Presque vingt ans après sa parution, Etant donné (Puf, 1997) a, au-delà des premiers débats, imposé la question du donné et de la donation. Etant donné. Reprise reprend et prolonge ces nouvelles interrogations. D'abord la question de la réduction : définit-elle vraiment le principe dernier de la phénoménologie? Si tel était le cas, la formule " autant de réduction, autant de donation " peut-elle se justifier (en discussion avec la critique de Michel Henry)? Ensuite, la reconnaissance du donné comme instance (...) première et dernière de la phénoménalité peut-elle encore faire droit à l'herméneutique (en discussion avec Hans-Georg Gadamer)? Dans ce cas, comment se déplie le pli de la donation avec la manifestation? Et encore, le monde peut-il se manifester comme l'un des phénomènes donnés, et même comme la totalité du donné? Ou ne faut-il pas lui reconnaître une donation par exception, celle de la possibilité de toute donation (sur la ligne de Jan Patocka)? Enfin, la reprise du phénomène à partir de la donation n'impose-t-elle pas de substituer décidément au modèle de l'objet, constitué à l'identique et pour lui, celui de l'événement, qui surgit à partir de soi seul, sans cause ni a priori (en faisant droit à Claude Romano)? (shrink)

Eric Weil assume a tarefa de compreender a realidade concebendo-a com base em categorias filosóficas, de um lado, e reconhecendo-a na sua historicidade, de outro. Daí uma das questões essenciais do seu pensamento ser justamente a relação entre filosofia e história. Desta relação com a história tout court surge o problema mais restrito, aquele que aqui nos interessa, do modo de a filosofia ler a sua própria história. O objetivo desse artigo é apresentar como Eric Weil realiza o projeto de (...) uma leitura filosófica da história da filosofia a partir do prin­cípio hermenêutico da retomada e da categoria do Sentido dentro da Logique de la philosophie. Para isso, parte-se da colocação da história da filosofia como um tema filosófico para passar ao modo como este é compreendido, no seu nível sistemático, dentro do pensamento weiliano. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende expor a Filosofia de Eric Weil a partir da relação intrínseca, tanto da categoria Sentido, como do conceito de retomada, presentes em todo o seu corpo filosófico. O texto apresenta, ainda, o próprio conceito de retomada como elemento teórico que permite a abertura do sistema weiliano e uma forma privilegiada de aplicação da cate­goria Sentido. Assim, Filosofia, Sentido e Retomada são compreendidos enquanto termos entrelaçados que permitem a apreensão da história humana como algo sensato.

I address a foundational problem with accounts of the morality of war that are derived from the Just War Tradition. Such accounts problematically focus on ‘the moment of crisis’: i.e. when a state is considering a resort to war. This is problematic because sometimes the state considering the resort to war is partly responsible for wrongly creating the conditions in which the resort to war becomes necessary. By ignoring this possibility, JWT effectively ignores, in its moral evaluation of wars, certain (...) types of past wrongdoing. I argue that we can address this problem by incorporating an account of compensatory liability into an account of the morality of war. Doing so yields the view that, if we have culpably failed to compensate victims for past wrongs, we might be morally required to weigh the well-being of those victims more heavily in our calculation of proportionality when determining the permissibility of a defensive act that harms the victim as a side-effect. This, in turn, makes satisfying t. (shrink)

The paper distinguishes between instrumental reasons and instrumental rationality. It argues that instrumental reasons are not reasons to take the means to our ends. It further argues that there is no distinct form of instrumental reasoning or of instrumental rationality. In part the argument proceeds through a sympathetic examination of suggestions made by M. Bratman, J. Broome, and J. Wallace, though the accounts of instrumental rationality offered by the last two are criticised.

I examine the blameworthiness of the resistance for Nazi reprisals in three morally disturbing cases which occurred in Nazi occupied Europe. I have organized my argument in the following way. After describing the cases, I propose a set of criteria for assessing the degree to which actors are blameworthy for the deaths of innocents. Using these criteria, I then explore the blameworthiness of the resistance members in these cases. I follow this analysis with an application of the doctrine of (...) double effect. My conclusion that some resistance members are blameworthy using my criteria is confirmed by the application of the doctrine of double effect. (shrink)

O presente artigo pretende explicitar a passagem da atitude à categoria realizada, na Logique de la Philosophie, através do conceito de reprise. Para isso, será usado o conceito de fé, entendido, evidentemente, não como fé teológica pertencente a uma determinada reli­gião positiva, mas como expressão pura do sentimento individual.

