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Summary According to Prioritarianism (or the Priority View), a benefit is more morally valuable or choiceworthy the worse off the recipient of this benefit is.  On the standard interpretation, what matters is how badly off in absolute terms the recipient would be, over the course of her whole life, independently of the benefit in question; but not all versions of Prioritarianism share these features.  Prioritarianism may appear more plausible than Utilitarianism, since unlike Utilitarianism it implies that if our choice were between substantially benefiting a very well off person and benefiting a very badly off person to a slightly lesser degree, we should do the latter, other things being equal.  Prioritarianism may also appear more plausible than Egalitarianism, since unlike Egalitarianism it seems to avoid the Levelling-Down Objection.  While many are attracted to Prioritarianism for these reasons, both of these purported advantages of the view have been contested, and indeed Prioritarianism faces a host of independent objections.
Key works Parfit's 1991 Lindley Lecture provides an early philosophical exploration of Prioritarianism, and among other things claims that it avoids the Levelling-Down Objection.  Crisp 2003 offers cases suggesting that Prioritarian concern should not apply to those who are sufficiently well off.  Temkin defends Egalitarianism against the Levelling-Down Objection and responds to Crisp in Temkin 2003, to which Crisp replies.  Broome 1991 and Otsuka & Voorhoeve 2009 have argued against Prioritarianism, claiming that it conflicts with plausible views about the value or choiceworthiness of uncertain prospects.  Rabinowicz 2002 responds to Broome, and the September 2012 issue of the journal Utilitas contains several important articles discussing Prioritarianism in light of the argument given by Otsuka and Voorhoeve.  Finally, Brown 2007Holtug 2010, and Adler 2011 have looked at some of the complications and potential challenges that arise for Prioritarianism in the context of population ethics, that is, whether and how to extend the view to cases involving variable populations.
Introductions Parfit 1991 usefully introduces Prioritarianism (the Priority View) in the context of earlier views and debates in distributive justice, or the ethics of distribution.  Holtug 2007 provides a sympathetic introduction, addressing several key objections to Prioritarianism. 
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  1. (Draft) The Prospects for Prospect Utilitarianism.Benjamin Davies - manuscript
    Sufficientarianism is a view of distributive justice that places importance on one or more ‘thresholds’, whereby those who are above the threshold have much weaker claims to additional benefits than those below, and may even have no claims at all. Hun Chung has recently argued for a new theory of distributive justice that overcomes two central problems faced by sufficientarianism. Sufficientarianism cannot give intuitively compelling answers to ‘lifeboat cases’, where we can save the lives of some but not all of (...)
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  2. Calibration Dilemmas in the Ethics of Distribution.Jacob M. Nebel & H. Orri Stefansson - manuscript
    This paper presents a new kind of problem in the ethics of distribution. The problem takes the form of several "calibration dilemmas," in which intuitively reasonable aversion to small-stakes inequalities requires leading theories of distribution to recommend intuitively unreasonable aversion to large-stakes inequalities—e.g., inequalities in which half the population would gain an arbitrarily large quantity of well-being or resources. We first lay out a series of such dilemmas for a family of broadly prioritarian theories. We then consider a widely endorsed (...)
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  3. The Structure of Good.David McCarthy - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.
  4. Ambiguity Aversion Behind the Veil of Ignorance.H. Orri Stefánsson - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
    The veil of ignorance argument was used by John C. Harsanyi to defend Utilitarianism and by John Rawls to defend the absolute priority of the worst off. In a recent paper, Lara Buchak revives the veil of ignorance argument, and uses it to defend an intermediate position between Harsanyi's and Rawls' that she calls Relative Prioritarianism. None of these authors explore the implications of allowing that agent's behind the veil are averse to ambiguity. Allowing for aversion to ambiguity---which is both (...)
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  5. Reading Rawls Rightly: A Theory of Justice at 50.Robert S. Taylor - forthcoming - Polity.
    A half-century of Rawls interpreters have overemphasized economic equality in A Theory of Justice, slighting liberty—the central value of liberalism—in the process. From luck-egalitarian readings of Rawls to more recent claims that Rawls was a “reticent socialist,” these interpretations have obscured Rawls’s identity as a philosopher of freedom. They have also obscured the perhaps surprising fact that Rawlsian liberties (basic and non-basic) restrain and even undermine that same economic equality. As I will show in this article, such undermining occurs in (...)
