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  1. Edison Barrios (2012). Knowledge of Grammar and Concept Possession. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):577-606.
    This article deals with the cognitive relationship between a speaker and her internal grammar. In particular, it takes issue with the view that such a relationship is one of belief or knowledge (I call this view the ‘Propositional Attitude View’, or PAV). I first argue that PAV entails that all ordinary speakers (tacitly) possess technical concepts belonging to syntactic theory, and second, that most ordinary speakers do not in fact possess such concepts. Thus, it is concluded that speakers do not (...)
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  2. Noam Chomsky (2005). Language and Mind : Current Thoughts on Ancient Problems. In Anjum P. Saleemi, Ocke-Schwen Bohn & Albert Gjedde (eds.), In Search of a Language for the Mind-Brain: Can the Multiple Perspectives Be Unified? Aarhus University Press ;.
  3. Noam Chomsky (1965). Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. The Mit Press.
    Chomsky proposes a reformulation of the theory of transformational generative grammar that takes recent developments in the descriptive analysis of particular ...
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  4. Noam Chomsky & Jerrold J. Katz (1974). What the Linguist is Talking About. Journal of Philosophy 71 (12):347-367.
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  5. Michael Devitt (2008). Explanation and Reality in Linguistics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (2):203-231.
    This paper defends Some anti-Chomskian themes in Ignorance of Language (Devitt 2006a) from, the criticisms of John Collins (2007, 2008a) and Georges Rey (2008). It argues that there is a linguistic reality external to the mind and that it is theoretically interesting to study it. If there is this reality, we have good reason to think that grammars are more or less true of it. So, the truth of the grammar of a language entails that its rules govern linguistic reality, (...)
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  6. Michael Devitt (2006). Intuitions in Linguistics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.
    Linguists take the intuitive judgments of speakers to be good evidence for a grammar. Why? The Chomskian answer is that they are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty. The paper takes a different view. It argues for a naturalistic and non-Cartesian view of intuitions in general. They are empirical central-processor responses to phenomena differing from other such responses only in being immediate and fairly unreflective. Applying this to linguistic intuitions yields an (...)
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  7. Michael Devitt (2006). Ignorance of Language. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
    The Chomskian revolution in linguistics gave rise to a new orthodoxy about mind and language. Michael Devitt throws down a provocative challenge to that orthodoxy. What is linguistics about? What role should linguistic intuitions play in constructing grammars? What is innate about language? Is there a 'language faculty'? These questions are crucial to our developing understanding of ourselves; Michael Devitt offers refreshingly original answers. He argues that linguistics is about linguistic reality and is not part of psychology; that linguistic rules (...)
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  8. Guy Longworth (2009). Ignorance of Linguistics: A Note on Devitt's Ignorance of Language. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):21-34.
    Michael Devitt has argued that Chomsky, along with many other Linguists and philosophers, is ignorant of the true nature of Generative Linguistics. In particular, Devitt argues that Chomsky and others wrongly believe the proper object of linguistic inquiry to be speakers' competences, rather than the languages that speakers are competent with. In return, some commentators on Devitt's work have returned the accusation, arguing that it is Devitt who is ignorant about Linguistics. In this note, I consider whether there might be (...)
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  9. W. V. Quine (1970). Methodological Reflections on Current Linguistic Theory. Synthese 21 (3/4):386 - 398.
  10. Georges Rey (2006). Conventions, Intuitions and Linguistic Inexistents. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):549-569.
    Elsewhere I have argued that standard theories of linguistic competence are committed to taking seriously talk of “representations of” standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”), such as NPs, VPs, morphemes, phonemes, syntactic and phonetic features. However, it is very doubtful there are tokens of these “things” in space and time. Moreover, even if were, their existence would be completely inessential to the needs of either communication or serious linguistic theory. Their existence is an illusion: an extremely stable perceptual state we regularly enter (...)
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  11. Georges Rey (2003). Intentional Content and a Chomskian Linguistics. In Alex Barber (ed.), Epistemology of Language. Oxford University Press. 140--186.
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  12. Barry C. Smith (2010). Speech Sounds and the Direct Meeting of Minds. In Matthew Nudds & Casey O'Callaghan (eds.), New Essays on Sound and Perception. Oxford University Press.
  13. Barry C. Smith (ed.) (2006). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
    Ernie Lepore and Barry Smith present the definitive reference work for this diverse and fertile field of philosophy. A superb international team contribute forty brand-new essays covering topics from the nature of language to meaning, truth, and reference, and the interfaces of philosophy of language with linguistics, psychology, logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. It will be an essential resource for anyone working in the central areas of philosophy, for linguists interested in syntax, semantics, and pragmatics, and for psychologists and cognitive scientists (...)
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  14. Barry C. Smith (2006). What I Know When I Know a Language. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford University Press.
    EVERY speaker of a language knows a bewildering variety of linguistic facts, and will come to know many more. It is knowledge that connects sound and meaning. Questions about the nature of this knowledge cannot be separated from fundamental questions about the nature of language. The conception of language we should adopt depends on the part it plays in explaining our knowledge of language. This chapter explores options in accounting for language, and our knowledge of language, and defends the view (...)
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  15. Barry C. Smith (2006). What We Know When We Know a Language. In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oup Oxford.
    EVERY speaker of a language knows a bewildering variety of linguistic facts, and will come to know many more. It is knowledge that connects sound and meaning. Questions about the nature of this knowledge cannot be separated from fundamental questions about the nature of language. The conception of language we should adopt depends on the part it plays in explaining our knowledge of language. This chapter explores options in accounting for language, and our knowledge of language, and defends the view (...)
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  16. Barry C. Smith (2001). Idiolects and Understanding: Comments on Barber. Mind and Language 16 (3):284–289.
  17. Scott Soames (1984). Linguistics and Psychology. Linguistics and Philosophy 7 (2):155 - 179.
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  18. Stephen P. Stich (1972). Grammar, Psychology, and Indeterminacy. Journal of Philosophy 64 (22):799-818.
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