Di 1 juan. Zhe xue di chuang xin -- di 2 juan. Zhe xue di ao mi -- di 3 juan. Zhe xue si wei fang shi bian ge -- di 4 juan. Chuan tong zhe xue dao xian dai zhe xue -- di 5 juan. Zhe xue ti xi gai ge -- di 6 juan. Zhe xue zai zou xiang wei lai.

Laozi zhe xue -- Zhuangzi zhe xue za lun -- Xian Qin zhu zi yan jiu wen xian mu lu.

This study investigates how social capital affects managers’ use of corporate resources. We find that for firms located in U.S. counties with a high level of social capital, (i) corporate cash holdings have higher marginal value, (ii) the contribution of capital expenditures to shareholder value is higher, and (iii) acquirers experience higher announcement-period abnormal stock returns. We further find that social capital decreases both over- and under-investment, and thus improves ex post corporate investment efficiency. Our evidence suggests that in communities (...) with a high level of social capital, strong social norms and dense social networks constrain unethical corporate behavior, which induces more efficient use of corporate resources. (shrink)

Personnage central de la littérature mondiale, prix Nobel 2000, Gao Xingjian est également peintre, dramaturge, chorégraphe, cinéaste et photographe. En quête de l'art total, tel Leonardo, il développe avec une infinie rigueur la théorie de l'engagement du créateur dans le réel au delà de toute ingérence politique. Avec quelques-unes des grandes figures de la culture internationale il engage le débat sur l'éthique et l'esthétique au cours d'un mémorable colloque organisé à Marseille dans le cadre surréel d'une incroyable Année Gao. Tous (...) les textes de cet ouvrage de référence sont des jalons précieux pour qui veut discerner les grandes alternatives de l'histoire de l'art au croisement des siècles et des millénaires de l'histoire des hommes. (shrink)

According to doxastic pragmatism, certain perceived practical factors, such as high stakes and urgency, have systematic effects on normal subjects’ outright beliefs. Upholders of doxastic pragmatism have so far endorsed a particular version of this view, which we may call threshold pragmatism. This view holds that the sensitivity of belief to the relevant practical factors is due to a corresponding sensitivity of the threshold on the degree of credence necessary for outright belief. According to an alternative but yet unrecognised version (...) of doxastic pragmatism, practical factors affect credence rather than the threshold on credence. Let’s call this alternative view credal pragmatism. In this paper, I argue that credal pragmatism is more plausible than threshold pragmatism. I show that the former view better accommodates a cluster of intuitive and empirical data. I conclude by considering the issue of whether our doxastic attitudes’ sensitivity to practical factors can be considered rational, and if yes, in what sense. (shrink)

We give a new argument supporting a gravitational role in quantum collapse. It is demonstrated that the discreteness of space-time, which results from the proper combination of quantum theory and general relativity, may inevitably result in the dynamical collapse of thewave function. Moreover, the minimum size of discrete space-time yields a plausible collapse criterion consistent with experiments. By assuming that the source to collapse the wave function is the inherent random motion of particles described by the wave function, we further (...) propose a concrete model of wavefunction collapse in the discrete space-time. It is shown that the model is consistent with the existing experiments and macroscopic experiences. (shrink)

The meaning of the wave function has been a hot topic of debate since the early days of quantum mechanics. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in this long-standing question. Is the wave function ontic, directly representing a state of reality, or epistemic, merely representing a state of knowledge, or something else? If the wave function is not ontic, then what, if any, is the underlying state of reality? If the wave function is indeed ontic, then exactly what physical (...) state does it represent? In this book, I aim to make sense of the wave function in quantum mechanics and find the ontological content of the theory. The book can be divided into three parts. The first part addresses the question of the nature of the wave function. After giving a comprehensive and critical review of the competing views of the wave function, I present a new argument for the ontic view in terms of protective measurements. In addition, I also analyze the origin of the wave function by deriving the free Schroedinger equation. The second part analyzes the ontological meaning of the wave function. I propose a new ontological interpretation of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles, and give two main arguments supporting this interpretation. The third part investigates whether the suggested quantum ontology is complete in accounting for our definite experience and whether it needs to be revised in the relativistic domain. (shrink)

According to evidentialist views, credence in a proposition p should be proportional to the degree of evidential support that one has in favor of p. However, empirical evidence suggests that our credences are systematically sensitive to practical factors. In this article, I provide a cost–benefit analysis of credences' practical sensitivity. The upshot of this analysis is that credences sensitive to practical factors fare better than practically insensitive ones along several dimensions. All things considered, our credences should be sensitive to practical (...) factors. (shrink)

We show that the physical meaning of the wave function can be derived based on the established parts of quantum mechanics. It turns out that the wave function represents the state of random discontinuous motion of particles, and its modulus square determines the probability density of the particles appearing in certain positions in space.

