My aim in this paper is to cast doubt on the idea of undercutting defeat by showing that it is beset by some serious problems. I examine a number of attempts to specify the conditions for undercutting defeat and find them to be defective. Absent further attempts, and on the basis of the considerations offered, I conclude that an adequate notion of undercutting defeat is lacking.

In this paper, I aim to do three things. First, I introduce the distinction between the Uniqueness Thesis (U) and what I call the Conditional Uniqueness Thesis (U*). Second, I argue that despite their official advertisements, some prominent uniquers effectively defend U* rather than U. Third, some influential considerations that have been raised by the opponents of U misfire if they are interpreted as against U*. The moral is that an appreciation of the distinction between U and U* helps to (...) clarify the contours of the uniqueness debate and to avoid a good deal of talking past each other. (shrink)

My main aim in this paper is to show that Kolodny’s intriguing argument against wide-scopism – ‘the Reasoning Argument’ – fails. A proper evaluation of the Reasoning Argument requires drawing two significant distinctions, one between thin and thick rational transitions and the other between bare-bones wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism) and embellished wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism). The Reasoning Argument is intended by Kolodny both as an argument against bare-bones wide-scopism and as an argument against embellished wide-scopism. I argue that despite its formidable virtue (...) of demonstrating the need for an account of thick subjective rationality, the Reasoning Argument works neither against bare-bones wide-scopism nor against embellished wide-scopism. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an answer to the question “what is it for a reason to be the reason for which a belief is held?” After arguing against the causal account of the reason-for-which connection, I present what I call the rationalization account, according to which a reason R a subject S has for a belief P is the reason for which S holds P just in case R is the premise in S’s rationalization for P, where the argument (...) from R to P becomes S’s rationalization in virtue of her endorsing it. In order to bring explicitly into view the version of the rationalization account I aim to argue for, I draw two distinctions, one between occurrent and dispositional endorsement and the other between personal and public endorsement. I show that the version of the rationalization account thus clarified receives intuitive support from various cases and survives some formidable objections that might be tempting to level against it. (shrink)

Epistemic infinitism is one of the logically possible responses to the epistemic regress problem, claiming that the justification of a given proposition requires an infinite and non-circular structure of reasons. In this paper, I will examine the dialectic between the epistemic infinitist and the regress skeptic, the sort of skeptic that bases his attack to the possibility of justification on the regress of reasons. I aim to show that what makes epistemic infinitism appear as well-equipped to silence the regress skeptic (...) is the very same thing that renders it susceptible to a powerful skeptical assault by the regress skeptic. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s famous Knowledge Argument moves from the premise that complete physical knowledge is not complete knowledge about experiences to the falsity of physicalism. In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the credibility of this and other well-known anti-physicalist arguments can be undermined by allowing that we possess a special category of concepts of experiences, phenomenal concepts, which are conceptually independent from physical/functional concepts. It is held by a large number of philosophers that since the conceptual independence of phenomenal (...) concepts does not imply the metaphysical independence of phenomenal properties, physicalism is safe. This paper distinguishes between two versions of this novel physicalist strategy –Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) – depending on how it cashes out “conceptual independence,” and argues that neither helps the physicalist cause. A dilemma for PCS arises: cashing out “conceptual independence” in a way compatible with physicalism requires abandoning some manifest phenomenological intuitions, and cashing it out in a way compatible with those intuitions requires dropping physicalism. The upshot is that contra Brian Loar and others, one cannot “have it both ways.”. (shrink)

Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) is arguably the most influential philosophical mystic in Islam. He is also a presentist. This paper responds to the arguments of contemporary philosophers, Norman Kretzmann, William Lane Craig, Garrett DeWeese, and Alan Padgett, who argue that divine atemporality and temporal presentism are incompatible, through the temporal ontology of Ibn ‘Arabī. Ibn ‘Arabī asserts that all entities in the universe are loci of manifestation of God’s most beautiful Names. These divine Names constitute sensible reality. The (...) principal response of Ibn ‘Arabī to the arguments of contemporary scholars is that the divine Names as they are manifested in the cosmos cannot be conflated with the divine Names as they are in themselves, which, in turn, cannot be conflated with God in His numinous essence. This allows him to simultaneously maintain the atemporality of God and temporal presentism. (shrink)

