It is especially hard, at present, to read the newspapers without emitting a howl of anguish and outrage. Philosophy can heal some wounds but, in this case, political action may prove a better remedy than philosophy. It can therefore feel odd trying to think philosophically about surveillance at a time like this, rather than joining with like‐minded people to protest the erosion of our civil liberties, the duplicity of our governments, and the failings in our political institutions ‐ including our (...) political parties – revealed by the succession of leaks which have dripped away this the summer. Still, philosophy can help us to think about we should do, not merely what we should believe. Thus, in what follows I draw on my previous work on privacy, democracy and security, in order to highlight aspects of recent events which – or so I hope – may prove useful both for political thought and action. (shrink)

This chapter is concerned with the role of democracy in preventing terrorism, identifying and apprehending terrorists, and in minimizing and alleviating the damage created by terrorism.1 Specifically, it considers the role of democracy as a resource, not simply a limitation, on counterterrorism.2 I am mainly concerned with the ways in which counterterrorism is similar to more familiar forms of public policy, such as the prevention of crime or the promotion of economic prosperity, and so nothing that I say turns on (...) being able sharply to distinguish terrorism from other bad things that democracies have to face. I will not, then, address the extensive debate on the best way to define terrorism.3 However, I assume that terrorists characteristically seek to terrorize people in order to secure their particular ends. What forms that terror takes, what people terrorists seek to terrorize, and what ends terrorists seek to promote I assume to be indeterminate, open to change, and a matter for empirical investigation. However, I take it that the IRA, Baader Meinhoff, and the Red Brigade, as well as certain animal rights groups in the United Kingdom and certain anti-abortion groups in the United States, are examples of terrorist groups and individuals. In short, I will be assuming that terrorism is principally characterized by the choice of means to given ends, rather than by the ends themselves, and that it is the choice of means, rather than the favored ends, that makes terrorism so problematic from a democratic perspective. However good the goal, terrorizing a population—whether or not this involves killing the innocent—is morally wrong and, from a democratic perspective, an abuse of power over the lives of others. While the use of terror may indicate that the ends sought by terrorists are such that people cannot be expected to support them voluntarily, there is no justification for supposing that the ends of terrorism must be morally or politically unacceptable simply because the means are both. It is a staple of ordinary life—not merely of philosophical examples—that people are sometimes unjustified in the means they use in order to accomplish perfectly acceptable ends. So, the ends terrorists seek are, or might become, morally or politically acceptable without in any way altering our objections to the use of terror as a tool for promoting them. (shrink)

It is especially hard, at present, to read the newspapers without emitting a howl of anguish and outrage. Philosophy can heal some wounds but, in this case, political action may prove a better remedy than philosophy. It can therefore feel odd trying to think philosophically about surveillance at a time like this, rather than joining with like-minded people to protest the erosion of our civil liberties, the duplicity of our governments, and the failings in our political institutions - including our (...) political parties – revealed by the succession of leaks dripping away this the summer. Still, philosophy can help us to think about what we should do, not merely what we should believe. Thus, in what follows I draw on my previous work on privacy, democracy and security, in order to highlight aspects of recent events which – or so I hope – may prove useful both for political thought and action. (shrink)

It is especially hard, at present, to read the newspapers without emitting a howl of anguish and outrage. Philosophy can heal some wounds but, in this case, political action may prove a better remedy than philosophy. It can therefore feel odd trying to think philosophically about surveillance at a time like this, rather than joining with like-minded people to protest the erosion of our civil liberties, the duplicity of our governments, and the failings in our political institutions - including our (...) political parties – revealed by the succession of leaks which have dripped away this the summer. Still, philosophy can help us to think about what we should do, not merely what we should believe. Thus, in what follows I draw on my previous work on privacy, democracy and security, in order to highlight aspects of recent events which – or so I hope – may prove useful both for political thought and action. (shrink)

In times of national crisis, citizens are often asked to trade liberty and privacy for security. And why not, it is argued, if we can obtain a fair amount of security for just a little privacy? The surveillance that enhances security need not be overly intrusive or life altering. It is not as if government agents need to physically search each and every suspect or those connected to a suspect. Advances in digital technology have made such surveillance (...) relatively unobtrusive. Video monitoring, global positioning systems, airport body scanners, and biometric technologies, along with data surveillance, provide law enforcement officials with monitoring tools, without also unduly burdening those being watched. Against this view are those who maintain that we should be worried about trading privacy for security. Criminals and terrorists, it is argued, are nowhere near as dangerous as governments. There are too many examples for us to deny Lord Acton’s dictum that “power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” If information control yields power and total information awareness radically expands that power, then we have good reason to pause before trading privacy for security. (shrink)

