L’auteur présente un nouveau projet éducatif rattaché au modčle de société bien ordonnée de Rawls. L’élément le plus important de ce projet est l’éducation morale. Le libéralisme moderne assimile l’éducation morale ŕ l’instruction civique. L’auteur trouve que cette maničre de concevoir la participation individuelle ŕ la vie sociale et politique est intéressante et utile. Cependant, quelle forme le fondement anthropologique de ces conceptions revęt-il? L’idée męme de l’ętre humain – exclusivement en tant qu’individu doué de raison – y est prise (...) pour sujet du processus éducationnel. L’auteur essaie de montrer que cette idée est trčs proche du concept de l’ętre humain que l’on pourrait qualifier de virtuel. (shrink)

Die Autorin stellt ein neues Erziehungsprojekt vor, das mit Rawls’ Modell der vernünftig eingerichteten Gesellschaft in Zusammenhang steht. Das wichtigste Element dieses Projektes ist die moralische Erziehung. Der moderne Liberalismus setzt die moralische Erziehung mit der bürgerlichen Erziehung gleich. Diese Auffassung der Teilnahme am sozialen und politischen Leben findet die Autorin interessant und notwendig. Doch wie ist es um die anthropologische Fundiertheit dieser Begriffe bestellt? Die Idee des menschlichen Wesens – als eines rationalen Individuums – setzt dieses als ein Subjekt (...) des Erziehungsprozesses voraus. Die Autorin versucht zu zeigen, dass diese Idee dem Konzept des menschlichen Wesens, das als virtuell bezeichnet werden könnte, sehr nahe kommt. (shrink)

The author presents a new education project connected with Rawls’ model of a well-ordered society. The most important element of this project is moral education. Modern liberalism identifies moral education with civic education. The author finds this way of thinking about one’s participation in social and political life rather interesting and needed. However, what does the anthropological foundation of these concepts look like? The very idea of human being – as a rational individual alone – is assumed as the subject (...) of the process of education. The author tries to show that this idea is very close to the concept of human being one could call virtual. (shrink)

Conceptual primitives and semantic universals are the cornerstones of a semantic theory which Anna Wierzbicka has been developing for many years. Semantics: Primes and Universals is a major synthesis of her work, presenting a full and systematic exposition of that theory in a non-technical and readable way. It delineates a full set of universal concepts, as they have emerged from large-scale investigations across a wide range of languages undertaken by the author and her colleagues. On the basis of empirical (...) cross-linguistic studies it vindicates the old notion of the "psychic unity of mankind", while at the same time offering a framework for the rigorous description of different languages and cultures. (shrink)

Introduction 1. Language and meaning Nothing is as easily overlooked, or as easily forgotten, as the most obvious truths. The tenet that language is a tool ...

Making decisions can be tough, but how do you know it s the right one and how can you be sure that unconscious biases aren t distorting your thinking? In Risky Business, Anna Withers and Mark Withers draw on decades of research in the fields of psychology, behavioral economics and neuroscience to explain why are so-called rational brains are frequently fooled by over 100 powerful unconscious biases. At the same time they provide a straightforward framework everyone can use, where (...) these biases are embodied into eight memorable characters that help us to avoid these pitfalls and make better decisions.". (shrink)

This article investigates the challenges posed by the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology and its connection to reality. Neurophenomenological research seeks to understand the intricate relationship between human consciousness, cognition, and the underlying neural processes. However, the subjective nature of conscious experiences presents unique epistemic challenges in determining the reliability of the knowledge generated in this research. Personal factors such as beliefs, emotions, and cultural backgrounds influence subjective experiences, which vary from individual to individual. On the other hand, scientific knowledge (...) aims to uncover universal truths based on empirical observations and objective principles. Reconciling the subjective and objective realms presents a significant challenge in determining the reliability of knowledge generated through neurophenomenological research. This article aims to examine the inherent limitations and challenges of neurophenomenological research to shed light on the complexities involved in understanding the nature of knowledge itself. This article highlights that the ontological implications of the reliability of knowledge in neurophenomenology arise from the question of how subjective experiences relate to objective reality. Understanding the neural correlates and mechanisms behind subjective experiences can provide insight into the underlying ontological nature of consciousness. (shrink)