The paper surveys recent appraisals of David Lewis’s seminal paper on truth in fiction. It examines variations on standard criticisms of Lewis’s account, aiming to show that, if developed as Lewis suggests in his 1983 Postscript A, his proposals on the topic are—as Hanley puts it—‘as good as it gets’. Thus elaborated, Lewis’s account can resist the objections, and it offers a better picture of fictional discourse than recent resurrections of other classic works of the 1970s by Kripke, van Inwagen (...) and Searle. The turn that Lewis suggests and the paper recommends draws on the remaining outstanding contribution from that time: Walton’s. (shrink)

In neither of his two major forays into the laws of war and peace – De iure praedae or De iure belli ac pacis – did Hugo Grotius discuss the legal institutions of reprisal – whether special or general – or privateering in their own right. His profoundly novel reading of the just war doctrine in the context of his theory of natural rights, however, gave powerful legitimisation to the practices of special reprisals, as well as of privateering in (...) times of war and of peace. (shrink)

Armed reprisals are the limited use of military force in response to unlawful actions perpetrated against states. Historically, reprisals provided a military remedy for states that had been wronged by another state without having to resort to all-out war in order to counter or deter such wrongful actions. While reprisals are broadly believed to have been outlawed by the UN Charter, states continue to routinely undertake such self-help measures. As part of the roundtable, “The Ethics of Limited (...) Strikes,” this essay examines the doctrine of armed reprisals in light of recent instances of states using force “short of war” in this manner. We argue that the ban on reprisals has been largely ignored by states, and that recent attempts to apply the laws of armed conflict to the cyber domain are further weakening this prohibition. We conclude that this is a potentially dangerous development that lowers the bar for resorting to military force, risking escalation and thereby further destabilizing the international system. (shrink)

Le terme de «reprise» désigne un concept propre à la Logique de la philosophie d’Eric Weil, à distinguer des diverses significations du mot dans la langue courante ou dans les discours philosophiques antérieurs («réduction», «répétition», «dépassement», etc.). Rendu possible et nécessaire par la différence, supposée par la Logique, entre attitude et catégo­rie philosophique, le concept de reprise permet de situer les diverses attitudes et catégories concrètes pures selon un ordre logico-philosophique (fondé sur le choix du discours cohé­rent) et de comprendre (...) comment elles jouent et se lient au cœur des discours philoso­phiques effectivement déployés au cours de l’Histoire. A l’œuvre dès le début du parcours logique qu’il rend possible, le concept de reprise est thématisé par étapes en fonction des contenus catégoriaux concrets jusqu’à l’explicitation de sa signification méthodique et sys­tématique dans la catégorie formelle du Sens. (shrink)

Husserl has dealt with the material relation of wholes to parts at the beginning of his philosophical career, namely in his third Logical Investigation, as well as, much later, in the texts edited by Landgrebe in Erfahrung und Urteil . The topic of mereology compels one to consider the relation between the formal analytic a priori and the material synthetic a priori within the objective realmof intentionality. Initially Husserl tried to find an articulation between the two a priori's in the (...) realm of objectivity. Subsequently Husserl insisted on the irreducible differences between the laws governing these two forms of the a priori. But eventually Husserl reformulated the problem in the framework of the subjective a priori regulating the functioning of intentionality. Only the teleological horizon of consciousness, by its indebtedness to genealogy, can outline a possible connection of the two a priori's; and do this, inastar as for a consciousness that is always already ahead of itself, the cognition of the world of pure forms also allows for the recognition of material a priori's. (shrink)