Modern insan eleştiriyi, neredeyse hava kadar, su kadar yaşamsal saymaktadır. Daha iyi bir dünyada yaşama isteği, verili olanlarla yetinmemeyi, gelenekleri, yerleşik değerleri sorgulamayı beraberinde getirmektedir. Felsefi eleştiri, sadece belli bir görüşe itiraz etmekle sınırlı bir tutum değildir; o aynı zamanda kendi dayanaklarının sağlamlığı ile de ilgilidir. Bilimlerde sıklıkla karşılaşılan yapıcı ya da olumlu eleştiri, başta felsefe olmak üzere sosyal bilimlerde yıkıcı bir niteliğe bürünmektedir. Felsefi eleştirinin yıkıcılığının nihilizmle sonuçlanmaması için bu eleştiri türünün de yapıcı bir nitelikle donatılması gerekir. Bu çalışmada (...) felsefi eleştirinin normları olabileceği öne sürülmektedir. Bu normlardan en bilinen ve kabul gören üç ilke tespit edilerek bu ilkelerin felsefi eleştirinin temellendirilmesinde oynadıkları rolün gösterilmesi amaçlanmaktadır. Böylelikle felsefenin de tıpkı bilimler gibi siyasal iktidarların hizmetinde olmak yerine, gerçeğin peşinden gidebileceğinin olası olduğu gösterilecektir. (shrink)

In _Knowing God_, Ismail Lala investigates the nature of God and whether we can truly know Him according to the influential mystic, Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ʿArabī, and his disciple, ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Qāshānī.

It is well known that Nash equilibria may not be Pareto-optimal; worse, a unique Nash equilibrium may be Pareto-dominated, as in Prisoners’ Dilemma. By contrast, we prove a previously conjectured result: every finite normal-form game of complete information and common knowledge has at least one Pareto-optimal nonmyopic equilibrium (NME) in pure strategies, which we define and illustrate. The outcome it gives, which depends on where play starts, may or may not coincide with that given by a Nash equilibrium. We use (...) some simple examples to illustrate properties of NMEs—for instance, that NME outcomes are usually, though not always, maximin—and seem likely to foster cooperation in many games. Other approaches for analyzing farsighted strategic behavior in games are compared with the NME analysis. (shrink)

Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 638/1240) is regarded as one of the foremost mystical thinkers in Islam. This paper explores the ways in which he and his followers distinguish between the reality of Muḥammad (al-ḥaqīqa al-Muḥammadiyya) or the light of Muḥammad (al-nūr al-Muḥammadī), as the metaphysical reality of Muḥammad, and his metahistorical manifestation as Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd Allāh. In his metaphysical reality, Muḥammad is the manifestation of the qur’ān, which ‘brings together’ the divine and His creation. Muḥammad’s metaphysical reality, as (...) the primary recipient of the divine outpouring, enables further differentiations of the divine to emerge in the form of the universe, and establishes his connection to the divine. Yet the Qur’an is also temporal in terms of being an historical act of revelation. Likewise, Muḥammad Ibn ‘Abd Allāh, in terms of his physical reality, was temporally circumscribed. It is in these ways, argues Ibn ‘Arabī and his acolytes, that Muḥammad, as reality and personality, brings together the divine and the temporal, in the same manner as the qur’ān/Qur’an respectively. (shrink)

