There has been a persistent tendency to identify what is called “the freerider problem” in the production of collective goods with the prisoner's dilemma. However, in this article I want to challenge that identification by presenting an analysis of what are in fact a variety of collective action problems in the production of collective goods. My strategy is not to consult any intuitions about what the free-rider problem is; rather I will be looking at the problematic game-theoretic structures of various (...) situations associated with the production of different types of collective goods, thereby showing what sorts of difficulties a community concerned with their voluntary production would face. I call all of these dilemmas free-rider problems because in all of them certain individuals find it rational to take advantage of others' willingness to contribute to the good in a way that threatens its production. Some readers may feel that the term ‘free-rider problem’ is so identified with the prisoner's dilemma that my extension of the term in this way “jars”; if so, I invite them to coin another word for the larger phenomenon. My aim is not to engage in linguistic analysis but to attempt at least a partial analysis of the complicated structure of collective good production. (shrink)

The human gene pool displays exuberant genetic variation; this is normal for a sexual species. Even small isolated populations contain a large percentage of the total variability, emphasizing the basic genetic unity of our species. As modern man spread across the world from its African source, the genetic basis for man''s unique mental acuity was retained everywhere. Nevertheless, some geographical genetic variation such as skin color, stature and physiognomy was established. These changes were biologically relatively insignificant. Most of the genetic (...) load in the genome has been carried throughout the history of the species. There is little hope of purging all of these harmful genes; we must accept them and continue to treat their syndromes medically. All populations carry extensive genetic variation due to genes that encode variations in quantitative traits. Of greatest importance among these is ubiquitous polygenic variability in brain function and intelligence. Mental acuity is what sets us apart from the rest of the biological world. Throughout our history, genetic recombination among the many genes involved in brain function has occurred. This has provided a genetic basis for the action of natural selection that favors intelligence in meeting the demands of the environment. As environments change in the future, this type of genetic variability will continue to be a crucial resource. (shrink)

This book focuses on the degree to which certain moral and legal doctrines are rooted in specific passions that are then institutionalised in the form of criminal law. A philosophical analysis is developed of the following questions: when, if ever, should hatred be overcome by sympathy or compassion? What are forgiveness and mercy and to what degree do they require - both conceptually and morally - the overcoming of certain passions and the motivation by other passions? If forgiveness and mercy (...) indeed are moral virtues, what role, if any, should they play in the law? (shrink)

A book aimed at advanced undergraduates and graduates in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, linguistics, applied mathematics and data analysis.

This major study of Hobbes's political philosophy draws on recent developments in game and decision theory to explore whether the thrust of the argument in Leviathan, that it is in the interests of the people to create a ruler with absolute power, can be shown to be cogent. Professor Hampton has written a book of vital importance to political philosophers, political and social scientists, and intellectual historians.

This challenging and provocative book argues against much contemporary orthodoxy in philosophy and the social sciences by showing why objectivity in the domain of ethics is really no different from the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Many philosophers and social scientists have challenged the idea that we act for objectively authoritative reasons. Jean Hampton takes up the challenge by undermining two central assumptions of this contemporary orthodoxy: that one can understand instrumental reasons without appeal to objective authority, and that the (...) adoption of the scientific world view requires no such appeal. In the course of the book Jean Hampton examines moral realism, the general nature of reason and norms, internalism and externalism, instrumental reasoning, and the expected utility model of practical reasoning. The book is sure to prove to be a seminal work in the theory of rationality that will be read by a broad swathe of philosophers and social scientists. (shrink)

Book Reviewed in this Article: Epistemology and Cognition. By Alvin I. Goldman. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986. pp. ix + 437. £23.50.

This major study of Hobbes' political philosophy draws on recent developments in game and decision theory to explore whether the thrust of the argument in Leviathan, that it is in the interests of the people to create a ruler with absolute power, can be shown to be cogent. Professor Hampton has written a book of vital importance to political philosophers, political and social scientists, and intellectual historians.

This book, which was completed just before Jean Hampton’s untimely death in April 1996, is an admirable hybrid. Although it successfully achieves its stated purpose of “acquaint[ing] the student of political philosophy both with [its] questions and with the various answers to them proposed by philosophers since the ancient Greeks”, it is, at the same time, quite an original work—one that can be read with real profit by professional philosophers as well as students.