This paper critically examines John Mark Mattox's view of the nature of the moral appropriateness of particular response options. By so doing, I aim to engage the wider readership in a debate, which I hope leads to greater clarity and precision of thinking on these topics. After summarizing Mattox's view, I argue first that in order for Mattox's ultimate conclusion to hold in moral terms, he must abandon the argument on the permissibility of nuclear reprisal to re-establish nuclear deterrence and (...) instead anchor this response solely on the moral grounds of retributive justice. Secondly, I argue that the morally superior and politically efficacious counter-nuclear terrorist response is to hunt down the nuclear terrorists and hold them accountable for war crimes in the International Criminal Court. This response is consistent with just war theoretic principles, and it also affirms the moral virtues of honor, dignity, and humane treatment in contexts where they are needed the most? the holocausts of nuclear terrorist attacks. (shrink)

Centuries before being included in Hugo Grotius’s De iure belli ac pacis and De iure praedae, the subject of reprisal was already being discussed in medieval literature. The aim of this paper is to examine the medieval and early modern practice and theory of reprisal as it developed before and during Grotius’s lifetime. Its first part investigates a number of important foundational elements, such as the issues of definition and terminology, and the common characteristics of a reprisal case. In the (...) second half, the author explores why reprisals were deemed to be a ‘perversus mos’ or ‘bad custom’ and how continued reliance on this practice was nonetheless justified by inserting it into the medieval just war doctrine. The paper does not provide a systematic study of Grotius’s own engagement with medieval reprisal sources. Rather, it should be read in conjunction with another publication in this same volume, ‘Grotius on Reprisal’ by Randall Lesaffer. (shrink)

Refletimos como em dois momentos – no “enxerto hermenêutico sobre a fenomenolo­gia” e no debate da alternativa entre hermenêutica das tradições e a crítica das ideologias (Gadamer/Habermas) –, Ricoeur parece acompanhar o mesmo movimento operatório da retomada: da inscrição de um discurso num outro ao mesmo tempo em que compreende toda a variedade interpretativa decorrente dessa alteridade, isto é, da articulação uno­-múltiplo. A hermenêutica ricoeuriana é, assim, uma tomada de posição análoga àquela da Logique de la Philosophie de Eric Weil (...) em relação ao conflito das filosofias. Porém, em Ricoeur, a retomada não é mais (predominantemente) a aplicação sobre as tipologias filosóficas ou dedução coerente através de uma lógica global, mas diálogo singular com os problemas suscitados pelos discursos dos filósofos em sua pretensão de universalidade e de sentido. (shrink)

This article discusses Jan Narveson's "Welfare and Wealth, Poverty and Justice in Today's World," and "Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?" and their relation to my "Thinking about the Needy, Justice, and International Organizations." Section 2 points out that Narveson's concerns differ from mine, so that often his claims and mine fail to engage each other. For example, his focus is on the poor, mine the needy, and while many poor are needy, and vice versa, our obligations (...) may differ regarding the poor than regarding the needy. Also, Narveson invokes a narrow conception of morality as those rules that government or society may compel people to follow. Given a broader, more plausible, conception of morality, many of Narveson's claims actually support my substantive views. Section 3 shows that many of Narveson's claims are relevant to the best means of aiding the needy, but do not challenge the validity of that end. This is true, for example, of his claims about the role of poor governments, the importance of freedom, the undesirability of mere "handouts," and the effects of bad economic policies. Section 4 defends the importance of my distinction between acting justly and acting for reasons of justice. It illustrates that on several widely shared conceptions of justice there might be agent-neutral reasons of justice to aid the needy, even if from an agent-relative perspective one would not be acting unjustly if one failed to do so. Section 5 contests Narveson's portrayal of egalitarianism as concerned about inequality of wealth, per se, as insensitive to prior wrongs, and as holding that the worse-off have a right to be made better off at the expense of the well-off. In addition, it rejects Narveson's contention that egalitarians violate impartiality, and aim to impose their personal tastes on others. Section 6 challenges a fundamental assumption underlying Narveson's doctrine of mutual advantage. In addition, it denies that egalitarians are irrational merely because equality can conflict with the pareto principle. More generally, by appealing to impersonal ideals, it challenges the widely held view that the pareto principle is a condition of rationality. Section 7 argues that Narveson's meta-ethical assumptions are controversial, internally inconsistent, in tension with his normative views, and ultimately a version of skepticism. In addition, it challenges Narveson's view about the role intuitions play in moral theory. Section 8 clarifies points where Narveson's discussion of my views may be misleading. Finally, the paper notes the role that moral reasons may play in deliberation and action, but emphasizes the philosophical and theoretical nature of my work. My aim is to determine the moral considerations that are relevant to how people should act regarding the needy. Whether people will actually be moved to so act, for those reasons or otherwise, is another matter. (shrink)