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  6. Equality for Prospective People: A Novel Statement and Defence.Alex Voorhoeve - forthcoming - Utilitas:1-17.
    A possible person’s conditional expected well-being is what the quality of their prospects would be if they were to come into existence. This paper examines the role that this form of expected well-being should play in distributing benefits among prospective people and in deciding who to bring into existence. It argues for a novel egalitarian view on which it is important to ensure equality in people’s life prospects, not merely between actual individuals, but also between all individuals who, given our (...)
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  7. Frege’s Puzzle and the Ex Ante Pareto Principle.Anna Mahtani - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2077-2100.
    The ex ante Pareto principle has an intuitive pull, and it has been a principle of central importance since Harsanyi’s defence of utilitarianism. The principle has been used to criticize and refine a range of positions in welfare economics, including egalitarianism and prioritarianism. But this principle faces a serious problem. I have argued elsewhere :303-323 2017) that the concept of ex ante Pareto superiority is not well defined, because its application in a choice situation concerning a fixed population can depend (...)
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  8. Utils and Shmutils.Jacob M. Nebel - 2021 - Ethics 131 (3):571-599.
    Matthew Adler's Measuring Social Welfare is an introduction to the social welfare function (SWF) methodology. This essay questions some ideas at the core of the SWF methodology having to do with the relation between the SWF and the measure of well-being. The facts about individual well-being do not single out a particular scale on which well-being must be measured. As with physical quantities, there are multiple scales that can be used to represent the same information about well-being; no one scale (...)
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  9. An Ethical Framework for Global Vaccine Allocation.Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Govind Persad, Adam Kern, Allen E. Buchanan, Cecile Fabre, Daniel Halliday, Joseph Heath, Lisa M. Herzog, R. J. Leland, Ephrem T. Lemango, Florencia Luna, Matthew McCoy, Ole F. Norheim, Trygve Ottersen, G. Owen Schaefer, Kok-Chor Tan, Christopher Heath Wellman, Jonathan Wolff & Henry S. Richardson - 2020 - Science 1:DOI: 10.1126/science.abe2803.
    In this article, we propose the Fair Priority Model for COVID-19 vaccine distribution, and emphasize three fundamental values we believe should be considered when distributing a COVID-19 vaccine among countries: Benefiting people and limiting harm, prioritizing the disadvantaged, and equal moral concern for all individuals. The Priority Model addresses these values by focusing on mitigating three types of harms caused by COVID-19: death and permanent organ damage, indirect health consequences, such as health care system strain and stress, as well as (...)
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  10. Rank-Weighted Utilitarianism and the Veil of Ignorance.Jacob M. Nebel - 2020 - Ethics 131 (1):87-106.
    Lara Buchak argues for a version of rank-weighted utilitarianism that assigns greater weight to the interests of the worse off. She argues that our distributive principles should be derived from the preferences of rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance, who ought to be risk averse. I argue that Buchak’s appeal to the veil of ignorance leads to a particular way of extending rank-weighted utilitarianism to the evaluation of uncertain prospects. This method recommends choices that violate the unanimous preferences of (...)
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  11. The Ethics of COVID-19 Immunity-Based Licenses (“Immunity Passports”).Govind Persad & Ezekiel J. Emanuel - 2020 - Journal of the American Medical Association:doi:10.1001/jama.2020.8102.
    Certifications of immunity are sometimes called “immunity passports” but are better conceptualized as immunity-based licenses. Such policies raise important questions about fairness, stigma, and counterproductive incentives but could also further individual freedom and improve public health. Immunity licenses should not be evaluated against a baseline of normalcy, ie, uninfected free movement. Rather, they should be compared to the alternatives of enforcing strict public health restrictions for many months or permitting activities that could spread infection, both of which exacerbate inequalities and (...)
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  12. Fairly Prioritizing Groups for Access to COVID-19 Vaccines.Govind Persad, Monica E. Peek & Ezekiel J. Emanuel - 2020 - JAMA 1.
    Initial vaccine allocations for the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) will be limited. It is crucial to assess the ethical values associated with different methods of allocation, as well as important scientific and practical questions. This Viewpoint identifies three ethical values, benefiting people and limiting harm; prioritizing disadvantaged populations; and equal concern for all. It then explains why these values support prioritizing three groups: health care workers; other essential workers and people in high-transmission settings; and people with medical vulnerabilities associated with (...)