This book is based on the premise that the trade-off between privacy and security is both unsound and conceals important aspects of surveillance and control. Accordingly, the authors analyse the symbiotic relationship between liberty and security, and the emptiness of both concepts when considered in isolation. They explore and contextualise different notions of risk, surveillance practices and the value of the rights to private life and data protection. Thereby, they show that surveillance and control neither necessarily attain (...) class='Hi'>security, nor always pose a threat to privacy and, conversely, that protecting privacy does not necessarily hamper security provision. Moreover, they appreciate how surveillance and control, mediated through technology, express and sustain specific power relationships. The book thus offers a kaleidoscope of perspectives, ranging from critical studies to international relations, law, philosophy and sociology, to rethink surveillance and control. (shrink)

Privacy is gravely endangered in the digital age, and we, the digital citizens, are its principal threat, willingly surrendering it to avail ourselves of new technology, and granting the government and corporations immense power over us. In this highly original work, Firmin DeBrabander begins with this premise and asks how we can ensure and protect our freedom in the absence of privacy. Can—and should—we rally anew to support this institution? Is privacy so important to political liberty after all? DeBrabander makes (...) the case that privacy is a poor foundation for democracy, that it is a relatively new value that has been rarely enjoyed throughout history—but constantly persecuted—and politically and philosophically suspect. The vitality of the public realm, he argues, is far more significant to the health of our democracy, but is equally endangered—and often overlooked—in the digital age. (shrink)

The creation of new search powers in the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act post-9/11 to make citizens more transparent to state surveillance was less a new phenomenon than an extension of preexisting tendencies to make citizens transparent to the state, so the risks they pose can be efficiently managed. However, 9/11 brought about a shift in the ways in which the Supreme Court of Canada talked about terrorism; terrorism was no longer placed on a continuum of criminal activity but was elevated to (...) a threat to Canadian values as a whole. I argue that, paradoxically, this shift reconnected the Court to earlier discourses about privacy as an essential element of democratic governance and reinvigorated narratives around the importance of the public-private boundary to democratic relationships by situating privacy within narratives informed by social memory. From this perspective, privacy can be conceptualized as a status claim: as citizens, we are entitled to privacy because privacy is the boundary that creates right relationships between citizens and between citizens and the state. This avoids pitting privacy as an individual right against societal interests in transparency because it more fully actualizes Priscilla Regan’s call to theorize the value of privacy as a public good central to liberal democratic governance. This conception also reconnects Alan Westin’s original understanding of privacy as an element of liberal democracy to the sociological research he drew on, enriching the liberal conception of privacy by locating it in the intersubjective communication of cultural actors living in community. (shrink)

Rapid advancements in machine learning techniques allow mass surveillance to be applied on larger scales and utilize more and more personal data. These developments demand reconsideration of the privacy-security dilemma, which describes the tradeoffs between national security interests and individual privacy concerns. By investigating mass surveillance techniques that use bulk data collection and machine learning algorithms, we show why these methods are unlikely to pinpoint terrorists in order to prevent attacks. The diverse characteristics of terrorist attacks—especially when considering (...) lone-wolf terrorism—lead to irregular and isolated footprints. The irregularity of data affects the accuracy of machine learning algorithms and the mass surveillance that depends on them which can be explained by three kinds of known problems encountered in machine learning theory: class imbalance, the curse of dimensionality, and spurious correlations. Proponents of mass surveillance often invoke the distinction between collecting data and metadata, in which the latter is understood as a lesser breach of privacy. Their arguments commonly overlook the ambiguity in the definitions of data and metadata and ignore the ability of machine learning techniques to infer the former from the latter. Given the sparsity of datasets used for machine learning in counterterrorism and the privacy risks attendant with bulk data collection, policymakers and other relevant stakeholders should critically re-evaluate the likelihood of success of the algorithms and the collection of data on which they depend. (shrink)

In a recent article in Respublica, Jesper Ryberg argues that CCTV can be compared to a little old lady gazing out onto the street below. This article takes issue with the claim that government surveillance can be justified in this manner. Governments have powers and responsibilities that little old ladies lack. Even if CCTV is effective at preventing crime, there may be less intrusive ways of doing so. People have a variety of legitimate interests in privacy, and protection for these (...) is important to their status as free and equal citizens. Consequently, though necessary, effectiveness is insufficient to justify CCTV in a democracy. (shrink)

Particular applications of Privacy by Design (PbD) have proven to be valuable tools to protect privacy in many technological applications. However, PbD is not as promising when applied to technologies used for surveillance. After specifying how surveillance and privacy are understood in this paper, I will highlight the shortcomings of PbD when applied to surveillance, using a web-scanning system for counter-terrorism purposes as an example. I then suggest reworking PbD into a different approach: the Minimum Harm by Design (MHbD) (...) model. MHbD differs from PbD principally in that it acknowledges that the potential harms of surveillance bear not only upon privacy but also values that define the very constitution of a society and its political character. MHbD aims to identify and systematise the different categories of such harms and links them to current theories on surveillance on the one hand and on possible design measures on the other. (shrink)

