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Summary The truth-conditional theory of meaning states that the meaning of a proposition is given by its truth conditions.
Key works Davidson 1984; LePore & Ludwig 2007 (the latter is an edited collection).  These works presume something between semantic minimalism and the mere fixing of pronominal anaphora and similar phenomena.  A pragmatic, fully contextualist view is to be found in Bezuidenhout 2002.  A full development which challenges the semantics-pragmatics divide can be found in Recanati 2010.
Introductions Because almost all introductions to logic use truth-theoretic semantics, the best introductions to this area are introductory logic textbooks which do so. There are literally hundreds of these; each instructor will have his own favorite.
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  1. Scott AnderBois (2012). Focus and Uninformativity in Yucatec Maya Questions. Natural Language Semantics 20 (4):349-390.
    Crosslinguistically, questions frequently make crucial use of morphosyntactic elements which also occur outside of questions. Chief among these are focus, disjunctions, and wh-words with indefinite semantics. This paper provides a compositional account of the semantics of wh-, alternative, and polar questions in Yucatec Maya (YM), which are composed primarily of these elements. Key to the account is a theory of disjunctions and indefinites (extending work by others) which recognizes the inherently inquisitive nature of these elements. While disjunctions and indefinites are (...)
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  2. Irving H. Anellis (2011). Peirce's Truth-Functional Analysis and the Origin of the Truth Table. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (1):87 - 97.
    We explore the technical details and historical evolution of Charles Peirce's articulation of a truth table in 1893, against the background of his investigation into the truth-functional analysis of propositions involving implication. In 1997, John Shosky discovered, on the verso of a page of the typed transcript of Bertrand Russell's 1912 lecture on ?The Philosophy of Logical Atomism? truth table matrices. The matrix for negation is Russell's, alongside of which is the matrix for material implication in the hand of Ludwig (...)
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  3. N. Asher (2000). Truth Conditional Discourse Semantics for Parentheticals. Journal of Semantics 17 (1):31-50.
    It has been often argued that parentheticals, discourse adverbials and certain parts of speech like interjections do not contribute to the truth conditional content of the assertions of which they are part. In this paper I argue that many of these constructions do contribute a truth conditional content, and I propose a semantics for parentheticals and discourse adverbials that treats these constructions similarly to SDRT's treatment of presuppositions. I also point out differences between standard presupposition triggers on the one hand (...)
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  4. Nicholas Asher (1992). A Default, Truth Conditional Semantics for the Progressive. Linguistics and Philosophy 15 (5):463 - 508.
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  5. Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia (2007). What Does '&' Mean? The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 5:45-50.
    Using conjunction as an example, I show a technical and philosophical problem when trying to conciliate the currently prevailing views on the meaning of logical connectives: the inferientialist (also called 'syntactic') one based on introduction and elimination rules, and the representationalist (also called 'semantic') one given through truth tables. Mostly I show that the widespread strategy of using the truth theoretical definition of logical consequence to collapse both definitions must be rejected by inferentialists. An important consequence of my argument is (...)
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  6. Alex Barber (2003). Truth Conditions and Their Recognition. In , Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press.
    This paper offers and defends a particular version of the view that it is the intentions with which it is performed that determine the truth conditions of an utterance. A competing version, implied by Grice's work on meaning, is rejected as inadequate. This latter is incompatible with the phenomenon of anti-lying: performing a true utterance with the intention that one's audience believe it to be false. In place of the quasi-Gricean version, the paper maintains that an utterance is true-iff-p just (...)
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  7. Stephen Barker (2011). Truth-Bearers and the Unsaid. In Ken Turner (ed.), Making Semantics Pragmatic. CUP.
    I argue that conventional implicatures embed in logical compounds, and are non-truth-conditional contributors to sentence meaning. This, I argue has significant implications for how we understand truth, truth-conditional content, and truth-bearers.
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  8. Anne Bezuidenhout (2002). Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):105-134.
    Introduction The mainstream view in philosophy of language is that sentence meaning determines truth-conditions. A corollary is that the truth or falsity of an utterance depends only on what words mean and how the world is arranged. Although several prominent philosophers (Searle, Travis, Recanati, Moravcsik) have challenged this view, it has proven hard to dislodge. The alternative view holds that meaning underdetermines truth-conditions. What is expressed by the utterance of a sentence in a context goes beyond what is encoded in (...)
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  9. Anne Bezuidenhout (2002). Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. Noûs 36 (s16):105 - 134.
    Introduction The mainstream view in philosophy of language is that sentence meaning determines truth-conditions. A corollary is that the truth or falsity of an utterance depends only on what words mean and how the world is arranged. Although several prominent philosophers (Searle, Travis, Recanati, Moravcsik) have challenged this view, it has proven hard to dislodge. The alternative view holds that meaning underdetermines truth-conditions. What is expressed by the utterance of a sentence in a context goes beyond what is encoded in (...)