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  13. Setting Priorities Fairly in Response to Covid-19: Identifying Overlapping Consensus and Reasonable Disagreement.David Wasserman, Govind Persad & Joseph Millum - 2020 - Journal of Law and the Biosciences 1:doi:10.1093/jlb/lsaa044.
    Proposals for allocating scarce lifesaving resources in the face of the Covid-19 pandemic have aligned in some ways and conflicted in others. This paper attempts a kind of priority setting in addressing these conflicts. In the first part, we identify points on which we do not believe that reasonable people should differ—even if they do. These are (i) the inadequacy of traditional clinical ethics to address priority-setting in a pandemic; (ii) the relevance of saving lives; (iii) the flaws of first-come, (...)
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  14. Prioritarianism: A Response to Critics.Matthew D. Adler & Nils Holtug - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (2):101-144.
    Prioritarianism is a moral view that ranks outcomes according to the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation of individual well-being. Prioritarianism is ‘welfarist’ (namel...
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  15. Prioritarianism: A (Pluralist) Defence.Shai Shimon Yehuda Agmon & Matt Hitchens - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1).
    A well-known objection to prioritarianism, famously levelled by Mike Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve, is that it wrongly ignores the unity of the individual in treating intra-personal cases like inter-personal cases. In this paper we accept that there should be a moral shift between these cases, but argue that this is because autonomy is a relevant consideration in intra-personal but not inter-personal cases, and one to which pluralist prioritarians ought to attend. To avoid this response, Otsuka and Voorhoeve must assume we (...)
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  16. Utility, Priorities, and Quiescent Sufficiency.Fausto Corvino - 2019 - Etica & Politica / Ethics & Politics 21 (3):525-552.
    In this article, I firstly discuss why a prioritarian clause can rescue the utilitarian doctrine from the risk of exacerbating inequality in the distribution of resources in those cases in which utility of income does not decline at the margin. Nonetheless, when in the presence of adaptive preferences, classic prioritarianism is more likely than utilitarianism to increase the inequality of resources under all circumstances, independently of the diminishing trend of utility. Hence, I propose to shift the informational focus of prioritarianism (...)
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  17. Transparency Trade-Offs: Priority Setting, Scarcity, and Health Fairness.Govind Persad - 2019 - In I. Glenn Cohen, Barbara Evans, Holly Lynch & Carmel Shachar (eds.), Transparency in Health and Health Care. New York: Cambridge UP.
    This chapter argues that rather than viewing transparency as a right, we should regard it as a finite resource whose allocation involves tradeoffs. It then argues that those tradeoffs should be resolved by using a multi-principle approach to distributive justice. The relevant principles include maximizing welfare, maximizing autonomy, and giving priority to the worst off. Finally, it examines some of the implications for law of recognizing the tradeoffs presented by transparency proposals.
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  18. Health(Care) and the Temporal Subject.Ben Davies - 2018 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 13 (3):38-64.
    Many assume that theories of distributive justice must obviously take people’s lifetimes, and only their lifetimes, as the relevant period across which we distribute. Although the question of the temporal subject has risen in prominence, it is still relatively underdeveloped, particularly in the sphere of health and healthcare. This paper defends a particular view, “momentary sufficientarianism,” as being an important element of healthcare justice. At the heart of the argument is a commitment to pluralism about justice, where theorizing about just (...)
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  19. ANTICORRUPTION NATIONAL SYSTEM: Model Whistleblowers Direct Citizen Action Against Corruption in Mexico.Carlos Medel-Ramírez - 2018 - Social Science Research Network:1-12.
    The phenomenon of corruption is a cancer that affects our country and that it is necessary to eradicate; This dilutes the opportunities for economic and social development, privileging the single conjunction of particular interests, political actors in non-legal agreements for their own benefit, which lead to acts of corruption. Recent studies indicate that the level of corruption present in a political system is directly related to the type of institutional structure that defines it (Boehm and Lambsdorff, 2009), as well as (...)
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  20. Equality Versus Priority.Michael Otsuka & Alex Voorhoeve - 2018 - In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 65-85.
    We discuss two leading theories of distributive justice: egalitarianism and prioritarianism. We argue that while each has particular merits and shortcomings, egalitarian views more fully satisfy a key requirement of distributive justice: respect for both the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons.
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  21. Prioritarianism Without Consequentialism.Yingying Tang & Lei Zhong - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (141):943-956.