Terminal kidney patients are faced with lower quality of life, restricted diets and higher morbidity and mortality rates while waiting for deceased donor kidney transplantation. Fortunately, living kidney donation has proven to be a better treatment alternative (e.g. in terms of waiting time and graft survival rates). We observed an inequality in the number of living kidney transplantations performed between the non-European and the European patients in our center. Such inequality has been also observed elsewhere in this field and it (...) has been suggested that this inequality relates to, among other things, attitude differences towards donation based on religious beliefs. In this qualitative research we investigated whether religion might indeed (partly) be the explanation of the inequalities in living donor kidney transplants (LDKT) among non-European patients. Fifty patients participated in focus group discussions and in-depth interviews. The interviews were conducted following the focus group method and analyzed in line with Grounded Theory. The qualitative data analyses were performed in Atlas.ti. We found that religion is not perceived as an obstacle to living donation and that religion actually promotes helping and saving the life of a person. Issues such as integrity of the body were not seen as barriers to LDKT. We observed also that there are still uncertainties and a lack of awareness about the position of religion regarding living organ donation within communities, confusion due to varying interpretations of Holy Scriptures and misconceptions regarding the process of donation. Faith leaders play an important educational role and their opinion is influential. This study has identified modifiable factors which may contribute to the ethnic disparity in our living donation program. We argue that we need to strive for more clarity and awareness regarding the stance of religion on the issue of living donation in the local community. Faith leaders could be key figures in increasing awareness and alleviating uncertainty regarding living donation and transplantation. (shrink)

Supervenience physicalism attempts to combine non-reductionism about properties with a physical determination thesis in such a way as to ensure physicalism. I argue that this attempt is unsuccessful: the specific supervenience relation in question is either strong enough to ensure reductionism, as in the case of strong supervenience, or too weak to yield physical determination, as in the case of global supervenience. The argument develops in three stages. First, I propose a distinction between two types of reductionism, definitional and scientific, (...) a distinction thanks to which we can reply to a standard objection against the ontological reductionism of strong supervenience. Second, I claim that because of "the problem of random distribution," global supervenience needs strengthening to be an adequate relation to capture our physicalistic intuitions; and I show, in accordance with Stalnaker's relevant proof, why a natural strengthening of global supervenience renders it equivalent to strong supervenience. Finally, I argue against Stalnaker about the possibility of a non-reductionist global supervenience. The upshot is that despite appearances, supervenience physicalism is a form of reductive physicalism. (shrink)

Religion and work are seldom discussed. The two have caused scholars to question the religion’s role with work. This paper reviews research on the integrate between religion and work by examining issues of concept, definition, measurement, and reviewing research that examines the relationship of work and religion with respect to: different times, types of people, organize human interactions and sources of knowledge. We then discuss the methodological requirement for reintegrating work studies into social institutional theory and indicate what the conceptual (...) payoffs of such integration might be. These payoffs include breaking new conceptual ground, resolving theoretical puzzles and envisioning the nature of new social institutions. (shrink)

This study is the first part of an attempt to settle a vigorous debate among historians of medieval philosophy by harnessing the resources of analytic philosophy. The debate is about whether Avicenna's epistemology is rationalist or empirical. To settle the debate, I first articulate in this article the three core theses of rationalism and one core thesis of empiricism. Then, I probe Avicenna's epistemology in his major works according to the first core thesis of rationalism (the intuition thesis). In the (...) end, I find Avicenna committed to this thesis in at least one substantive way, namely, in his claim to intuit the intelligible forms or essences. This suffices to count Avicenna as rationalist. In a subsequent article, I shall probe Avicenna's epistemology according to the other two core theses of rationalism, presenting further evidence that he was a rationalist, not an empiricist. (shrink)

Kierkegaard raises many issues in his account of the near sacri­fice of Isaac by his father. Responding to and critiquing Hegelian and Kantian depictions of Abraham, Kierkegaard moves to elevate Abraham into a position as a knight of faith. The Sunnī perception of the incident in the exegetical tradition is far more ethically unequivocal than that of the Latin philosophical tradi­tion. The ubiquitous Sufi theorist, Ibn ʿArabī, however, in a single act of interpretive ingenuity, managed to extirpate the central root (...) of contention raised by the philosophers when he alleges that Abraham was only ever commanded to sacrifice a ram. Despite his abiding commitment to spiritual unveiling and his insistence on the personal nature of God, Ibn ʿArabī advo­cates the employment of a Kantian criterion of universal ratio­nality to adjudicate between literal and metaphorical dreams. (shrink)

