The surface grammar of reports such as ‘I have a pain in my leg’ suggests that pains are objects which are spatially located in parts of the body. We show that the parallel construction is not available in Mandarin. Further, four philosophically important grammatical features of such reports cannot be reproduced. This suggests that arguments and puzzles surrounding such reports may be tracking artefacts of English, rather than philosophically significant features of the world.

Hempel seems to hold the following three views: (H1) Understanding is pragmatic/relativistic: Whether one understands why X happened in terms of Explanation E depends on one's beliefs and cognitive abilities; (H2) Whether a scientific explanation is good, just like whether a mathematical proof is good, is a nonpragmatic and objective issue independent of the beliefs or cognitive abilities of individuals; (H3) The goal of scientific explanation is understanding: A good scientific explanation is the one that provides understanding. Apparently, H1, H2, (...) and H3 cannot be all true. Some philosophers think that Hempel is inconsistent, while some others claim that Hempel does not actually hold H3. I argue that Hempel does hold H3 and that he can consistently hold all of H1, H2, and H3 if he endorses what I call the “understanding argument.” I also show how attributing the understanding argument to Hempel can make more sense of his D-N model and his philosophical analysis of the pragmatic aspects of scientific explanation. (shrink)

Veritism claims that only true beliefs are of basic epistemic value. Michael DePaul argues that veritism is false because it entails the implausible view that all true beliefs are of equal epistemic value. In this paper, I discuss two recent replies to DePaul's argument: one offered by Nick Treanor and the other by Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij and Stephen Grimm. I argue that neither of the two replies is successful. I propose a new response to DePaul's argument and defend my response against (...) a possible objection. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: According to a traditional account, understanding why X occurred is equivalent to knowing that X was caused by Y. This paper defends the account against a major objection, viz., knowing-that is not sufficient for understanding-why, for understanding-why requires a kind of grasp while knowledge-that does not. I discuss two accounts of grasp in recent literature and argue that if either is true, then knowing that X was caused by Y entails at least a rudimentary understanding of why X occurred. (...) If my defense is successful, it would cast doubt on an influential account of the epistemic value of understanding. (shrink)

There seem to be cases where A believes p, and B believes not-p, but neither makes a mistake. This is known as faultless disagreement. According to the epistemic account, in at least some cases of faultless disagreement either A or B must believe something false, and the disagreement is faultless in the sense that each follows the epistemic norm. Recently, philosophers have raised various objections to this account. In this paper, I propose a new version of the epistemic account and (...) show how it can handle those objections. (shrink)

In this paper, I survey some recent literature produced by the established Chinese philosophers who regularly publish in Chinese philosophy journals and work in Mainland China. Specifically, I review the recent research of these philosophers in two areas: Chinese Philosophy and epistemology. In each area, I focus on two topics that have caught the attention of a lot of Chinese philosophers. I argue that the Chinese philosophers’ research on these topics has two prevalent problems: (i) a lot of arguments they (...) make are weak; (ii) they tend not to critically engage with others. I discuss a metaphilosophical objection that weak argumentation and disengagement are not vices of philosophical research. I also try to make sense of (i) and (ii) in terms of some cultural factors. (shrink)

Veritists hold that the goal of inquiry is true belief, while justificationists contend that the goal of inquiry is justified belief. Recently, Christoph Kelp makes two new objections to both veritism and justificationism. Further, he claims that the two objections suggest that the goal of inquiry is knowledge. This paper defends a sophisticated version of veritism against Kelp's two objections.

Some philosophers (e.g., Pritchard, Grimm, and Hills) recently have objected that veritism cannot explain the epistemic value of understanding-why. And they have proposed two anti-veritist accounts. In this paper, I first introduce their objection and argue that it fails. Next, I consider a strengthened version of their objection and argue that it also fails. After that, I suggest a new veritist account: Understanding-why entails believing the truth that what is grasped is accurate (or accurate enough), and it is this true (...) belief, along with many other true beliefs understanding-why entails, that makes understanding-why finally epistemically valuable. Then, I explain why the two anti-veritist accounts are both false. Finally, I briefly discuss the idea that understanding involves a kind of know-how and show how veritism can explain the epistemic value of know-how in general. (shrink)

In this paper, I distinguish between two senses of “understanding”: understanding as an epistemic good and understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind. I argue that understanding as a character trait or a distinctive power of the mind is an intellectual virtue while understanding as an epistemic good is not. Finally, I show how the distinction can help us better appreciate Aristotle’s account of intellectual virtue.

