The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these historically prominent views agree in at least one fundamental respect. They are all alethic monists. They all endorse the thesis that there is only one property (...) in virtue of which propositions can be true, and so, in this sense, take truth to be one. The truth pluralist, on the other hand, rejects this idea. There are several properties in virtue of which propositions can be true. The literature on truth pluralism has been growing steadily for the past twenty years. This volume, however, is the first of its kind—the first collection of papers focused specifically on pluralism about truth. Part I is dedicated to the development, investigation, and critical discussion of different forms of pluralism. An additional reason to look at truth pluralism with interest is the significant connections it bears to other debates in the truth literature—the debates concerning traditional theories of truth and the deflationism/inflationism divide being cases in hand. Parts II and III of the volume connect truth pluralism to these two debates. (shrink)

Dorian Abbot and twenty-eight coauthors from many quarters of science have recently published a spirited defense of a perceived ‘liberal’ scientific meritocratism—roughly the view that rivalrous or excludable goods in the sphere of scientific work should be distributed entirely based on potential recipients’ merits in that sphere. They propose to understand merit in terms of ‘achievements,’ not least in the form of individual academic track records. A closer examination of their argument reveals their implicit reliance on several incompatible conceptions of (...) merit. Moreover, they conspicuously ignore the typical collective nature of academic achievements in modern science. In this paper, I argue that a different version of scientific meritocratism, based on the central theses of standpoint epistemology, represents an attractive compromise between Abbot et al. and anti-meritocratic theories informed by the sociology of science. Ultimately, however, the credentials of this ‘strong scientific meritocratism’ rest on empirical hypotheses which remain underexamined. (shrink)

Vann McGee claims that open-ended schemas are more innocuous than ordinary second-order quantification, particularly in terms of ontological commitment. We argue that this is not the case.

Le concept d’enseignement se trouve au centre des conférences faites par Levinas au Collège philosophique et récemment publiées. Cette notion est toujours présente dans Totalité et Infini, mais semble disparaître ensuite de la philosophie de Levinas. Le but de ce travail est de comprendre pourquoi cela a lieu. En faisant un détour par un texte de Levinas sur « Judaïsme et éducation » de la même période, il est possible de proposer que la notion d’éducation chez Levinas conduise à une (...) ambiguïté au regard de la position du soi responsable faisant qu’il oscille entre l’accusatif et le datif. Cette ambiguïté est la cause de son abandon plus tardif ou plutôt : elle est résolue par la transformation de l’éducation en une instruction non médiate pour laquelle la révélation de la loi est la figure paradigmatique. (shrink)

Everybody Present seeks to create a new kind of culture in our schools: one that counters stress and facilitates learning. It reframes the student-teacher relationship, showing teachers how to supplant antagonism and foster strong relationships by planting seeds of mindfulness in their students and encouraging them to embark on a mindfulness practice of their own. Illustrating the transformative effects of mindfulness on educators, students, and their classrooms, Everybody Present shows how mindfulness helps to strengthen inner peace and prevent stress, foster (...) contagious joy and an ethic of altruism, improve understanding between student and teacher, and fortify competence in educational relations. A working manual addressed to everyone in the educational universe, Everybody Present presents real-world applications grounded in solid research. Stories, exercises, and case studies demonstrate the effectiveness of mindful practices across all areas of education. Everybody Present is intended to contribute to the creation of a culture throughout the educational system writ large, working against stress and victim mentality to set in motion a revolution of silence, allowing each individual the experience of inter-being, inner calm, and joy. By exploring the challenges of teaching, Everybody Present will help all educators transform feelings of inadequacy into experiences of abundance. (shrink)

This is the first edited collection entirely dedicated to non-evidentialist epistemology or non-evidentialism—the controversial view that evidence is not required in order for doxastic attitudes to enjoy a positive epistemic status. Belief or acceptance can be epistemically justified, warranted, or rational without evidence. The volume is divided into three section: the first focuses on hinge epistemology, the second offers a critical reflection about evidentialist and non-evidentialist epistemologies, and the third explores extensions of non-evidentialism to the fields of social psychology, psychiatry, (...) and mathematics. Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti. (shrink)