Nothing seems as certain as death. However, what if life continues digitally after death? Companies and initiatives such as Amazon, Storyfile, Here After AI, Forever Identity and LifeNaut are dedicated to precisely this objective: using avatars, records, and other digital content of the deceased, they strive to enable a digital continuation of life. The deceased live on digitally, and at times, these can even appear very much alive-perhaps too alive? This article explores the ethical implications of these technologies, commonly known (...) as Death Tech. With the advancement of artificial intelligence, Death Tech will inevitably transform mourning practices, our perception of death, and how we cope with its reality in the coming years. In this article, it is demonstrated that Death Tech can contribute to individual grief support, education, and a vibrant culture of remembrance. However, it is crucial to recognise that the Digital Afterlife is not a paradise but necessitates active designing and ethical deliberation. DOI 10.5771/0010-3497-2023-3-427. (shrink)

Enjoying great popularity in decision theory, epistemology, and philosophy of science, Bayesianism as understood here is fundamentally concerned with epistemically ideal rationality. It assumes a tight connection between evidential probability and ideally rational credence, and usually interprets evidential probability in terms of such credence. Timothy Williamson challenges Bayesianism by arguing that evidential probabilities cannot be adequately interpreted as the credences of an ideal agent. From this and his assumption that evidential probabilities cannot be interpreted as the actual credences of human (...) agents either, he concludes that no interpretation of evidential probabilities in terms of credence is adequate. I argue to the contrary. My overarching aim is to show on behalf of Bayesians how one can still interpret evidential probabilities in terms of ideally rational credence and how one can maintain a tight connection between evidential probabilities and ideally rational credence even if the former cannot be interpreted in terms of the latter. By achieving this aim I illuminate the limits and prospects of Bayesianism. (shrink)

Habilitation thesis, book proposal in preparation.

PCCP is the much discussed claim that the probability of a conditional A → B is conditional probability. Triviality results purport to show that PCCP – as a general claim – is false. A particularly interesting proof has been presented in (Hájek, 2011), who shows that – even if a probability distribution P initially satisfied PCCP – a rational update can produce a non-PCCP probability distribution. We argue that the notion of rational update in this argumentation is construed in much (...) too broad a way. In order to make the argumentation precise, we discuss the general rules for modeling conditionals in probability spaces and present formalized version(s) of PCCP and of minimal assumptions concerning the appropriate spaces. Using the introduced apparatus we give a detailed analysis of Hájek’s (2011) triviality proof and show that it is based on an application of revision rules which allow one to construct probability distributions violating not only PCCP, but also fundamental properties of conditionals. This means that they do not really provide arguments against PCCP, properly formalized. We also discuss a Dutch Book argument which shows that the updated belief system is not coherent. This gives an additional, strong argument against accepting the update rules. We also discuss the Converse Dutch Book theorem and argue, that even if the produced probability measure seems to violate it, it cannot serve as the counterexample, as it is not an appropriate model for conditionals. Ultimately, we show that important arguments against PCCP fail. (shrink)

Organizations pride themselves on their creation of rational structures based primarily on a male perspective of interaction. Workers are expected to set aside interpersonal behaviours that do not directly contribute to task performance. As more women enter management, norms concerning appropriate interpersonal relationships at work are undergoing strain. In addition, the phenomenon of mutual sexual attractions between co-workers is demanding attention. This study systematically describes attitudes, attributions and anticipated consequences of mutual sexual attractions at work. Findings suggest that gender stereotypes (...) are significant factors in people's judgments of persons involved in sexual attractions at work. (shrink)

What is the political meaning of justice combined with aletheia, that is, the truth understood as revealing, disclosing, and unconcealment? On the basis of an immanent analysis of certain excerpts from Plato’s work we could find the answer. First of all, in Plato the question of justice is not a technical issue, a question of good or bad ruling over the polis, a good or bad law. It concerns matters of much greater significance: existential issues. That is why justice is (...) more important than wealth, both to a man and to a political community. Only through other people, in a political community, is man capable of acquiring an identity, a unity between what he is by nature and what he becomes through education, during the process of adapting to a community to which he belongs. If we succeed in creating such a structure of a political community in which people recognize their proper place and can identify with it, then they will be able to identify with the whole political community. Only a political community thus united can be true, that is, just. Internal unity, which is an expression of justice, is the source of a political community’s power, it is the basis for coexistence and cooperation. When there is no justice, bonds among people die out. Through injustice they become above all incapable of cooperating. (shrink)

