Everyone knows that Wales is a land of scenery. It is also known to have local customs and usages, and a peculiar language; in fact it has also its own history and historical memories. By virtue of these things Wales is a nation with its own life and culture, which merits study and demands respect.

At the bottom of all human activities are “values,” the conviction that some things “ought to be” and others not. Science, however, with its immense interest in mere facts seems to lack all understanding of such‘requiredness.’… A science … which would seriously admit nothing but indifferent facts … could not fail to destroy itself.

A problem for natural scientific accounts, psychology in particular, is the existence of value. An ecological account of values is reviewed and illustrated in three domains of research: carrying differing loads; negotiating social dilemmas involving agreement and disagreement; and timing the exposure of various visual presentations. Then it is applied in greater depth to the nature of language. As described and illustrated, values are ontological relationships that are neither subjective nor objective, but which constrain and obligate all significant animate activity (...) physically, socially, and morally. As an embodied social activity, conversational dialogue is characterized in terms of values, pragmatics, and presence rather than in terms of syntactic and semantic rules. In particular the nature of dialogical arrays is explored, and the hypothesis that language is an action system, a perceptual system, and a caring system is explored. Language expands horizons and makes it possible for humans to realize their calling as culture makers and caretakers. (shrink)

Social and ecological research and theory are used to elaborate and enrich two important sets of accounts of language origins. One is the interdependence and shared intentionality hypothesis (e.g.,Tomasello, 2014a) of the ways in which humans became cooperative and conforming in ways that other apes did not, eventually leading to language. A second set of accounts addresses the emergence of bipedalism and its connections to language and to many other anatomical, cognitive, and social features that are distinctive in humans. Particular (...) attention is given to the carrying and caretaking of infants. Research and theory challenging common assumptions about the role of conformity in cooperation and conversation are reviewed and integrated into these accounts. Together these varying perspectives point toward a more dialogical, dynamic, and distributed understanding of social interactions and the values that motivate and constrain humans’ social and linguistic skills. (shrink)

Values will be central to developing a more balanced social psychology. A nonconformist account of Asch's (1956) experiments is used to illustrate the role of multiple values and to support and extend Krueger & Funder's (K&F's) claims. A balance of values, one that goes beyond accuracy and truth, and that avoids absolutism and relativism, is needed.

Social and ecological research and theory are used to elaborate and enrich two important sets of accounts of language origins. One is the interdependence and shared intentionality hypothesis of the ways in which humans became cooperative and conforming in ways that other apes did not, eventually leading to language. A second set of accounts addresses the emergence of bipedalism and its connections to language and to many other anatomical, cognitive, and social features that are distinctive in humans. Particular attention is (...) given to the carrying and caretaking of infants. Research and theory challenging common assumptions about the role of conformity in cooperation and conversation are reviewed and integrated into these accounts. Together these varying perspectives point toward a more dialogical, dynamic, and distributed understanding of social interactions and the values that motivate and constrain humans’ social and linguistic skills. (shrink)

Accountability is viewed as a civilizing element in society, with professional accountability formalized in most cases as duties dating to the Greeks and Socrates; journalists must find their own way, without formal professional or government regulation or licensing. Three scholars look at the process in a line from the formal professional discipline to suggesting problems the journalism fraternity faces without regulation to suggesting serious internal ethics conferences as 1 solution to the problem.

We explore the various ethical challenges that arise during the practical implementation of an emergency resource allocation protocol. We argue that to implement an allocation plan in a crisis, a hospital system must complete five tasks: (1) formulate a set of general principles for allocation, (2) apply those principles to the disease at hand to create a concrete protocol, (3) collect the data required to apply the protocol, (4) construct a system to implement triage decisions with those data, and (5) (...) create a system for managing the consequences of implementing the protocol, including the effects on those who must carry out the plan, the medical staff, and the general public. Here we illustrate the complexities of each task and provide tentative solutions, by describing the experiences of the Coronavirus Ethics Response Group, an interdisciplinary team formed to address the ethical issues in pandemic resource planning at the University of Rochester Medical Center. While the plan was never put into operation, the process of preparing for emergency implementation exposed ethical issues that require attention. (shrink)

