In political philosophy, reflective equilibrium is a standard method used to systematically reconcile intuitive judgments with theoretical principles. In this paper, we propose that survey experiments and a model selection method—i.e., the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)-based model selection method—can be viewed together as a methodological means of satisfying the epistemic desiderata implicit in reflective equilibrium. To show this, we conduct a survey experiment on two theories of distributive justice, prioritarianism and sufficientarianism. Our experimental test case and AIC-based model selection method (...) demonstrate that the refined sufficientarian principle, a widely accepted principle of distributive justice, is no more plausible than the prioritarian principle. This tells us that some changes of certain intuitions revolving around sufficientarianism should be examined (separately) based on the findings of the survey experiment and AIC model selection. This shows the potential of our approach—both practically and methodologically—as a novel way of applying reflective equilibrium in political philosophy. (shrink)

Originally published as 「明治の哲学界：有機体の哲学とその系譜」in 井上克人編『豊饒なる明治』, Kansai Daigaku Shuppannbu, 2012, 3–22. Translated by Morisato Takeshi. German Idealism was introduced to Japanese intellectuals in the middle of Meiji era and was mainly received from a mystical or religious perspective, as we see in Inoue Tetsujirō’s “harmonious existence,” Inoue Enryō’s “unity of mind and body,” and Kiyozawa Manshi’s “existentialism.” Since these theories envisioned true reality as a unified and living whole, I group them under the label “philosophy of organism” and from (...) there argue that their conviction that “all is truth and truth is all” was shaped in large part by the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana. The understanding of Buddhist concepts by Meiji philosophers was philosophical in its content, and those who devoted themselves to the study of Western philosophy were encouraged to describe Eastern thought in Western philosophical terms. As a result, the philosophical world of the Meiji era developed an original standpoint that unified Eastern and Western perspectives by means of a logic of “phenomena-in-reality.”. (shrink)

descent represents a progression in this relationship whereby the Chorus, in finally abandoning their chariot and agreeing to approach Prometheus and listen to him, jeopardize their detachment from him and his fate, offer tentative support, and give him scope to develop his storytelling abilities and apply his persuasive powers. Although this progression does not represent an unequivocal commitment to Prometheus–for the Chorus fluctuate throughout the play between sympathy and reproach for him–it is none the less a crucial step as signalled (...) by the intensity of Prometheus' insistence that they descend and hear his story through to the end. (shrink)

生命が今こそ、語り直されなくてはならない!文明論、歴史、メタ科学、経済批判、生権力の視点から。.

人のいのちと向き合う医学は、冷徹な科学的思考と人間哲学の激突する現場である。哲学としての医学概論を創始した澤瀉久敬の思想を繙き、分子生物学や臨床疫学、フランクルの人間論、さらには近藤誠のがんもどき理論 やスピリチュアリティなど現代の諸問題をも論じつつ、科学と哲学の葛藤を調停し、医学のあるべき思想的立脚点を探る。.

In this article, I argue that Powers and Faden’s non-ideal, comprehensive theory of justice cannot keep in line with the proposed moderateness of their essentialist approach. My argument is as follows: Powers and Faden’s comprehensive theory of justice contravenes the thrust of moderate essentialism, in claiming that their theory values health for its own sake. Why do they define their conception of justice as valuing health for its own sake when it is likely to be incongruous with their essentialist approach? (...) To understand this, we should examine their sufficientarian proposal. There are two requirements for plausible sufficientarianism. The first requirement is to specify the threshold below which people are seriously deprived and must be urgently benefited in a non-arbitrary manner. The second requirement is that sufficientarianism should be sensitive to certain inequalities above the threshold. Powers and Faden’s approach convincingly meets the first requirement. However, the non-ideal aspect of their approach, which is key to meeting the second requirement, makes it explicit that at least one of the listed dimensions of well-being must be valued for their own sake. This is not reconcilable with their own characterization of moderate essentialism. For this reason, we should conclude that Powers and Faden fail to argue for moderate essentialism. (shrink)

This theoretical paper develops a conceptual framework that explains how companies can influence consumer behavior in terms of both social and business benefits through their corporate social marketing initiatives. Drawing from the source credibility literature, the article asserts that the effectiveness of CSM depends largely on the corporate credibility of a company in supporting a social cause. Based on this assertion, the framework identifies ten different antecedents of CSM credibility, which are organized into attributes of the company, attributes of the (...) CSM initiative, and attributes of the cause. Furthermore, this framework shows that CSM credibility affects the two examined consequences, intended prosocial behavior and consumer loyalty. Several research and managerial implications are developed based on the propositions specified in the framework. (shrink)

This article presents a unified theory of irony which claims, with the help of Fauconnier’s (1985) mental space theory, that an ironical utterance refers to the mental space of a mutually manifest expectation. According to this view, what a typical ironical speaker does is to say without any distinct space builders that something is the case in the mental space of expectation in order to make it mutually manifest that it is not so in the initial reality space. This expectation (...) space theory of irony integrates the explanatory power of Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) echoic interpretation theory with the descriptive power of the view of irony as relevant inappropriateness. (shrink)

