This essay argues two main points by analyzing Sengzhao’s contentions regarding several basic Buddhist concepts such as emptiness, being, and nonbeing. First, Sengzhao synthesizes Daoist methods of argumentation into his description of the middle path and other Buddhist concepts. Second, he revives Daoist concepts, giving them Buddhist meaning and expressing them in Buddhist terms. In the process, he consciously differentiates Madhyamika Buddhism from earlier Buddhism as understood from a Daoist perspective, such as the teachings of the School of Original Non-Being (...) and the School of No-Mind. However, because his understanding of the middle path is not sufficiently deep, he wavers between Buddhist and Daoist understandings of terms such as prajñā and nirvāṇa, rest and movement, and name and reality. Despite these inconsistencies, his discourse, as the first attempt to differentiate Madhyamika from Daoism, is still a milestone in the development of Chinese Buddhism and has exerted a far-reaching influence on later generations. (shrink)

Our inspiring mentor, Vincent Shen, who served as Lee Chair Professor in Chinese Thought and Culture at the University of Toronto, passed away on Wednesday, November 14, 2018, at age sixty-nine. Professor Shen joined the Department of East Asian Studies of the University of Toronto in 2000 and was Department Chair from 2007 to 2010. He held joint appointments in Philosophy and Religious Studies. A specialist in Chinese Philosophy and Comparative Philosophy, he was a prolific writer and a highly regarded (...) scholar of East Asian studies, and his reputation earned him the position of Vice President of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.Professor Shen graduated from the Fu Jen Catholic... (shrink)

Wang Fuzhi’s 王夫之 remarks on Buddhism have not been given sufficient attention despite increasing research on him. The few works on this topic either focus on just one aspect of his view of Buddhism or fail to disclose the purpose and uniqueness of his attack of it. This essay analyzes his view of Buddhism comprehensively, in particular his insight into the paradox of Buddhist universal love and his rejection of Buddhist retribution and reincarnation from Confucian righteousness and qi 氣-monism. In (...) addition, it also explores the reason, context, and limitations of his criticism, that is, his reaction to the popular approach of “understanding Confucian classics through learning Buddhism” in the late Ming 明, his response to Zongmi’s 宗密 criticism of Confucian cosmology and human nature, and his misunderstanding of some Buddhist concepts. Yet his criticism is still illuminating to our understanding of the interaction of Confucianism with Buddhism and other religions. (shrink)

Liu, Xiaogan 劉笑敢, Zhuangzi’s Philosophy and Its Transformation 莊子哲學及其演變 Beijing 北京: People’s University of China Press, 2010, 433 pages.

Since being widely rediscovered in the beginning of the last century, Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 has been accepted as one of the most outstanding thinkers in Chinese history. His works are now attracting the eyes of many scholars in Mainland China. However, compared with others, Wang Fuzhi's commentary on the Zhuangzi 莊子, specifically his book the Zhuangzijie 莊子解, has not been thoroughly investigated. Tan Mingran, one of the scholars who has devoted himself to this field, has made a terrific contribution (...) in a recent monograph on Wang Fuzhi, An investigation of Wang Fuzhi's study on the Zhuangzi: Focusing on the Zhuangzijie. This treatise discusses almost all... (shrink)

In this essay, I draw upon Ellen J. Langer’s notions of mindlessness and mindfulness to identify and delineate Confucius’ views on mindfulness. Langer’s theory exemplifies a social-cognitive approach to mindfulness which is a prominent orientation in the extant research. I argue that Confucius, like Langer, rejects mindlessness that is characterised by an over-reliance on automatic responses based on past knowledge and experiences. Furthermore, Confucius supports Langerian mindfulness by underlining the importance of a flexible mindset that is demonstrated through making novel (...) distinctions, appreciating new perspectives and being sensitive to the context. But Confucius’ formulation of mindfulness goes beyond Langer’s by advocating the setting of one’s heart-mind on learning and the application of virtues. A Confucian interpretation of mindfulness debunks an East-West dichotomy on mindfulness and illustrates the harmonisation of the cognitive, affective, moral and social dimensions of mindfulness. (shrink)