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 5, Page 1012-1015, September 2011.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Narrative Symposium:Conflicting Interests in MedicineLaura Jean Bierut, Sal Cruz-Flores, Laura E. Hodges, Anthony A. Mikulec, Govind K. Nagaldinne, Erine L. Bakanas, John F. Peppin, Joel S. Perlmutter, William H. Seitz Jr., Edward Diao, Andre N. Sofair, and David M. Zientek• To Recruit or Not to Recruit for a Clinical Trial• An Unexpected Lesson• Am I on call for the entire Midwest?• Why is Medicare Wasting Away?• The Downside (...) of the Informed Consent Juggernaut• Expert Testimony at the Food and Drug Administration: Who Wants the Truth?• Crossroads: The Intersection of Personal, Professional Society, and Industry Relationships• A Change of Heart• The Evolution of Conflicts of Interest in a New Subspecialty: A Case Study of the Development of Interventional CardiologyCopyright © 2011 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

He discusses the challenges these four philosophical Anglicans issued to certain important trends in the philosophy and theology of their day, and argues that ...

Book Reviews RICHARD HARRIES, Religious Studies, FirstView Article.

Epiphenomenalism consists of three claims: mental events are irreducibly distinct from physical events; each mental event is dependent both for its existence and for its properties on physical events; no mental event exerts any causal influence either on other mental events or on physical events. The first claim identifies epiphenomenalism as a dualistic theory, which is a source of both strength and weakness. The second and third claims taken together assert the complete dependence of the mental on the physical and (...) thus amount to commitment to the autonomy of physical operations. The mental, while conceded an ontologically irreducible status, is said to be causally impotent. The physical is identified as its indispensable causal ground. At the same time, whatever occurs within the human body is asserted to be fully explicable by reference to antecedent physical events and the laws that relate them. It is his commitment to the autonomy of the physical that allows the epiphenomenalist to welcome the findings of modern science. At the same time, this autonomy of the physical and the consequent potential adequacy of science to physical fact are not thought to compel surrender of a dualist ontology. (shrink)

Visuomotor adaptation to novel environments can occur via non-physical means, such as observation. Observation does not appear to activate the same implicit learning processes as physical practice, rather it appears to be more strategic in nature. However, there is evidence that interspersing observational practice with physical practice can benefit performance and memory consolidation either through the combined benefits of separate processes or through a change in processes activated during observation trials. To test these ideas, we asked people to practice aiming (...) to targets with visually rotated cursor feedback or engage in a combined practice schedule comprising physical practice and observation of projected videos showing successful aiming. Ninety-three participants were randomly assigned to one of five groups: massed physical practice, distributed physical practice, or one of 3 types of combined practice: alternating blocks, or all observation before or after blocked physical practice. Participants received 100 practice trials. All groups improved in adaptation trials and showed savings across the 24-h retention interval relative to initial practice. There was some forgetting for all groups, but the magnitudes were larger for physical practice groups. The Act and Obs_During groups were most accurate in retention and did not differ, suggesting that observation can serve as a replacement for physical practice if supplied intermittently and offers advantages above just resting. However, after-effects associated with combined practice were smaller than those for physical practice control groups, suggesting that beneficial learning effects as a result of observation were not due to activation of implicit learning processes. Reaction time, variable error, and post-test rotation drawings supported this conclusion that adaptation for observation groups was promoted by explicit/strategic processes. (shrink)

