Abstract: This working paper focuses on the question whether there is a therapeutic imperative that, in specific situations, would oblige us to perform genome editing at the germline level in the context of assisted reproduction. The answer to this central question is discussed primarily with reference to specific scenarios where preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) does not represent an acceptable alternative to germline genome editing based on either medical, or ethical, or – from the perspective of the potential parents – moral (...) or religious grounds. This article deals with four different types of case constellations that result from these possible reasons against PGD as well as from the necessity or dispensability of a subsequent “control PGD.” These cases are discussed based on hypotheses concerning contextual factors and theoretical assumptions. In conclusion, we point out that if our assumptions are correct, there is probably no therapeutic imperative for genome editing at the germline level. We draw this rationale from the fact that germline interventions are likely not person-affecting. However, we caution the reader that our result is preliminary and needs to be more carefully examined in future work in light of the bioethical debate and potential objections. -/- // Abstract: Im Zentrum dieses Working Papers steht die Frage, ob es einen therapeutischen Imperativ geben kann, der uns, in bestimmten Situationen, verpflichten würde, eine Genomeditierung (genome editing) auf Keimbahnebene im Rahmen der assistierten Befruchtung vorzunehmen. Die Antwort auf diese zentrale Frage wird insbesondere mit Bezug auf Fälle diskutiert, in denen das Verfahren der Präimplantationsdiagnostik (PID) keine aus entweder medizinischen oder ethischen oder – aus Sicht der potentiellen Eltern – moralischen bzw. religiösen Gründen akzeptable Alternative zu einem Keimbahneingriff darstellt. Die möglichen Gründe gegen die PID sowie die Erforderlichkeit oder Verzichtbarkeit einer nachfolgenden «Kontroll-PID» ergeben vier verschiedene Fallkonstellationen, denen sich der Beitrag zuwendet. Auf Grundlage von Hypothesen zu kontextuellen Faktoren und theoretischen Annahmen diskutieren wir diese Fälle. Im Ergebnis verweisen wir darauf, dass es, wenn unsere Annahmen zutreffen, vermutlich keinen therapeutischen Imperativ zum genome editing auf Keimbahnebene gibt. Dies begründet sich daraus, dass der Keimbahneingriff vermutlich nicht als personenbezogen (person-affecting) zu bezeichnen ist. Wir weisen jedoch darauf hin, dass unser Ergebnis vorläufig ist und unter Berücksichtigung der bioethischen Debatte und möglicher Einwände genauer geprüft werden muss. -/- // Résumé: Ce Working Paper se concentre sur la question de l’existence d’un impératif thérapeutique qui, dans des situations spécifiques, nous obligerait à réaliser une édition du génome au niveau de la lignée germinale dans le cadre de la procréation assistée. Afin de répondre à cette question centrale nous développons quatre scénarios spécifiques dans lesquels le diagnostic préimplantatoire (DPI) ne représente pas une alternative acceptable à l’édition du génome germinal pour des raisons médicales, éthiques ou – du point de vue des futurs parents – morales ou religieuses. Cet article traite de quatre constellations différentes de cas résultant des raisons mises en avant pour s'opposer au DPI ainsi que de la nécessité ou de l’inutilité d’un ultérieur « DPI de contrôle » Ces cas sont discutés sur la base d’hypothèses portant sur les facteurs contextuels et sur les présupposés théoriques. En conclusion, nous soulignons que si nos hypothèses sont correctes, il n’y a probablement aucun impératif thérapeutique justifiant l’édition du génome au niveau de la lignée germinale. Nous arrivons à cette conclusion parce qu’une intervention au niveau de la lignée germinale n’est probablement pas susceptible d’affecter la personne. Cependant, nous mettons en garde le lecteur sur le fait que notre conclusion est préliminaire et qu’elle doit être examinée avec soin dans des futurs travaux instruits par le débat bioéthique et par les éventuelles objections. (shrink)

The existing literature treats of several investigations with a certain bearing on the question which is roughly indicated by the title “Imperatives and Logic.” Some of those investigations, however, are entirely outside the scope of the present work.Mally sets himself the task of developing a “Logik des Willens” constituting a parallel to the usual logic, the “Logik des Denkens". In order to emphasize its independence, the author also calls this “Logik des Willens” “Deontik”, and he conceives it as being (...) based on the “Wesensgesetze” of will in the same way as the usual logic is conceived as being based on the “Wesensgesetze” of thought. The author develops a formalistic deductive system on the basis of 5 axioms of demands, including the axiom that there is at least one fact which is unconditionally demanded, and through a lengthy series of theorems he arrives at the sentence that what is unconditionally demanded is identical with what is actually the case: “was sein soll, ist Tatsache”. Similarly, the author develops a system of axioms for “right” volition, including the axiom that right volition is non-contradictory. (shrink)

This paper provides evidence for an ambiguity of bare VPs in the English conditional conjunction construction. This ambiguity, undetected by previous researchers, provides a key to the development of a compositional semantic analysis of conditional conjunction with imperative first conjuncts. The analysis combines existing semantic theories of imperatives, the future tense, modal subordination, and speech act conjunction to yield the correct semantics without further stipulation.

"Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight" is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an imperative. Several philosophers, however (Williams 1963; Wedeking 1970; Harrison 1991; Hansen 2008), have denied that imperative inferences exist, arguing that (1) no such inferences occur in everyday life, (2) imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, "since surrender" or "it follows that surrender or fight", and (3) distinct imperatives have conflicting (...) permissive presuppositions ("surrender or fight" permits you to fight without surrendering, but "surrender" does not), so issuing distinct imperatives amounts to changing one's mind and thus cannot be construed as making an inference. In response I argue inter alia that, on a reasonable understanding of 'inference', some everyday-life inferences do have imperatives as premises and conclusions, and that issuing imperatives with conflicting permissive presuppositions does not amount to changing one's mind. (shrink)