Sacrificing one's own interests in order to serve another is, in general, supposed to be a good thing, an example of altruism, the hallmark of morality, and something we should commend to (but not always require of) the entirely-too-selfish human beings of our society. But let me recount a story that I hope will persuade the reader to start questioning this conventional philosophical wisdom. Last year, a friend of mine was talking with me about a mutual acquaintance whose two sons (...) were in the same nursery school as our sons. This woman, whom I will call Terry, had been pregnant with twins, but one of the twins had died during the fourth month of pregnancy, and the other twin had just been born prematurely at six months with a host of medical problems. We were discussing how stressful this woman's life had been while she was pregnant: she was a housewife, and her two boys, aged three and five, were lively, challenging, often unruly--a real handful to raise. Her husband worked long hours in a law firm, so the vast majority of the childcare and household chores fell on her shoulders. "You could see that she was exhausted by end of the first trimester," I maintained, "because her eyes were tired, and her cheeks were sunken--she looked almost like a cadaver." My friend agreed. I went on to blame her exhaustion on the fact that she had to do too much during a pregnancy that anyone would have found difficuIt. "I don't understand her husband," I maintained. "Surely he could how badly she looked. If he had concern for his future children, why didn't he do something to help her so that the pregnancy had a chance of going better? And if he loved her, why didn't he cut down his hours so that he could help out at home? Surely he could see just by looking at her that she was in trouble," My friend said nothing at the time, but after a week she called me, and told me that my criticism of this woman's husband had bothered her all week. "You're wrong about Terry's husband not caring enough about her, They have a good marriage," she insisted, and then she continued: "You know, you're not like us, We accept the fact that we should do most of the childcare and housework.. (shrink)

Political philosophy, perhaps even more than other branches of philosophy, calls for constant renewal to reflect not just re-readings of the tradition but also the demands of current events. In this lively and readable survey, Jean Hampton has created a text for our time that does justice both to the great traditions of the field and to the newest developments. In a marvelous feat of synthesis, she links the classical tradition, the giants of the modern period, the dominant topics (...) of the twentieth century, and the new questions and concerns that are just beginning to rewrite contemporary political philosophy.Hampton presents these traditions in an engaging and accessible manner, adding to them her own views and encouraging readers to critically examine a range of ideas and to reach their own conclusions. Of particular interest are the discussions of the contemporary liberalism-communitarianism debates, the revival of interest in issues of citizenship and nationality, and the way in which feminist concerns are integrated into all these discussions. Political Philosophy is the most modern text on the topic now available, the ideal guide to what is going on in the field. It will be welcomed by scholars and students in philosophy and political science, and it will serve as an introduction for readers from outside these fields. (shrink)

In this paper, The author discusses rawls's recent argument that the aim of political philosophy is not the pursuit of truth but of "free agreement, Reconciliation through public reason" designed to forge an "overlapping consensus." although the author is prepared to agree that political philosophy should sometimes have this goal, She maintains that there are metaphysical commitments about the nature of human beings underlying philosophy itself which commit the political philosophers to pursuing conditions of freedom and equal respect for all, (...) A pursuit which may fail to create--Even undermine--An overlapping consensus in a community. (shrink)

In the wake of the recent expansion of democratic forms of government around the world, political theorists have begun to rethink the nature and justification of this form of government. The essays in this book address a variety of foundational questions about democracy: How effective is it? How stable can it be in a pluralist society? Does it deserve its current popularity? Can it successfully guide a socialist society?

This paper addresses theoretical problems arising from the vagueness of language terms, and intuitions of the vagueness of the concepts to which they refer. It is argued that the central intuitions of prototype theory are sufficient to account for both typicality phenomena and psychological intuitions about degrees of membership in vaguely defined classes. The first section explains the importance of the relation between degrees of membership and typicality (or goodness of example) in conceptual categorization. The second and third section address (...) arguments advanced by Osherson and Smith (1997), and Kamp and Partee (1995), that the two notions of degree of membership and typicality must relate to fundamentally different aspects of conceptual representations. A version of prototype theory—the Threshold Model—is proposed to counter these arguments and three possible solutions to the problems of logical selfcontradiction and tautology for vague categorizations are outlined. In the final section graded membership is related to the social construction of conceptual boundaries maintained through language use. (shrink)

Jacobi held a position of unparalleled importance in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century intellectual history. This includes his role in bringing about the close of the Enlightenment, his central part in shaping the reception of Kant's philosophy and German idealism, and his influence on the development of Romanticism and existentialism.