After a recent spate of terrorist attacks in European and American cities, liberal democracies are reintroducing emergency securitarian measures that curtail rights and/or expand police powers. Political theorists who study ESMs are familiar with how such measures become instruments of discrimination and abuse, but the fundamental conflict ESMs pose for not just civil liberty but also democratic equality still remains insufficiently explored. Such phenomena are usually explained as a function of public panic or fear-mongering in times of crisis, but I (...) show that the tension between security and equality is in fact much deeper and more general. It follows a different logic than the more familiar tension between security and liberty, and it concerns not just the rule of law in protecting liberty but also the role of law in integrating new or previously subjected groups into a democratic community. As liberal-democratic societies become increasingly diverse and multicultural in the present era of mass immigration and global interconnectedness, this tension between security and equality is likely to become more pronounced. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Terrorism‐as‐Crime Terrorism‐as‐Crime and Police Institutions Counter‐Terrorism and Human Rights in Liberal Democracies at Peace Conclusion.

The privacy concerns discussed in the 1990s in relation to the New Genetics failed to anticipate the relevant issues for individuals, families, geneticists and society. Consumers, for example, can now buy their personal genetic information and share it online. The challenges facing genetic privacy have evolved as new biotechnologies have developed, and personal privacy is increasingly challenged by the irrepressible flow of electronic data between the personal and public spheres and by surveillance for terrorism and security risks. This book (...) considers the right to know and the right not to know about your own and others’ genomes. It discusses new privacy concerns and developments in ethical thinking, with the greater emphasis on solidarity and equity. The multidisciplinary approach covers current topics such as biobanks and forensic databases, DIY testing, group rights and accountability, the food we eat and the role of the press and the new digital media. (shrink)

Twenty years after the outbreak of the threat posed by international jihadist terrorism, which triggered the need for democracies to balance fundamental rights and security needs, 9/11 and the Rise of Global Anti-Terrorism Law offers an overview of counter-terrorism and of the interplay among the main actors involved in the field since 2001. This book aims to give a picture of the complex and evolving interaction between the international, regional and domestic levels in framing counter-terrorism law and (...) policies. Targeting scholars, researchers and students of international, comparative and constitutional law, it is a valuable resource to understand the theoretical and practical issues arising from the interaction of several levels in counter-terrorism measures. It also provides an in-depth analysis of the role of the United Nations Security Council. (shrink)

This book explores the Janus-faced features of privacy, and looks at their implications for the control of personal information, for sexual and reproductive freedom, and for democratic politics. It asks what, if anything, is wrong with asking women to get licenses in order to have children, given that pregnancy and childbirth can seriously damage your health. It considers whether employers should be able to monitor the friendships and financial affairs of employees, and whether we are entitled to know whenever someone (...) rich, famous or powerful has cancer, or an adulterous affair. It considers whether we are entitled to privacy in public and, if so, what this might mean for the use of CCTV cameras, the treatment of the homeless and the provision of public facilities such as parks, libraries and lavatories. Above all, the book seeks to understand whether and, if so, why privacy is valuable in a democratic society, and what implications privacy has for the ways we see and treat each other. The ideas about privacy we have inherited from the past are marked by beliefs about what is desirable, realistic and possible which predate democratic government and, in some cases, predate constitutional government as well. Hence, this book argues, although privacy is an important democratic value, we can only realise that value if we use democratic ideas about the freedom, equality, security and rights of individuals to guide our understanding of privacy. (shrink)

In earlier work, I have expressed scepticism about privacy-based criticisms of bulk collection for counter-terrorism ( Sorell 2018 ). But even if these criticisms are accepted, is bulk collection nonetheless legitimate on balance – because of its operational utility for the security services, and the overriding importance of the purposes that the security services serve? David Anderson’s report of the Bulk Powers review in the United Kingdom suggests as much, provided bulk collection complies with strong legal safeguards (...) ( Anderson 2016 ). I think it is hard to mount a uniformly compelling operational utility argument, because purposes other than counter-terrorism are pursued by the security services with the help of bulk collection. For example, the Intelligence Services Act 1994, section 1(2) says that apart from the interests of national security and the prevention and detection of serious crime, the Secret Intelligence Service may act “in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom.”The phrase “interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom” is opento a disturbingly wide range of interpretations, and it is doubtful that these interests justify bulk collection even when relevant “economic interests” are confined to those “also relevant to the interests of national security”, as required by the Investigatory Powers Act (2016) section 204 (3a). (shrink)

The majoritarian conception of democracy implies that counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism—and even representative institutions—are derogations from democracy. The majoritarian conception is mistaken for two reasons. First, it is incoherent: majoritarianism ultimately stands against one of democracy’s core normative commitments—namely, political equality. Second, majoritarianism is premised on a mistaken view of power, which fails to account for the power of numbers and thereby fails to explain the inequality faced by members of persistent minorities. Although strict majority rule serves the (...) democratic values of political agency and equality as interpreted by a set of formal conditions, an adequate conception of power shows why in real-world conditions formal-procedural inequalities, instantiated by counter-majoritarian institutions such as federalism, are sometimes required to serve democratic equality. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 2, Page 364-367, June 2011.