This study bridged the gap in the literature by exploring the overlaps between public financial accountability and religious sentiments. Previous studies have considered accountability in specific religions and religious organisations through the expositions of their application of accounting concepts and procedures. However, the ways in which religious sentiments affect public accountability are rarely researched. Yet, religion and religious sentiments play central roles in the lived experiences of many people and affect their decisions and perceptions. We used the issuance of Sukuk (...) as a way to understanding how religious sentiments can impact public financial accountability. Our analysis of the online commentaries on the media report of the Sukuk issuance relied on the theory of Symbolic Interactionism and an interpretivist research approach that recognises multiple realities and supports exploring people’s lived experiences. Symbolic Interactionism suggests that people create meanings from their interactions with others through symbols, actions and multiple roles in social settings. Our findings showed that the Sukuk issuance elicited conflicting symbolic meanings amongst Netizens that affected their opinions of governments’ efforts to enhance public infrastructure using alternative financing options. We argued that clarity on the intersection between religious sentiment and public financial accountability can lead to deeper understanding on the nature of public accountability. It could also support the design of appropriate accountability frameworks especially in contexts with social fissures capable of undermining public accountability. (shrink)

Messianism is an integral component of Abrahamic faiths. Yet the emergence of the Messiah is counterbalanced by the Antichrist. Apocalyptic visions of the future in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam...

The coronavirus has brought unprecedented shifts to our world. Fracturing social arrangements, yet evincing also long-time weaknesses therein, the pandemic beckons from us now new forms of organizi...

This paper discusses the contribution of a prolific author and an Egyptian scholar Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd and his hermeneutical approach to the Qur’an. The article argues that Abu Zayd is a Muslim reformer of the twentieth century through his takwil. His hermeneutical concept is questioning the “an-nash ” tradition of the Qur’an and the transformation of Arab culture from oral to text-oriented culture in the earliest history of the Qur’an. He differentiates between tanzil to takwil. This article further argues (...) that Abu Zayd’s hermeneutical concept should be understood from the history of revelation which speaks to a particular community and respond to a particular situation. Thus, the Qur’an itself is a living phenomenon and open for interpretation, rather than a closed corpus. (shrink)

In this article, I make a distinction between two versions of non-epistemicism about seeing, and bring explicitly into view and argue against a particular version defended by Dretske. More specifically, I distinguish non-epistemic seeing as non-conceptual seeing, where concept possession is assumed to be cognitively demanding, from non-epistemic seeing as seeing without noticing, where noticing is assumed to be relatively cognitively undemanding. After showing that Dretske argues for the possibility of non-epistemic seeing in both senses of the term, I target (...) his thesis that a given subject sees all the objects that are visually differentiated in her visual field, where visual differentiation does not require that she notice those objects. I argue that the notion of a visual field deployed in the formulation of the thesis cannot be phenomenal and therefore that seeing without noticing amounts to mere visual confrontation. I further argue that since the epistemicist does not deny the existence of seeing without noticing in the sense of mere visual confrontation, there is a clear sense in which Dretske's non-epistemicism turns out to be trivial. (shrink)

Karl Popper’s critique of idealism manifests itself with the application of his method, falsificationism, to metaphysics, epistemology, and social and political philosophy. According to Popper, who identifies himself as a philosophical realist, idealism has emerged as a result of the idea that reality cannot be known by reason and of the search for certainty which is erroneous, and it has begotten two mistaken and detrimental views. These views are historicism, the notion that history has an irresistible course, and holism, the (...) notion that social wholes are organic structures that amount to more than the individuals constituting them. Historicism and holism have become the philosophical underpinnings of closed societies throughout history, such as the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. Therefore, with a practical leaning, Popper actually takes aim at these pernicious consequences of idealism while criticizing it. In this study, idealism and the contours of Popper’s philosophy are examined, and then Popper’s metaphysical, epistemological, social, and political critiques against idealism are investigated. Keywords: Karl Popper, idealism, historicism, holism, falsificationism. (shrink)