Menschen können heute in der für sie gewohnten Weise leben, weil Hunderte und Tausende von Generationen Erfahrungen über die Natur gesammelt und weitergegeben haben. Wir wissen, was wir essen und trinken können und was nicht, wie wir uns kleiden, wie wir wohnen und wie wir uns verhalten. Wir haben dieses Wissen übernommen und weiter gestaltet. Menschen können in einer bedrohlichen bis feindlichen, aber wiederum auch sie ernährenden und schützenden Welt überleben, weil sie die überkommenen Erfahrungen und das Wissen weiter kultiviert (...) haben. Die kulturelle Existenzform ist eine Besonderheit und unterscheidet Menschen von anderen Lebewesen, welche sich in ihre Umwelt problemlos einfügen. (shrink)

L'auteur montre que, dans la philosophie du droit de Radbruch, l'idée de droit répond à trois paramètres qui interfèrent dans la pratique juridique quotidienne : le besoin de justice, l’exigence de garantie, le souci des fins. Le res-pect de ces paramètres est indis-pensable en toute société démocratique.

Wie kann Versohnung geschaffen werden, wenn sich Menschen, Familien, Gruppen, Parteien, Nationen oder Religionsgemeinschaften getrennt oder verfeindet haben? Wahrend das Gegeneinander, der Streit, die Entzweiung oder der Krieg Folgen von Sprachlosigkeit sind, ist Versohnung nur mit Sprache und durch Sprache moglich. Solange Menschen miteinander sprechen, sind sie auf einem Weg der gegenseitigen Verstandigung. Stephan Gratzel zeigt, wie es mit einem dialogischen Verstandnis von Sprache gelingt, Gemeinsamkeiten zu stiften und Konflikte zu losen. Der dialogische Weg ermoglicht jedoch nicht nur die (...) Versohnung zwischen Menschen, sondern fuhrt auch zur Versohnung des Menschen mit sich selbst. (shrink)

Identitat ist unter den Bedingungen der Postmoderne kein festes Ganzes mehr. Die unuberschaubare Anzahl an Moglichkeiten in Ausbildung, Studium, Beruf, aber auch Partnerschaft und Lebensformen fuhren zu der Einsicht, dass Identitat sich immer neu konstituieren muss. Tatsachlich ist Identitat das, was mich als unverwechselbares Ich korperlich und geistig - und das heisst: leiblich - konstituiert. Zugleich entzieht sie sich mir und muss immer wieder neu errungen werden. Dies gilt gerade dann, wenn fruhere Ideale zusammenbrechen oder das zuvor Selbstverstandliche nicht mehr (...) tragt. Identitat und Identitatsbildung betreffen den Einzelnen ebenso wie politische oder religiose Gemeinschaften. In Zeiten, in denen vieles in Bewegung ist, ist Identitat eng verbunden mit der Frage nach den gemeinsamen Werten - das, wofur es sich zu leben lohnt und was wir an die nachste Generation weitergeben mochten. Besondere Beachtung verdienen in diesem Kontext phanomenologische Ansatze, die den leiblichen, sinnlichen und affektiven Dimensionen des Lebens Rechnung tragen. Auf diese Weise lassen sich Erfahrungen, die unsere Identitat begrunden und ausmachen, als Momente einer breiter angelegten Spiritualitat der Wahrnehmung verstehen. Mit Beitragen von Johannes Bundgens, Natalie Depraz, Stephan Gratzel, Caroline Horch, Antje Kapust, Rolf Kuhn, Elmar Nass, Simone Paganini, Michaela Puzicha, Bertin Rautenberg, Holger Zaborowski u. a. (shrink)