A European Union counter-terrorism strategy was devised in 2005.1 Of its four strands—prevent, pursue, protect, and respond—only two have a direct connection with policing. Perhaps surprisingly, th...

Counter-Terrorism makes a connection, unique to terrorism studies, between the mechanisms of colonizing narratives and psychological warfare aimed at recruitment. There is an urgent need to understand the narrative tactics of terrorist recruitment and an equal if not greater need to destabilize and exploit the weaknesses of those narratives.

Fall prediction using machine learning has become one of the most fruitful and socially relevant applications of computer vision in gerontological research. Since its inception in the early 2000s, this subfield has proliferated into a robust body of research underpinned by various machine learning algorithms (including neural networks, support vector machines, and decision trees) as well as statistical modeling approaches (Markov chains, Gaussian mixture models, and hidden Markov models). Furthermore, some advancements have been translated into commercial and clinical practice, with (...) companies in various stages of development capitalizing on the aging population to develop new commercially available products. Yet despite the marvel of modern machine learning-enabled fall prediction, little research has been conducted to shed light on the security and privacy concerns that such systems pose for older adults. The present study employs an interdisciplinary lens in examining privacy issues associated with machine learning fall prediction and exploring the implications of these models in elderly care and the Internet of Medical Things (IoMT). Ultimately, a justice-informed set of best practices rooted in social geroscience is suggested to help fall prediction researchers and companies continue to advance the field while preserving elderly privacy and autonomy. (shrink)

Changes in security environment after the end of Cold War and 9/11 have strongly affected our security concepts and paradigms. In the field of counter-terrorism, a serious conceptual and practical debate on the relationship between security and human rights and freedoms has begun. The goal of this paper is to reflect on this complex relationship at the conceptual level and introduce the empirical debate on this relationship in the field of civil aviation. The paper’s results show (...) that the concept of human security usefully integrates the care for human rights and security of individuals. The debate on the potential introduction of body scanners on the European airports was actually a debate on the ways of providing individual human security on the airports with simultaneous concern for other human rights. The output of this debate was a compromise: body scanners can be used at the discretion of individual airports and member states, but are not an obligatory measure on all European airports. (shrink)

Infusing contemporary critical terrorism studies (CTS) with concepts and methodologies from philosophy and critical theory via a Baradian posthumanist agential realist perspective and (counter)terrorist cases and vignettes, this chapter argues for a retheorisation of (counter)terrorism. It does so, firstly, by reconceptualising terrorism and counterterrorism as complex assemblages consisting not only of discursive-material components – an entanglement now largely accepted within CTS and critical security studies (CSS) – but also of affective layers and more-than-human phenomena. Secondly, by analysing (...) European urban (counter)terrorist cases from the UK, Germany, France, and Spain, together with these cases’ surprising spacetime-jumping interlinkages underwriting what we here conceptualise as queer(ing) spacetimematterings, this chapter zooms in on the intra-actions taking place between human and more-than-human agential phenomena and their risk-managed urban environments. Lastly, extra analytical attention is paid to how, in this neoliberal day and age – here rephrased as control society-driven ‘situationscaping times’ – very specific macro- and micropolitical violence-preventing measures and efforts are employed in the fight against various manifestations of urban terror and terrorism. (shrink)

Recent decades have seen an unprecedented proliferation of surveillance programs by government agencies. This development has been driven both by technological progress, which has made large scale surveillance operations relatively cheap and easy, and by the threat of terrorism, organized crime and pandemics, which supplies a ready justification for surveillance. For a long time, mass surveillance programs have been associated with autocratic regimes, most notoriously with the German Democratic Republic and the Stasi, its secret police. A more recent case in (...) point is the efforts of the People’s Republic of China to set up a comprehensive surveillance system that assigns citizens a score reflecting their social and political conformity. But the current rise of state mass surveillance is mostly attributable to the new readiness of liberal democracies to monitor their populations. The vast surveillance system uncovered by whistleblower Edward Snowden is maintained and supported by a group of established liberal democracies, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and many others. While surveillance programs of authoritarian regimes, installed to monitor and quash political dissidents, are uncontroversially unjust, surveillance operations carried out by liberal democracies possess at least some prima facie legitimacy. They are set up with the stated objective of protecting citizens against terrorism, organized crime and pandemics, which few would deny is the duty of any state. Still, the expansion of large-scale surveillance by democratic governments has widely been perceived as objectionable or at least problematic on account of its harmful effects on both individuals and liberal society at large. (shrink)