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  10. Ben Blumson (forthcoming). A Never-Ending Story. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 14 (40).
    Take a strip of paper with 'once upon a time there'‚ written on one side and 'was a story that began'‚ on the other. Twisting the paper and joining the ends produces John Barth’s story Frame-Tale, which prefixes 'once upon a time there was a story that began'‚ to itself. I argue that the ability to understand this sentence cannot be explained by tacit knowledge of a recursive theory of truth in English.
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  11. Ben Blumson (2010). Maps and Meaning. Journal of Philosophical Research 35:123-128.
    It's possible to understand an infinite number of novel maps. I argue that Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi's compositional semantics of maps cannot explain this possibility, because it requires an infinite number of semantic primitives. So the semantics of maps is puzzlingly different from the semantics of language.
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  12. Steven E. Boër & William G. Lycan (1980). A Performadox in Truth-Conditional Semantics. Linguistics and Philosophy 4 (1):71 - 100.
    An argument is developed at some length to show that any semantical theory which treats superficially nonperformative sentences as being governed by performative prefaces at some level of underlying structure must either leave those sentences semantically uninterpreted or assign them the wrong truth-conditions. Several possible escapes from this dilemma are examined; it is tentatively concluded that such hypotheses as the Ross-Lakoff-Sadock Performative Analysis should be rejected despite their attractions.
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  13. E. J. Borowski (1976). English and Truth Functions. Analysis 36 (2):96 - 100.
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  14. Robert B. Brandom (1994). Unsuccessful Semantics. Analysis 54 (3):175-178.
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  15. B. Brogaard (2012). Truth-Conditional Pragmatics * by Francois Recanati. Analysis 72 (4):846-849.
  16. Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno (2008). Counterfactuals and Context. Analysis 68 (297):39–46.
    It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals. The following putative counter-examples are frequently cited, respectively.
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  17. H. G. Callaway (2008). Meaning Without Analyticity: Essays on Logic, Language and Meaning. Cambridge Scholars.
    Meaning without Analyticity draws upon the author’s essays and articles, over a period of 20 years, focused on language, logic and meaning. The book explores the prospect of a non-behavioristic theory of cognitive meaning which rejects the analytic-synthetic distinction, Quinean behaviorism, and the logical and social-intellectual excesses of extreme holism. Cast in clear, perspicuous language and oriented to scientific discussions, this book takes up the challenges of philosophical communication and evaluation implicit in the recent revival of the pragmatist tradition—especially those (...)
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  18. H. G. Callaway (1993). Review of Evnine, Donald Davidson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 43 (October):555-560.
    Tracing the background of Davidson’s work in the positivists’ philosophical emigration of the 30’s and in Quine, Evnine’s “Introduction” offers a “map of the terrain to be covered” which stresses the “rationalistic” character of Davidson’s views on holism and rationality. Thus, “his main philosophical concerns ... language, the mental and action...are the ingredients of a philosophical anthropology.” In spite of Quinean roots, the view is that “Davidson has now wholly removed himself, philosophically speaking, from the empiricist tradition.” The result: a (...)
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  19. H. G. Callaway (1982). Sense, Reference and Purported Reference. Logique Et Analyse 25 (March):93-103.
    This paper argues for the importance of the concept of purported reference in understanding linguistic meaning and reference.
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  20. H. G. Callaway (1981). Semantic Theory and Language: A Perspective (Reprinted in Callaway 2008, Meaning Without Analyticity). Proceedings of the Southwestern Philosophical Association; Philosophical Topics 1981 (summer):93-103.
    Chomsky’s conception of semantics must contend with both philosophical skepticism and contrary traditions in linguistics. In “Two Dogmas” Quine argued that “...it is non-sense, and the root of much non-sense, to speak of a linguistic component and a factual component in the truth of any individual statement.” If so, it follows that language as the object of semantic investigation cannot be separated from collateral information. F. R. Palmer pursues a similar contention in his recent survey of issues in semantic theory: (...)
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  21. Fabrizio Cariani (2012). Truth-Conditional Pragmatics. By Francois Recanati. (Oxford UP, 2010. Pp. Vii + 324. Price £55.00 (Hardcover), £18.99 (Paperback).). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):415-418.
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  22. Ian F. Carlstrom (1990). A Truth-Functional Logic for Near-Universal Generalizations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 19 (4):379 - 405.
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  23. Lucio Chiaraviglio & Albert M. Sweet (1964). The Pragmatics of Truth Functions. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 5 (3):191-198.
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  24. Lenny Clapp (2012). Three Challenges for Indexicalism. Mind and Language 27 (4):435-465.