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Why Be Moral? Learning from the Neo-Confucian Cheng Brothers, by Yong Huang, is a book written for Western philosophers. Professor Huang claims that there are two ways of introducing a Chinese philosopher to Western audiences: first, by showing them that the Chinese philosopher’s ideas are ridiculous or inferior compared to the corresponding Western ideas, and second, by showing them that the Chinese philosopher has better answers to some Western philosophical questions than great Western philosophers. Huang thinks the first way is (...) pointless and adopts the second way in this book, which “attempts to show that the Cheng brothers’ neo-Confucian position is superior to the representative views [such as Aristotle’s... (shrink)

Confucianism advocates the lofty moral ideal of “humane love” (ren ai 仁愛) and condemns immoral actions. Strangely enough, however, Mencius, a “paradigmatic Confucian intellectual” who believed that “a true man cannot be corrupted by wealth, subdued by power, or affected by poverty” (Tu 1989a: 15), highly commended such typically corrupt actions as bending the law for the benefit of relatives or appointing people by mere nepotism when he talked about Shun 舜 in the text of the Mencius. In the first (...) four sections of this article, I will address the issue of how Confucianism encourages a special kind of corruption through its fundamentally consanguineous affection. Then, in the remaining sections, I will try to respond to some criticisms of my views by a few Chinese scholars. (shrink)

There are three widely held beliefs among epistemologists: (1) the goal of inquiry is truth or something that entails truth; (2) epistemology aims for a reflectively stable theory via reflective equilibrium; (3) epistemology is a kind of inquiry. I argue that accepting (1) and (2) entails denying (3). This is a problem especially for the philosophers (e.g. Duncan Pritchard and Alvin Goldman) who accept both (1) and (2), for in order to be consistent, they must reject (3). The tension is (...) not restricted to epistemology. A similar tension also exists in the area of moral philosophy. The tension can be generalized. If one believes that the goal of inquiry is truth or something that entails truth and that philosophy aims for a reflectively stable theory via reflective equilibrium, she must deny that philosophy is a kind of inquiry. (shrink)

This book attempts to revolutionise epistemology. A traditional goal of epistemology is to provide an analysis of knowledge in terms of more basic things. But the post-Gettier literature has made some philosophers like Timothy Williamson suspect that knowledge cannot be analysed. Kelp claims that both the traditional project and Williamson's knowledge-first project are misguided. He provides an alternative: Knowledge is an item in an inquiry-related network and can thereby be analysed in terms of its relations to other items in the (...) network, rather than of things that are more basic than knowledge.Kelp begins his book by distinguishing two types of inquiry: inquiry into specific questions (such as whether Plato's Republic advocates totalitarianism and when World War I took place) and inquiry into general phenomena (such as the rise of the Roman Empire and the origins of species). Chapter 1 argues that the goal of inquiry into specific questions—Kelp's discussion focuses on whether questions—is knowledge. This is because even if the inquirer into whether p acquires a Gettierised justified true belief that p, she has not achieved the goal of inquiry, for the question of whether p has not been properly closed for her: she can be sensibly asked to do more research. (shrink)

Let Λ be a singular cardinal of uncountable confinality ψ. Under various assumptions about the sizes of covering families for cardinals below Λ, we prove upper bounds for the covering number cov(Λ, Λ, v⁺, 2). This covering number is closely related to the cofinality of the partial order ([Λ]", ⊆).

On the question of whether the universe should be infinite or finite, there has been throughout the history of physics a struggle between materialism and idealism, between dialectics and metaphysics. Materialism asserts that the universe is infinite, while idealism advocates finitude. At every stage in the history of physics, these two philosophical lines have engaged in fierce struggle. Although developments in physics always demonstrate the failure of the finite universe doctrine, with every new advance in science the idealists distort and (...) take advantage of the latest results of physics to "prove" with varying sleights of hand that the universe is finite, serving the reactionary rule of the moribund exploiting classes. In the early part of this century after the rise of quantum theory and relativity theory, physics arrived at a new stage of development. After General Relativity was announced in 1916, a lot of people used it and similar theories of gravity to produce all sorts of models of the universe. The "finite universe" point of view became even more fashionable. Lenin pointed out that "That certain schools of the new physics have various dealings with Machism and other variants of modern idealism, is a fact not to be doubted for a moment." It is clear from reading all sorts of foreign literature that the schools of physics promoting a finite universe are linked up with all sorts of idealist philosophy, including theology. (shrink)

William James makes several major claims about truth: (i) truth means agreement with reality independently of the knower, (ii) truth is made by human beings, (iii) truth can be verified, and (iv) truth is necessarily good. These claims give rise to a few puzzles: (i) and (ii) seem to contradict each other, and each of (ii), (iii), and (iv) has counter-intuitive implications. I argue that Richard Gale's interpretation of James' theory of truth is inadequate in dealing with these puzzles. I (...) propose an alternative interpretation and show how it can solve these puzzles. (shrink)

What do Philosophers do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. By Maddy Penelope.