This book is based on the premise that the trade-off between privacy and security is both unsound and con-ceals important aspects of surveillance and control. Accordingly, the authors analyse the symbiotic relati-onship between liberty and security, and the emptiness of both concepts when considered in isolation. They explore and contextualise different notions of risk, surveillance practices and the value of the rights to pri-vate life and data protection. Thereby, they show that surveillance and control neither necessarily attain (...) class='Hi'>security, nor always pose a threat to privacy and, conversely, that protecting privacy does not necessarily hamper security provision. Moreover, they argue that surveillance and control, mediated through technolo-gy, express and sustain specific power relationships. The book offers a kaleidoscope of perspectives, ranging from critical studies to international relations, law, philosophy and sociology, to rethink surveillance and control. (shrink)

Since the 1970s Western governments have sought to defend selective urban areas from terrorist attack through a plethora of measures aimed at territorially controlling space both physically and technologically where the disruption to the orderly flow of commerce, or other activities, is minimized. Drawing on recent historical accounts, this paper seeks to track the changes to the landscape of Britain’s financial heart, the City of London, from the 1990s to the current day, as its leaders and security agents have (...) sought to defend the area from terrorist attack through the construction of what is commonly referred to as the “ring of steel.”. (shrink)

Discourses and the ideas, perceptions and templates upon which they are based exert a powerful influence on law-making, push policy-making in a precise direction and determine operational action and outcomes. British counterterrorist law and policy post 9/11 is heavily mediated through a conceptual filter that evokes a siege mode of democracy, which deliberately displaces the traditional rights-based model, and a security narrative based on a double asymmetry. By blending a discursive theoretical approach with an institutionalist perspective, the discussion examines (...) the siege mode of democracy and its implications and the double asymmetry underpinning the Government's framing of the threat and of the means to counter it. Both features of the Government's security discourse are critical in explaining not only British counter-terrorist legislation and policy evolution in the 21st century and the controversial operation ‘Kratos’ adopted by ACPO in 2002, but also their official depiction as necessary, and singular, responses to some structured necessity and the associated logic of ‘no alternative’. (shrink)

SummaryThe practice of counterintelligence traditionally lies in its application to the function of catching spies, stopping espionage and protecting national security and the national interest. More recently though counterintelligence has matured and is frequently being deployed into fields such as counter-terrorism, however it still remains that counterintelligence is often poorly understood, and the practice of counterintelligence operations in the counter-terrorism space presents new challenges as well as conflicts of purpose with the contemporary partners of intelligence and (...) class='Hi'>security services such as law enforcement and the military. This article, the first in a series, will discuss issues surrounding the common understanding of counterintelligence, the development and practice of offensive missions, and its role in counter-terrorism from its current functions across intelligence, military and law enforcement spheres, as well as its potential to realize new outcomes. (shrink)

The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, facilitated a transformation in federal Governance in the United States of America (hereinafter – the USA). The events of that day showed that the counter-terrorism system of the USA was ineffective. Law enforcement agencies failed to prevent terrorist attacks and thus changes were necessary. The most significant transformations were the following: dozens of new laws were passed; the bureaucracy of the US Government was reorganized; a war was launched to eliminate a sanctuary (...) that had existed for half a decade in Afghanistan; the wall that had existed between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence was torn down; the rules by which US domestic agencies could collect information, tap phones, and tap email were changed; the efforts of the USA to secure its borders were totally transformed; transportation security was dramatically enhanced. All measures adopted during that first year after the terrorist attacks were implemented very quickly and without careful consideration of the costs and benefits. However, for the USA the year right after September 11 was not a period for thinking twice. It was the year of relentless offensive action against the threats that the USA faced. President Bush announced that the USA will follow a pre-emptive strategy of going after terrorists and the regimes that support them before they attack, not waiting to be attacked. Aforesaid changes greatly affected conditions of human rights in the USA. This article examines the effect on human rights by the new US counter-terrorism measures. (shrink)

Challenging the posthumanist canon which celebrates the pre-eminence of matter, Ruth Miller, inFlourishingThoughtargues that what nonhuman systems contribute to democracy is thought. Drawing on recent feminist theories of nonhuman life and politics, Miller shows that reproduction and flourishing are not antithetical to contemplation and sensitivity. After demonstrating processes of life and processes of thought are indistinguishable, Miller finds that four menacing accumulations of matter and information--global surveillance, stored embryos, human clones, and reproductive trash--are politically productive rather than threats to democratic (...) politics. As a consequence, she questions the usefulness of individual rights such as privacy and dignity, contests the value of the rational metaphysics underlying human-centered political participation, and re-evaluates the gender relations that derive from this type of participation. Ultimately, in place of these human-centered structures, Miller posits a more meditative mode of democratic engagement. Miller's argument has shattering implications for the debates over the proper use and disposal of embryonic tissue, alarms about data gathering by the state and corporations, and other major ethical, social, and security issues. (shrink)