It is shown that the combination of unitary quantum theory and special relativity may lead to a contradiction when considering the EPR correlations in different inertial frames in a Gedankenexperiment. This result seems to imply that either unitary quantum theory is wrong or if unitary quantum theory is right then there must exist a preferred Lorentz frame.

Self-deception is typically considered epistemically irrational, for it involves holding certain doxastic attitudes against strong counter-evidence. Pragmatic encroachment about epistemic rationality says that whether it is epistemically rational to believe, withhold belief or disbelieve something can depend on perceived practical factors of one’s situation. In this paper I argue that some cases of self-deception satisfy what pragmatic encroachment considers sufficient conditions for epistemic rationality. As a result, we face the following dilemma: either we revise the received view about self-deception or (...) we deny pragmatic encroachment on epistemic rationality. I suggest that the dilemma can be solved if we pay close attention to the distinction between ideal and bounded rationality. I argue that the problematic cases fail to meet standards of ideal rationality but exemplify bounded rationality. The solution preserves pragmatic encroachment on bounded rationality, but denies it on ideal rationality. (shrink)

It has been debated whether protective measurement implies the reality of the wave function. In this article, I present a new analysis of the relationship between protective measurements and the reality of the wave function. First, I briefly introduce protective measurements and the ontological models framework for them. Second, I give a simple proof of Hardy’s theorem in terms of protective measurements. Third, I analyse two suggested ψ -epistemic models of a protective measurement. It is shown that although these models (...) can explain the appearance of expectation values of observables in a single measurement, their predictions about the variance of the result of a non-ideal protective measurement are different from those of quantum mechanics. Finally, I argue that under an auxiliary finiteness assumption about the dynamics of the ontic state, protective measurement implies the reality of the wave function in the ontological models framework. (shrink)

Based on self-determination theory, we conceptualized the effect of empowering leadership on employee’s voice via harmonious passion. This paper further explored the moderating effect of job characteristics in voice process, and proposed a moderated mediation model. Using a sample of 674 supervisor-subordinate dyads, we found that (1) empowering leadership was positively related to employees’ harmonious passion and voice behavior, (2) harmonious passion played a mediating role in the relationship between empowering leadership and employee voice, and (3) job autonomy strengthened the (...) effect of harmonious passion on employee voice, which, in turn, enhanced the mediated relationship between empowering leadership and employee voice via harmonious passion. We discuss the implications of these findings for research and practice. (shrink)

It has been argued recently that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. This norm can be formulated as a bi-conditional: it is appropriate to treat p as a reason for acting if and only if you know that p. Other proposals replace knowledge with warranted or justified belief. This paper gives counter-examples of both directions of any such bi-conditional. To the left-to-right direction: scientists can appropriately treat as reasons for action propositions of a theory they believe to be false (...) but good approximations to the truth for present purposes. Cases based on a variant of Pascal’s Wager and actions performed by a skeptic also illustrate the point. To the right-to-left direction: in certain circumstances, it can be unreasonable for a scientist to reason from propositions of a theory she knows to be true. (shrink)

The relation between quantum collapse, consciousness and superluminal communication is analyzed. As we know, quantum collapse, if exists, can result in the appearance of quantum nonlocality, and requires the existence of a pre- ferred Lorentz frame. This may permit the realization of quantum superluminal communication (QSC), which will no longer result in the usual causal loop in case of the existence of a preferred Lorentz frame. The possibility of the existence of QSC is further analyzed under the assumption that quantum (...) collapse is a real process. We demonstrate that the combination of quantum collapse and the consciousness of the observer will permit the observer to distinguish nonorthogonal states in principle. This provides a possible way to realize QSC. Some implications of the existence of QSC are briefy discussed. (shrink)

This article analyzes the implications of protective measurement for the meaning of the wave function. According to protective measurement, a charged quantum system has mass and charge density proportional to the modulus square of its wave function. It is shown that the mass and charge density is not real but effective, formed by the ergodic motion of a localized particle with the total mass and charge of the system. Moreover, it is argued that the ergodic motion is not continuous but (...) discontinuous and random. This result suggests a new interpretation of the wave function, according to which the wave function is a description of random discontinuous motion of particles, and the modulus square of the wave function gives the probability density of the particles being in certain locations. It is shown that the suggested interpretation of the wave function disfavors the de Broglie-Bohm theory and the many-worlds interpretation but favors the dynamical collapse theories, and the random discontinuous motion of particles may provide an appropriate random source to collapse the wave function. (shrink)