_ On Evidence in Philosophy _ By LycanWilliamOxford University Press, 2019. ix + 160 pp.

Peter van Inwagen defines a successful argument in philosophy as one that can be used to convert an audience of ideal agnostics in an ideal debate. Sarah McGrath and Thomas Kelly recently argue that van Inwagen’s definition cannot be correct since the idea of ideal agnostics is incoherent with regard to an absolute paradigm of a successful philosophical argument. This paper defends van Inwagen’s definition against McGrath and Kelly’s objection.

Biobanks are potential goldmines for genomics research. They have become increasingly common as a means to determine the relationship between lifestyle, environmental exposures and predisposition to genetic disease. More and more countries are developing massive national scale biobanks, including Iceland, the UK and Estonia. Now several large-scale regional and national biobanks are planned in China, such as Shanghai Biobank, which is defined as a key-element in Shanghai's twelfth five-year Development Plan of Science and Technology. It is imperative that the authors (...) who are in charge of the ethical aspect of Shanghai Biobank discuss the ethical aspects of these biobanks up front. Currently there is a great deal of heterogeneity in the approaches to informed consent taken by different countries. In the article, after briefly introducing the biobanks in China, we focus on the three most common approaches: classical informed consent, tiered consent, and one-time general (or blanket) consent, and propose a version of the latter for China, based on compelling arguments. (shrink)

Shun argues that the distinction between first and third person is ill-suited to explain the complexities of anger. In this commentary, I first argue that, while the distinction is not uniquely important in characterizing anger and its variations, it can be distinctively important in illuminating the nature and normative significance of different forms of anger. Indeed, Shun’s own characterizations of anger in the paper seem to presuppose this importance. Secondly, I show that there are two related but distinct ways in (...) which one’s anger is ‘personally involved’: the first concerns how the offence is registered (e.g., whether it is perceived as targeting oneself), and the second concerns one’s emotional uptake of the offence. Lastly, I propose an alternative interpretation of Zhu Xi’s distinction between anger that ‘resides in things’ and anger that ‘resides in the self’, where the emphasis is not on whether anger is an appropriate response to a situation but on whether anger is properly encapsulated. (shrink)

Wie in anderen Ländern, so galt Einstein auch in China als einer der berühmtesten Wissenschaftler schlechthin. In den siebziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts wurden drei Bände Einstein’scher Schriften zusammengestellt, übersetzt und als Einsteins gesammelte Werke veröffentlicht. Diese Bände dienten lange Zeit vielen Chinesen als Hauptwissensquelle über Einstein; sie übten sogar einen bedeutenden ideologischen Einfluss aus. Im Hintergrund dieses herausgeberischen Projekts standen in der Zeit nach 1949 einflussreiche politische Bewegungen im Zusammenwirken mit wissenschaftskritischen Ansätzen, die ein solches Projekt erst möglich machten (...) und die Textauswahl sowie die Herangehensweise bei der Übersetzung und den Druckvorbereitungen beeinflussten. Unter den Herausgebern und Übersetzern kommt Xu Liangying eine besondere und wichtige Rolle zu, denn er war ursprünglich, vor der Gründung der Republik China, ein Untergrundrevolutionär gewesen. Später wurde er Wissenschaftshistoriker. Es vergingen fast 10 Jahre, bis er die Übersetzung der Einstein’schen Schriften fertigstellen konnte, da er gleichzeitig als Bauer auf dem Lande arbeiten musste und während der „Anti-Rechts-Bewegung” „rechts” stand. Die Übersetzung und Veröffentlichung von Einsteins gesammelten Werken in diesem besonderen soziologischen, kulturellen und politischen Kontext bietet viel Stoff für Rückblicke und Aufarbeitungen aus historischer Perspektive. Vor allem die ideologischen, symbolischen Implikationen in Zusammenhang mit Einstein waren ein dominantes Merkmal jener Zeit. (shrink)