The longstanding philosophical orthodoxy on counterfactuals holds, in part, that counterfactuals with metaphysically impossible antecedents are indiscriminately vacuously true. Drawing on a number of examples from across scientific practice, I argue that science routinely treats counterpossibles as non-vacuously true and also routinely treats other counterpossibles as false. In fact, the success of many central scientific endeavors requires that counterpossibles can be non-vacuously true or false. So the philosophical orthodoxy that counterpossibles are indiscriminately vacuously true is inconsistent with scientific practice. I (...) argue that this provides a conclusive reason to reject the orthodoxy. (shrink)

Philosophy of dialectical materialism and logic.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is transforming our world: today machines not only can mimic human actions but out-perform human agents in many activities, including learning and thinking. AI offers revolutionary solutions and new possibilities in transportation, business, communication, medicine, law, and other domains. While some welcome this brave new world, others fear the threats AI pose to people’s livelihoods, social relations, individuality, freedom, and perhaps even the very survival of the human species. No doubt some of this existential angst is exaggerated, (...) but AI does raise questions for our understanding of the world and ourselves that require serious reflection, including questions about adequacy of education in various aspects. This chapter offers, from the perspectives of John Dewey’s Pragmatism as well as Confucianism, some reflections on the role of the humanities in education in response to the opportunities and challenges of the development and widespread use of AI. It shows that Dewey and Confucius share similar views regarding the humanistic purpose of education and their philosophies of education offer arguments for why humanities education will be relevant, if not more important, when many jobs we are familiar with become obsolete. Their attitudes toward the economic motive in education will help us rethink the meaning of work in a “world without work.” At the same time, they offer a critical evaluation of contemporary humanities education, which have failed to realize their visions of personal cultivation and growth. Among its failings is the continued dichotomy between the humanities and the sciences. In the age of AI, it has become even more vital to integrate them to avoid science and technology from becoming materialistic and anti-human while the humanities become merely literary and without any means to transform the world. (shrink)

In two recent papers, Mr Robert Young maintains that all attempts by philosophers to bolster the-violation-of-law concept of miracles are bound to fail and propounds what he claims to be a novel non-reductivist concept of miracles which avoids the conceptual difficulties of the violation-model. His view of miracles is of god being ‘an active agent-factor in the set of factors which actually was causally operative’ [p. 123] in an event dubbed a miracle. God is put in among ‘the plurality of (...) causes’ [p. 122, S p. 33] that could determine the event, but if he acts in a miracle, then ‘his presence…alters the outcome from what it would have been if, contrary to fact , he had not been present’ [p. 122]. Young claims that his concept ‘is neither a violation of … laws nor is it a coincidental occurrence religiously interpreted’ [p. 122, S p. 33], and so it avoids the difficulties, which he thinks are faced by the violation-model, of having an intelligible notion of an occurrence of the physically impossible, and also the reductivism inherent in taking mere coincidences as miracles. He also suggests a procedure of settling the epistemological issue regarding particular alleged miracles, an inquiry he thinks he has made possible by having first given a sense to miracles. [p. 126]. (shrink)

This paper explores the ethical and conceptual implications of the findings from an empirical study (reported elsewhere) of decision-making capacity in anorexia nervosa. In the study, ten female patients aged thirteen to twenty-one years with a diagnosis of anorexia nervosa, and eight sets of parents, took part in semistructured interviews. The purpose of the interviews was to identify aspects of thinking that might be relevant to the issue of competence to refuse treatment. All the patient-participants were also tested using the (...) MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool—Treatment test of competence. This is a formalized, structured, interviewer-administered test of competence, which is a widely accepted clinical tool for determining capacity. The young women also completed five brief, self-administered questionnaires to assess their levels of psychopathology. The issues identified from the interviews are described under two headings: difficulties with thought processing and changes in values. The results suggest that competence to refuse treatment may be compromised in people with anorexia nervosa in ways that are not captured by traditional legal approaches. (shrink)