Suppose that a sign at the entrance of a hotel reads: “Don’t enter these premises unless you are accompanied by a registered guest”. You see someone who is about to enter, and you tell her: “Don’t enter these premises if you are an unaccompanied registered guest”. She asks why, and you reply: “It follows from what the sign says”. It seems that you made a valid inference from an imperative premise to an imperative conclusion. But it also seems that (...) class='Hi'>imperatives cannot be true or false, so what does it mean to say that your inference is valid? It cannot mean that the truth of its premise guarantees the truth of its conclusion. One is thus faced with what is known as “Jørgensen’s dilemma” (Ross 1941: 55-6): it seems that imperative logic cannot exist because logic deals only with entities that, unlike imperatives, can be true or false, but it also seems that imperative logic must exist. It must exist not only because inferences with imperatives can be valid, but also because imperatives (like “Enter” and “Don’t enter”) can be inconsistent with each other, and also because one can apply logical operations to imperatives: “Don’t enter” is the negation of “Enter”, and “Sing or dance” is the disjunction of “Sing” and “Dance”. A standard reaction to this dilemma consists in basing imperative logic on analogues of truth and falsity. For example, the imperative “Don’t enter” is satisfied if you don’t enter and is violated if you enter, and one might say that an inference from an imperative premise to an imperative conclusion is valid exactly if the satisfaction (rather than the truth) of the premise guarantees the satisfaction of the conclusion. But before getting into the details, more needs to be said on what exactly imperatives are. (shrink)

Television commercials are often thought of as bothersome multimedia artefacts that by their very existence spoil our viewing pleasure at regular intervals. Not only that, but they seem to have the habit of ordering us around. This aspect of TV ads has often been commented on by experts and laypersons alike. Therefore, we decided to tackle this issue and look at the prototypical expression of directives, that is, imperatives in voice-overs in television commercials. To this end we have (...) carried out an empirical analysis of imperatives in voice-overs in the MATVA corpus which contains transcriptions of nearly 800 voice-overs in British TV ads recorded on six days during 2009, 2010 and 2011. We provide an exhaustive quantitative and qualitative profile of imperatives in contemporary TV advertising. This includes information on the distribution of imperatives, the most common verbs in imperative clauses, and their discourse function. We are also able to show conclusively that the directive force of imperatives in TV ads is more akin to advice or recommendation than commands, and explain from a discourse-pragmatic perspective why this is so. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism seems to appeal to liberal neutrality because both are committed to core values such as reciprocity, autonomy, respect for the individual, personal accountability, and inclusivity. Further, cosmopolitanism is legitimate for many only insofar as it endorses value-pluralism in open societies, which is a staple of liberal neutrality. And yet, one might think that there is a moral obligation to create a cosmopolitan community. One can think of this as moral (normative) cosmopolitanism. To the end of creating a cosmopolitan community, (...) certain values ought to be fostered in laws and public policies, and certain attitudes ought to be cultivated. This leads to a potential impasse, namely if cosmopolitanism is committed to neutrality then it cannot promote its normativity, and if it is not committed to neutrality then it cannot promote value-pluralism. I propose a solution to this potential impasse by examining several of the democratic and cosmopolitan commitments of Alain Locke. What I take from Locke is his grounding of both pluralism and moral cosmopolitanism in democratic, time-honored principles that exist in all acts of free association, namely: liberty, equality, and fraternity. These values, of necessity, pervade all political conceptions of good lives because all political conceptions require what acts of free association allow, namely community with others. To this end, I provide an argument for how someone can consistently be committed to both moral cosmopolitanism and liberal neutrality. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism seems to appeal to liberal neutrality because both are committed to core values such as reciprocity, autonomy, respect for the individual, personal accountability, and inclusivity. Further, cosmopolitanism is legitimate for many only insofar as it endorses value-pluralism in open societies, which is a staple of liberal neutrality. And yet, one might think that there is a moral obligation to create a cosmopolitan community. One can think of this as moral cosmopolitanism. To the end of creating a cosmopolitan community, certain (...) values ought to be fostered in laws and public policies, and certain attitudes ought to be cultivated. This leads to a potential impasse, namely if cosmopolitanism is committed to neutrality then it cannot promote its normativity, and if it is not committed to neutrality then it cannot promote value-pluralism. I propose a solution to this potential impasse by examining several of the democratic and cosmopolitan commitments of Alain Locke. What I take from Locke is his grounding of both pluralism and moral cosmopolitanism in democratic, time-honored principles that exist in all acts of free association, namely: liberty, equality, and fraternity. These values, of necessity, pervade all political conceptions of good lives because all political conceptions require what acts of free association allow, namely community with others. To this end, I provide an argument for how someone can consistently be committed to both moral cosmopolitanism and liberal neutrality. (shrink)

Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives, and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives, there are mixed-premise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives, and cross-species arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives or vice versa. I propose a general definition of argument validity: an argument is valid exactly if, necessarily, every fact that sustains its premises also sustains its conclusion, where a fact sustains an imperative exactly (...) if it favors the satisfaction over the violation proposition of the imperative, and a fact sustains a declarative exactly if, necessarily, the declarative is true if the fact exists. I argue that this definition yields as special cases the standard definition of validity for pure declarative arguments and my previously defended definition of validity for pure imperative arguments, and that it yields intuitively acceptable results for mixed-premise and cross-species arguments. (shrink)

Besides pure declarative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are declaratives (“you sinned shamelessly; so you sinned”), and pure imperative arguments, whose premises and conclusions are imperatives (“repent quickly; so repent”), there are mixed-premise arguments, whose premises include both imperatives and declaratives (“if you sinned, repent; you sinned; so repent”), and cross-species arguments, whose premises are declaratives and whose conclusions are imperatives (“you must repent; so repent”) or vice versa (“repent; so you can repent”). I propose a general (...) definition of argument validity: an argument is valid exactly if, necessarily, every fact that sustains its premises also sustains its conclusion, where a fact sustains an imperative exactly if it favors the satisfaction over the violation of the imperative, and a fact sustains a declarative exactly if, necessarily, the declarative is true if the fact exists. I argue that this definition yields as special cases the standard definition of validity for pure declarative arguments and my previously defended definition of validity for pure imperative arguments, and that it yields intuitively acceptable results for mixed-premise and cross-species arguments. (shrink)