In his Meditations Descartes advances an argument that contains the essentials of the so-called “hard problem” of explaining consciousness. I show how this Cartesian argument was taken up in the twentieth century by C. A. Campbell, the moral libertarian and student of idealist Henry Jones. Campbell can be regarded as the model of what John Passmore and Simon Glendinning have respectively dubbed a “recalcitrant metaphysician” or “honorary Continental” philosopher—labels that attach largely to metaphysically-minded, mainly British thinkers who, with varying degrees (...) of affiliation to idealism, resisted the twentieth-century trends of logical behaviorism and the “revolutionary” linguistic method. In the course of this paper, I situate Campbell’s version of Descartes’ argument within the broader history of the development of the hard problem. (shrink)

Solidarité est un maître-mot des discours éthiques et politiques contemporains. Sa relative banalisation ne devrait pourtant pas faire oublier l'intense travail de pensée, pluridisciplinaire, qui sous-tend son élaboration, en particulier au sein du solidarisme. On s'intéressera ici tout particulièrement à l'apport du protestantisme aux idées de coopération, d'équité, de service public et de don. Des idées qui témoignent de la force d'un projet éthique souvent inspiré de Kant mais aussi de la liberté critique des solidaristes, qui n'ont pas hésité à (...) réinterpréter le Kantisme dans le cadre d'une anthropologie soucieuse de pratiques concrètes. Solidarity is a keyword of contemporary ethical and political views. Although it has become a relatively commonplace term, one should not forget the hard work of underlying multidisciplinary thinking behind its elaboration, especially in Solidarism. This paper deals particularly with the contribution of Protestantism to the ideas of cooperation, equity, public service, and donation. These ideas witness to the power of an ethical project that is often inspired by Kant, but also by the critical freedom of the Solidarists, who did not hesitate to reinterpret Kantianism in the setting of an anthropology preoccupied with concrete practices. (shrink)

Deux assomptions ont été faites au sujet du refus du Pape Pie XII à aller au-delà de condamnations génériques de l'Holocauste Nazi. 1. La politique était dictée par peur de représailles contre les Catholiques et les Juifs. 2. La peur de représailles contre les Juifs était essentiellement une excuse pour ne rien faire ou rester au niveau de condamnations génériques. Mais les organisations juives elles-mêmes ont souvent cité la peur de représailles contre les Juifs comme la raison d'une restrainte dans (...) les déclarations publiques. Bien que la peur des représailles fut un élément formatif de la politique diplomatique du Vatican, la politique n'est pas venue de la peur, comme on peut le voir de l'histoire de condamnations génériques en d'autres contextes de guerre où les atrocités furent en jeu, entre autres en Arménie sous Benoît XV, en Espagne et Abyssinie sous Pie XI, de même qu'en Pologne et en Russie sous Pie XII. Deux fois Benoît XV fit un appel direct au Sultan de Turquie, mentionnant les Arménians spécifiquement trois fois, parlant de «souffrances indicibles», mais sans mentionner des noms personnels, des noms de lieu, des dates, des batailles. Bien que la condamnation resta générique, Benoît XV est considéré un héro national Arménien. Pendant la guerre civile en Espagne les républicains «incontrôlables» ont assassiné plus de cinq mille prêtres, moines et séminaristes pendant les trois premiers mois de la guerre et à la fin de. (shrink)

Au chapitre II de La Logique publiée en 1780, partie du Cours d’étude rédigé entre 1758 et 1767 à destination du Prince de Parme dont il était le précepteur, Condillac se sert du paradigme de la fenêtre forgé par Alberti afin de décrire la manière dont les représentations naissent dans l’esprit humain. L’enjeu est celui de la connaissance du monde extérieur : comment l’esprit humain peut-il acquérir des représentations ordonnées et fidèles d’un réel infini et changeant? Comment les représent...