Rawls’s theory of justice has been criticized for allowing individuals by their own voluntary choice to make themselves members of the ‘least advantaged’ class and thereby eligible, albeit undeservedly, for the benefits mandated by the Difference Principle. I argue, first, that this criticism overlooks the fact that the Difference Principle applies only to the lifetime expectations of representative persons and, second, that it is possible to implement the Difference Principle (and the social minimum) through policies that do not create work (...) disincentives or require making objectionable moral judgments about who is and who is not deserving of assistance. (shrink)

Virtues are standardly understood as (1) essentially dispositions to perform certain actions and (2) having only instrumental value as motives to fulfill moral duties which can be fulfilled by persons lacking the virtue because the duties mandate only certain act-types. The argument of this article is that the duties of beneficence, gratitude and self-respect cannot be stated in terms of obligatory act-types because they cannot be fulfilled (except in deficient form) by persons lacking the appropriate virtue; they are, rather, duties (...) to cultivate specific virtues which therefore cannot themselves be defined in terms of obligatory actions. (shrink)

I consider three questions concerning the relation of the good will to the moral worth of actions. (1) Does a good will consist simply in acting from the motive of duty? (2) Does acting from the motive of duty presuppose that one has a good will? (3) Does the fact that one has a good wilI entail that all of one’s duty-fulfilling actions have moral worth, even if they are not (directly) motivated by duty? I argue that while only persons (...) with a good will are capable of acting from the motive of duty, it does not follow either that a good will consists in acting from duty or that if one has a good will, all of one’s dutiful actions will be motivated by duty. Whereas the good will is constituted by the agent’s highest-order maxim (the moral law itself), moral worth is a function of the agent’s first-order maxims. (shrink)

I consider three questions concerning the relation of the good will to the moral worth of actions. (1) Does a good will consist simply in acting from the motive of duty? (2) Does acting from the motive of duty presuppose that one has a good will? (3) Does the fact that one has a good wilI entail that all of one’s duty-fulfilling actions have moral worth, even if they are not (directly) motivated by duty? I argue that while only persons (...) with a good will are capable of acting from the motive of duty, it does not follow either that a good will consists in acting from duty or that if one has a good will, all of one’s dutiful actions will be motivated by duty. Whereas the good will is constituted by the agent’s highest-order maxim (the moral law itself), moral worth is a function of the agent’s first-order maxims. (shrink)

Patočka, J. Erinnerungen an Husserl.--Landgrebe, L. Philosophische Anthropologie - eine empirische Wissenschaft?--Schmidt, G. Was ist der Mensch?--Polin, R. Être et ordre.--Funke, G. Handeln aus Pflicht.--Kohlenberger, H. Zum Problem der Teleologie des Handelns.--Schaller, K. Theorie der Bildsamkeit.--Berlinger, R. Die Weltgestaltung der Philosophie.--Fink, E. Phronesis und Theoria.--Krońska, I. Atome und Menschen.--Dembowski, H. Martin Luthers Disputatio de Homine von 1536.--Heintel, E. Aristotelismus und Transzentalismus im "Begriff" bei Hegel.--Orth, E. W. Husserl und Hegel.--Baczko, B. Zum Problem der Leiblichkeit in der Anthropologie von Marx.--Kolakowski, (...) L. Richard Avenarius et le suicide apparent de la philosophie.--Biemel, W. Der Beginn von Prousts À la recherche du temps perdu.--Van Breda, H. L. L'itinéraire husserlien de la phénoménologie pure à la phénoménologie transcendentale. (shrink)

Heumer and I debate animal rights, utilitarianism, libertarianism, morality and philosophy. We agree that suffering is a problem, and diverge, widely, on how to deal with it. I maintain that this author’s reputation as a libertarian, let alone an intellectual leader of this movement, is problematic. Why? That is because libertarianism, properly understood, is a theory of intra-human rights; this philosophy says nothing about right from an extra-human perspective, Heumer to the contrary notwithstanding. That is to say, he is improperly (...) importing into the freedom philosophy considerations extraneous to it. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