“Surrender; therefore, surrender or fight” is apparently an argument corresponding to an inference from an imperative to an imperative. Several philosophers, however, have denied that imperative inferences exist, arguing that no such inferences occur in everyday life, imperatives cannot be premises or conclusions of inferences because it makes no sense to say, for example, “since surrender” or “it follows that surrender or fight”, and distinct imperatives have conflicting permissive presuppositions, so issuing distinct imperatives amounts to changing one’s (...) mind and thus cannot be construed as making an inference. In response I argue inter alia that, on a reasonable understanding of ‘inference’, some everyday-life inferences do have imperatives as premises and conclusions, and that issuing imperatives with conflicting permissive presuppositions does not amount to changing one’s mind. (shrink)

This article offers a new interpretation of Adorno’s new categorical imperative : it suggests that the new imperative is an important element of Adorno’s moral philosophy and at the same time runs counter to some of its essential features. It is suggested that Adorno’s moral philosophy leads to two aporiae, which create an impasse that the new categorical imperative attempts to circumvent. The first aporia results from the tension between Adorno’s acknowledgement that praxis is an essential part of moral philosophy, (...) and his view according to which existing social conditions make it impossible for moral knowledge to be translated into right action. The second aporia results from the tension between the uncompromising sensitivity to suffering that underlies Adorno’s moral thought, and his analysis of the culture industry mechanisms which turn people into happy, satisfied customers—an incompatibility which threatens to pull the rug out from under Adorno’s moral philosophy. My interpretation of the new categorical imperative focuses on two characteristics it inherits from the old, Kantian one—self-evidence and unconditionality—in order to present the new imperative as a response to these two aporiae. (shrink)

Their important exegetical and philosophical disagreements notwithstanding, Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek, on the one hand, and Alyssa Bernstein, on the other, seem to agree that Kant’s Categorical Imperative transcends the contemporary dichotomy between moral realism and ethical constructivism. My contribution is an attempt to further elaborate on the third, unique, conceptual option that they have identified. I employ the notion of an “enabling condition,” introduced in epistemology and action theory by Jonathan Dancy, in order to show that the Categorical (...) Imperative enables action and is enabled by action. The Categorical Imperative (as distinct from specific categorical imperatives and moral laws) is discussed as a structural, but still normative, coherence and consistence norm of practical reasoning. As such it is two things at the same time, namely, first, the most fundamental normative background condition of practical deliberation, choice, and action. Second, however, the mutual enabler-enablee-relationship between action and Categorical Imperative points in the other – “not-so-Kantian” – direction as well: individual practical deliberation, understood as the mundane phenomenon that penetrates the lives of agents, is the (existence) condition that enables the Categorical Imperative in normatively-structured action. (shrink)

The passionate and staunch defence of logic of the controversial thinker Ibn Ḥazm, Abū Muḥammad ʿAlī b. Aḥmad b. Saʿīd of Córdoba (384-456/994-1064), had lasting consequences in the Islamic world. Indeed, his book Facilitating the Understanding of the Rules of Logic and Introduction Thereto, with Common Expressions and Juristic Examples (Kitāb al-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq wa-l-mudkhal ilayhi bi-l-alfāẓ al-ʿāmmiyya wa-l-amthila al-fiqhiyya), composed in 1025-1029, was well known and discussed during and after his time; and it paved the way for the studies (...) of his compatriots Ibn Bājjah (d. 1138), Ibn Ṭufayl (1185), and Ibn Rushd (1198), who each gave demonstrative reasoning a privileged place within the methods of attaining knowledge. Unfortunately, as too often in the history of science, Ibn Ḥazm’s innovative perspectives and contributions in logic have been overlooked or considered with an attitude of contempt. On the one hand, his work has been seen, at best, as promulgating the benefits of studying Aristotle’s logic, so that his contribution is assessed as more didactical than conceptual. And on the other hand, those who do examine his innovations often consider them to be mistaken. As indicated by Chejne (1984, p. 2) contempt towards the logical work of Ibn Ḥazm was also present in its reception by the Eastern philosophers who accused him of deviating from Aristotelian logic and of dabbling in things beyond his capability. However, a reassessment of his work on logic has since begun, by delving into the ways the thinker of Córdoba studied the links between deontic and modal qualification of propositions. In this context Lameer’s (2013) paper on the logical sources of Ibn Ḥazm is worth mentioning; the author (p. 417, footnote 1) observes that, although, strictly speaking, it was al-Fārābī who first drew the parallelism between deontic and modal concepts, it was Ibn Ḥazm who developed it and worked it out in a more precise manner. A primary aim of this paper is to help fill some of these gaps by stressing the role of the work of Ibn Ḥazm in developing a notion of deontic necessity deeply rooted in legal normativity, and in explicitly discussing the transference between deontic and modal concepts. According to our view; the basic units of Islamic deontic logic are what we might call, indulging in terminological anachronism, heteronomous imperatives. As it turns out, the heteronomy of imperatives within Islamic legal systems contrasts with those of the purely moral realm, which seem to be closer to an autonomous conception of moral law. There it concurs again with Leibniz’s proposal to define obligatory as “what is necessary for a good person to do”. In the present paper, we will focus on the heteronomous imperatives of legal systems rather than on the imperatives of the purely moral realm. In this context, the work of Ibn Ḥazm extends the parallelism between the necessity of events and that of human actions stressed by his predecessors. According to our understanding, Ibn Ḥazm’s parallelism can be rendered explicit formally by means of a conditional (or hypothetical) structure shared by both deontic and modal propositions. Moreover, this structure makes apparent that this parallelism displays an underlying system of “degrees”. Indeed, while in the domain of events, given some conditions, it makes sense to distinguish between an event that is more likely to happen than another. Ibn Ḥazm speaks of near and distant possibility (such as the higher degree of likelihood of rain, given the condensation of clouds in December, and its lower degree, when the condensation occurs in summer); and, in the domain of actions, the Islamic notion of weighting actions determines degrees of virtue (or of legal and moral value). So whereas the degree of virtue of performing a forbidden act as determined by the distribution of sanction and reward is 0, we obtain the same value by pondering the likelihood of an impossible event to take place. Furthermore, as discussed in section II.3.2, the system of values at work in the parallelism can be seen as opening the way to a more direct correspondence. Thus, while in the realm of nature, likelihood of occurrence of an event is dependent upon the conditions specific to the occurrence of that event; while, in the realm of jurisprudence, likelihood of performing an action is dependent upon the distribution of reward and sanction specific to that action (being that, given the choice to perform or not perform a given action, those that will be rewarded are more likely to be performed than those that are not). According to this perspective, the point of the parallelism is that both deontic and modal qualifications measure the degree of an action or event to become actual; that is – indulging once more in anachronism (but this time from the Leibnizian background) – the degree measures how feasible (facile) an action or event may be. This suggests that Ibn Ḥazm’s perspectives already herald the links to probability and possibility explored by Leibniz six centuries later – see for example Leibniz’s (1671, A VI, I, p. 424-26) use of probability in the context of conditional right. Nevertheless, it also shows a crucial difference to the approach developed in the Elementa Jura Naturalis: whereas Leibniz’s studies seek to define what is to be just or virtuous, the logical system of deontic imperatives within Islamic jurisprudence presupposes that what is to be virtuous has already been settled. Determining what is to be virtuous is not achieved by logical reasoning within the system of legal jurisprudence, but by delving into the higher objectives of the Sharīʿa. While developing our point, we will delve into the logical structure of the heteronomous imperatives. This distinguishes our contribution from the existing literature, such as the papers of Chejne (1984), Lameer (2014), and Guerrero (1997, 2010, 2014), which do not provide a logical analysis of the deontic concepts put into work by Ibn Ḥazm. The true antecedent to the present paper is the work of Farid Zidani (2007, 2015), who, so far as we know, was the first to undertake such a task. Some of our own developments and general epistemological thoughts go beyond Ibn Ḥazm’s framework and motivations; mainly those contained in sections II.3.2 and IV. However, according to our view, these reflections suggest that Ibn Ḥazm’s approach has the substance for a broader and deeper exploration of the logic of norms. The paper is structured as follows:I.Ibn Ḥazm’s Logic of Heteronomous Imperatives. After presenting some extracts of the relevant text, we proceed by providing a formal reconstruction of the five forms of deontic modalities. II. A Landmark in the History of the Logical Analysis of Norms. Duties and Modalities. In this section, we study the transferences from deontic to modal necessity and possibility. We briefly compare the deontic system of Islamic Jurisprudence with that of Leibniz.III. Leibniz and Hypothetical Imperatives in Law.IV. Beyond Ibn Ḥazm: Conclusions and the Work Ahead. We will conclude the paper by discussing briefly some conceptual points that distinguish the logic of heteronomous imperatives from contemporary deontic logic. Our final words will discuss deontic-modal parallelism in the context of Ibn Ḥazm’s rejection of reasoning by conjecture and what we call “the internalization of nature.”. (shrink)

