This is the first complete, one-volume English translation of the ancient Chinese text Xunzi, one of the most extensive, sophisticated, and elegant works in the tradition of Confucian thought. Through essays, poetry, dialogues, and anecdotes, the Xunzi articulates a Confucian perspective on ethics, politics, warfare, language, psychology, human nature, ritual, and music, among other topics. Aimed at general readers and students of Chinese thought, Eric Hutton’s translation makes the full text of this important work more accessible in English than ever (...) before. Named for its purported author, the Xunzi has long been neglected compared to works such as the Analects of Confucius and the Mencius. Yet interest in the Xunzi has grown in recent decades, and the text presents a much more systematic vision of the Confucian ideal than the fragmented sayings of Confucius and Mencius. In one famous, explicit contrast to them, the Xunzi argues that human nature is bad. However, it also allows that people can become good through rituals and institutions established by earlier sages. Indeed, the main purpose of the Xunzi is to urge people to become as good as possible, both for their own sakes and for the sake of peace and order in the world. In this edition, key terms are consistently translated to aid understanding and line numbers are provided for easy reference. Other features include a concise introduction, a timeline of early Chinese history, a list of important names and terms, cross-references, brief explanatory notes, a bibliography, and an index. (shrink)

The process of elaborating EU legislation includes the activity of translation. Drafting and translation cannot be considered separately but are rather two complementary activities whose aim is the quality of legislation. In order to achieve the required quality of legislation, one guiding principle is consistency of terminology. This study examines the particular case of two terms in German that appeared in the EC Treaty: Entscheidung and Beschluss. The inconsistent use of the two terms was the source of interpretative problems, as (...) observed in Case C-370/07 Commission v Council. A comparison of the contested provisions in the EC Treaty and the provisions in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union shows that the terminological inconsistency has been corrected. After the examination of this case, we elaborate on the impact of terminological consistency on interpretation as reflected in requests for preliminary rulings. (shrink)

En 'La Naturalizacion de la Filosofia' se exploran diversos aspectos de la pretensión naturalista en diferentes campos filosóficos, con sus aciertos y sus limitaciones.

El 1 de febrero de 1982 se constituyeron en la Archidiócesis de Sevilla los Tribunales Interdiocesanos de Primera y Segunda Instancia. Se trata de Tribunales Eclesiásticos de Justicia extracanónicos, que se originaron primero en Italia según el Motu Propio 'Qua Cura' de Pío XI, y luego se extendieron a la Iglesia en general, para integrarse finalmente en el actual Derecho Canónico. Este ensayo describe el desarrollo y la naturaleza de estos Tribunales de Justicia, así como su funcionamiento en la Archidiócesis (...) de Sevilla. (shrink)

1. Sae sidae rŭl yŏrŏ gan saramdŭl -- 2. Ŏdum ŭi sidae.

¿Cómo es que un sistema cognitivo del que se dice no habría surgido para conocer, sino para sobrevivir, ha venido a conocer tantas cosas evolutivamente inútiles y -por qué descartarlo hoy- hasta nocivas para la supervivencia de la especie? El saber filosófico despierta, dirán Aristóteles o Hegel, una vez satisfecho lo necesario para la existencia. Puede incluso que la superfluidad sea esencial a la cultura, pues lo superfluo es para el hombre, según la expresión de Voltaire, «cette chose si nécessaire!». (...) Ese desequilibrio entre utilidad natural y uso cultural de la razón avala bien el rechazo a ver en ésta un elemento más de la naturaleza. Aceptarlo obligaría a normalizar su estudio y -consecuencia o premisa inevitable- a naturalizar su concepto. Ambas cosas conllevarían además una incursión, insolente no sólo para el filósofo, de las ciencias particulares en los dominios tradicionales de la filosofía, dominios con tanta acucia conseguidos a lo largo de su historia. No obstante, quienes estén convencidos de que la naturalización de la razón equivale al suicidio de la filosofía, y la rehúsen por ello, deberían sopesar antes las razones por las que habría de ser preferible salvar la filosofía a naturalizar la razón. Tal vez descubran al paso qué ancestral, qué prefilosófica es su idea de la filosofía. (shrink)

Primera parte. Problemas teóricos en torno a la filosofia latinoamericana. A modo de introducción : la historia de las ideas en América Latina -- Breve trazo de un camino -- Crítica de la Crítica de la razón latinoamericana de Santiago Castro-Gómez -- Rafael Gutiérrez Girardot y José Luis Romero : historiografía e identidad latinamericana -- El colonialismo intelectual en América Latina y su crítica -- La historiografía como "carta de batalla" -- El rastacuerismo y nuestra cultura política -- La secularización (...) y la racionalización en hispanoamérica -- Filosofía y crisis -- Segunda parte. Filósofos y filosofías revisitados. El Ariel de José Enrique Rodó : su contexto, sus fuentes y sus críicas -- María Zambrano, José Gaos y la filosofía latinoamericana -- El problema de la recepción del pensamiento de Xavier Zubiri en Colombia -- Ernesto Sábato : crítica de la tecnolatría y religación de lo humano -- Guillermo Hoyos Vásquez...entre nosotros -- Pablo Guadarrama y la filosofía colombiana : un testimonio. (shrink)