This article examines whether (1) government intervention causes bribery (or corruption) as rent-seeking theory suggested; (2) a firm’s perceived benefit partially mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior, as rational choice/behavior theory suggested; and (3) other firms’ bribing behavior moderates the relationship between government intervention and a firm’s perceived benefit. Our study shows that government intervention causes bribery/corruption indeed, but it exerts its effect on bribery/corruption through the firm’s perceived benefit. In other words, a firm’s perceived benefit (...) fully mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior. We also find that other firms’ bribery positively moderates the relationship between government intervention and a given firm’s bribery. This study partly proves that firms are rational actors. Potential benefit encourages them to practice bribery. Besides, this research also supports the rent-seeking view of bribery/corruption, which argues that government intervention is a source of bribery/corruption. However, we have also identified that only those government interventions that will create “rent” can cause bribery/corruption. (shrink)

In the paper I trace the histories of four terms. All four words were originally translated from western languages or Russian, but have attained new meanings in China. The first is the "principle of the Party literature," an expression made by V. I. Lenin, which remained influential in China for a very long time. The change in its translation to the "principle of Party publication" eventually became a part of the ideological liberation of the early 1980s. The second is "imaged (...) thought." This term enabled Chinese literature to separate itself from the political ideology after the Cultural Revolution. The third is "subjectivity," a term originally translated as zhuguanxing, and then as zhutixing, which in the ears of Chinese philosophers substantially changed from a term with a negative sense, to one with a positive sense, and which paved the way for a philosophical revolution in China. The fourth is "ontology". The Chinese mixed the ontology criticized by Kant with the doctrine of noumena implied by Kant's philosophy, with ontology thus gaining its special meanings in Chinese philosophy and aesthetics. By presenting the histories of four terms, the author attempts to demonstrate how one and the same term can be ascribed different meanings in different cultures, and how it undergoes specific changes and historical transformations. (shrink)

Gao Yihan was among the Chinese thinkers most familiar with Western political thought. He graduated from Meiji University in Japan in 1916, returned to China and was appointed professor of political science at Beijing University in 1918, where he remained until 1926. He subsequently taught at the Law School of the China National Institute of Shanghai, served as a member of the control Yuan, and after 1949 was dean of the Law School of Nanjing University. He wrote extensively on political (...) theory, evaluating and synthesizing various trends in Western political thought. Rights figure prominently in Gao's writings; in addition to being one of the most subtle analysts of the general notion of rights writing in China, Gao was among the earliest advocates of economic rights. The first excerpt we translate here comes from one of Gao's earliest writings and articulates the central features of the conception of rights he discusses throughout his career: Rights are to be protected by the state, but they are neither innate nor ends in themselves. The second excerpt comes from a slightly later essay in which Gao makes explicit that rights, in his view, have an economic as well as a political dimension. (shrink)

This thesis is an attempt to reconstruct the conceptual foundations of quantum mechanics. First, we argue that the wave function in quantum mechanics is a description of random discontinuous motion of particles, and the modulus square of the wave function gives the probability density of the particles being in certain locations in space. Next, we show that the linear non-relativistic evolution of the wave function of an isolated system obeys the free Schrödinger equation due to the requirements of spacetime translation (...) invariance and relativistic invariance. Thirdly, we argue that the random discontinuous motion of particles may lead to a stochastic, nonlinear collapse evolution of the wave function. A discrete model of energy-conserved wavefunction collapse is proposed and shown to be consistent with existing experiments and our macroscopic experience. In addition, we also give a critical analysis of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, the many-worlds interpretation and other dynamical collapse theories, and briefly discuss the issue of unifying quantum mechanics and special relativity. (shrink)

According to an increasingly popular view in epistemology and philosophy of mind, beliefs are sensitive to contextual factors such as practical factors and salient error possibilities. A prominent version of this view, called credal sensitivism, holds that the context-sensitivity of belief is due to the context-sensitivity of degrees of belief or credence. Credal sensitivism comes in two variants: while credence-one sensitivism (COS) holds that maximal confidence (credence one) is necessary for belief, threshold credal sensitivism (TCS) holds that belief consists in (...) having credence above some threshold, where this threshold doesn’t require maximal confidence. In this paper, I argue that COS has difficulties in accounting for three important features about belief: i) the compatibility between believing p and assigning non-zero credence to certain error possibilities that one takes to entail not-p, ii) the fact that outright beliefs can occur in different strengths, and iii) beliefs held by unconscious subjects. I also argue that TCS can easily avoid these problems. Finally, I consider an alleged advantage of COS over TCS in terms of explaining beliefs about lotteries. I argue that lottery cases are rather more problematic for COS than TCS. In conclusion, TCS is the most plausible version of credal sensitivitism. (shrink)

