Rendell and Whitehead adopt a weak definition of culture to allow low standards of evidence for marine mammals, but they do not adequately rule out genetic factors or individual versus social learning. They then use these low standards to argue that some whales have unique cultures only matched by humans. It would have been more helpful to specify data gaps and suggest critical tests.

What is the one big idea of Koselleck’s Historik understood as a methodological framework for the attempt to combine a theory of historical times with a theory of historical time? In part (1) of this paper, I criticize the two most basic attempts to understand Koselleck’s one big idea as mistaken because they are exclusively interested either in history (in the singular) or in histories (in the plural) and thus miss the central relevance of structures of repetition (“Wiederholungsstrukturen”) for Koselleck’s (...) Historik. In part (2), I will clarify the rather hidden pre-history, the main ambition, the theoretical context and the substantial content of Koselleck’s concept of structures of repetition in history and language. In part (3), I will discuss four historiographical consequences of Koselleck’s structures of repetition. I will end the paper by observing a remarkable theoretical affinity between Barrington Moore’s search for recurring patterns in the field of sociology and Koselleck’s structures of repetition in history and language. Moore’s work illustrates the historiographical potential of the one big idea of Koselleck’s Historik better than any other work I am aware of. (shrink)

This eye-opening read spans the foundations of ethics and key Buddhist concepts. Professor Peter Singer is a world-renowned moral philosopher and preeminent voice in bioethics whose writings have helped shape the animal rights and effective altruism movements. Venerable Shih Chao-Hwei of Taiwan is a Buddhist monastic and social activist who's been a key figure in the Buddhist gender equality movement. This unlikely duo came together in conversation at a meditation retreat center in 2016 and continued discussions in writing. They (...) shed light on the intersection of philosophy, religion, and day-to-day life. (shrink)

Susanne K. Langer (1895—1985) Susanne Langer was an American philosopher working across the analytic and continental divide in the fields of logic, aesthetics, and theory of mind. Her work connects in various ways to her central concerns of feeling and meaning. Feeling, in Langer’s philosophy, encompasses the qualitative, sensory, and emotional aspects of human experience. … Continue reading Susanne K. Langer →.

Band I. Das Körperbild und seine Störungen -- Band II. Unfassbare Zeitlichkeit.

Interviews met denkers uit het gehele politieke spectrum over het populisme.

Examines the common sense attractiveness of contextualism over invariantism, and ultimately takes such a common sense attractiveness to be a function of our intellectual habits as opposed to a reflection of objective fact. The claim that there do not exist semantic approaches that are more favorable than either contextualism or invariantism is made and argued for via an appeal to sortalism, superinvariantism, and supercontextualism, which are also rejected as brutally implausible. The possibility that any of these three semantic approaches might (...) be as good as either contextualism or invariantism merely serves to support semantic relativity. A foundation for semantic relativity is located within the vagueness of natural language terms. (shrink)

Applies the semantic relativism developed in the previous chapters to key terms in several philosophical debates in order to establish philosophical relativity. In all of these cases, invariantism forces the skeptical position whilst contextualism resonates with our common sense views. These philosophical debates and their relevant terms are the problem of epistemic skepticism via “know,” the problem of freewill and determinism as instanced by compatibilism and incompatibilism via “can” and “freewill,” the problem of specifying causal conditions via “cause,” and the (...) problem of explanation via “explanation.”,, and are straightforward categorical problems in that the skeptic's success will simply mean that the terms involved fail to apply. by contrast is a conditional problem such that it is contingent on the truth of determinism itself, which few assent to. (shrink)

Explores the distinction between the prevalent approach to ostensible intuitions, which takes such intuitions to be indicative of semantic conditions, and the broadly psychological approach, which does not. An attack is made against Kripke and Putnam's causal theory of reference via Putnam's Twin Earth thought experiments. Our responses to such examples may be distinguished into two types, a dominant response, and a dominated response. The common aspect to all demonstrable counterexamples to the causal theory of reference turns on the individual (...) differences among the responses. The prevalent approach must deny semantic competence to dissenting agents. We may maintain, in a relativist spirit, that there is no absolutely right answer in such cases. Kripke's distinction between epistemological examples and metaphysical examples is noted and the two are united in order to generate combined examples. The failure of the causal theory of reference to deal with any such examples in a successful and systematic way tells against the prospect of maintaining an internalized semantics. Historical and current versions of the causal theory of reference are explored, with neither accurately capturing our natural responses, strengthening the objection against the prevalent approach and supporting the broadly psychological approach, which in contrast to the prevalent approach attributes agents’ responses to the examples to their egocentric bias, which may not be fully rational. As such, the relativist now has a direct reply to the objection from semantic intuitions, this being that such common sense intuitions are not a function of an internalized semantics. Supposing that the broadly psychological approach is no stronger than the prevalent approach merely strengthens the relativist's position. (shrink)