In this paper, the concept of political culture is considered in reference to the notions of G.A. Almond, S. Verba and J. Rawls. It is defined as a specific educational project, which is linked to the idea of a fair, democratic and constitutional system. The author also points to potential contemporary obstacles to implementation of this project. Deepening inequalities arising from personal culture are the first threat to liberal civic education. The second threat is associated with the development of new (...) media and the related changes in the public sphere, including various forms of political and civic activity. (shrink)

What is the philosophy of politics in contemporary times and how can the need for its presence be justified? The philosophy of politics is no longer needed by politicians themselves, primarily because it cannot be applied to an electoral campaign and will thus not ensure them an electoral victory. Public opinion probably feels no such a need either, bearing in mind that what it expects is more along the lines of new episodes of a political serial rather than a holistic (...) philosophical interpretation of political reality. Public opinion might begin to feel such a need if it were to prove possible to restore, partly at least, its civic awareness, which is to say, the awareness that emerges on becoming conscious of the necessity for political freedom, for there is no politics without citizens; there is, at most, social policy and its clientele. Without a community of the free and equal, which may consist of citizens alone, there will be no philosophy itself, including that of politics. Philosophy should not treat politics as a certain, particular field or a distinct area of study, It has to learn to recognise in it the basis of this particular form of being, a community of ‘good life’ which is also its own fount. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest krytyczna analiza wybranych badań empirycznych z zakresu neuroestetyki. Neuroestetyka to nowa interdyscyplinarna dziedzina naukowa zmierzająca do opisu funkcjonowania mózgowia w kontekście reakcji na dzieło sztuki. W artykule przedstawiam i analizuję wyniki badań na temat mózgowych korelatów preferencji estetycznej i percepcji piękna. Pomimo wątpliwości natury interpretacyjnej, wyniki te potwierdzają hipotezę o specyfice reakcji estetycznej w stosunku do innych typów reakcji kognitywnych człowieka.

I discuss the limits of Ingarden’s phenomenology of perception from a naturalistic perspective. Ingarden did not propose any proper method of the realization of the applied theory of perception (critics of perception). This situation enables to apply empirical data from cognitive neurosciences. The applied procedure shows that basic components of the phenomenology of perception are not valid.

Uszkodzenie mózgowia o różnej etiologii wiąże się często z następczą zmianą zdolności poznawczych, emocjonalnych i motorycznych. Dotyczy to także osób zajmujących się bardziej lub mniej profesjonalnie tworzeniem dzieł artystycznych. W związku z tym powstaje pytanie o charakter zmian w stylu artystycznym po epizodzie neurologicznym oraz neuronalne korelaty takich zmian. Neuropsychologia jest jedną z dyscyplin zajmujących się empiryczną analizą zmian artystycznych po epizodzie neurologicznym. Jak dotąd nie wypracowano spójnego modelu badań neuropsychologicznych w tym zakresie, dominują subiektywne analizy zmian artystycznych, zaś tematyka (...) badawcza jest znacznie rozproszona. Nie ma też zadowalających odpowiedzi na fundamentalne pytania dotyczące relacji pomiędzy uszkodzonym mózgiem i zachowaniami artystycznymi. W artykule przedstawiono najpierw krytyczną analizę „koncepcji medycznej”, zgodnie z którą samo dzieło artystyczne pozwala na diagnozowanie form patologii. Następnie podejęto próbę ustalenia względnie jednolitej i adekwatnej metodologii badań zmian artystycznych po epizodzie neurologicznym. Dodatkowo przedstawiono zarys aktualnych kluczowych tendencji badawczych i wyników neuropsychologii sztuki wizualnej. Ponadto krytycznej ocenie poddano modelowe badanie określające nasilenie i zakres zmian artystycznych po uszkodzeniu mózgowia. (shrink)

In line with the concept of politics developed by ancient Greeks, the political sphere is identified with transparency and overtness. However, it has always been hiding secret actions, conspiracies and collusions. The emergence of the modern model of the state, along with the rationalisation of its structures, enabled the secret equivalents of authority to transform into organisations, i.e. institutions alternative to official organisations, established by law and having specific powers. Rather than talking about actual organisations, the author discusses the process (...) whereby these secret, underground structures turn into organisations that influence the sphere of overt politics. She tries to show that this is a specific kind of game between what is explicit and public and what is concealed and secret. This game is constantly present in political activities, although we seldom realise it. (shrink)