If people believe that some property is true of all members of a class such as sofas, then they should also believe that the same property is true of all members of a conjunctively defined subset of that class such as uncomfortable handmade sofas. A series of experiments demonstrated a failure to observe this constraint, leading to what is termed the inverse conjunction fallacy. Not only did people often express a belief in the more general statement but not in the (...) more specific, but also when they accepted both beliefs, they were inclined to give greater confidence to the more general. It is argued that this effect underlies a number of other demonstrations of fallacious reasoning, particularly in category-based induction. Alternative accounts of the phenomenon are evaluated, and it is concluded that the effect is best interpreted in terms of intensional reasoning [Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D.. Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.]. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 1, April 1995, pp. 57-74 Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason? JEAN HAMPTON Many philosophers and social scientists regard the instrumental theory of practical reason as highly plausible, and standardly credit David Hume as the first philosopher to formulate this conception of reason clearly. Yet I will argue in this paper that Hume does not advocate the instrumental conception of (...) practical reason as that conception is normally understood by contemporary theorists who endorse it. Although it is often thought that Hume's position on reason is the "common-sense" one, I will argue that in a very fundamental way, his view of reason defies common-sense. The Instrumental Conception of Reason Consider the following definition of an instrumental theory of reason, understood normatively: 1) An action is rational to the extent that an agent believes (reasonably)1 that it furthers the attainment of an end; and 2) Human reasoning involves the determination of means to achieve ends, in a way described by the theory (I will say, henceforth, that using reason to determine the extent to which an action is a means to an end is an instrumental use of reason); and 3) These ends are in no way fixed by reason operating non-instrumentally; i.e., what makes them our ends is something other than reason. Jean Hampton is at the Department of Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tuscon, AZ 85721 USA. 58 Jean Hampton In this article I will consider as instrumental all and only theories that accept these three theses.2 Thesis 3 is normally understood as the hallmark of the instrumental theory. Hume's famous remark "Reason is...the slave of the passions" (T 415) is a clear endorsement of this thesis. In contrast, theories of reason that do not count as instrumental maintain that reason not only pursues means to ends, but also defines ends of action, thereby denying thesis 3. On this sort of view, it is reason that is, at least sometimes, the master. For example, Kant portrays reason as concerned both with the efficiency and the morality of an action, and as that faculty which determines whether any proposed course of action is acceptable. So for Kant, reason "constructs" the ends of action insofar as it picks out from among the goals proposed by our desires those which are appropriate for us to pursue: it is the final determiner of what our ends of action ought to be. Moreover, after approving these ends, Kant says that reason provides a motivation to achieve them in virtue of the fact that it has approved them, a motivation which, if it directs a moral action, is always sufficient to determine that action, if the agent chooses to let it.3 So on Kant's view, practical reason is a master that issues directives, provides the impetus for obeying them, and calculates how best to do so. There are two reasons why philosophers have been troubled by the Kantian type of view. First, it is a conception of reason that seems unacceptable from the standpoint of science. What special "sight" or access to normative reality can we realistically ascribe to human reason, such that it can tell us our ends in life? And how does a scientific world view permit us to believe that there are unmotivated ends which we are rationally compelled to pursue? Science, after all, does not recognize such objects or properties with inherent prescriptive power. J. L. Mackie calls such objects and properties "queer"—indeed, too queer, given the strictures of science, for us to believe they obtain.4 Moreover, no scientific description of human beings has identified a rational capacity within us that can determine these objects, respond to their inherent prescriptivity, and motivate action in compliance with their requirements. The other problem facing any non-instrumental account of reason concerns motivation. Most theorists believe that whereas the question "Why be moral?" is deeply troubling, the question "Why be rational?" does not seem to be. Yet if reason is developed along Kantian lines, it becomes so expansive, and its directives so wide-ranging and divergent from interests the individual is readily able to... (shrink)

This book focuses on the degree to which certain moral and legal doctrines are rooted in specific passions that are then institutionalised in the form of criminal law. A philosophical analysis is developed of the following questions: when, if ever, should hatred be overcome by sympathy or compassion? What are forgiveness and mercy and to what degree do they require - both conceptually and morally - the overcoming of certain passions and the motivation by other passions? If forgiveness and mercy (...) indeed are moral virtues, what role, if any, should they play in the law? (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)