Not turned upside down, as Marx did to Hegel, but « inverted » by the mere contact with speaking beings, the Cartesian order of reasons becomes, according to Antonia Birnbaum, a device which generates both the subject and its environment, all at once, determining them as elements of the political - which has however already become « accidental » due to this invention, which exposes the speaking being to the world, and confronts it with the haecceity of the event. Cartesian (...) « politics » thus takes place in the forest, the privileged figure of the philosopher and the sign of the absence of any orientation, the truth of which Antonia Birnbaum tends to identify in and through Beckett s Molloy: far from being an possible community, it is full of « good things ». (shrink)

なぜ脳死が人の死とされるのか、なぜ尊厳死が推進されるのか。「人間の尊厳」の系譜を、ギリシア哲学やキリスト教神学からたどり直し、生権力の淵源に迫る画期的な著作。.

A dialectical contradiction can be appropriately described within the framework of classical formal logic. It is in harmony with the law of noncontradiction. According to our definition, two theories make up a dialectical contradiction if each of them is consistent and their union is inconsistent. It can happen that each of these two theories has an intended model. Plenty of examples are to be found in the history of science.

Mueller's gibbons ( Hylobates muelleri ) sing both sex-specific and duet songs. These songs are thought to be involved in territory maintenance, as well as the maintenance of pair or family bonds. However, few observational studies have examined how gibbons interact with their neighbors through song in the wild. We have been conducting field observations of wild gibbon groups in northeast Borneo since 2001. In the Borneo Rainforest Lodge (BRL) and Danum Valley Field Center (DVFC) at the Danum Valley Conservation (...) Area (DVCA), we observed seven episodes of alternating songs between males. Here, we describe the process of song exchange between males. During male interactions, song bouts rarely overlapped and were alternately emitted. Several studies have reported antiphonal vocalizations in New World and Old World primate species, but rarely in apes. Our observations of antiphonal songs in gibbons indicate that gibbons not only unilaterally advertise information, but also interactively communicate with neighbors and family members through songs. Since gibbons are phylogenetically similar to humans, and turn-taking has an important role in human conversation, our research on gibbon communication may provide insight into the evolution of human language. (shrink)

Traumatized with the national « blunder » of the Gulf War, the Japanese government tries now to cross a historic threshold: contribution to the war for the « new world order » must not be limited any more to finances, but widened in the military cooperation, which is formally forbidden with the Constitution. A revision of that this is nevertheless unthinkable, because the political tension which would be then created would return the new late Constitution on the situation. Where from (...) big current effort to coexist legal pacifism and military «duty », to deny and assert at the same time the current Constitution. « Theological » attempt which invents funny solutions. (shrink)

of (from Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy).

This paper aims to specify the precise conditions under which an agent is responsible for inequalities. Admittedly, the careful examination of the conditions in question has been the main focus of contemporary egalitarianism. As a matter of fact, contemporary political philosophers take responsibility to be a core conception which in principle justifies inequalities. In particular, they tend to flesh out the conception of responsibility in terms of choice, in such a way that we should hold individuals responsible for chosen inequalities (...) but not for unchosen inequalities. This core idea is intuitively appealing because, on the one hand, alleviation of inequalities that people do not choose would thereby be encouraged, and on the other hand, it avoids an egalitarian ‘moral hazard’: the situation in which people need care nothing for the consequences (economic or otherwise) of their own choice. G. A. Cohen thus goes so far as to say that egalitarianism successfully incorporates “within it the most powerful idea in the arsenal of the anti-egalitarian right: the idea of choice and responsibility.”. (shrink)