Tekst stanowi próbę konfrontacji estetyki dekadenckiej z teologicznym myśleniem Jerzego Nowosielskiego. Pretekstem staje się ubiór, sakralizowany w ujęciu Baudelaire’a poprzez osobę dandysa i mający swoją sakralną symbolikę w szatach liturgicznych. Z pozoru osobliwe zestawienie dekadenckiej myśli Baudelaire’owskiej z analizą szat liturgicznych nie jest bezzasadne. Teologia szat zarysowana poprzez Nowosielskiego pozwala wprowadzić do analizy estetyki dekadenckiej myślenie religijne. Choć religijność w dekadencji rozumiana jest specyficznie, to zestawienie z myślą prawosławia pozwala wskazać możliwą drogę jej analizy. Dekadencja objawia transgresyjną aspirację wobec świata (...) profanicznego i analogiczne do religijnego pragnienie transcendencji. Przyjęcie takiego punktu widzenia pozwala na wydobycie wielu nieoczywistych wątków i odnalezienie sacrum w powierzchowności ubioru. (shrink)

Celem artykułu jest krytyczna analiza wybranych wyników neuroobrazowania procesów snu w kontekście specyfiki umysłu śniącego. Kombinacja danych hemodynamicznych i magnetycznych oraz danych fenomenologicznych i kognitywnych dopuszcza wyróżnienie czterech specyficznych typów umysłu podczas snu. Dzięki temu ogólna wizja mózgu/umysłu podczas snu, typowo sprowadzana do dystynkcji NREM/REM, jest bardziej adekwatna. Dodatkowo, kognitywna interpretacja danych neuroobrazowych pozwala na ustalenie możliwych funkcji adaptacyjnych umysłu podczas snu.

Artykuł zawiera prezentację i dyskusję wybranych zagadnień świadomości śniącej. Pierwsze z nich dotyczy znaczenia adaptacyjnego świadomości podczas snu. Drugie zagadnienie obejmuje charakterystykę kognitywnej świadomości śniącej. Efektem krytycznego przeglądu badań i koncepcji jest teza, że: (1) świadomość śniąca nie ma charakteru adaptacji biologicznej, (2) świadomość śniąca jest formą zdegradowanej reprezentacji kognitywnej w porównaniudo świadomości w stanie czuwania. W szczególności świadomość śniąca zawiera deficyty intencjonalności (uwagi) oraz wyższych form kognitywnych, w tym dysfunkcji wykonawczych.

Grounding theorists insist that grounding and explanation are intimately related. This claim could be understood as saying either that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation or it could be interpreted as saying that grounding plays an important—possibly an indispensable—role in metaphysical explanation. Or both. I argue that saying that grounding ‘inherits’ its properties from explanation can only be justified if grounding is explanatory by nature, but that this view is untenable. We ought therefore to be ‘separatists’ and view grounding and (...) explanation as distinct. As it turns out, though, once grounding has been in this sense distinguished from the explanation it backs, the view that the role grounding plays in explanation justifies its introduction ends up in serious trouble. I conclude that the role grounding plays in explanation does not justify attributing to grounding whatever nature we think it has, and it most likely does not give us any special reason to think grounding exists. (shrink)

In everyday life and in science we acquire evidence of evidence and based on this new evidence we often change our epistemic states. An assumption underlying such practice is that the following EEE Slogan is correct: 'evidence of evidence is evidence' (Feldman 2007, p. 208). We suggest that evidence of evidence is best understood as higher-order evidence about the epistemic state of agents. In order to model evidence of evidence we introduce a new powerful framework for modelling epistemic states, Dyadic (...) Bayesianism. Based on this framework, we then discuss characterizations of evidence of evidence and argue for one of them. Finally, we show that whether the EEE Slogan holds, depends on the specific kind of evidence of evidence. (shrink)

The use of prisoners as research participants is controversial. Efforts to protect them in response to past exploitation and abuse have led to strict regulations and reluctance to involve them as participants. Hence, prisoners are routinely denied the opportunity to participate in research. In the absence of comprehensive information regarding prisoners’ current involvement in research, we examined UK prisoners’ involvement through review of research applications to the UK National Research Ethics Service. We found that prisoners have extremely limited access to (...) research participation. This analysis was augmented by a survey of those involved in research and research governance (UK researchers and Research Ethics Committee members). Our results suggest that pragmatic concerns regarding the perceived burden of including prisoners are far more prominent in motivating their exclusion than ethical concerns or knowledge of regulations. While prisoners may remain a vulnerable research population due to constraints upon their liberty and autonomy and the coercive nature of the prison environment, routine exclusion from participation may be disadvantageous. Rigorous ethical oversight and the shift in the prevailing attitude towards the risks and benefits of participation suggest that it may be time for research to be more accessible to prisoners in line with the principle of equivalence in prison healthcare. We suggest the necessary first step in this process is a re-examination of current guidance in the UK and other countries with exclusions. (shrink)