    According to prioritarianism, an influential theory of distributive justice, we have a stronger reason to benefit people the worse off these people are. Many authors have adopted a consequentialist version of prioritarianism. On this account, we have a consequentialist reason to benefit the worse off because the state of affairs where the worse off gains a given amount of utility is more valuable than the state of affairs where the better off gains roughly the same amount of utility. In this (...)
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  22. Dilemmas in Access to Medicines: A Humanitarian Perspective – Authors' Reply.Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Govind Persad - 2017 - Lancet 387 (10073):1008-1009.
    Our Viewpoint argues that expanding access to less effective or more toxic treatments is supported not only by utilitarian ethical reasoning but also by two other ethical frameworks: those that emphasise equality and those that emphasise giving priority to the patients who are worst off. The inadequate resources available for global health reflect not only natural constraints but also unwise social and political choices. However, pitting efforts to reduce inequality and better fund global health against efforts to put available resources (...)
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  23. Poverty, Partiality, and the Purchase of Expensive Education.Christopher Freiman - 2017 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 16 (1):25-46.
    Prioritarianism doesn’t value equality as such – any reason to equalize is due to the benefits for the worse off. But some argue that prioritarianism and egalitarianism coincide in their implications for the distribution of education: Equalizing educational opportunities improves the socioeconomic opportunities of the worse off. More specifically, a system that prohibits parents from making differential private educational expenditures would result in greater gains to the worse off than a system that permits these expenditures, all else equal. This article (...)
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  24. Restricted Prioritarianism or Competing Claims?Benjamin Lange - 2017 - Utilitas 29 (2):137-152.
    I here settle a recent dispute between two rival theories in distributive ethics: Restricted Prioritarianism and the Competing Claims View. Both views mandate that the distribution of benefits and burdens between individuals should be justifiable to each affected party in a way that depends on the strength of each individual’s separately assessed claim to receive a benefit. However, they disagree about what elements constitute the strength of those individuals’ claims. According to restricted prioritarianism, the strength of a claim is determined (...)
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  25. Taking Risks Behind the Veil of Ignorance.Buchak Lara - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):610-644.
    A natural view in distributive ethics is that everyone's interests matter, but the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off. I provide a new argument for this view. The argument takes as its starting point the proposal, due to Harsanyi and Rawls, that facts about distributive ethics are discerned from individual preferences in the "original position." I draw on recent work in decision theory, along with an intuitive principle about risk-taking, to (...)
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  26. The Priority View.David McCarthy - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):215–57.
    According to the priority view, or prioritarianism, it matters more to benefit people the worse off they are. But how exactly should the priority view be defined? This article argues for a highly general characterization which essentially involves risk, but makes no use of evaluative measurements or the expected utility axioms. A representation theorem is provided, and when further assumptions are added, common accounts of the priority view are recovered. A defense of the key idea behind the priority view, the (...)
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  27. Priority, Not Equality, for Possible People.Jacob M. Nebel - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):896-911.
    How should we choose between uncertain prospects in which different possible people might exist at different levels of wellbeing? Alex Voorhoeve and Marc Fleurbaey offer an egalitarian answer to this question. I give some reasons to reject their answer and then sketch an alternative, which I call person-affecting prioritarianism.
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  28. The Case for Resource Sensitivity: Why It Is Ethical to Provide Cheaper, Less Effective Treatments in Global Health.Govind C. Persad & Ezekiel J. Emanuel - 2017 - Hastings Center Report 47 (5):17-24.
    We consider an ethical dilemma in global health: is it ethically acceptable to provide some patients cheaper treatments that are less effective or more toxic than the treatments other patients receive? We argue that it is ethical to consider local resource constraints when deciding what interventions to provide. The provision of cheaper, less effective health care is frequently the most effective way of promoting health and realizing the ethical values of utility, equality, and priority to the worst off.
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  29. Why Inequality Matters: Luck Egalitarianism, its Meaning and Value. [REVIEW]Alex Voorhoeve - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3.
    I review Shlomi Segall's book 'Why Inequality Matters'. I argue that it conclusively establishes that alongside egalitarians, prioritarians and sufficientarians must sometimes regard a prospect as better (in at least one respect) when it is not better (in terms of well-being) for anyone. Sufficientarians and prioritarians must therefore relinquish a treasured anti-egalitarian argument. It also makes a powerful case that among these three views, egalitarians are in the best position to explain such departures from what is in each person’s prudential (...)
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  30. Fair Innings and Time-Relative Claims.Ben Davies - 2016 - Bioethics 30 (6):462-468.