Der enorme Erfolg der Naturwissenschaften fuhrte zugleich zu der vorherrschenden Auffassung, dass alles Wesentliche in der Welt naturwissenschaftlich erfasst werden kann. Auch lebensweltliche Phanomene sollen sich in dieser Perspektive prinzipiell auf kausal-funktionale Strukturen der Natur zuruckfuhren lassen. Die Beitrager dieses Bandes diskutieren diese reduktionistische Auffassung kritisch und zeigen, wie differenziert das Verhaltnis von Lebenswelt und naturwissenschaftlicher Perspektive ist. Mit Beitragen von Stefan Bauberger, Wolf-Jurgen Cramm, Thomas Fuchs, Stephan Gratzel, Michael Hampe, Matthias Jung, Anton Friedrich Koch, Uwe Meixner, Tobias Muller, (...) Hans-Dieter Mutschler und Gregor Schiemann. (shrink)

Partindo do pluralismo religioso como um fato europeu, no diálogo inter-religioso encontra-se uma chance para uma espécie de acordo entre diferentes culturas. No presente texto, após intensos debates sobre diferentes correntes religiosas e filosóficas do decorrer da história, o professor Dr. Michael Schulz utiliza especialmente da abordagem dos pensadores Stephan Grätzel e Armin Kreiner para explicar o que significa uma filosofia da religião inter-religiosa e intercultural.

English summary: The account of the fate of Stephen takes up a large part in the Acts of the Apostles. Being the first martyr, Stephen became a Saint and the patron of many churches. There is, however, a modern exegetical tradition which blames Stephen himself for his violent death. Against this, Haaker emphasises the psychological and historical plausibility of Luke's account. The volume reflects the drama of the biblical narrative of Stephen and provides incisive examples of its reception history until (...) the 20th century. German description: Der Sammelband dokumentiert die Tagungen der Kulturhermeneutischen Sozietat e. V. der Jahre 2009 bis 2011, bei denen der Diskurs uber Emotionen und Verhalten im Zentrum stand. In den Zusammenhangen der philosophischen und theologischen Ethik werden Artikulationsformen der Moral, Entwicklungen der Theoriebildung und Probleme der Normativitat erortert. Mit Beitragen von Stefan Beyerle, Volker Caysa, Ferdinand Fellmann, Stephan Gratzel, Peter Fischer, Bernd Harbeck-Pingel, Susanne Klinger, Michael Roth, Friedrike Schick und Albrecht Scriba. (shrink)

The elucidations and regimentations of grounding offered in the literature standardly take it to be a necessary connection. In particular, authors often assert, or at least assume, that if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of the former necessitates the latter; and moreover, that grounding is an internal relation, in the sense of being necessitated by the existence of the relata. In this article, I challenge the necessitarian orthodoxy about grounding by offering two prima facie counterexamples. First, some (...) physical facts may ground a certain phenomenal fact without necessitating it; and they may co-exist with the latter without grounding it. Second, some instantiations of categorical properties may ground the instantiation of a dispositional one without necessitating it; and they may co-exist without grounding it. After arguing that these may be genuine counterexamples, I ask whether there are modal constraints on grounding that are not threatened by them. I propose two: that grounding supervenes on what facts there are, and that every grounded fact supervenes on what grounds there are. Finally, I attempt to provide a rigorous formulation of the latter supervenience claim and discuss some technical questions that arise if we allow descending grounding chains of transfinite length. (shrink)

Bayesian epistemology addresses epistemological problems with the help of the mathematical theory of probability. It turns out that the probability calculus is especially suited to represent degrees of belief (credences) and to deal with questions of belief change, confirmation, evidence, justification, and coherence. Compared to the informal discussions in traditional epistemology, Bayesian epis- temology allows for a more precise and fine-grained analysis which takes the gradual aspects of these central epistemological notions into account. Bayesian epistemology therefore complements traditional epistemology; it (...) does not re- place it or aim at replacing it. (shrink)

Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its rivals, this (...) entry explores some of the arguments for and objections to this controversial account of our nature and persistence. (shrink)

The view known as animalism asserts that we are human animals—that each of us is an instance of the Homo sapiens species. The standard argument for this view is known as the thinking animal argument . But this argument has recently come under attack. So, here, a new argument for animalism is introduced. The animal ancestors argument illustrates how the case for animalism can be seen to piggyback on the credibility of evolutionary theory. Two objections are then considered and answered.