Comme dans les autres pays, Einstein a été l’un des scientifiques les plus célèbres en Chine. Dans les années soixante-dix du 20e siècle, trois volumes des OEuvres complètes d’Einstein ont été traduits et publiés en Chine. Pour de nombreux Chinois ces volumes représentaient une source d’informations sur Einstein et une influence idéologique importante. Le contexte politique en est le suivant: après l’an 1949 des mouvements politiques très influents sont nés en Chine, ayant pour objectif la critique des sciences. Ces mouvements (...) ont beaucoup influencé les décisions, la sélection, le progrès ainsi que la manière de traduire et de publier les oeuvres d’Einstein. Parmi les éditeurs et les traducteurs excellait Xu Liangying. Révolutionnaire clandestin avant la mise en place de la République, il est devenu par la suite historien de la science. Il a investi presque dix ans pour terminer la traduction des oeuvres d’Einstein parce qu’ à l’époque il travaillait comme agriculteur pour ses idées de droite pendant la Révolution culturelle. Dans ce contexte sociologique, culturel et politique, la traduction et la publication des OEuvres complètes d’Einstein offre beaucoup de points qui méritent d’être examinés et analysés dans une perspective historique. Surtout, par exemple, les implications idéologiques, symboliques reliés à Einstein et qui ont été les caractéristiques dominantes de cette époque historique. (shrink)

As in other countries, Einstein has been one of the most famous scientists in China. In 1970’s, the three volumes Collection of Einstein in Chinese have been selected, translated and published, which was the main sources for Chinese people knowing Einstein for long time, and even had important ideological influence. However, as the background of it, in China, there were very influential political movements related to criticism of science after 1949, which also influenced the decision, selection, progress and the way (...) of the translating and publishing of Einstein’s works. Among the editors and translators, XU Liangying was a special and important person, who was originally a underground revolutionist before establishment of the Republic, and latterly became a historian of science. He spent nearly ten years to finish the most translation when he was a real peasant in countryside and a “righty” because of the “anti-righty“ movement. During the translating work and the publication of Collection of Einstein in that special social, cultural and political context then, there were many things worth to look back and analyze their meanings by a historical perspective reflection. Especially, the ideological symbolic implication related to the Einstein has been a very dominant characteristic in the history mentioned here. (shrink)

Liu Ping discusses patriotism and nationalism in regard to culture and values and also the role of the prophetic voice in Chinese society. His provocative allegorical rewriting of a prophecy from the Biblical book of Amos, setting it in contemporary China, is pointedly political. Liu writes in the Chinese intellectual tradition of pointing out when a society or a country is on the brink of destruction.

Guanxi is essential to doing business in China. Even those who are minimally familiar with business in the People’s Republic seem to know this. How should Western business organizations look at guanxi? Further, if guanxi is seen as essential, what is the responsible approach to guanxi building? These questions may have different answers depending on one’s perspectives. First, what is guanxi?

Guanxi is essential to doing business in China. Even those who are minimally familiar with business in the People’s Republic seem to know this. How should Western business organizations look at guanxi? Further, if guanxi is seen as essential, what is the responsible approach to guanxi building? These questions may have different answers depending on one’s perspectives. First, what is guanxi?

Introduction My fluid thinking began when Professor Laurence-Berger invited me to co-edit a panel of articles on Chinese Temporalities for the French academic journal Temporalités, centering on the relationship between the concept of Chinese temporalities and the several manifestations of China as a modern, national, political entity. I myself define the concept of temporalities in terms of its methodological meanings, by emphasizing its multidimensional nature: first of all, the concept of t...

The first problem we confront in the study and research of the philosophical thought of Mao Zedong is the relationship between Mao Zedong Philosophical Thought and Mao Zedong Thought. Clarification of the relationship between the two can assist our understanding of the status and function of Mao Zedong Philosophical Thought in Mao Zedong Thought, and thereby promote our understanding of why it is necessary to study and research Mao Zedong Philosophical Thought.

本书从教师职业素质和专业发展的角度出发,参考借鉴了网络上颇为流行的《做教师的22条军规》的部分条款,分成运筹职业:三尺讲台与你一生有约;决胜课堂:让你的教学充满激情与诗意;倾情心田:让爱做主,剑指未来 :让你的教师生涯洒满阳光四个部分。.

本书系统地阐述了人人平等的独特的平等观,主张实行财产公有制,主张男女平等、婚姻自由,主张劳动产品按劳分配或按需分配以及每个人的生活都有保障,主张法律应当由全体人民制定、体现人民的意志。.