Fairchild, Center for the History and Ethics of Public Health in the Department of Sociomedical Sciences at Columbia University's Mailman School of Public Health Abstract Surveillance is a cornerstone of public health. It permits us to recognize disease outbreaks, to track the incidence and prevalence of threats to public health, and to monitor the effectiveness of our interventions. But surveillance also challenges our understandings of the significance and role of privacy in a liberal democracy. In this paper we trace the (...) century-long history of public health surveillance in the United States situating that history in the context of the broad social, political, and ideological forces that have shaped our conceptions of privacy. Although we focus here on the United States, the debates over privacy that unfolded in the 1960s were repeated in many European nations. The themes we explore here, then, provide a framework for examining the relationship between privacy and public health in other contexts. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Purpose This study aims to explore how the public perceives the effectiveness of surveillance technology, and how people’s views on privacy and their views on effectiveness are related. Likewise, it looks at the relation between perceptions of effectiveness and opinions on the acceptable cost of surveillance technology. Design/methodology/approach For this study, surveys of Dutch students and their parents were conducted over three consecutive years. Findings A key finding of this paper is that the public does not engage in a trade-off (...) neither with regard to privacy-effectiveness nor with effectiveness-cost, but rather expects all three elements to be achieved simultaneously. This paper also found that the correlation between perceived effectiveness and perceived privacy was stronger for parents than for students. Research limitations/implications Participants for this study were exclusively in The Netherlands. Survey questions on the effectiveness of surveillance technology focused on one type of technology, and on private mobile device use in two scenarios. Social implications The public’s perceptions of the effectiveness of surveillance technology potentially influence its acceptance of the technology, which, in turn, can affect the legitimacy and use of the technology. Originality/value Within the much-discussed privacy-security debate lies a less-heard debate – that of the effectiveness of the surveillance technology in question. The public is one actor in this debate. This study examines the public’s perceptions of this less-heard debate. (shrink)

Must privacy and freedom of expression conflict? To witness recent debates in Britain, you might think so. Anything other than self-regulation by the press is met by howls of anguish from journalists across the political spectrum, to the effect that efforts to protect people’s privacy will threaten press freedom, promote self-censorship and prevent the press from fulfilling its vital function of informing the public and keeping a watchful eye on the activities and antics of the powerful.[Brown, 2009, 13 January]1 Effective (...) protections for privacy, from such a perspective, inevitably pose a threat to democratic government via the constraints that they place on the press. Such concerns with privacy must be taken seriously by anyone who cares about democratic government, and the freedom, equality and wellbeing of individuals. But if it is one thing to say that privacy and freedom of expression cannot always be fully protected, it is another to suppose that protections for the one must always come at the expense of the other. After all, the economics of contemporary politics and journalism would seem to be partly responsible for our difficulties in protecting personal privacy while sustaining robust and informative forms of public discourse. [Moore, 2010, 10 -141]2 Most newspapers are loss-making businesses and the need to reduce those losses and, if possible, to turn a profit, make investigative journalism an increasingly expensive proposition as compared to both “comment” and more or less elevated forms of gossip. At the same time, politics has increasingly become the prerogative of a narrow group of people with access to the large sums of money necessary successfully to compete for high office. In those circumstances, the need for critical scrutiny is as important as it is difficult. Revising our ideas about privacy and its protection cannot alone reduce the tensions between freedom of expression and personal privacy typical of our societies, necessary though such revision may be. Moreover, this paper can only touch on some aspects of the ways in which we need to rethink our interests in privacy, in order adequately to reflect people’s diverse interests in freedom of expression, and the important role of a free press to democratic government. Nonetheless, I hope to suggest ways of thinking about people’s claims to privacy which can be generalised fairly readily, and can help us to think constructively about the nature, causes and solutions to some important social and political problems, even if, in its nature, philosophical analysis rarely tells us what to do. More specifically, this paper argues that people are entitled to keep some true facts about themselves to themselves, should they so wish, as a sign of respect for their moral and political status, and in order to protect themselves from being used as a public example in order to educate or to entertain other people. The “outing” - or non-consensual public disclosure - of people’s health records or status, or their sexual behaviour or orientation is usually unjustified, even when its consequences seem to be beneficial. Indeed, the paper claims, the reasons to reject outing, as inconsistent with democratic commitments to freedom and equality, are reasons to insist on the importance of privacy to freedom of expression. While a free press is of the utmost importance to democratic government, it is not identical with the free expression of individuals and, on occasion, the former may have to be constrained in order to protect the latter. [Barendt, 2007, 231]. Hence, the paper concludes, we should distinguish the claims of individuals to publish reports about their lives – even if this necessarily involves revealing the private lives of others – from journalistic claims to publish information about the sex lives of consenting adults. I will start by briefly situating my argument within a democratic approach to privacy, before using the “outing” of Oliver Sipple to examine people’s claims to privacy and their implications for freedom of expression and of the press. I will be assuming that some forms of privacy are legitimate, in order to focus more closely on the question of what information, if any, people may keep to themselves. (shrink)