    Greg Bognar has recently offered a prioritarian justification for ‘fair innings’ distributive principles that would ration access to healthcare on the basis of patients' age. In this article, I agree that Bognar's principle is among the strongest arguments for age-based rationing. However, I argue that this position is incomplete because of the possibility of ‘time-relative' egalitarian principles that could complement the kind of lifetime egalitarianism that Bognar adopts. After outlining Bognar's position, and explaining the attraction of time-relative egalitarianism, I suggest (...)
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  31. Impartiality, Priority, and Justice: The Veil of Ignorance Reconsidered.Michael Moehler - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (3):350-367.
    In this article, I defend the veil of ignorance against the objection that the device is inadequate for deriving demands of justice, because the veil of ignorance purportedly enforces a stronger form of impartiality than Kant’s categorical imperative and, primarily as a consequence, it generally leads to non-prioritarian conclusions. I show that the moral ideal of impartiality that is expressed by the veil of ignorance is not essentially different from Kant’s notion of impartiality and that it does not generally lead (...)
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  32. Sufficiency, Comprehensiveness of Health Care Coverage, and Cost-Sharing Arrangements in the Realpolitik of Health Policy.Govind Persad & Harald Schmidt - 2016 - In Carina Fourie & Annette Rid (eds.), What is Enough?: Sufficiency, Justice, and Health. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 267-280.
    This chapter explores two questions in detail: How should we determine the threshold for costs that individuals are asked to bear through insurance premiums or care-related out-of-pocket costs, including user fees and copayments? and What is an adequate relationship between costs and benefits? This chapter argues that preventing impoverishment is a morally more urgent priority than protecting households against income fluctuations, and that many health insurance plans may not adequately protect individuals from health care costs that threaten to drop their (...)
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  33. What is the Point of Sufficiency?Shlomi Segall - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 33 (1):36-52.
    Telic sufficientarians hold that there is something special about a certain threshold level such that benefiting people below it, or raising them above it, makes an outcome better in at least one respect. The article investigates what fundamental value might ground that view. The aim is to demonstrate that sufficientarianism, at least on this telic version, is groundless and as such indefensible. The argument is advanced in three steps: first, it is shown that sufficientarianism cannot be grounded in a personal (...)
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  34. Just Enough: Sufficiency as a Demand of Justice.Liam Shields - 2016 - Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press.
    Liam Shields systematically clarifies and defends the political philosophy of Sufficientarianism, which insists that securing enough of some things, such as food, healthcare and education, is a crucial demand of justice. By engaging in practical debates about critical issues such as child-rearing and global justice, the author sheds light on the potential implications of suffientarianism on the social policies that affect our daily lives.
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  35. Priority or Equality for Possible People?Alex Voorhoeve & Marc Fleurbaey - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):929-954.
    Suppose that you must make choices that may influence the well-being and the identities of the people who will exist, though not the number of people who will exist. How ought you to choose? This paper answers this question. It argues that the currency of distributive ethics in such cases is a combination of an individual’s final well-being and her expected well-being conditional on her existence. It also argues that this currency should be distributed in an egalitarian, rather than a (...)
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  36. Response to Our Critics.Alex Voorhoeve, Trygve Ottersen & Ole Frithjof Norheim - 2016 - Health Economics, Policy and Law 11 (1):103-111.
    We reply to critics of the World Health Organisation's Report "Making Fair Choices on the Path to Universal Health Coverage". We clarify and defend the report's key moral commitments. We also explain its role in guiding policy in the face of both financial and political constraints on making fair choices.
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  37. Well-Being Thresholds and Moral Priority.Matthew D. Adler - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 12 (6):773-786.
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  38. Concerns for the Poorly Off in Ordering Risky Prospects.Luc Bovens - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (3):397-429.
    The Distribution View provides a model that integrates four distributional concerns in the evaluation of risky prospects. Starting from these concerns, we can generate an ordering over a set of risky prospects, or, starting from an ordering, we can extract a characterization of the underlying distributional concerns. Separability of States and/or Persons for multiple-person risky prospects, for single-person risky prospects and for multiple-person certain prospects are discussed within the model. The Distribution View sheds light on public health policies and provides (...)
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  39. Evaluating Risky Prospects: The Distribution View.Luc Bovens - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):243-253.