The concept of supervenience and a regimented concept of grounding are often taken to provide rival explications of pre-theoretical concepts of dependence and determination. Friends of grounding typically point out that supervenience claims do not entail corresponding grounding claims. Every fact supervenes on itself, but is not grounded in itself, and the fact that a thing exists supervenes on the fact that its singleton exists, but is not grounded in it. Common lore has it, though, that grounding claims do entail (...) corresponding supervenience claims. In this article, I show that this assumption is problematic. On one way of understanding it, the corresponding supervenience claim is just an entailment claim under a different name. On another way of understanding it, the corresponding claim is a distinctive supervenience claim, but its specification gives rise to what I call the "reference type problem": to associate the classes of facts that are the relata of grounding with the types of facts that are the relata of supervenience. However it is understood, supervenience rules out prima facie possibilities: alien realizers, blockers, heterogeneous realizers, floaters, and heterogeneous blockers. Instead of being rival explications of one and the same pre-theoretical concept, grounding and supervenience may be complementary concepts capturing different aspects of determination and dependence. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the greatest value of the Bayesian framework in cognitive science consists in its unifying power. Several Bayesian cognitive scientists assume that unification is obviously linked to explanatory power. But this link is not obvious, as unification in science is a heterogeneous notion, which may have little to do with explanation. While a crucial feature of most adequate explanations in cognitive science is that they reveal aspects of the causal mechanism that produces the phenomenon to be (...) explained, the kind of unification afforded by the Bayesian framework to cognitive science does not necessarily reveal aspects of a mechanism. Bayesian unification, nonetheless, can place fruitful constraints on causal–mechanical explanation. 1 Introduction2 What a Great Many Phenomena Bayesian Decision Theory Can Model3 The Case of Information Integration4 How Do Bayesian Models Unify?5 Bayesian Unification: What Constraints Are There on Mechanistic Explanation?5.1 Unification constrains mechanism discovery5.2 Unification constrains the identification of relevant mechanistic factors5.3 Unification constrains confirmation of competitive mechanistic models6 ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

There has been much concern with the abundance of misinformation in public discourse. Although misinformation has always played a role in political debate, its character has shifted from support fo...

This entry sketches the theory of personal identity that has come to be known as animalism. Animalism’s hallmark claim is that each of us is identical with a human animal. Moreover, animalists typically claim that we could not exist except as animals, and that the (biological) conditions of our persistence derive from our status as animals. Prominent advocates of this view include Michael Ayers, Eric Olson, Paul Snowdon, Peter van Inwagen, and David Wiggins.

Nancy Cartwright is one of the most distinguished and influential contemporary philosophers of science. Despite the profound impact of her work, there is neither a systematic exposition of Cartwright’s philosophy of science nor a collection of articles that contains in-depth discussions of the major themes of her philosophy. This book is devoted to a critical assessment of Cartwright’s philosophy of science and contains contributions from Cartwright's champions and critics. Broken into three parts, the book begins by addressing Cartwright's views on (...) the practice of model building in science and the question of how models represent the world before moving on to a detailed discussion of methodologically and metaphysically challenging problems. Finally, the book addresses Cartwright's original attempts to clarify profound questions concerning the metaphysics of science. With contributions from leading scholars, such as Ronald N. Giere and Paul Teller, this unique volume will be extremely useful to philosophers of science the world over. (shrink)

Supervenience is a topic-neutral, broadly logical relation between classes of properties or facts. In a slogan, A supervenes on B if and only if there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference. The first part of this paper considers different ways in which that slogan has been cashed out. The second part discusses applications of concepts of supervenience, focussing on the question whether they may provide an explication of determination theses such as physicalism.