What is social entrepreneurship? In, particular, what’s so social about it? Understanding what social entrepreneurship is enables researchers to study the phenomenon and policy-makers to design measures to encourage it. However, such an understanding is lacking partly because there is no universally accepted definition of entrepreneurship as yet. In this paper, we suggest a definition of social entrepreneurship that intuitively accords with what is generally accepted as entrepreneurship and that captures the way in which entrepreneurship may be altruistic. Based on (...) this we provide a taxonomy of social entrepreneurship and identify a number of real cases from Asia illustrating the different forms it could take. (shrink)

Since the official history-writing is a defining aspect for the formation and consolidation of nation-states, it is crucial to explore the attempts to legitimize particular discourses regarding historical atrocities. The selective representations of the past, in this regard, contradict counter-memories and propagate hegemonic patterns of remembrance and/or forgetting of past crimes. This article accordingly addresses how the representations of counter-memories as threats to national security and the silencing of gender-specific experiences and remembrances by sanctioned historical narratives become manifest in the (...) history-making of the Turkish nation-state. By focusing on the Holocaust and the Armenian Genocide as two cases of crimes against humanity, it is intended to discuss the shifting positions and roles that the Turkish state adopts in the remembering and forgetting of historical offences. The article argues that through prioritizing national security and national interests, the securitization of memory reconstructs collective traumas of distinct ethnic and religious groups on the basis of a nation-state’s perceived internal and external threats. It also claims that the competing voices of women and their distinct experiences and patterns of remembrance and forgetting past atrocities are suppressed for the sake of the preservation of national security. By incorporating the issue of gender into the debate on the securitization of memory, this article elucidates the mismatch between positions of femininity and masculinity within the official national historiography of the Turkish state. (shrink)

I argue that an account of national responsibility, as both collective and inheritable, that allows for making sense of holding nations responsible as an entity for past international injustices and to make reparations for these injustices is not at odds with the demands of global egalitarianism. A global distributive commitment does not deny this account of national responsibility; to the contrary, we can properly appreciate the scope of national responsibility only in light of what global justice truly demands. Thus while (...) I agree with David Miller that we can hold nations accountable for past international injustices, I do not agree with Miller that this is in tension with global egalitarianism. (shrink)

Liberal nationalism is a boundary‐making project, and a feature of this boundary‐making enterprise is the belief that the compatriots have a certain priority over strangers. For this reason it is often thought that liberal nationalism cannot be compatible with the demands of global egalitarianism. In this essay, I examine the sense in which liberal nationalism privileges compatriots, and I argue that, properly understood, the idea of partiality for compatriots in the context of liberal nationalism is not at odds with global (...) equal concern for all persons. In particular, I argue that the three central goals and aspirations of liberal nationalism—promoting individual autonomy and cultural identity, the realization of deliberative democracy, and the aspiration for social justice within the state—do not entail or require a form of compatriot partiality that is inconsistent with the demands of global egalitarian justice. (shrink)

This article clarifies the relationship between moral personhood and moral management in ethical leadership from a Confucian perspective. Drawing from four Confucian classics, this study integrates the leader’s ethical values and activities undertaken to promote virtues in followers. The harmonisation of moral personhood and moral management is facilitated by two cardinal Confucian beliefs: innate human nature and moral self-cultivation. From a Confucian viewpoint, all human beings are endowed with a good nature that enables them to become virtuous persons and leaders. (...) Ethical leaders subdue their selfish desires and extend their natural moral feelings of true goodness, righteousness, propriety and wisdom to others. Moral personhood and moral management are inseparable because to cultivate oneself morally is to help others to become moral persons. By synthesising moral personhood and moral management, a Confucian worldview of ethical leadership contributes to leadership studies in two main ways: safeguarding against the leader’s abuse of power, and advancing organisational change through path-shaping. (shrink)

