización de derechos de autor. Advierte sobre el «fetichismo tecnológico» (...) y propone un marco mínimo de discernimiento en dilemas vinculados a estas materias.It will scan critically the current economic phase to show the importance of the intangible commons. Investigate the thesis of a new mode of production based on collaborative knowledge management. Analyze the specificities of the intangible commons according to their quality and character. We will compare the patent and intellectual property rights that allow its appropriation. Study the resistance to its «commoditization» from the free software paradigm and the proposed relaxation of copyright. Warn of the risks of new forms of «technological fetishism» and conclude by proposing a minimum framework of discernment dilemmas in these matters. (shrink)