During the past thirty years, scholars and commentators have produced a flood of articles and books on almost every aspect and feature of Berkeley's work. There are, however, very few points on which these commentators agree. Since the debate shows no signs of abating, Walter Creery has gathered together a collection of the more significant articles in this extremely useful and accessible form. These three volumes gather together eighty-seven articles on Berkeley's views on the central issues of the philosophy (...) of language, the theory of vision, qualities, general ideas, matter, the theory of mind, and notions. The collection contains articles both harshly critical of Berkeley as well as those sympathetic with the philosopher's views, and there has been an attempt to balance the selection between the immaterialist and idealist theories. (shrink)

Huemer [33] argues against the killing of animals. I offer a critical libertarian analysis of his claim.

What is the proper punishment from the perspective of the libertarian philosophy? More specifically, in what way, if at all, may a thief benefit from his robbery? The present essay attempts to wrestle with these challenging questions.

SummaryThis paper sets the developmental view of Piaget and the structural perspective of Lonergan in juxtaposition for the purpose of allowing their complementary approaches on objectivity to jointly illuminate their common epistemological theme of the constitutive role of the creative and constructive knowing subject at the heart of the cognitive process, as well as to highlight what I argue is their commonly shared and fundamental epistemological thesis of self‐transcending subjectivity: the radical identity of genuine objectivity and authentic subjectivity — that (...) subjectivity is objective insofar as it transcends itself.RésuméCet article met la vue génétique de Piaget en parallèle avec la perspective structurale de Lonergan. Leurs approches complémentaires de l'objectivitééclairent leur thème épistémologique commun, c'est‐à‐dire le rôle du sujet connaissant créateur et constructeur au cœur du processus de connaissance. L'auteur souligne leur thèse épistémologique commune qu'il appelle subjectivité auto‐transcendante: l'identité radicale de la véritable objectivité et de l'authentique subjectivité, car cette subjectivité est objective dans la mesure où elle se transcende elle‐même.ZusammenfassungEs wird der genetische Standpunkt Piagets mit dem strukturalen von Lonergan verglichen, um zu zeigen, wie ihre komplementären Betrachtungsweisen der Objektivität den gemeinsamen erkenntnistheoretischen Gegenstand ihrer Untersuchung, nämlich die konstitutive Rolle des schöpferischen und konstruierenden Erkenntnissubjekts im Erkenntnisprozess, beleuchten. Es geht um die gemeinsame, fundamental These der sich selbst transzendierenden Subjektivität: die radikale Identität der wahren Objektivität und der echten Subjektivität. Das Subjektive kann nur, sofern es sich selbst trans‐zendiert, objektiv werden. (shrink)

Erik Erikson's work in psychosocial developmental theory has made valuable contributions to the field of religious ethics on some very basic issues. This paper makes scattered elements of Erikson's explicit ethical perspective available in concise fashion for critical ethical reflection. It does this in such a way as to highlight the centrally important fact for religious ethics that implicitly operative in Erikson's view is a criterion of "self-transcendence" as definitive of mature personal (fully human, ethical) development.

After reviewing Newman’s famous defense of conscience in his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk (1875), this essay assembles Newman’s lifelong reflections on conscience—from his Anglican sermons to his Grammar of Assent (1870)—in a threefold structure: desire, discernment, and demand.

As a way of overcoming the conflict between the Apologia’s focus on Liberalism and Frank Turner’s recent insistence that the real Tractarian target was Evangelicalism, this essay proposes that Newman’s fundamental opponent was subjectivism.

SummaryThe problems of operations research, optimized at the tactical and strategic level, have a domain of interest much broader than many of its earlier suboptimization problems. Its appeal to scientific method requires the construction of a model from which predictions can be made. This model must have the comprehensive character of those proposed by philosophy and the sciences. Such a model is available in the form of war gaming, a traditional military training vehicle transformed in such a way as to (...) make it a research tool of great power and flexibility and which can assume a multitude of forms. The war game as a new research tool, when applied to the important problems at a high level of optimization, carries with it the excitement of a pioneering venture and the promise of contributions of greatly increased importance to the development of military science. (shrink)