是東漢哲學家、思想家桓譚的主要論着，但早己亡佚。今存之輯本有《指海》內佚名氏輯本、清孫馮翼輯本、清嚴可均輯本、黃以周輯本，及近人朱謙之輯本，但均有不足。有鑒於此，吳則虞先生於1962年着有新輯本，收錄 二百餘條，以類相從，分為八卷，並添加附編，匯涵桓譚佚文、存疑、訂訛之文；記載桓譚事跡、著述、評論之文。 桓譚，后漢時人，官至給事中。博學多識，破讖緯迷妄，去虛妄偽飾，先於王充、張衡，具有唯物啟蒙學者之學識，是漢時哲學思想家。《新諭》是桓譚主要論着，但早已亡佚。據歷史記載，明有二卷本，清有孫之騌輯本，皆不 傳。另有《指海》內佚名氏輯本、清孫馮翼輯本、清嚴可均輯本、黃以周輯本及近人朱謙之輯本。從今日的學術、校勘、編排諸方面來看，諸本均有不足：或短椾零篇，漫無倫紀；或望文歸屬，強系篇名；或條目重復，內容雜陳 迭見；或引用刻本，多有遺漏；或雖沿用十七卷篇目之名稱，但其條目已不能再顯現原書各篇的思想內容。有鑒於此，吳則虞先生於一九六二年着有新輯本，收錄二百余條，以類相從，分為八卷，並添加附編，匯涵桓譚佚文、存 疑、訂訛之文；記載桓譚事跡、著述、評論之文；最后殿以輯校引用書目及版本之詳目，以便於讀者查閱與研究。此書成為目前桓譚《新論》集大成之著作。.

In the 1920s, John Dewey's followers in China, led by his student Hu Shih, attempted to put his pragmatism into practice in their quest for democracy. This essay compares Hu Shih's thought, especially his emphasis on pragmatism as method, with Dewey's philosophical positions and evaluates Hu's achievement as a pragmatist in the context of the tumultuous times he lived in. It assesses Hu's claim that the means to democracy lies in education rather than politics, since democracy as a way of (...) life requires a cultural renewal beyond institutional changes. It argues that a problem‐centered approach to social change does not preclude radical action, even revolution. But pragmatism is against gratuitous use of violence in the service of wholesale and abstract ideals advocated by various “isms.” While Hu's experiment of democracy in China is a significant episode in the history of pragmatism, its “failure” does not prove that there are inherent flaws in the pragmatist method, that pragmatism is unviable for China. The failure needs to be understood in the context of the pragmatist conception of experiment, in which failures are to be expected; what is important is to learn from them to achieve better results in the next stage of inquiry. Hu Shih's pragmatism contains lessons for pragmatists and for those interested in the continued quest for democracy in China—the experiment continues. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Decision-Making as a Broader ConceptJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)KeywordsCompetence, decision-making, capacity, anorexia nervosa, autonomy, values, identityWe thank Demian Whiting for the thoughtful critique of aspects of our paper (Tan et al. 2006a). A primary aim of our research was to provide empirical grounds on which to stimulate discussion about the nature of decision-making capacity (DMC). Whiting criticizes in particular the concept of (...) 'pathological values' that we suggested might be relevant in the assessment of DMC and in the related issue of deciding when a patient's refusal of beneficial treatment should be overridden.Whiting's central concern is with DMC. Whiting argues that the absence of pathological values should not be a criterion for DMC. We are unclear whether he is also arguing that pathological values do not provide a reason of any kind for overriding treatment refusal. At the end of the paper he writes: "we cannot justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values... on the grounds that these patients lack DMC" (2009, XX). This seems to leave open the possibility that we may be able to justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values on grounds other than that they lack DMC. As we wrote in our response to the discussants of our original paper, "The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests" (Tan et al. 2006b, 300).In deciding on whether to use compulsory treatment, there are other relevant factors that may need to be considered, such as the seriousness of the decision, which determines the threshold for competence. However, in this response we consider three issues. First, we argue that the current concept of DMC is by no means so clear cut or generally agreed upon as Whiting implies, and that some of the lack of clarity relates to pathological values. Second, that the concept of DMC is itself dependent on accounts of autonomy, and that it is plausible that pathological values can affect autonomy. Third, we directly consider the question of whether a coherent account of pathological values might be given based on a concept of authenticity.The Current Criteria for DMCWhiting argues that the current criteria for DMC are correct and that an additional criterion along the lines of absence of pathological values should not be added. This argument assumes that there is a clear and agreed understanding of the current criteria. We believe this is not the case for three reasons.(i) Whiting begins his account of DMC by saying that it is normally taken to include: "(1) [End Page 345] understanding (and appreciation)" (2009, 341). Already there is an area of dispute, and the use of parentheses reflects this. The concept of 'appreciation' was developed by Grisso and Applebaum (Grisso, Appelbaum, and Hill-Fotouhi 1997). It is not included in either English common law development, for example (ReC), nor in the criteria specified in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. More important, Grisso and Appelbaum in their comment on our original paper (2006) argue that our work advances thinking about 'appreciation' rather than requiring that we add new elements. The implication is that they believe that what we have called pathological values are relevant to the assessment of capacity and are already included in an account of capacity that incorporates the criterion of 'appreciation.' In our response, we argued that pathological values are not entirely captured within the account of appreciation that Grisso and Appelbaum had previously given. We do not want to revisit that issue here, but the point of relevance is that on one view (that of Grisso and Appelbaum) pathological values are already included in the current criteria for DMC as part of the concept of appreciation, whereas on Whiting's view they are not.(ii) Even if there were agreement over the wording and concepts relevant to DMC there is a further important issue: how are those concepts... (shrink)