Certaines notions philosophiques dans leur splendeur paraissent s’imposer à tous en Afrique. C’est ainsi que la réalité, l’existence, l’objet, la substance, la qualité, la punition… semblent avoir une extension presque universelle. Il est question pour l’auteur de contextualiser ces notions et de décoloniser mentalement les Africains qui les utilisent sans en tirer des conséquences historiques.

Rorty's Neopragmatism and the Imperative of the Discourse of African Epistemology Pragmatism, as a philosophical movement, was a dominant orientation in the Anglo-American philosophical circles in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. Pragmatism, as expressed by its classical advocates, namely, Charles Sanders Peirce, William James and John Dewey, emphasized the primacy of practice or action over speculative thought and a priori reasoning. The central thesis of pragmatism (though there exist other variants) is the belief that the meaning of (...) an idea or a proposition lies in its "observable practical consequences", And as a theory of truth, it diverges from the correspondence and coherence theories which see truth in terms of correspondence of a proposition to facts and coherence of propositions to other propositions within the web respectively, but instead contends that "truth is to be found in the process of verification". In other words, pragmatists would emphasize the practical utility or "cash value", as it were, of knowledge and ideas as instruments for understanding reality. Neopragmatism is used to refer to some contemporary thinkers whose views incorporate in a significant way, though with minor differences bordering on methodology and conceptual analysis, the insights of the classical pragmatists. Our intention in this paper is to explore Rorty's neopragmatism, particularly his critique of analytic philosophy and then argue that his views have potential for the establishment of African epistemology as an emerging discourse within the African philosophical tradition. (shrink)

What is morality? Is “morality” something that admits of technological enhancement? What could it possibly mean for a society to have a moral imperative to morally enhance? We are compelled to take up questions like these as we move into the future of moral bioenhancement. Each article in this issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy attempts to bring some clarity as to what is meant by morality, such that one could be morally obligated to morally enhance. These articles (...) broaden the scope of the question as to the nature of human morality, what might and what might not be permitted in terms of moral bioenhancement, and explore the nature of the kinds of beings humans might become—whether human or post-human—and the moral obligations that may exist toward them. (shrink)

For Kant and Levinas, the categorical imperative is the only possible formula for universalization. It has a structural necessity. Its claim is ultimate, valid without exception, and therefore reason-based. What differentiates Levinas from Kant is Kant’s assumption that “pure reason, practical of itself” is “immediately lawgiving.” Levinas contradicted this form of reason legislating itself as an end in itself: according to Levinas, reason has no self-generated power. Although both agree that the achievement of an ethical insight depends on “passivity,” in (...) contrast to Kant Levinas does not consider this “passivity” to be part of a conceptual insight. Its place is outside the subject. Instead of an “archetype” that already exists in the subject, Levinas advocates the conception of a counter-image whose form is based on the face. This face is not speechless. His speech is based on a universalizable commandment, namely the commandment: You shall not kill me. In its full extent, this claim can only be understood via a body-based understanding of the categorical imperative. (shrink)