    Risky prospects represent policies that impose different types of risks on multiple people. I present an example from food safety. A utilitarian following Harsanyi's Aggregation Theorem ranks such prospects according to their mean expected utility or the expectation of the social utility. Such a ranking is not sensitive to any of four types of distributional concerns. I develop a model that lets the policy analyst rank prospects relative to the distributional concerns that she considers fitting in the context at hand. (...)
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  40. Equality Versus Priority: A Useful Distinction.John Broome - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):219-228.
  41. Equality Versus Priority: How Relevant is the Distinction?Marc Fleurbaey - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):203-217.
  42. Antiprioritarianism.Hilary Greaves - 2015 - Utilitas 27 (1):1-42.
    Prioritarianism is supposed to be a theory of the overall good that captures the common intuition of . But it is difficult to give precise content to the prioritarian claim. Over the past few decades, prioritarians have increasingly responded to this by formulating prioritarianism not in terms of an alleged primitive notion of quantity of well-being, but instead in terms of von NeumannPrimitivistTechnicalpriority to the worse offMorgenstern utility is a retrograde step.
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  43. Equality Versus Priority: A Misleading Distinction.Daniel M. Hausman - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):229-238.
    People condemn inequalities for many reasons. For example, many who have no concern with distribution per se criticize inequalities in health care, because these inequalities lessen the benefits provided by the resources that are devoted to health care. Others who place no intrinsic value on distribution believe that a just society must show a special concern for those who are worst off. Some people, on the other hand, do place an intrinsic value on equality of distribution, regardless of its contribution (...)
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  44. Challenges for Principles of Need in Health Care.Niklas Juth - 2015 - Health Care Analysis 23 (1):73-87.
    What challenges must a principle of need for prioritisations in health care meet in order to be plausible and practically useful? Some progress in answering this question has recently been made by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. This article continue their work by suggesting that the characteristic feature of principles of needs is that they are sufficientarian, saying that we have a right to a minimally acceptable or good life or health, but nothing more. Accordingly, principles of needs must answer two (...)
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  45. Equality and Public Policy: Volume 31, Part 2.Mark LeBar, Antony Davies, David Schmidtz & Miller Jr (eds.) - 2015 - Cambridge University Press.
    If ever there were a time in which concerns about equality as a primary issue for social policy disappeared from public view, now is not that time. Recent work in economics on inequality has climbed to the top of best-sellers lists, and the issue was a major talking point in American midterm elections in 2014. The sheer bewildering volume of scholarship and discussion of equality makes it difficult to distinguish signal from noise. What, of all that we know about ways (...)
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  46. Distributive Equality.David McCarthy - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1045-1109.
    Egalitarians think that equality in the distribution of goods somehow matters. But what exactly is egalitarianism? This article argues for a characterization based on novel principles essentially involving risk. The characterization is then used to resolve disputed questions about egalitarianism. These include: the way egalitarianism is concerned with patterns, in particular its relationship to strong separability; the relationship between egalitarianism and other distributive views, such as concerns with fairness and with giving priority to the worse off; and the relationship between (...)
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  47. Prioritarianism and the Measure of Utility.Michael Otsuka - 2015 - Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (1):1-22.
    I argue that prioritarianism cannot be assessed in abstraction from an account of the measure of utility. Rather, the soundness of this view crucially depends on what counts as a greater, lesser, or equal increase in a person’s utility. In particular, prioritarianism cannot accommodate a normatively compelling measure of utility that is captured by the axioms of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. Nor can it accommodate a plausible and elegant generalization of this theory that has been (...)
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  48. A Silenced Cry: Should Stillbirth Be Given Greater Priority on the Global Health Agenda?Z. U. Qureshi - 2015 - British Medical Journal 351 (h4620).
  49. Facing Difficult Decisions: When to Give Priority and Why.Ewan Rodgers - 2015 - Lse Philosophy Blog.
    Some people believe that when facing difficult decisions we should give priority to those who are worst-off. In ‘Prioritarianism and the Measure of Utility’, Michael Otsuka argues that this is only true in some situations.
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  50. In Defense of Priority.Shlomi Segall - 2015 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 14 (4):343-364.
    In a recent article, Michael Otsuka and Alex Voorhoeve argue that prioritarianism fails to account for the shift in moral significance in gains to individuals in interpersonal as compared to intrapersonal cases. In this article, I show that the priority view escapes this objection but in a way that deprives it of its anti-egalitarian stance. Despite Otsuka and Voorhoeve, prioritarianism, rightly understood, provides consistent and attractive recommendations in both single- and multi-person cases. Yet prioritarians, the article goes on to show, (...)
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