Examines a different objection against the relativity hypotheses, the objection from superficiality, which takes the relativity hypotheses to be leaving deep philosophical issues aside. A similar objection is that the relativity hypotheses take many traditional philosophical problems to have the status of pseudoproblems. The objection from superficiality comes in several forms: the objection from particular expressions, the objection from a particular language, the objection from overgeneralization, and the objection from unnaturalness. All four forms of the objection from superficiality are countered (...) and the point is argued that many traditional philosophical problems are left untouched by the relativity hypotheses. With regards to those that are not, there is still much philosophical work to be done in these areas. The relativity hypotheses do not imply that such philosophical problems may be easily solved. The positive aspect of the relativity hypotheses is that the specific areas where they are active may be identified and distinguished in order to reveal the aspects of particular philosophical problems that may admit of nonarbitrary solutions. (shrink)

The „petite éthique” which Ricoeur develops in Soi-meme comme un autre is distinctive in its way of paying attention to the individual, the other and the society all at the same time. For this very reason the problem of the distribution of social goods is fundamental. Ricoeur tries to solve this problem through a synthesis of teleological and deontological considerations, and here the approach of Rawls occupies a central place. On the one hand, the attempt to solve this problem in (...) the framework of a teleological approach draws on principles of justice which Rawls establishes through formal procedure; on the other hand, Rawls‘ position depends on a number of teleological presuppositions which are not compatible with his deontological approach. Ricoeur does not only attempt to refute Rawls, but to interpret his principles of justice as the result of a rationalisation of a sense of justice which is simply presupposed. (shrink)

Through case studies on biodiversity, deforestation, pollution, and war, among others, Stoett analyzes the ability of international policy to provide environmental protection and discusses the ever-present factors of equality, sovereignty, and human rights integral to these issues. While providing a panoramic view of the actors and structures producing these policies. Stoett reminds readers that the topic is personal, that effective governance is not solely the responsibility of governments but of individuals and communities as well. Environmental diplomacy may not always meet (...) its intended goals, but positive steps are being achieved, and change can only happen when angst is replaced with an educated determination to work toward environmental justice. The Second Edition will explore new events, issues, and agreements since 2011; notably the Paris Agreement. The UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will be a new theme added throughout and highlighted in each case study. (shrink)

The volume presents the views of ten authors from four PostCommunist Central and East European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Latvia) on the impact of emerging technologies on human condition. They analyse the topic from anthropological, ethical, philosophical, ontological, empirical and legal perspectives.

There has been a groundswell of interest in the account of modality that Kant sets forth in his pre-Critical Only Possible Argument. Andrew Chignell's reconstruction of Kant's theistic argument in terms of what he calls has a prima facie advantage in that it appears to be able to block the plurality objection (namely, that even if every modal fact presupposes some ground, this does not entail that all modal facts share the same ground). I argue that it is both textually (...) and philosophically problematic to interpret Kant's argument in terms of real harmony. Then, I set forth an alternative response to the plurality objection which does not require the adoption of the problematic notion of real harmony. Instead, I argue that the objection can be overcome by observing that the argument seeks to ground modal facts as a totality and that, according to Kant, such relations can be accounted for only by their schematization in a single intellect. (shrink)

Explores how to identify future-proof science. Peter Vickers takes a transdisciplinary approach in his analysis of 'scientific fact' in order to defend science against potentially dangerous scepticism.

P.F. Strawson's essay traces some formal characteristics of logic and grammar to their roots in general features of thought and experience.

In this systematic study, Professor Achinstein analyzes such concepts as definitions, theories, and models, and contrasts his view with currently held positions that he finds inadequate.

Commentary on four articles in a special issue on “theories of emotion,” comparing the theories with respect to five conceptual contrasts. The first four contrasts are essentialism versus nonessentialism, discriminative versus integrative theories, individual versus social focus, and instrumentalism versus scientific realism. Although scientific psychologists appear to have reached consensus in favor of nonessentialism and they freely use both realist and instrumentalist interpretations, there is no consensus on the other two contrasts. The final contrast explored addresses attitudes toward the use (...) of philosophy in scientific theorizing, and whether philosophy is best kept in the background or brought into the foreground. (shrink)

How do we judge whether we should be willing to follow the views of experts or whether we ought to try to come to our own, independent views? This book seeks the answer in medieval philosophical thought. In this engaging study into the history of philosophy and epistemology, Peter Adamson provides an answer to a question as relevant today as it was in the medieval period: how and when should we turn to the authoritative expertise of other people in (...) forming our own beliefs? He challenges us to reconsider our approach to this question through a constructive recovery of the intellectual and cultural traditions of the Islamic world, the Byzantine Empire, and Latin Christendom. Adamson begins by foregrounding the distinction in Islamic philosophy between taqlid, or the uncritical acceptance of authority, and ijtihad, or judgment based on independent effort, the latter of which was particularly prized in Islamic law, theology, and philosophy during the medieval period. He then demonstrates how the Islamic tradition paves the way for the development of what he calls a "justified taqlid," according to which one develops the skills necessary to critically and selectively follow an authority based on their reliability. The book proceeds to reconfigure our understanding of the relation between authority and independent thought in the medieval world by illuminating how women found spaces to assert their own intellectual authority, how medieval writers evaluated the authoritative status of Plato and Aristotle, and how independent reasoning was deployed to defend one Abrahamic faith against the other. This clear and eloquently written book will interest scholars in and enthusiasts of medieval philosophy, Islamic studies, Byzantine studies, and the history of thought"-- Back cover. (shrink)