For Kant and Levinas, the categorical imperative is the only possible formula for universalization. It has a structural necessity. Its claim is ultimate, valid without exception, and therefore reason-based. What differentiates Levinas from Kant is Kant’s assumption that “pure reason, practical of itself” is “immediately lawgiving.” Levinas contradicted this form of reason legislating itself as an end in itself: according to Levinas, reason has no self-generated power. Although both agree that the achievement of an ethical insight depends on “passivity,” in (...) contrast to Kant Levinas does not consider this “passivity” to be part of a conceptual insight. Its place is outside the subject. Instead of an “archetype” that already exists in the subject, Levinas advocates the conception of a counter-image whose form is based on the face. This face is not speechless. His speech is based on a universalizable commandment, namely the commandment: You shall not kill me. In its full extent, this claim can only be understood via a body-based understanding of the categorical imperative. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to discuss the tradition of adversarialism as it relates to mediation and to suggest ways in which good practice can be encouraged amongst mediation advocates. Mediation is a key mechanism for dispute resolution in the English and Welsh jurisdiction. The practice of the lawyers involved in the mediation process is shaped by various factors including training, codes of practice, behavioural norms and court guidance. The default skill set the legal professionals bring to the process (...) is founded on the principle of adversarialism which is not suited to the core values of mediation. The developing professional group of mediation advocates, many of whom are from the legal professions, may benefit from a voluntarily assumed code of practice. The alternatives are to include provisions covering behaviour in mediation into existing codes of conduct for legal professionals and the adoption of more collaborative pre-meditation agreements which include lawyers. A combination of these measures is recommended as a way to assist the process of realignment of the advocate role from that of legal adversary to collaborator. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of Kant’s justification of the categorical imperative. The book contests the standard interpretation of Kant’s views by arguing that he never abandoned his view about this as expressed in his Groundwork. It is distinctive in the way in which it places Kant’s argument in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, which is essential to understand it as an argument from within human agential self-understanding. The book reviews that existing literature, then presents (...) a logical construction of Kant’s argument, which it defends by examining what Kant has to say about synthetic a priori practical propositions in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, and by a detailed examination of how he presents his argument in the Second Critique and the Groundwork. Particular attention is given to the views of two scholars who share many of the views expressed in this book: Klaus Steigleder and Michael Wolff. Special attention is also given to the views of Owen Ware, who, while sharing many of our arguments has a very different overall view. The concluding chapter provides a statement about the validity of Kant’s argument. (shrink)

The motivation of this paper is to contribute to the project of finding new ways to use "utopia" in philosophy again. Since philosophers as well as poets can look to their forbears for inspiration in re-inventing terms, it would be nice if those of us trying to rehabilitate the term could lean a bit on our own disciplinary heavies, especially in the current climate of philosophical skepticism, even cynicism, about the very idea of utopia. My contribution to that task here (...) will be to present a vision of utopian commitment that I see taking shape in the interface between Kant's ethics and aesthetics. This vision is broadly speaking a moral one, insofar as it describe the barriers to, but also the necessary conditions of, human motivation to strive for the creation of a just society in the real world. But turning to Kant's ethics as a model for a theory of utopia requires some explanation. After all, his moral theory, when it takes into account the really existing conditions of human existence, appears to do so only to dismiss them as obstacles or diversions in the path of correct moral judgment. When he discusses human community, it is often to dismiss it as driven by self-interest and and an "each against all" struggle that can be responsibly regulated but never eliminated. At best this "unsocial sociability" might be evidence for a hypothetical natural purpose: human strife and misery is a mechanical force driving the progress of our talents and capacities in the long evolutionary run.1 But this is hardly a utopian vision in the sense in which we would wish to see a well-regulated society be.. (shrink)

I focus on the broadly instrumentalist view that all genuine practical imperatives are hypothetical imperatives and all genuine practical deliberation is deliberation from existing motivations. After indicating why I see instrumentalism as highly plausible, I argue that the most popular version of instrumentalism, according to which genuine practical imperatives can take desires as their starting point, is problematic. I then provide a limited defense of what I see as a more radical but also more compelling version of (...) instrumentalism. According to the position I defend, genuine practical deliberation and genuine practical imperatives take as their starting point the agent's intentions and only the agent's intentions. (shrink)

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of Kant’s justification of the categorical imperative. The book contests the standard interpretation of Kant’s views by arguing that he never abandoned his view about this as expressed in his Groundwork. It is distinctive in the way in which it places Kant’s argument in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, which is essential to understand it as an argument from within human agential self-understanding. The book reviews that existing literature, then presents (...) a logical construction of Kant’s argument, which it defends by examining what Kant has to say about synthetic a priori practical propositions in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, and by a detailed examination of how he presents his argument in the Second Critique and the Groundwork. Particular attention is given to the views of two scholars who share many of the views expressed in this book: Klaus Steigleder and Michael Wolff. Special attention is also given to the views of Owen Ware, who, while sharing many of our arguments has a very different overall view. The concluding chapter provides a statement about the validity of Kant’s argument. (shrink)

This paper explores the charge by Bruce Aune and Allen Wood that a gap exists in Kant's derivation of the Categorical Imperative. I show that properly understood, no such gap exists, and that the deduction of the Categorical Imperative is successful as it stands.