The relationship between quantum collapse and consciousness is reconsidered under the assumption that quantum collapse is an objective dynamical process. We argue that the conscious observer can have a distinct role from the physical measuring device during the process of quantum collapse owing to the intrinsic nature of consciousness; the conscious observer can know whether he is in a definite state or a quantum superposition of definite states, while the physical measuring device cannot “know”. As a result, the consciousness observer (...) can distinguish the definite states and their quantum superposition, while the physical measuring device without consciousness cannot do. This provides a possible quantum physical method to distinguish man and machine. The new result also implies that consciousness has causal efficacies in the physical world when considering the existence of quantum collapse. Accordingly consciousness is not reducible or emergent, but a new fundamental property of matter. This may establish a quantum basis for panpsychism, and make it be a promising solution to the hard problem of consciousness. Furthermore, it is suggested that a unified theory of matter and consciousness includes two parts: one is the psychophysical principle or corresponding principle between conscious content and matter state, and the other is the complete quantum evolution of matter state, which includes the definite nonlinear evolution element introduced by consciousness and relating to conscious content. Lastly, some experimental schemes are presented to test the proposed quantum theory of consciousness. (shrink)

We investigate the validity of the field explanation of the wave function by analyzing the mass and charge density distributions of a quantum system. It is argued that a charged quantum system has effective mass and charge density distributing in space, proportional to the square of the absolute value of its wave function. This is also a consequence of protective measurement. If the wave function is a physical field, then the mass and charge density will be distributed in space simultaneously (...) for a charged quantum system, and thus there will exist a remarkable electrostatic self-interaction of its wave function, though the gravitational self-interaction is too weak to be detected presently. This not only violates the superposition principle of quantum mechanics but also contradicts experimental observations. Thus we conclude that the wave function cannot be a description of a physical field. In the second part of this paper, we further analyze the implications of these results for the main realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics, especially for de Broglie-Bohm theory. It has been argued that de Broglie-Bohm theory gives the same predictions as quantum mechanics by means of quantum equilibrium hypothesis. However, this equivalence is based on the premise that the wave function, regarded as a Ψ-field, has no mass and charge density distributions, which turns out to be wrong according to the above results. For a charged quantum system, both Ψ-field and Bohmian particle have charge density distribution. This then results in the existence of an electrostatic self-interaction of the field and an electromagnetic interaction between the field and Bohmian particle, which contradicts both the predictions of quantum mechanics and experimental observations. Therefore, de Broglie-Bohm theory as a realistic interpretation of quantum mechanics is probably wrong. Lastly, we suggest that the wave function is a description of some sort of ergodic motion (e.g. random discontinuous motion) of particles, and we also briefly analyze the implications of this suggestion for other realistic interpretations of quantum mechanics including many-worlds interpretation and dynamical collapse theories. (shrink)

It is shown that the heuristic "derivation" of the Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics textbooks can be turned into a real derivation by resorting to spacetime translation invariance and relativistic invariance.

In the original publication of the article, Table 1 was incorrectly published. The corrected table is give below.

This study explores whether or not a firm’s ownership status, as state-owned enterprise or private-owned enterprise, will influence its likelihood of engaging in illegality in China. We build our arguments on the institution-based view, positing that firms rationally pursue their interests in the distinct institutional context of China. Compared to SOEs, POEs have limited access to institutional resources, the lack of which threatens their development or even survival, forcing them to “break rules” to overcome institutional barriers. We thus suggest that (...) POEs demonstrate a higher propensity to engage in illegal actions than SOEs do. However, if POEs could gain access to more institutional resources, their motivation to engage in illegal actions is likely to decrease. Following this logic, we suggest that political connections and market development will mitigate the likelihood that POEs will engage in illegal actions. We find support for our predictions using evidence from Chinese listed manufacturers. Our research contributes to the literature by revealing the institutional aspects of corporate illegality in transitional economies. (shrink)