Here is a well-known thought about truth: Truth consists in correspondence with reality. A sentence is true just in case what it says corresponds with how the world is. Theories of truth that incorporate this thought are naturally regarded as robust or “heavyweight”. Truth is to be understood in a realist fashion. The world decides what is true and what is not. A recent incarnation of the correspondence view is found in truth-maker theories, whose adherents maintain that truths are true (...) in virtue of there being something – a truth-maker – in the world that makes them so.2. (shrink)

Throughout the twentieth century a significant tradition in French thought promoted a highly dramatized reading of the Hegelian struggle for recognition. In this tradition a violent struggle was regarded as an indispensable means to the realization of both individual and social ideals. The following article considers Claire Denis's film I Can't Sleep as an oblique challenge to this tradition. I Can't Sleep performs a careful dedramatization of an extremely violent story and thereby points to the possibility of an alternative form (...) of co-existence outside a logic of conflict. (shrink)

This book gets to the heart of trophy hunting, unpacking and explaining its multiple facets and controversies, and exploring why it divides environmentalists, the hunting community, and the public. Bichel and Hart provide the first interdisciplinary and comprehensive approach to the study of trophy hunting, investigating the history of trophy hunting, and delving into the background, identity and motivation of trophy hunters. They also explore the role of social media and anthropomorphism in shaping trophy hunting discourse, as well as the (...) viability of trophy hunting as a wildlife management tool, the ideals of fair chase and sportsmanship, and what hunting trophies are, both literally and in terms of their symbolic value to hunters and non-hunters. The analyses and discussions are underpinned by a consideration of the complex moral and practical conflicts between animal rights and conservation paradigms. This book appeals to scholars in environmental philosophy, conservation and environmental studies, as well as hunters, hunting opponents, wildlife management practitioners, and policymakers, and anyone with a broad interest in human–wildlife relations. (shrink)

The article examines the conjunction of writing and the Hegelian theory of recognition as it appears in Jean-Paul Sartre's text "Why Write?" The author argues that Sartre's theory of literature is not only a theory of literature as conversation and communication, but also a theory about the relation to a certain silence, and since literature and recognition go together in Sartre's text, the presence of silence has consequences for his theory of recognition.

Chantal Akerman’s documentary Sud [South, 1999] investigates the brutal racist murder of James Byrd Jr that took place in Jasper, Texas in 1998. Sud is a socio-political documentary, but it...

How do Mallarmé’s writings speak to the present? To answer this question, this article establishes a dialogue between one of Mallarmé’s early prose poems, ‘Le Démon de l'analogie’, and texts by the...

Much of the force behind doxastic involuntarism comes from our pre-theoretical judgement that any effort to form a belief simply by intending to form it must remain unsuccessful. However, despite this, ordinary language use of locutions like “chose to believe” are common. In this article, we present new experimental data that shows that the prevalence of ordinary language talk of “chosen beliefs” is no obstacle to doxastic involuntarism in a standard sense (pace Turri et al. 2018). While we employ the (...) methods of experimental philosophy, our argument also concerns the fundamental question as to what those methods can achieve: as is typical of philosophical debates, the debate over doxastic voluntarism involves a refined theoretical concept, specifically a refined concept of voluntary belief. In such debates, we cannot determine our pre-theoretical position by conducting surveys on those who may not yet own the requisite theoretical concepts. (shrink)

This article presents a systematic literature review documenting how technical investigations have been adapted in value sensitive design (VSD) studies from 1996 to 2023. We present a systematic review, including theoretical and applied studies that either discuss or conduct technical investigations in VSD. This systematic review contributes to the VSD community when seeking to further refine the methodological framework for carrying out technical investigations in VSD.

An influential version of doxastic voluntarism claims that doxastic events such as belief-formations at least sometimes qualify as actions. William Alston has made a simple response to this claim by arguing on empirical grounds that in normal human agents intentions to form specific beliefs are simply powerless. However, despite Alston’s observation, various authors have insisted that belief-formations may qualify as voluntary in perfect analogy to certain types of actions or even to actions in general. I examine three analogy arguments of (...) this type and argue that they all fail. (shrink)