El campo conceptual en el que nuestra cultura ha cultivado, y aún cultiva, sus ideas acerca de la razón está fuertemente contaminado de representaciones míticas y psicopopulares. Tanto que todavía es necesaria una arqueología crítica de su historia. La historia de los nombres de la razón es la de sus atavismos populares. En ella se descubre que 'naturaleza' es el nombre más querido que la razón se ha dado, lo que ha constituido una fuente de la que aún hoy fluye (...) un sinfín de equívocos a la hora de pensar las relaciones entre la naturaleza y la razón, entre la naturaleza y la cultura. (shrink)

There is a consensus that our culture is already "post-metaphysical." Does this mean that the culture has abandoned the philosophy? This question is not separable in fact from the historical-philosophical relationships between science and philosophy. These relationships determine the contemporary metaphilosophical positions, which are analyzed in the first half. The second and third parts address the metaphilosophical question in the light of Heidegger's position on the "end of philosophy." This analysis concludes that the issue " postmetaphysics or postphilosophy?" refers to (...) another question, envisioned but not settled by Heidegger: are the symbolic forms, known until today (religion, art, philosophy, science), a closed set of transcultural universals or an open set, able to admit new elements in the future? (shrink)

Toda cultura lleva inherente una cultura-de-la-cultura por la que contrae compromisos epistémicos, pues cualquier forma de cultura no es compatible con cualquier forma de conocimiento. La cultura ignorante de sus responsabilidades epistémicas es una cultura irresponsable. Se desarrolla esta tesis en torno a tres tópicos (las “dos culturas”, la permeabilidad cultural de la ciencia, el “efecto Hydra”) y se infieren algunas condiciones mínimas de la responsabilidad cultural epistémica.

Information can be public among a group. Whether or not information is public matters, for example, for accounts of interdependent rational choice, of communication, and of joint intention. A standard analysis of public information identifies it with (some variant of) common belief. The latter notion is stipulatively defined as an infinite conjunction: for p to be commonly believed is for it to believed by all members of a group, for all members to believe that all members believe it, and so (...) forth. This analysis is often presupposed without much argument in philosophy. Theoretical entrenchment or intuitions about cases might give some traction on the question, but give little insight about why the identification holds, if it does. The strategy of this paper is to characterize a practical-normative role for information being public, and show that the only things that play that role are (variants of) common belief as stipulatively characterized. In more detail: a functional role for “taking a proposition for granted” in non-isolated decision making is characterized. I then present some minimal conditions under which such an attitude is correctly held. The key assumption links this attitude to beliefs about what is public. From minimal a priori principles, we can argue that a proposition being public among a group entails common commitment to believe among that group. Later sections explore partial converses to this result, the factivity of publicity and publicity from the perspective of outsiders to the group, and objections to the aprioricity of the result deriving from a posteriori existential presuppositions. (shrink)

Kant claims that natural sciences require a “pure part” ,(reiner Teil), which has to be formulated a priori by philisophy. This pure part, is enunciated by Kant in his Metaphysische Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaften in relation to Netwon’s Pincipia, whose steps is closely follows. This Kantian Work also represents an instance of classical “foundation” by philosophy in the particular sciences.In this paper the particularities of Kant’s foundation in Newton’s physics come under close scrutiny, and his huge speculative effort on this issue (...) is shown to be equivocant in content, inconsistent in form and probably useless. (shrink)

Kant claims that natural sciences require a “pure part” ,, which has to be formulated a priori by philisophy. This pure part, is enunciated by Kant in his Metaphysische Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaften in relation to Netwon’s Pincipia, whose steps is closely follows. This Kantian Work also represents an instance of classical “foundation” by philosophy in the particular sciences.In this paper the particularities of Kant’s foundation in Newton’s physics come under close scrutiny, and his huge speculative effort on this issue is (...) shown to be equivocant in content, inconsistent in form and probably useless. (shrink)

Traditionally, empathy is conceived of as a cognitive function that governs how people think during social interactions, and is considered as largely impervious to change. However, developments in psychology and neuroscience show that empathy is grounded in neural substrates of emotionally communicative behaviour and so is learned through imitation and other forms of cultural learning. This also means that abnormal patterns of empathic function can develop through adverse life experiences, or that empathy may fail to develop in young people with (...) neurodevelopmental disorders. Nevertheless, by focussing on empathy as a quality of social interaction and affective expression in the here and now, and by appreciating that it is as a special form of sensorimotor skill, pathways to training and fostering better development of empathy can be identified. (shrink)