    Indexicalism is a strategy for defending truth-conditional semantics from under-determination arguments. According to indexicalism the class of indexical expressions includes not only the obvious indexicals, e.g. demonstratives and personal pronouns, but also unobvious indexical expressions, expressions which allegedly have been discovered to be indexicals. This paper argues that indexicalism faces significant obstacles that have yet to be overcome. The issue that divides indexicalism and truth-conditional pragmatics is first clarified. And then three general problems for indexicalism are presented, and some potential (...)
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  25. Lenny Clapp (2012). Indexical Color Predicates: Truth Conditional Semantics Vs. Truth Conditional Pragmatics. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (2):71-100.
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  26. Lenny Clapp (2002). Davidson's Program and Interpreted Logical Forms. Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (3):261-297.
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  27. Joseph T. Clark (1952). Truth-Functional Conjunction. Philosophical Studies of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 3:24-25.
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  28. Finn Collin & Anders Engstrøm (2001). Metaphor and Truth-Conditional Semantics: Meaning as Process and Product. Theoria 67 (1):75-92.
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  29. Neil Cooper & Pascal Engel (eds.) (1991). New Inquiries Into Meaning and Truth. St. Martin's Press.
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  30. Stephen Crain & Drew Khlentzos (2010). The Logic Instinct. Mind and Language 25 (1):30-65.
    We present a series of arguments for logical nativism, focusing mainly on the meaning of disjunction in human languages. We propose that all human languages are logical in the sense that the meaning of linguistic expressions corresponding to disjunction (e.g. English or , Chinese huozhe, Japanese ka ) conform to the meaning of the logical operator in classical logic, inclusive- or . It is highly implausible, we argue, that children acquire the (logical) meaning of disjunction by observing how adults use (...)
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  31. Robert C. Cummins, Truth and Meaning.
    D O N A L D D AV I D S O N’S “ Meaning and Truth,” re vo l u t i o n i zed our conception of how truth and meaning are related (Davidson    ). In that famous art i c l e , Davidson put forw a rd the bold conjecture that meanings are satisfaction conditions, and that a Tarskian theory of truth for a language is a theory of meaning for that language. (...)
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  32. Robert C. Cummins (1979). Intention, Meaning and Truth-Conditions. Philosophical Studies 35 (4):345 - 360.
    In this paper, I sketch a revision of jonathan bennett's "meaning-Nominalist strategy" for explaining the conventional meanings of utterance-Types. Bennett's strategy does not explain sentence-Meaning by appeal to sub-Sentential meanings, And hence cannot hope to yield a theory that assigns a meaning to every sentence. I revise the strategy to make it applicable to predication and identification. The meaning-Convention for a term can then be used to fix its satisfaction conditions. Adapting a familiar trick of tarski's, We can then determine (...)
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  33. Robert C. Cummins & Dale Gottlieb (1972). On an Argument for Truth-Functionality. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (3):265 - 269.
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  34. Donald Davidson (2010). Truth and Meaning. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. 304 - 323.
  35. Donald Davidson (2006). The Essential Davidson. Oxford University Press.
    The Essential Davidson compiles the most celebrated papers of one of the twentieth century's greatest philosophers. It distills Donald Davidson's seminal contributions to our understanding of ourselves, from three decades of essays, into one thematically organized collection. A new, specially written introduction by Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig, two of the world's leading authorities on his work, offers a guide through the ideas and arguments, shows how they interconnect, and reveals the systematic coherence of Davidson's worldview. Davidson's philosophical program is (...)
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  36. Donald Davidson (1984). Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation. Oxford University Press.
    Now in a new edition, this volume updates Davidson's exceptional Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (1984), which set out his enormously influential philosophy of language. The original volume remains a central point of reference, and a focus of controversy, with its impact extending into linguistic theory, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. Addressing a central question--what it is for words to mean what they do--and featuring a previously uncollected, additional essay, this work will appeal to a wide audience of philosophers, linguists, (...)
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  37. Donald Davidson (1968). On Saying That. Synthese 19 (1-2):130-146.
  38. Donald Davidson (1967). Truth and Meaning. Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
  39. Mauro Nasti De Vincentis (2004). From Aristotle's Syllogistic to Stoic Conditionals: Holzwege or Detectable Paths? Topoi 23 (1):113-137.
    This paper is chiefly aimed at individuating some deep, but as yet almost unnoticed, similarities between Aristotle's syllogistic and the Stoic doctrine of conditionals, notably between Aristotle's metasyllogistic equimodality condition (as stated at APr. I 24, 41b27–31) and truth-conditions for third type (Chrysippean) conditionals (as they can be inferred from, say, S.E. P. II 111 and 189). In fact, as is shown in §1, Aristotle's condition amounts to introducing in his (propositional) metasyllogistic a non-truthfunctional implicational arrow '', the truth-conditions of (...)