Since the 1860s, petroleum companies, through their influence on local governments, port authorities, international actors and the general public gradually became more dominant in shaping the urban form of ports and cities. Under their development and pressure, the relationships between industrial and urban areas in port cities hosting oil facilities evolved in time. The borders limiting industrial and housing territories have continuously changed with industrial places moving progressively away from urban areas. Such a changing dynamic influenced the permeability of these (...) borders. Port cities are nodes and logistic points where various flows of commodities, wealth, and knowledge gathered before further re‐distribution. These flows affected port cities by changing their spatial organization and the availabiity of space between borders. The main question here is: How did industrial and urban borders evolve through time in port cities? Through a historical analysis, the article explores the settlements of oil facilities and the influence of oil companies over local, regional, and national governments in creating borders and how it influenced the porosity of port cities. This article, through the petroleum narrative, illustrates the impacts of past borders on the contemporary urban form through the evolution of the French port city of Dunkirk, in the North of France. As a historical study, the article analyzes the changing relationships between petroleum industrial sites and housing areas in the city of Dunkirk, using aerial pictures, archival sources, and regulations of different periods. The importance of this analysis lies in knowing that former oil sites previously located on the periphery of Dunkirk, that were forgotten by the authorities are now located within the current urban tissue. This process demonstrates the importance of historical developments to understand current challenges in the urban planning of industrial port cities. (shrink)

The rare condition known as dicephalus occurs when (prior to implantation) a zygote fails to divide completely, resulting in twins who are conjoined below the neck. Human dicephalic twins look like a two-headed person, with each brain supporting a distinct mental life. Jeff McMahan has recently argued that, because they instance two of us but only one animal, dicephalic twins provide a counterexample to the animalist's claim that each of us is identical with a human animal. To the contrary, I (...) argue that in cases of dicephalus it is obvious neither that there is one animal nor that there are two of us. Consequently, the animalist criterion does not straightforwardly apply to cases of dicephalus. I defend an account of dicephalus that is both sensitive to the complexity of twinning phenomena and not inconsistent with animalism. In my view, dicephalic twins are a borderline case of the concept HUMAN ANIMAL. I conclude with some speculative remarks concerning the normative import (if any) of my claim that dicephalic twins are a borderline case. (shrink)

The relation of global supervenience is widely appealed to in philosophy. In slogan form, it is explained as follows: a class of properties A supervenes on a class of properties B if no two worlds differ in the distribution of A-properties without differing in the distribution of B-properties. It turns out, though, that there are several ways to cash out that slogan. Three different proposals have been discussed in the literature. In this paper, I argue that none of them is (...) adequate. Furthermore, I present a puzzle that reveals a tension in our concept of global supervenience. (shrink)

Simulation techniques, especially those implemented on a computer, are frequently employed in natural as well as in social sciences with considerable success. There is mounting evidence that the "model-building era" (J. Niehans) that dominated the theoretical activities of the sciences for a long time is about to be succeeded or at least lastingly supplemented by the "simulation era". But what exactly are models? What is a simulation and what is the difference and the relation between a model and a simulation? (...) These are some of the questions addressed in this article. I maintain that the most significant feature of a simulation is that it allows scientists to imitate one process by another process. "Process" here refers solely to a temporal sequence of states of a system. Given the observation that processes are dealt with by all sorts of scientists, it is apparent that simulations prove to be a powerful interdisciplinarily acknowledged tool. Accordingly, simulations are best suited to investigate the various research strategies in different sciences more carefully. To this end, I focus on the function of simulations in the research process. Finally, a somewhat detailed case-study from nuclear physics is presented which, in my view, illustrates elements of a typical simulation in physics. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the concept of environmental scaffolding can contribute to a better understanding of our affective life and the complex manners in which it is shaped by environmental entities. In particular, the concept of environmental scaffolding offers a more comprehensive and less controversial framework than the notions of embeddedness and extendedness. We contribute to the literature on situated affectivity by embracing and systematizing the diversity of affective scaffolding. In doing so, we introduce several distinctions that provide (...) classifications of different types of environmentally scaffolded affectivity. Furthermore, we differentiate eight dimensions that allow us to evaluate the quality and effectivity of scaffolds in particular applications. On that basis, we develop a taxonomy using paradigmatic examples of affective scaffolding. This taxonomy enriches the current debate by emphasizing distinctions that are often conflated and by identifying fields of application that are commonly overlooked. (shrink)