Surging from the ontopoietic vital timing of life, human self-consciousness prompts the innermost desire to rise above its brute facts. Imaginatio creatrix inspires us to fabulate these facts into events and plots with personal significance attempting to delineate a life-course in life-stories within the ever-flowing stream – existence. Seeking their deep motivations, causes and concatenations, we fabulate relatively stabilized networks of interconnecting meaning – history. But to understand the meaning and sense of these networks’ reconfigurations call for the purpose (...) and telos of our endless undertaking; they remain always incomplete, carried onwards with the current of life, while fluctuating with personal experience in the play of memory. Facts and life stories, subjective desires and propensities, the circumambient world in its historical moves, creative logos and mythos, personal freedom and inward stirrings thrown in an enigmatic interplay, prompt our imperative thirst for the meaning of this course, its purpose and its fulfillment – the sense of it all. To disentangle all this animates the passions of the literary genius. The focus of this collection is to isolate the main arteries running through the intermingled forces prompting our quest to endow life with meaning. Papers by: Jadwiga Smith, Lawrence Kimmel, Alira Ashvo-Munoz, William D. Melaney, Imafedia Okhamafe, Michel Dion, Franck Dalmas, Ludmila Molodkina, Victor Gerald Rivas, Rebecca M. Painter, Matti Itkonen, Raymond J. Wilson III, Christopher S. Schreiner, Bruce Ross, Bernadette Prochaska, Tsung-I Dow, Jerre Collins, Cezary Jozef Olbromski, Victor Kocay, Roberto Verolini. (shrink)

In this chapter, the authors trace the epistemic challenge initiated by colonialism as part of its civilizing and modernizing missions, and the epistemological violence that undermined Africa’s knowledge systems. The chapter argues that the anticolonial and decolonization efforts have been more programmatic without pushing the boundary of decolonizing the epistemic basis of colonialism. The chapter then contends that decolonizing resistance can best be captured in the form of a reversed epistemic process that not only excavates Africa’s knowledge forms, Africanizes other (...) available knowledges, but more importantly generates an epistemological framework that establishes and reinforces a combative alternative Afrocentric mythology that subverts the existing Eurocentric mythology. Such an alternative myth constitutes a new vision of the African continent and all it can achieve outside of the grip of Eurocentric epistemic hegemony. (shrink)

Feminist decolonial scholars have called for disengaging from the current system built on a hierarchical logic of race and gender central to modern, colonial thinking. They have looked to worlds outside the modern system to lead us out of current unjust practices harming both humans and the environment. Although policymaking may be seen as the stronghold of the current political agenda and of the structures that have led to the climate crisis, we argue that climate policies too, are also crucial (...) for rethinking and transforming societies. Our examination of climate adaptation policies in Sweden and the literature from Europe shows how policy documents ignore and unknow the oppressive intersections of gender and power despite the knowledge that exists on these issues in the public domain. Drawing on the tools of agnotology, we examine how this is achieved by strategies of ‘denial, dismissal, diversion and displacement.’ Building on feminist post and decolonial scholarship, we make explicit the gendered and racial hierarchies and dichotomies underpinning these policy documents. At the same time, we bring attention to the nuances in the policy documents we study and look for the openings that might be used to bring about transformation by making these hierarchies explicit and calling them into question. We argue that a transformation is possible through a feminist post and decolonial intervention, even in policymaking otherwise ignorant of culture, values and the colonial histories that have produced contemporary society. (shrink)

Board oversight of community benefit constitutes an ethical imperative for nonprofit health care organizations. By "ethical imperative" we mean a health care organization's duty to fulfill value-based obligations that transcend compliance requirements in order to be consistent with its basic sense of purpose. We consider three points here: the existence of a distinctively ethical imperative for board oversight, the fact that the imperative is organizational in nature, and practical ways to fulfill its obligations. To explain the meaning of ethical (...) imperative, offer analytical clarification, and provide evidence-based guidelines we adopt an organizational ethics paradigm. Because community benefit for tax-exempt .. (shrink)

Throughout his work, from the logic which first brought him to prominence, through Our Social Inheritance, to the last book he lived to see through the press, Lewis was concerned with what he calls "the whole question of validity at large... the relation between valid knowing and justified self-direction of our activities." Lange, who was Lewis' student, has selected several lectures and papers from the last years of Lewis' life. Because Lewis had been working toward a major statement on ethics, (...) these ten late essays are all on ethical themes. Because Lewis was a constructive, systematic philosopher, his ethical position is grounded in his logic, metaphysics, and epistemology. For example, Lewis characterizes 'truth' as a semantic word designating a relation between the conception in question and existant actuality, NOT a relation between the conception and the evidence. Only two of these papers have already appeared in print; the rest were delivered as public lectures. Some were deliberately not published while he still hoped to improve on them. Acknowledging this is probably only fair to Lewis, but it is not the whole story. Over the years, Lewis has delineated the spheres of the valid, the right, the good, and the imperative, and has worked on capturing the relations between the right and the good, the valid and the imperative, the rational, the consistent and the normative. These papers contain new insights as well as older insights elegantly polished.--M. B. M. (shrink)

In this book, Matthew C. Ally explores the changing and increasingly troubled relationship between humankind and planet Earth. Oriented by the seemingly simple example of a woodland pond, he draws together insights from existential philosophy, scientific ecology, and several disciplines in the social sciences and humanities to articulate a strong sense of human belonging in the living Earth community and a binding imperative of participation in the struggle to preserve a habitable planet and build a livable world.

This study analyzes the increasing presence and capabilities of wearable computing devices in the cornucopia of personalized digital data. We argue that the institutional data practices typical of Google Glass will pose policy challenges and herald yet another dramatic shift to personalized data marketing. We also highlight the characteristics of Google’s existing synergetic data practices that will shape the development of not only Google Glass, but also all subsequent wearable mobile devices in light of 360-degree data collection. The key organizing (...) concept of our study is the disjuncture between institutional and policy forces in harnessing dual market mechanism, which frames how the new communication industry operates in the marketplace of ubiquitous personal advertising. We conclude by summarizing the three key areas of political-policy concern and suggest future solutions, with the discussion on the future of wearable computing practices related to the freedom of the human body. (shrink)