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  40. Heather Dyke (2003). Tensed Meaning: A Tenseless Account. Journal of Philosophical Research 28:65-81.
    If, as the new B-theory of time maintains, tensed sentences have tenseness truth conditions, it follows that it is possible for two sentence-tokens to have the same truth conditions but different meanings. This conclusion forces a rethink of the traditional identification of truth-conditions with meaning. There is an aspect of the meanings of tensed sentences that is not captured by their truth conditions, and that has so far eluded explanation. In this paper I intend to locate, examine, and explain this (...)
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  41. Pascal Engel (2007). Review of Ernest Lepore, Kirk Ludwig, Donald Davidson's Truth-Theoretic Semantics. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (8).
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  42. Aleksandar Fatic (1995). Kazna kao metafora (Punishment as a Metaphor). Sluzbeni list SRJ.
    The book explores the communicative and deliberative context for punishment and discusses the extent to which institutional punishment is an implicit language, conveying not only the values and norms, but also the collective experience and collective expectations of a community.
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  43. Kenneth G. Ferguson (1987). Truth Conditions for "Might" Counterfactuals. Review of Metaphysics 40 (3):483 - 494.
    According to david lewis, When the conditional excluded middle is accepted for would-Asserting counterfactuals, It becomes difficult or impossible to define their might-Asserting counterparts. But I provide a definition of "might" counterfactuals that does agree with cem: a "might" counterfactual is true iff its consequent is true at some antecedent-World within a set whose membership is determined by appeal to various categories of possibility.
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  44. Jerome Frazee (1988). A New Symbolic Representation of the Basic Truth-Functions of the Propositional Calculus. History and Philosophy of Logic 9 (1):87-91.
    As with mathematics, logic is easier to do if its symbols and their rules are better. In a graphic way, the logic symbols introduced in thís paper show their truth-table values, their composite truth-functions, and how to say them as either ?or? or ?if ? then? propositions. Simple rules make the converse, add or remove negations, and resolve propositions.
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  45. Joseph S. Fulda (2008). Pragmatics, Montague, and “Abstracts From Logical Form”. Journal of Pragmatics 40 (6):1146-1147.
    In "Abstracts from Logical Form I/II," it was stated in the abstract that it remained necessary to put the pilot experiments into a "comprehensive theory." It is suggested here that the comprehensive theory is nothing other than classical logic modestly extended to include higher-order predicates, functions, and epistemic predicates, as well as a quantitative quantifier to deal with cases other than "all" (taken literally) or "some" in the sense of at least one. It is further suggested that up to a (...)
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  46. Joseph S. Fulda (2006). Abstracts From Logic Form: An Experimental Study of the Nexus Between Language and Logic I. Journal of Pragmatics 38 (5):778-807.
    See the abstract for the "Abstracts from Logical Form II".
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  47. Joseph S. Fulda (2006). Abstracts From Logical Form: An Experimental Study of the Nexus Between Language and Logic II. Journal of Pragmatics 38 (6):925-943.
    This experimental study provides further support for a theory of meaning first put forward by Bar-Hillel and Carnap in 1953 and foreshadowed by Asimov in 1951. The theory is the Popperian notion that the meaningfulness of a proposition is its a priori falsity. We tested this theory in the first part of this paper by translating to logical form a long, tightly written, published text and computed the meaningfulness of each proposition using the a priori falsity measure. We then selected (...)
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  48. Nina Gierasimczuk & Jakub Szymanik (2009). Branching Quantification V. Two-Way Quantification. Journal of Semantics 26 (4):329-366.
    Next SectionWe discuss the thesis formulated by Hintikka (1973) that certain natural language sentences require non-linear quantification to express their meaning. We investigate sentences with combinations of quantifiers similar to Hintikka's examples and propose a novel alternative reading expressible by linear formulae. This interpretation is based on linguistic and logical observations. We report on our experiments showing that people tend to interpret sentences similar to Hintikka sentence in a way consistent with our interpretation.
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  49. Brendan S. Gillon (1990). Truth Theoretical Semantics and Ambiguity. Analysis 50 (3):178 - 182.
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  50. Kathrin Glüer (2012). Theories of Meaning and Truth Conditions. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), The Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Continuum International Pub..
    Or, in Donald Davidson’s much quoted words: “What is it for words to mean what they do?” (Davidson 1984, xiii). Davidson himself suggested approaching this matter by asking two different questions: What form should a formal semantics take? And: What is it that makes a semantic theory correct for a particular language, i.e. what determines meaning? The second question concerns the place of semantic facts in a wider metaphysical space: How do these facts relate to non-semantic facts? Can they be (...)
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