We routinely take diminished capacity as diminishing moral responsibility (as in the case of immaturity, senility, or particular mental impairments). The prospect of enhanced capacity therefore poses immediate questions with regard to moral responsibility. Of particular interest are those capacities that might allow us to better avoid serious harms or wrongdoing. We can consider questions of responsibility with regards to enhancement at various removes. In the first instance: where such (safe and effective) interventions exist, do we have an obligation to (...) undergo such enhancement? Secondly: once enhanced, would the ambit of our responsibility therefore increase? Some philosophers have argued that enhanced capacities potentially generate “hyperresponsibility.” Hyperresponsible people would be held to a different and higher moral standard than those of us with more ordinary human capacities, and are liable to be more blameworthy for wrongdoing than ordinary agents. This chapter discusses the implications of enhancement for three central views of responsibility, namely: capacity-based, control-based and revelation-based views. Debates around moral responsibility have primarily concerned diminished capacities; as such the prospect of enhancement introduces new terrain—and potentially new fault-lines and complexities—in which to interrogate our theoretical conceptions of the foundations (and limits) of moral responsibility. (shrink)

The author would like to make the following corrections to the published paper [...].

In ‘The autonomy of the affect’ Brian Massumi wrote of the gap between affective and cognitive registering of the traumatic experience. Affect theorists and neuroscientists have long shared the notion of a gap between the somatic response to a traumatic event and the appraisal of the affective situation. This article develops theories on dissociation or nothingness, where nothingness is a measurement of the space between the affective and the cognitive registering of a traumatic event. It explores the concept of two (...) different systems, one a ‘conscious automatic’ system and the other an ‘intensity system’ that exists outside of normal physiological sequencing, beyond narration, and therefore incapable of integrating into memory systems. (shrink)

Julia Annas here offers a fundamental reexamination of Plato's ethical thought by investigating the Middle Platonist perspective, which emerged at the end of Plato's own school, the Academy. She highlights the differences between ancient and modern assumptions about Plato's ethics--and stresses the need to be more critical about our own. One of these modern assumptions is the notion that the dialogues record the development of Plato's thought. Annas shows how the Middle Platonists, by contrast, viewed the dialogues as multiple presentations (...) of a single Platonic ethical philosophy, differing in form and purpose but ultimately coherent. They also read Plato's ethics as consistently defending the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness, and see it as converging in its main points with the ethics of the Stoics. Annas goes on to explore the Platonic idea that humankind's final end is "becoming like God"--an idea that is well known among the ancients but virtually ignored in modern interpretations. She also maintains that modern interpretations, beginning in the nineteenth century, have placed undue emphasis on the Republic, and have treated it too much as a political work, whereas the ancients rightly saw it as a continuation of Plato's ethical writings. (shrink)

In this Introduction we introduce the central themes of the Evaluative Perception volume. After identifying historical and recent contemporary work on this topic, we discuss some central questions under three headings: (1) Questions about the Existence and Nature of Evaluative Perception: Are there perceptual experiences of values? If so, what is their nature? Are experiences of values sui generis? Are values necessary for certain kinds of experience? (2) Questions about the Epistemology of Evaluative Perception: Can evaluative experiences ever justify evaluative (...) judgments? Are experiences of values necessary for certain kinds of justified evaluative judgments? (3) Questions about Value Theory and Evaluative Perception: Is the existence of evaluative experience supported or undermined by particular views in value theory? Are particular views in value theory supported or undermined by the existence of value experience? (shrink)

This paper proposes a novel account of the contents of memory. By drawing on insights from the philosophy of perception, I propose a hybrid account of the contents of memory designed to preserve important aspects of representationalist and relationalist views. The hybrid view I propose also contributes to two ongoing debates in philosophy of memory. First, I argue that, in opposition to eternalist views, the hybrid view offers a less metaphysically-charged solution to the co-temporality problem. Second, I show how the (...) hybrid view conceives of the relationship between episodic memory and other forms of episodic thinking. I conclude by considering some disanalogies between perception and memory and by replying to objections. I argue that, despite there being important differences between memory and perception, those differences do not harm my project. (shrink)