This article highlights the significance of the “Za shuo” 雜說 (Miscellaneous discourses) series for the study of Han Yu’s 韓愈 (768–824) political ideology, which proposes a three-tier system of governance that is made up of the emperor, the feudal lords, and the bureaucrats. The emperor is the pinnacle of the system; he collaborates with his ministers to devise state policies in the inner palace. The feudal lords protect the emperor in the regional areas. The bureaucrats form the machinery of the (...) government and implement its policies. Challenging current scholarship, which treats each of Han Yu’s essays independently, the article proposes a new interpretation of them as a whole It argues that the three essays “Long shuo” 龍說 (Discourse on the dragon), “Yi shuo” 醫說 (Discourse on physicians), and “Ma shuo” 馬說 (Discourse on horses) form an organic unit that provides internally consistent counsel to the ruler for his governance, and that a fourth essay, “Ti Cui Shanjun zhuan” 題崔山君傳 (Foreword to the biography of Cui Shanjun), is likely an interpolation. Through unearthing the true meaning of this series, the article also narrows down its time of composition, which has traditionally been left unspecified. This article also reveals Han Yu’s attitude toward the revived concern over the enfeoffment of princes in medieval China and toward his political ideology, which is not purely Confucian. The article thus is a contribution to the study of both political history and literary creation in the mid-Tang era. (shrink)

This is a brief review of the Civics and Moral Education programme currently in use in Singapore schools. The paper offers an appraisal of the rationale provided in policy statements and of selected official and students' workbook descriptions of curricular content, activities and pedagogic theories. It shows that the Civics and Moral Education programme is more a matter of training students to absorb pragmatic values deemed to be important for Singapore to achieve social cohesion and economic success, rather than moral (...) education as the development of intrinsic commitment to and habituation in the practice of values, defended on autonomous moral considerations and not mere national expediency. Whilst educationists would be inclined to take issue with the programme's ultimate stand on values, they might warm to the pedagogy it prescribes in terms of the need for character-building by practice and experience, and also the importance of reasoning in the resolving of disputes and dilemmas. (shrink)