“Aleatory materialism” does not merely constitute that which, in an overly linear perspective, one would call the “fourth Althusser”. Even if, in the last decade of his life, Althusser did indeed attempt to construct a “new philosophy”, seen as an alternative to “dialectical materialism”, one should rather perceive, behind the past arguments, so assertive and sharp, advanced by the previous Althusser, something like a discreet practical layer, self-conscious or not, wherein such arguments would have found their true point of anchorage. (...) What is at stake in this philosophy “starting from nothing” is what has always been the most necessary and the most unthinkable question, that of political subjectivation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 29, Number 2, November 2003, pp. 205-221 The Origin of the Indirect Passions in the Treatise: An Analogy between Books 1 and 2 HARUKOINOUE 1. The Analogy Between Book 1 and Book 2 If the central design of the Treatise is to demonstrate that "the subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a complete chain of reasoning by themselves" (T 2; SBN xii), as Hume advertises, (...) it seems unquestionable that his intention lies in the illustration of the human mind as an integrated system dependent upon the cooperation of the understanding and the passions, which are discussed separately in Book 1 and Book 2, respectively.1 What is yet to be determined is whether any internal or systematic connection between these two books was originally intended by the author. Is it too fanciful to agree with John Passmore, and to suggest that some dynamic system of the human mind would emerge when we open the door which stands between the first two books?2 The key for this door seems to be found in Hume's account of personal identity. We may well remember how he distinguished two aspects of our identity, one regarding the understanding and another regarding the passions, and claimed that the latter "serves to corroborate" the former "by the making our distant perceptions influence each other, and by giving us a present concern for our past or future pains or pleasures" (T 1.4.6.19; SBN Haruko Inoue is Professor of Philosophy, Sapporo University 3-7-3-1 Toyohira-ku, Sapporo 062-8520, Japan. e-mail: [email protected] 206 Haruko Inoue 261). It seems reasonable to agree with Jane Mclntyre, who suggests that "Hume recognized questions about personal identity not addressed in Book 1, and that Book 2 makes an important contribution to our understanding of Hume's account of the self and its identity."3 And once we get a good understanding of this integrated mechanism of the human mind operating with both wheels, as it were, of the imagination and the passions, all we have to do is to accept his invitation and enjoy the efficiency of this two-wheeled car, driving through the fields of "Morals, Politics, and Criticism." For, if we take his words in his Advertisement seriously,4 it seems quite likely that the Treatise was published first as a set of Book 1 and Book 2, as Passmore suggests,5 and that Book 3 was written as the demonstration of the consistency of his system through the application of the hypothesis established in the first two books. This paper is a modest attempt to illustrate the intimate connection between Book 1 and Book 2: the latter, planned as a proof and reinforcement of the system Hume had established in Book 1, depends on the former. His basic strategy in the Treatise is to explain both systems of the mind by means of the easy transition of the imagination, which connects different perceptions with each other according to two kinds of principles or "properties of human nature " (T 2.1.4.2; SBN 283), viz. "the association both of impressions and ideas, and the mutual assistance they lend each other" (T 2.1.5.5; SBN 284). In Book 1 Hume establishes the system of the understanding in terms of the first association, viz. the association of ideas, and in Book 2 he proceeds to illustrate the system of passions by involving not only the second association but also the concurrence of both kinds of association which he calls "a double relation of impressions and ideas." His basic strategy is thus to apply the same method of reasoning to the illustration of both systems, assuming that "there is an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas" (T 2.1.4.3; SBN 283). The intimate connection between the two systems of the understanding and the passions is illustrated through the demonstration of the "influence of the imagination upon the passions" (T 2.3.6.1; SBN 424), or in terms of the dependence of the latter on the former. It is owing to the dependence of the association of... (shrink)

The ontology of Toni Negri, as political philosophy of the multitude, supposes a very speck relation between philosophy and politics, determined by the non-difference between the two of them, while refusing, at the same time, to make the one proceed from the other, or to médiatise them and to unite them by a third necessity. They unite there only by the univocity of freedom that registers the political-philosophical indeterminacy. Hence the difficulty of making them into a political programme, of «organizing» (...) the multitude as a political subject. But the notion of void, concomitant this univocity and defined as the very possibility of any qualitative change, establishes the philosophical-political particularity of the negrian ontology related to 1) the deconstructionist founding of the political and democracy and 2) Alain Badiou’s ontology. Far from being incapable of presenting a politics, Negri’s void designs a way to act « doing and saying at the same time » in politics. (shrink)

Résumé Par rapport au « renversement » qui, comme dans la dialectique, s’opère entre deux choses ayant le même niveau de substantialité, l’ « inversion » fonde une ontologie paradoxale où les choses à inverser ne préexistent pas à l’inversion elle-même. Tel est le sens d’une thèse ontologique largement partagée dans le marxisme d’aujourd’hui : le primat de la lutte de classes sur les classes. Tout en discernant nettement la différence du renversement et de l’inversion dans Le Capital, Jacques Rancière (...) ne cesse de poser la question de savoir si le clivage des deux opérations est possible sans recours au « kautskisme » qui l’introduit dans la lutte de l’extérieur de la lutte, ce qui dénie purement et simplement le primat ontologique de la lutte. La solution donnée par lui est inouïe : radicalisant d’un côté l’inversion en tant que politique identique à la subjectivation, dans laquelle il n’y a plus de « constitué », et restituant de l’autre le renversement en tant qu’activité de l’imagination qui se différencie perpétuellement de soi comme dans le « rêve ouvrier » ou la « parole hérétique », il fait de ces deux opérations les conditions réciproques pour que l’une et l’autre viennent au jour. (shrink)

The attack of September 11 verified M Hardt’s and T Negri’s main thesis and by breaking with the politics of nation-state, Empire materializes under our eyes. At the same time however, event leads us to question definitions proposed in their book. It seems that we attend the end of the « small crises» which characterized Empire. And that the current visibility is how a protest against the definition of its essence as « abstract machine ». But the most serious problem (...) is in its «ontological » foundation: the Multitudes. If they are they who support and determine the state of the Empire, are they forced to keep pace with this last one, including when the stability seems shaken ? Which is then the line of possible flight for the Multitudes ? (shrink)