Several epistemologists have advanced the idea that a subject’s epistemic status can be weakened by evidence she does not possess but should have possessed, or, alternatively, by beliefs or doubts she should have had under her evidential circumstances but does not have. This alleged phenomenon is known as normative defeat and its adherents have typically reported intuitions that it obtains under mundane circumstances. Some epistemologists have analyzed normative defeat in terms of breached epistemic obligations, while others have preferred an analysis (...) in terms of cognitive malfunctioning. No matter which analysis one prefers, I here argue that - given plausible psychological and epistemological assumptions - if the normative defeat phenomenon were real it would be more bizarre than is generally recognized. I conclude that alleged cases of normatively defeated knowledge or epistemic justification are better analyzed as cases of lucky or undeserved knowledge or epistemic justification. (shrink)

This paper undertakes two projects: Firstly, it offers a new account of the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ). Secondly, it brings out the basic weaknesses of DCEJ, thus accounted for. It concludes that strong reasons speak against its acceptance. The new account takes it departure from William Alston’s influential work. Section 1 argues that a fair account of DCEJ is only achieved by modifying Alston’s account and brings out the crucial difference between DCEJ and the less radical position (...) of epistemic deontologism. Section 2 starts by setting up two fundamental problems for proponents of DCEJ to solve. It argues further that proponents of DCEJ may not convincingly solve those problems by appeal to a notion of permissible belief. Section 3 investigates, whether an appeal to the notion of blameless belief may help DCEJ overcome its central problems. It argues that, even if an appeal to the notion of blameless belief has advantages over an appeal to the notion of permissible belief, DCEJ cannot convincingly overcome the problems set up for it. Further, it is brought out that DCEJ commits its proponents to a problematic non-standard view regarding the intrinsic value of epistemic justification. Section 4 concludes that DCEJ is not the natural conception of epistemic justification, that Alston takes it to be. However, its problems do not leave a scratch on epistemic deontologism, properly conceived. (shrink)

This edited volume brings together 18 state-of-the art essays on pluralism about truth and logic. Parts I and II are dedicated to respectively truth pluralism and logical pluralism, and Part III to their interconnections. Some contributors challenge pluralism, arguing that the nature of truth or logic is uniform. The majority of contributors, however, defend pluralism, articulate novel versions of the view, or contribute to fundamental debates internal to the pluralist camp. The volume will be of interest to truth theorists and (...) philosophers of logic, as well as philosophers interested in relativism, contextualism, metaphysics, philosophy of language, semantics, paradox, epistemology, or normativity. (shrink)

This is the introduction to Moretti, Luca and Nikolaj Pedersen (eds), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Brill. Contributors: N. Ashton, A. Coliva, J. Kim, K. McCain, A. Meylan, L. Moretti, S. Moruzzi, J. Ohlorst, N. Pedersen, T. Piazza, L. Zanetti.

What is truth? Philosophers are interested in a range of issues involving the concept of truth beginning with what sorts of things can be true. This is a collection of eighteen new and original research papers on truth and other alethic phenomena by twenty of the most promising young scholars working on truth today.

ABSTRACTW.K. Clifford is widely known for his emphatic motto that it is wrong, always everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. In fact, that dictum and Clifford’s...

The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and alethic pluralism. Section 2 (...) presents a distinction between strong and moderate versions of monism and pluralism, understood as theses about the existence of truth properties. Section 3 introduces four pluralist positions: strong alethic pluralism, alethic disjunctivism, second-order functionalism and manifestation functionalism. These positions are classified using the basic framework from Section 2, and a further distinction between pure and mixed versions of pluralism is drawn. Interestingly, alethic disjunctivism and the two kinds of functionalism—i.e. three out of four positions— have a mixed character. They incorporate a monist thesis. The only pure form of pluralism is strong alethic pluralism. Section 4 adds another distinction to the stock: one-level and two-level views. Each of the mixed positions operates with two levels, locating certain “alethically potent”—or grounding—properties at a lower level and others at a higher level. We briefly discuss the nature of grounding. In Section 5, we answer a question about mixed, two-level views, viz. whether they are as much monist as pluralist in nature, or more. They are not. Section 6 is devoted to the task of arguing that the strong pluralist, the second-order functionalist, and the manifestation functionalist will find it hard to deny a commitment to alethic disjunctivism. (shrink)

This paper offers a discussion of metaphysical pluralism, alethic pluralism, and logical pluralism. According to the metaphysical pluralist, there are several ways of being. According to the alethic pluralist, there are several ways of being true, and according to the logical pluralist, there are several ways of being valid. Each of these three forms of pluralism will be considered on its own, but the ambition of the paper is to explore possible connections between them. My primary objective is to present (...) and develop a positive account according to which the different forms of pluralism are intimately related. I will proceed in two steps. First, I will investigate the connection between alethic pluralism and logical pluralism. I will argue that a certain version of alethic pluralism supports logical pluralism. Second, I will connect alethic pluralism and logical pluralism to metaphysical pluralism. I will suggest that the former two are at least partly founded on the latter. (shrink)

Umberto Eco oversat af Finn Frandsen, første gang bragt i Slagmark #5.