THE ARTICLE ARGUES THAT RECENT ATTEMPTS, TO REFUTE THE NEO-HUMEAN CONTENTION 1. THAT MIRACLES CONSIDERED AS VIOLATIONS OF NATURAL LAWS ARE IN PRINCIPLE UNIDENTIFIABLE, AND 2. THAT IN ANY CASE CRITICAL HISTORY WOULD ALWAYS RULE AGAINST ACCEPTING PURPORTED EVIDENCES FOR MIRACLES, ARE UNSUCCESSFUL EVEN THOUGH SUGGESTIVE IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. THEY EITHER EVADE THE ISSUE, OR FAIL TO FULLY COGNISE THE PURPORT OF THE CONTENTION. IT IS THEN ARGUED THAT ONCE MIRACLES ARE CONSIDERED WITHIN THEIR RELIGIOUS CONTEXT, SITUATIONS COULD BE (...) ENVISAGED WHERE THE NEO-HUMEAN POSITION WOULD BE UNDULY SCEPTICAL. (shrink)

In his stimulating and provocative collection of essays, Globalization and Justice, Kai Nielsen defends a cosmopolitan account of global justice. On the cosmopolitan view, as Nielsen understands it, individuals are entitled to equal consideration regardless of citizenship or nationality and global institutions should be arranged in such a way that each person's interest is given equal consideration. Nielsen's defense of cosmopolitan justice in this collection will be of no surprise to readers familiar with his socialist egalitarian commitments. Indeed, the internationalism (...) underlying socialism, Nielsen would argue, naturally entails the cosmopolitan account of justice. (shrink)

Anonymous didactic verse work, with paraphrase in Tamil and English; transcribed from a palm-leaf manuscript preserved in the Tanjore Maharaja Serfoji's Sarasvati Mahal Library.

YOUNG DESCRIBES A MIRACLE AS DESCRIPTION OF AN EVENT EFFECTED BY A SET OF CAUSALLY OPERATIVE FACTORS, A NECESSARY ONE OF WHICH BEING GOD’S PRESENCE. BUT THE ACCOUNT IS ONLY A REDRESSING OF THE VIOLATION-OF-LAW MODEL OF MIRACLES AND DOESN’T ESCAPE THE CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE MODEL NOR THE METHODOLOGICAL DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING IDENTIFYING AND ASCERTAINING PURPORTED MIRACLES.

In his paper ‘The Problem of the Meaning of “Miracle” , Professor Michael J. Langford proffers a concept of miracles that derives its intelligibility from the familiar phenomenon of the interaction of minds. Miraculous occurrences are portrayed as a variant, though abnormal, form of what we may term ‘inter-psychosomatic influence’, God's mind being the ultimate determinant. Langford thinks that to speak significantly of miracles, the phenomenon should be understood as ‘not totally dissimilar to our previous experience’ ; hence the familiar (...) notion of inter-psychosomatic influence. He thinks, too, that to talk of miracles as God interfering directly with the natural order would be to admit that such interference would not upset our concept of human nature and responsibility, a consequence which, to Langford, would make it inconsistent for Christians to maintain the free-will defence in the face of the problem of evil. According to Langford, human interference with the natural order does not vitiate the preconditions of human responsibility, and so he thinks that his concept of miracle, which is only ‘an extension of the same phenomenon, of a kind that also does not disrupt either human freedom or the stable order that is the necessary context for human life’ , will provide a way out of the dilemma. Having agreed with Hume and Flew that it would be unreasonable ‘to explain an unusual event by introducing divine causation if we hadn't already got independent evidence for the divine’ , Langford nevertheless maintains that ‘unthought possibilities’ should not be ruled out in the manner of a ‘prejudiced theorist’ . He thinks that such possibilities are left open in his concept of miracle, which makes the prior assumption that ‘independent grounds for belief in God’ exist before affirming that, given that God exists, miracles may be consistently and substantively understood in terms of a special distinguishable sort of inter-psychosomatic influence. He concedes, of course that his concept would rule out ‘those miracles that appear to be quite apart from the working of grace through human minds’ . I think, however, that Langford's thesis is faulty at key places. (shrink)