Production methods for food from U.K. livestock industries (milk, dairy products, meat, eggs, fibre) are undergoing substantial change as a result of the need to respond to environmental and animal welfare awareness of purchasing customers, and to espouse the principles of environmental protection. There appears to be a strong will on the part of livestock farmers to satisfy the environmental imperative, led by the need to maintain market share and by existing and impending legislation. There has been support forthcoming in (...) the form of Government-sponsored scientific research and technological development to provide the necessary framework for new environmentally sensitive practices. The agricultural community has itself made substantial responses to market demand through the inception of Farm Assured Quality Assurance Schemes. These appear to have a more sustainable future than the extremes of organic farming and free-range practices. Pollution of agricultural land with nitrate and phosphate by intensive livestock industries is a greater problem in some parts of continental Europe than it is in the U.K. The distribution of livestock out of intensive units and into mixed farming systems, would require substantial restructuring of the industry. Many of the animal welfare requirements which have been forwarded as a part of the environmental agenda for agriculture have been voluntarily accepted by livestock producers. However, some major aspects, such as alternative housing systems for pigs and poultry, remain unresolved. Analysis of the science and technology support for the environmental imperative, especially from Government sources, would suggest that, although dramatically increased in recent years, environmentally orientated research remains a relatively small proportion of the whole. Whilst a movement away from governmental funding of volume production appears to be justifiable, there has not been an equivalent balancing of effort toward funding for product quality, sustainability, environmental protection and animal welfare. Nevertheless, the university education system is producing a generation of more environmentally aware agricultural science graduates who are opting to pursue Government-sponsored environmentally orientated postgraduate research programs. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence surveillance can be used to diagnose individual cases, track the spread of Covid‐19, and help provide care. The use of AI for surveillance purposes (such as detecting new Covid‐19 cases and gathering data from healthy and ill individuals) in a pandemic raises multiple concerns ranging from privacy to discrimination to access to care. Luckily, there exist several frameworks that can help guide stakeholders, especially physicians but also AI developers and public health officials, as they navigate these treacherous shoals. (...) While these frameworks were not explicitly designed for AI surveillance during a pandemic, they can be adapted to help address concerns regarding privacy, human rights, and due process and equality. In a time where the rapid implementation of all tools available is critical to ending a pandemic, physicians, public health officials, and technology companies should understand the criteria for the ethical implementation of AI surveillance. (shrink)

Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative can be expressed as the formula of humanity. This states that rational beings ought always to treat humanity, whether in our own persons or in others, as ends in themselves and never as mere means. In this essay, I argue that if God exists, then the Kantian formula of humanity is false. The basic idea behind my argument is that if God exists, then he has knowingly created a world with all kinds of naturally occurring threats, (...) such as disease, flood, drought, etc. and he has knowingly placed human beings in such a world without their consent, knowing that many innocent human beings will be led to suffer, and he allows this suffering to occur. I argue that even if this is somehow for their own good or the good of others or contributes to the goodness of the world as a whole, God treats these innocent human beings as mere means when he places humans in such a world without their consent and allows this suffering to occur. (shrink)

We are in the midst of a crisis of climate change and environmental degradation that will only get worse, unless significant changes are rapidly made. Globally, the healthcare sector causes a large share of our total environmental footprint: 4.4% of greenhouse gases. Sustainable healthcare has emerged as a way for healthcare sectors in high‐income countries to help mitigate climate change by reducing their emissions. Whether global health should be sustainable and what ethical grounds might exist to support such a claim (...) are not questions that have been investigated. The paper argues that global health practice—the delivery of health services to underserved populations in resource‐poor areas of the world—should be sustainable as a matter of climate justice and solidarity. Reducing climate change‐related risks and harms for the vulnerable is integral to the mission of global health and thus it is necessary to consider the climate impact of its practice. The field has a duty to provide sustainable health services that are responsive to climate change‐related changes in the local burden of disease and to build sustainable health system infrastructure. Specific responsibilities for global health funders, managers, and implementers to uphold the duty are proposed. To conclude, the paper considers what limits might be placed on the duty to deliver sustainable global healthcare. (shrink)

In this paper, I take up the question of how epistemic injustices can be resisted. Miranda Fricker, who introduced the term to describe situations in which subjects are wronged as knowers, has initially advocated an individualist, virtue-based account to counteract epistemic injustices. Epistemic injustices, however, do not merely operate at an individual level but are rooted in social practices and structures. Arguably therefore, individually virtuous epistemic conduct is not enough to uproot patterns of epistemic injustice. Institutional change and collective actions (...) are needed. Recently, Elizabeth Anderson has proposed such a structural remedy. Diagnosing patterns of social segregation that track existing inequalities to be the principal structural cause of epistemic injustices, Anderson suggests that integration is required to achieve epistemic justice. Pace Anderson, I argue that certain segregated spaces —namely spaces provided by subaltern counter-publics— can function and, in fact, have historically functioned as important sites of epistemic resistance. In particular, I argue that even if integration is sharply distinguished from assimilation, Anderson’s proposal insufficiently acknowledges the subversive potential of those spaces, in which shielded from the gaze of the oppressors, marginally situated subjects can assemble and question hegemonic epistemic practices. (shrink)

Arguments for a just transition are integral to debates about climate change and the drive to create a carbon-neutral economy. There are currently two broad approaches rooted in ethics and justice for framing just energy transitions. The first can be described as internal to the transition and emphasizes the anticipation, assessment, and redressing of harms created by the transition itself and the inclusion in transition governance of groups or communities potentially harmed by its disruptions. In this article, we propose a (...) second approach to ethics and justice in an energy transition, which we describe as systemic or societal in scope. This approach complements attention to the proximate dynamics and impacts of the transition process with a focus on the distant societal and economic outcomes the transition brings into being and how they compare to conditions prior to the transition. It poses the question: do the transformative social, economic, and technological changes wrought by energy systems create more just societies and economies, or do they instead reinforce or recreate long-standing injustices and inequalities? We illustrate this approach with an assessment of one of the most significant existing forms of energy injustice: the energy-poverty nexus. We argue that the energy-poverty nexus reflects configurations of socio-energy systems that create complex, extractive feedbacks between energy insecurity and economic insecurity and, over time, reinforce or exacerbate poverty. We further argue that just energy transitions should work to disentangle these configurations and re-design them so as to create generative rather than extractive feedbacks, thus ending the energy-poverty nexus and creating long-term outcomes that are more just, equitable, and fair. (shrink)

Many features of the existing biomedical research enterprise rest on questionable judgments about the value of research. Policymakers and research ethicists make assumptions about research value that aren't necessarily warranted. A more balanced view of research value could contribute to more defensible decisions about research policy and practice.