Purpose This paper aims to study the developed countries’ experience on the cyberbullying legal regulation among adolescents, to identify existing shortcomings in the developing countries’ laws and to develop recommendations for regulatory framework improvement. Design/methodology/approach The authors have studied the state regulatory practice of the UK, the USA, Canada, Malaysia, South Africa, Turkey, UAE and analyzed the statistics of 2018 on the cyberbullying manifestation among adolescents in these countries. Findings The study results can encourage countries to create separate cyberbullying legislation (...) and periodically review and modify already existing legislation. Originality/value The study provides a list of the recommendations to regulate cybercrime in developing countries and prevent it as well. The results may contribute to creating laws related to the regulation of cyberbullying in countries where such legislation does not exist yet or existing regulatory legal acts do not bring the expected results, namely, in Post-Soviet countries and other developing countries of the world. (shrink)

PART I The superpower and asymmetry PART II Jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus post bellum PART III Leadership and accountability PART IV Soldiersa (TM) ...

From North Korea's recent attacks on Sony to perpetual news reports of successful hackings and criminal theft, cyber conflict has emerged as a major topic of public concern. Yet even as attacks on military, civilian, and commercial targets have escalated, there is not yet a clear set of ethical guidelines that apply to cyber warfare. Indeed, like terrorism, cyber warfare is commonly believed to be a war without rules. Given the prevalence cyber warfare, developing a practical moral code for this (...) new form of conflict is more important than ever. In Ethics and Cyber Warfare, internationally-respected ethicist George Lucas delves into the confounding realm of cyber conflict. Comparing "state-sponsored hacktivism" to the transformative impact of "irregular warfare" in conventional armed conflict, Lucas offers a critique of legal approaches to governance, and outlines a new approach to ethics and "just war" reasoning. Lucas draws upon the political philosophies of Alasdair MacIntyre, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas to provide a framework for understanding these newly-emerging standards for cyber conflict, and ultimately presents a professional code of ethics for a new generation of "cyber warriors." Lucas concludes with a discussion of whether preemptive self-defense efforts - such as the massive government surveillance programs revealed by Edward Snowden - can ever be justified, addressing controversial topics such as privacy, anonymity, and public trust. Well-reasoned and timely, Ethics and Cyber Warfare is a must-read for anyone with an interest in philosophy, ethics, or cybercrime. (shrink)

In “Life After Privacy: Reclaiming Democracy in a Surveillance Society,” Firmin DeBrabander proposes that the stakes associated with the loss of personal privacy are even higher than is generally acknowledged. Personal privacy is a compelling issue, and his review of it is engaging and accessible. He is successful in demonstrating that powerful forces—corporations, governments, and partisan activists—have many ways of intruding on our private lives and thoughts. DeBrabander’s largest contribution to the ongoing dialogue about privacy, however, is an assertion that (...) the loss of privacy threatens democracy itself. Disturbingly, he may be right—although maybe not for all the reasons he claims.DeBrabander’s focus is on... (shrink)

: Does the rejection of pure proceduralism show that we should adopt Brettschneider’s value theory of democracy? The answer, this paper suggests, is ‘no’. There are a potentially infinite number of incompatible ways to understand democracy, of which the value theory is, at best, only one. The paper illustrates and substantiates its claims by looking at what the secret ballot shows us about the importance of privacy and democracy. Drawing on the reasons to reject Mill’s arguments for open voting, in (...) a previous paper by A. Lever, it argues that people’s claims to privacy have a constitutive, as well as an instrumental, importance to democratic government, which is best seen by attending to democracy as a practice, and not merely as a distinctive set of values. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people's freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these are, (...) genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of personal choice, association and expression and shows that, so described, people have legitimate political interests in privacy. These interests reflect the ways that privacy rights can supplement the protection for people’s freedom and equality provided by rights of political choice, association and expression, and can help to make sure that these are, (...) genuinely, democratic. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, attention to the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

This article argues that people have legitimate interests in privacy that deserve legal protection on democratic principles. It describes the right to privacy as a bundle of rights of solitude, intimacy and confidentiality and shows that, so described, people have legitimate interests in privacy. These interests are both personal and political, and provide the grounds for two different justifications of privacy rights. Though both are based on democratic concerns for the freedom and equality of individuals, these two justifications for privacy (...) can be distinguished because the one is principally concerned with protecting the personal freedom and equality of individuals, while the other is principally concerned with their political equivalents. Feminists have often been ambivalent about legal protection for privacy, because privacy rights have, so often, protected the coercion and exploitation of women, and made it difficult to politicise personal forms of injustice. However, interpreting the content and justification of privacy rights in light of the differences between democratic and undemocratic forms of politics can enable us to meet these concerns, and to distinguish a democratic justification of privacy rights from the alternatives. (shrink)