In this thesis, I explore a number of epistemological issues concerning the relations between knowledge, belief and practical matters. In particular, I defend a view, which I call credal pragmatism. This view is compatible with moderate invariantism, a view that takes knowledge to depend exclusively on truth-relevant factors and to require an invariant epistemic standard of knowledge that can be quite easily met. The thesis includes a negative and a positive part. In the negative part I do two things: i) (...) I critically examine some moderate invariantist accounts of the intuitive influence of practical factors on knowledge ascriptions, and ii) I provide a criticism of the idea that knowledge is the norm of practical reasoning. In Chapter 1, I provide a general overview of the issues that constitute the background for the views and arguments defended in my thesis. In particular, I provide a thorough discussion of two aspects of the relation between knowledge and practical matters: one is constituted by the practical factors’ effects on knowledge ascriptions; the other is the intuitive normative role of knowledge in the regulation and assessments of action and practical reasoning. In Chapter 2, I consider and criticize Timothy Williamson’s account according to which an alleged failure to acknowledge the distinction between knowing and knowing that one knows generates the intuition that knowledge ascriptions are sensitive to practical factors. In Chapter 3, I argue against the idea that practical reasoning is governed by a knowledge norm. The argument generalizes to other candidate epistemic norms of practical reasoning. In Chapter 4, I criticise a number of accounts which explain effects of practical factors on knowledge ascriptions in terms of the influence of practical factors on belief. These include the accounts of Brain Weatherson, Dorit Ganson, Kent Bach and Jennifer Nagel. In the positive part of the thesis, I develop and argue for credal pragmatism, an original account of the nature and interaction of different doxastic attitudes and the role of practical factors in their rational regulation. On this view, given a certain fixed amount of evidence, the degree of credence of an adaptively rational agent varies in different circumstances depending on practical factors, while the threshold on the degree of credence necessary for outright belief remains fixed across contexts. This account distinguishes between two kinds of outright belief: occurrent belief, which depends on the actual degree of credence, and dispositional belief, which depends on the degree of credence in normal circumstances. In Chapter 5, I present the view and I show how credal pragmatism can explain the practical factors’ effects on knowledge ascriptions. In Chapter 6, I develop a fallibilist account of several features about knowledge ascriptions including i) why in folk epistemological practices knowledge is often taken to be a necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for relying on a proposition in practical reasoning; ii) concessive knowledge attributions and related data; and iii) the infallibilist intuition that knowledge excludes error possibilities. (shrink)

Las confesiones profesionales de Jose Gaos (Espana, 1900-1969) cultivan un genero donde se conjugan relato y reflexion, exposicion filosofica y recuento autobiografico. Se trata de una exposicion organizada y sobre todo organica donde se pone en juego un trasvase de la vida de las ideas de Gaos.

… Talking again about the right to freedom, the situation is the same. That is, the right to freedom is as vulnerable in the face of social inequalities as the right to property, which Gao has just discussed. For example, the constitution stipulates only that "people have freedom of speech and thought." We have to ask whether, in order to enjoy these kinds of freedoms, people do not also need some corresponding life capabilities? [If so], then should society not have (...) to provide each individual with the appropriate capabilities and facilities? The first precondition for all those who want to enjoy the freedom of speech and thought is to be able to live. If not even one's life can be protected, then it is impossible for one to receive an education. And even if one's life is protected and an education received, and even if one does not have any other problems, still, if there are no library facilities in society and no scholars to advise one or to stimulate one's academic interests, or if society, because of its industrial system or because of other customs, does not give one convenient opportunities for study, then how can one enjoy the high-sounding freedoms of speech and thought stipulated in the constitution? (shrink)

We show that consciousness may violate the basic quantum principle, according to which the nonorthogonal quantum states can't be distinguished. This implies that the physical world is not causally closed without consciousness, and consciousness is a fundamental property of matter.

We study the notion of polynomial-time relation reducibility among computable equivalence relations. We identify some benchmark equivalence relations and show that the reducibility hierarchy has a rich structure. Specifically, we embed the partial order of all polynomial-time computable sets into the polynomial-time relation reducibility hierarchy between two benchmark equivalence relations Eλ and id. In addition, we consider equivalence relations with finitely many nontrivial equivalence classes and those whose equivalence classes are all finite.

In this entry, we provide an overview of some of the methodological debates surrounding contextualism and consider whether they are, in effect, based on an underlying methodological dispute. We consider three modes of motivation of epistemic contextualism including i) the method of cases, ii) the appeal to linguistic analogies and iii) the appeal to conceptual analogies and functional roles. We also consider the methodological debates about contextualism arising from experimental philosophy. We conclude that i) there is no distinctive methodological doctrine (...) or set of methodological doctrines that is centrally invoked by all epistemic contextualists and ii) the substantive dispute about the truth of contextualism very frequently, although not invariably, reflects an underlying methodological dispute. (shrink)