A widely shared view in the cognitive sciences is that discovering and assessing explanations of cognitive phenomena whose production involves uncertainty should be done in a Bayesian framework. One assumption supporting this modelling choice is that Bayes provides the best approach for representing uncertainty. However, it is unclear that Bayes possesses special epistemic virtues over alternative modelling frameworks, since a systematic comparison has yet to be attempted. Currently, it is then premature to assert that cognitive phenomena involving uncertainty are best (...) explained within the Bayesian framework. As a forewarning, progress in cognitive science may be hindered if too many scientists continue to focus their efforts on Bayesian modelling, which risks to monopolize scientific resources that may be better allocated to alternative approaches. (shrink)

Bayes nets are a powerful tool for researchers in statistics and artificial intelligence. This chapter demonstrates that they are also of much use for philosophers and psychologists interested in (Bayesian) rationality. To do so, we outline the general methodology of Bayes nets modeling in rationality research and illustrate it with several examples from the philosophy and psychology of reasoning and argumentation. Along the way, we discuss the normative foundations of Bayes nets modeling and address some of the methodological problems it (...) raises. (shrink)

Fundamental theories are hard to come by. But even if we had them, they would be too complicated to apply. Quantum chromodynamics is a case in point. This theory is supposed to govern all strong interactions, but it is extremely hard to apply and test at energies where protons, neutrons and ions are the effective degrees of freedom. Instead, scientists typically use highly idealized models such as the MIT Bag Model or the Nambu Jona-Lasinio Model to account for phenomena in (...) this domain, to explain them and to gain nderstanding. Based on these models, which typically isolate a single feature of QCD and disregard many others, scientists attempt to get a better understanding of the physics of strong interactions. But does this practice make sense? Is it justified to use these models for the purposes at hand? Interestingly, these models do not even provide an accurate description of the mass spectrum of protons, neutrons and pions and their lowest lying excitations well - despite several adjustable parameters. And yet, the models are heavily used. I'll argue that a qualitative story, which establishes an explanatory link between the fundamental theory and a model, plays an important role in model acceptance in these cases. (shrink)

Despite widespread support for the claim that death can harm the one who dies, debate continues over how to rescue this harm thesis (HT) from Epicurus’s challenge. Disagreements focus on two of the three issues that any defense of HT must resolve: the subject of death’s harm and the timing of its injury. About the nature of death’s harm, however, a consensus has emerged around the view that death harms a subject (when it does) by depriving her of the goods (...) life would’ve afforded had she continued living. This deprivation view of death’s harm (DV) derives some of its credibility from the general deprivation theory of which it is an instance: mortal harm is subject to the same kind of analysis plausibly given of other non-mortal harms. Furthermore, note that the weak formulation of HT—asserting only that death can inflict harm, not that it always or necessarily does—accommodates the intuition that instances of rational suicide and justifiable euthanasia present cases in which death fails to harm. DV is equipped to explain how in these cases the harms involved in continued existence outweigh the goods of which death deprives the subject. I agree that suicide can be rational and that euthanasia can be justifiable. Likewise I accept both HT and DV as far as they go. But they do not go far enough. Specifically, I argue here that death harms even those who die as a result of rational suicide or justifiable euthanasia; that death’s harm is neither undifferentiated nor wholly contingent, but multifaceted and partly necessary; that the necessary part of death’s harm is distinctive, inflicting a peculiar restriction on the autonomy of one who dies; and, regarding the timing and subject issues, that this restriction harm is inflicted on the antemortem subject prior to her death. (shrink)

In "Ramseyan Humility," David Lewis argues that we cannot know what the fundamental properties in our world are. His arguments invoke the possibility of permutations and replacements of fundamental properties. Most responses focus on Lewis’s view on the relationship between properties and roles, and on the assumptions about knowledge that he makes. I argue that no matter how the debates about knowledge and about the metaphysics of properties turn out, Lewis’s arguments are unconvincing since they rely on a highly implausible (...) assumption about the expressive power of our language. (shrink)