This paper examines the relationship between the university and fair trade coffee campaigns in North America. In recent years, fair trade coffee sales internationally have increased substantially but have still not grown large enough to meet the needs of fair trade producers in the South. In consequence, fair trade activists have sought to expand the market by pressuring public institutions to adopt fair trade purchasing policies. In North America, the university has emerged as a central focus of fair trade coffee (...) campaigns. Thus far, university administrators have been reluctant to support fair trade. This paper explores this reluctance and asserts that the university has a moral responsibility to support fair trade. However, it also argues that the potential exists for administrators to employ fair trade as an ethical fig leaf to mask the growing corporatization of the university under the weight of neoliberal reforms. This has become a common strategy of many neoliberal institutions in the North. Contrary to the assumptions of much of the emerging literature, it cannot be assumed that the impact of fair trade will necessarily be beneficial in the North unless activists work to ensure fair trade does not become employed as an ethical fig leaf. (shrink)

In this wide-ranging and multidisciplinary volume, leading scholars, activists, journalists, and public figures deliberate about the creative and critical potential of public imagination in an era paradoxically marked by intensifying globalization and resurgent nationalism. Divided into five sections, these essays explore the social, political, and cultural role of imagination and civic engagement, offering cogent, ingenious reflections that stand in stark contrast to the often grim rhetoric of our era. Short and succinct, the essays engage with an interconnected ensemble of themes (...) and issues while also providing insights into the specific geographical and social dynamics of each author's national or regional context. Part 1 introduces the reader to theoretical reflections on imagination and the public sphere; Part 2 illustrates dynamics of public imagination in a diverse set of cultural contexts; Part 3 reflects in various ways on the urgent need for a radically transformed public and civic imagination in the face of worldwide ecological crisis; Part 4 suggests new societal possibilities that are related to spiritual as well as politically revolutionary sources of inspiration; Part 5 explores characteristics of present and potentially emerging global society and the existing transnational framework that could provide resources for a more humane global order. Erudite and thought-provoking, On Public Imagination makes a vital contribution to political thought, and is accessible to activists, students, and scholars alike. (shrink)

The recent committee report from the Institute of Medicine in Washington, DC, containing proposals for controlling conflicts of interest 1 reflects the medical profession’s limited understanding of the actual scope of the issues and demonstrates how reactive academic physicians have become to media and congressional priorities instead of those of the medical field. The near-exclusive focus on the compromising of medical decision-making by the receipt of fungible support from the commercial sector fails to identify critical interdependencies of the relationship between (...) academic physicians and capitalist industry, the historical and economic context in which it takes place and the other stakeholders in the process who are trying to, or should be trying to, manage similar issues of ethical prioritisation of manpower and resources, allegiances and alliances.In the process of protecting ourselves, our patients and our institutions from the scourge of the market and its undue influence, we are participating in a much larger discussion, which we are so far neglecting. In redefining academia–industry relations, we are also negotiating over the means of support for translational clinical research, our educational mission as experts and our capacity to serve at centres of excellence in healthcare. Even more fundamentally, the process of examining ourselves and our institutions for conflicts of interest that negatively impact on our ability to protect and to treat our patients, as well as on how we educate the next generations of healthcare workers, goes to the moral core of what it means to be healing arts professionals.The Institute of Medicine report has chosen to overlook the existing complex …. (shrink)

The usual conception of transcendence is as the success of a process or practice of mediation, meditation, transmutation, salvation, supplication, application or implication. Blanchot's unusual transcendence escapes the inevitable ruin of such achievements by arriving in the form of the failure of immanence. Although it is impossible to describe that failure explicitly, it can be approached apophatically. Following an impossible imperative to see the whole, immanence generates inadvertent transcendence “thus exposing the essential ambiguity of transcendence and the impossibility that this (...) ambiguity be measured according to truth or legitimacy.” ( Writing of the Disaster p.65). The demanding process of bringing enough ambiguity into play in order to elucidate the failure of immanence and demonstrate a glimpse of an unavowable transcendence shall be undertaken through an assemblage of fragments from The Writing of the Disaster , interpreted as instructions for constructing and interrogating a temporary singularity. (shrink)

This paper presents a historical examination of the influence of the Darwinian metaphor 'the struggle for existence' on a variety of scientific theories which inform our current understanding of the prospects for sustainable development. The first part of the paper traces the use of the metaphor of struggle through two distinct avenues of thought relevant to the search for sustainable development. One of these avenues leads to the biophysical critique of conventional development popularised by 'ecological economists' such as Georgescu-Roegen (...) and Daly. This critique suggests that modern economic systems have gone astray by failing to respect the biological and physical limits to development and that they should be adapted to make them more like ecological systems. The other avenue leads to the modern insights of evolutionary psychology. These latter insights suggest that in certain key respects, the economic system (and actors within it) are already behaving more or less like an ecological system, driven as they are by evolutionary imperatives. Consequently, this second avenue appears to offer far bleaker prospects for achieving sustainable development than the first. However, the final part of the paper re-examines the historical roots of the metaphor itself, and suggests a number of ways in which a critical response to those historical roots might influence our understanding of the prospects for sustainable development. (shrink)

The author argues that being-thought, in keeping with the ‘intellectualist choice’ of the Greeks, has narrowed the thinkable to the question of whether something is or is not. The discourse-reason (logos) of the Greeks necessarily lends itself to construction and to its result, which is knowledge. Knowledge in turn trades the singular for generality, e.g. beautiful things for beauty. Because what it seeks is nowhere to be found in the world, such philosophy has located pure in-itself-ness in the beyond of (...) metaphysics, reducing life to metabolism, a shuttling between the extrema of lack and satiety. The Chinese language, because it lacks morphological markers, an imperative mood, and a verb ‘to be’, sidesteps ontology (being-thought) and thus hints at a more fruitful perspective on living, elucidating the notion of ex-istence as a way to provide an exteriority from which to examine living, in all its immediacy, without recourse to any metaphysical beyond. (shrink)