This paper examines MacKinnon’s claims about the relationship of rights to privacy and equality in light of the reasoning in Harris and Bowers. When we contrast the Majority and Minority decisions in these cases, it shows, we can distinguish interpretations of the right to privacy that are consistent with sexual equality from those that are not. This is not simply because the two differ in their consequences – though they do - but because the former, unlike the latter, rely on (...) empirical and normative assumptions that would justify sexual inequality whatever right they were used to interpret. So while I agree with MacKinnon that the Majority’s interpretation of the right to privacy in Harris is inconsistent with the equality of men and women, I show that there is no inherent inconsistency in valuing both privacy and equality, and no reason why we must chose to protect the one, rather than the other. Indeed, an examination of MacKinnon’s article, I suggest, can help us to see why rights to privacy can be part of a scheme of democratic rights, and how we might go about democratising the right to privacy in future. To avoid confusion I should emphasise that my arguments are of a philosophical, not a legal, nature. Thus, I will be ignoring the specifically legal and constitutional aspects of MacKinnon’s article, and of the Supreme Court decisions, in order to bring their philosophical significance into focus. (shrink)

Modern technologies are providing unprecedented opportunities for surveillance. In the workplace surveillance technology is being built into the very infrastructure of work. Can the employee legitimately resist this increasingly pervasive net of surveillance? The employers argue that workplace surveillance is essential for security, safety, and productivity in increasingly competitive markets. They argue that they have a right to ensure that they 'get what they pay for', furthermore, that the workplace is a place of 'work' which by its very definition (...) excludes the 'personal' dimension at the core of all privacy claims. Legal developments, especially in the USA, seem to favour such an interpretation. The individual's call for workplace privacy seems illegitimate in a context where the 'personal' is almost excluded by default. In this paper I want to argue that the private/public distinction is not useful in the context of workplace surveillance since it always seems possible to argue that the workplace is always and only 'public'---thereby leaving the employee without resources to defend their claim. Such a position belies the fact that the fundamental claim of workplace privacy is not a claim for some personal space as such but rather a claim for the protection against the inherently political interests in the 'gaze' of the employer. Furthermore, that it is probably impossible, in practice, to separate the public from the private in the flow of everyday work. Thus, it seems that one needs to develop another approach to think through the issues at stake. I will argue that the distribution of privacy rights and transparency rights is rather a matter of organisational justice. I will suggest that we may use theories of justice---in particular the work of Rawls---to develop a framework of distributive justice for distributing privacy and transparency between the collective and the individual in a way that is fair. I will contend that such an approach will provide the employee with resources to defend their legitimate claim to workplace privacy. (shrink)

Recently, there has been a heavy debate in the US about the government’s use of data mining in its fight against terrorism. Privacy concerns in fact led the Congress to terminate the funding of TIA, a program for advanced information technology to be used in the combat of terrorism. The arguments put forward in this debate, more specifically those found in the main report and minority report by the TAPAC established by the Secretary of Defense to examine the TIA issue, (...) will be analysed to trace the deeper roots of this controversy. This analysis will in turn be used as a test case to examine the adequacy of the usual theoretical frameworks for these kinds of issues, in particular the notion of privacy. Whereas the dominant theoretical framing of the notion of privacy turns around access to information, most of the core arguments in the debate do not fit in this kind of framework. The basic disagreements in the controversy are not about mere access, they involve both access and use. Furthermore, whereas the issue of access by itself refers to a more or less static situation, the real disagreements much more concern the organisational dynamics of the use of information, the mechanisms in the organisation that control these dynamics, and the awareness present within the organisation of the ‘social risks’ these dynamics represent. The bottom line question is whether the assessment of these gives sufficient reason for trust. (shrink)

Is shame dead? With personal information made so widely available, an eroding public/private distinction, and a therapeutic turn in public discourse, many seem to think so. People across the political spectrum have criticized these developments and sought to resurrect shame in order to protect privacy and invigorate democratic politics. Democracy and the Death of Shame reads the fear that 'shame is dead' as an expression of anxiety about the social disturbance endemic to democratic politics. Far from an essential supplement to (...) democracy, the recurring call to 'bring back shame' and other civilizing mores is a disciplinary reaction to the work of democratic citizens who extend the meaning of political equality into social realms. Rereadings from the ancient Cynics to the mid-twentieth century challenge the view that shame is dead and show how shame, as a politically charged idea, is disavowed, invoked, and negotiated in moments of democratic struggle. (shrink)

Elections are generally considered the only way to create a democratic legislature where direct democracy is not an option. However, in recent years that assumption has been challenged by individuals who claim that lotteries are a democratic way of selecting people for office, elections are aristocratic or oligarchic, not democratic, and that elections as we know them are inadequate if true democracy is prioritized. In opposition to this wave, my paper argues that the assertions made to support the democratic merits (...) of lotteries are unpersuasive. Current evidence that sortition is either more egalitarian or produces epistemically better results than elections is poor. Instead, these assertions illuminate the importance of elections in enabling the constituents of a democracy to reconcile the personal and political dimensions of their lives and, therefore, better reflect citizens’ claims to privacy and equality. The paper begins by recapping the main arguments for treating sortition as a democratic way to select a legislature, outlines their deficiencies, and then turns to what these perceived failings actually suggest about the democratic value of elections. (shrink)