Alethic pluralism is the view that the nature of truth is not uniform across domains. There are several ways of bang true $(T_1 ...\,T_n )$ A simple argument, the 'instability challenge', purports to show that this view is inherently unstable. One can simply say that something is uniformly true if and only if it is T₁ or ... or $\,T_n $ . Being uniformly true is a single truth property that applies across the board, and so the nature of truth (...) is uniform across domains, contra pluralism. I defend pluralism against the instability challenge. I show that the challenge bifurcates: one Challenge is formulated in terms of predicates, and the other is formulated in terms of properties. Vie pluralist has the resources to defuse both of these. The sparse/abundant property distinction and considerations of explanatory asymmetry play a crucial role in my argument. (shrink)

Modern social orders are legitimized by the ideal of freedom. Most conceptions of this ideal are theorized against the backdrop of nature understood as governed by its own laws beyond the realm of the social. However, such an understanding of nature is now being challenged by the ‘Anthropocene’ hypothesis. This article investigates the consequences of this hypothesis for freedom as an ideal legitimizing social order. We begin by discussing the conception of legitimation, after which we examine three classical notions of (...) freedom (developed by Hobbes, Kant, and Hegel), in light of the Anthropocene. Following our claim that these notions all have severe weaknesses in view of the Anthropocene, we argue that modern social orders are facing a new legitimation crisis. Such a crisis, we suggest, involves a ‘brutalization of social conflicts’, which under the conditions of the Anthropocene assumes the form of geo-social conflict. (shrink)

Following the global financial crisis, banks have become more regulated to advance ethical sales cultures throughout the sector. Based on case studies of three retail banks, we find that they construct the ‘appropriate advisor’ in different ways. Inspired by Bakhtin’s work on ethics, we propose a vocabulary of relational ethics centered on the ‘answerable self.’ We argue that this vocabulary is apt for studying and discussing how organizations advance ethical sales cultures in ways that instead of encouraging value congruence and (...) alignment allow for ethical openness. In such cultures, employees—as moral agents—are morally questioning, critically self-reflexive, and answerable for their own actions toward others in their social relationships. Our paper makes three theoretical contributions, namely, problematizing the idea of cultural alignment and value congruence, demonstrating that identity regulation can both comprise and support the ‘answerable self,’ and advancing our understanding of the interdependence of ethical openness and ethical closure in fostering ethical sales cultures. (shrink)

Prispevek predstavi sklop evholoških besedil na čast svetemu Hieronimu: od prvih omemb v Gelazijevem zakramentarju do prenovljenega rimskega misala Pavla vi. Orisan je potek kompozicije temeljnih zakramentarjev in misalov rimskega obreda, ki so vir, iz katerega se je bogato razširil obstoječ misal. Predstavljeni so vidiki, ki bi jih za zvest prenos misli, izraženih v latinski evhologiji, v drug jezik, lahko upoštevali. Razširjeni konteksti umeščenega besedila namreč v bogoslužju omogočajo liturgičnemu besedilu, da lahko postane učinkovit dogodek vere. Njihovo neupoštevanje pa učinkovitost (...) besedila omejuje. Zaradi pretežno filološke metode prevedeno evhološko besedilo uporabnika lahko doseže šele s katehezo, homilijo ali komentarjem. Tak pristop je neprimerljivo hitrejši in zaradi še neizdelanih študij za vsak posamezni formular se ohranja vtis, da je zahtevni proces inkulturacije rimskega obreda nujno potrebno centralno nadzorovati. Predstavljena so tudi obvezujoča navodila, s katerimi Cerkev že desetletja usmerja prevajanje in iz katerih postaja še bolj očitna teža in preroškost odločitev, ki jih je v korist vernikov naredila na drugem vatikanskem koncilu. (shrink)