This book explores the changing perspective of astrology from the Middle Ages to the Early Modern Era. It introduces a framework for understanding both its former centrality and its later removal from legitimate knowledge and practice. The discussion reconstructs the changing roles of astrology in Western science, theology, and culture from 1250 to 1500. The author considers both the how and the why. He analyzes and integrates a broad range of sources. This analysis shows that the history of astrology—in particular, (...) the story of the protracted criticism and ultimate removal of astrology from the realm of legitimate knowledge and practice—is crucial for fully understanding the transition from premodern Aristotelian-Ptolemaic natural philosophy to modern Newtonian science. This removal, the author argues, was neither obvious nor unproblematic. Astrology was not some sort of magical nebulous hodge-podge of beliefs. Rather, astrology emerged in the 13th century as a richly mathematical system that served to integrate astronomy and natural philosophy, precisely the aim of the “New Science” of the 17th century. As such, it becomes a fundamentally important historical question to determine why this promising astrological synthesis was rejected in favor of a rather different mathematical natural philosophy—and one with a very different causal structure than Aristotle's. (shrink)

There are few books in any language which attempt to survey the whole range of Lukács' work. English readers may, therefore, consider themselves fortunate to have available the present volume and, doubly fortunate, to have forthcoming in late 1970 or early 1971 yet another book by one of the present contributors, István Mészáros, titled the Life and Work of Georg Lukács. The work under review is based on a series of lectures in 1968 at the Graduate School of Contemporary European (...) Studies at the University of Reading. The Introduction by Parkinson is largely expository and concentrates on Lukacs' celebrated Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein. The individual essays which follow are critical examinations of Lukács' views in the fields of philosophy, sociology, and literary criticism. The essays are generally of a high caliber and the differences which the authors express in relation to various aspects of Lukács are themselves testimony to the complexity and depth of his thought. The most comprehensive, and, in many ways, the most interesting approach to Lukács is in the lead-off essay by Mészáros which, in the context of dealing with his concept of the dialectic, seeks to disclose the basic structure of Lukács' thought and to establish its continuity from the young Lukács to the mature Lukács. Mészáros finds from the very beginning not only a revolutionary turn in Lukács' structure of thought, but along with it--or within it--or perhaps even conditioning it--a complex and far-ranging "ought". The "ought-ridden" character of Lukács' thought, Mészáros claims, is both the source of some of his great intellectual achievements and of some of his great failures, particularly when he substitutes ideology and moral postulates for mediated, concrete reality. Those interested in the development of the concept of the dialectic from Hegel to Marx and from Marx to the present will find Mészáros' discussion of Lukács' categories of "totality" and "mediation" informative and thought-provoking. H. A. Hodges examines Lukács' critique of philosophical irrationalism and singles out for special study his comments on the degree to which Dilthey and Mannheim contributed toward this trend. Parkinson, in addition to writing the introduction, has an essay on the nature of Besonderheit, the central category of Lukács' aesthetics. He translates Besonderheit as "speciality" or "the special." Roy Pascal digs into Lukács' concept of totality as developed in the Ästhetik and as applied in his critique of Walter Scott and of Kafka. In addition, there is an essay by David Craig on how, in Lukács' view, history molds literature, and another essay by Stanley Mitchell on Lukács' concept of the "beautiful." All in all, while the book does not represent a definitive or inclusive introduction to the work of Lukács, it does constitute an important landmark in presenting many important dimensions of his thought, as well as some highly critical appraisals of its validity and importance.--H. B. (shrink)

There are a bewildering variety of claims connecting Darwin to nineteenth-century philosophy of science—including to Herschel, Whewell, Lyell, German Romanticism, Comte, and others. I argue here that Herschel’s influence on Darwin is undeniable. The form of this influence, however, is often misunderstood. Darwin was not merely taking the concept of “analogy” from Herschel, nor was he combining such an analogy with a consilience as argued for by Whewell. On the contrary, Darwin’s Origin is written in precisely the manner that one (...) would expect were Darwin attempting to model his work on the precepts found in Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on Natural Science. While Hodge has worked out a careful interpretation of both Darwin and Herschel, drawing similar conclusions, his interpretation misreads Herschel’s use of the vera causa principle and the verification of hypotheses. The new reading that I present here resolves this trouble, combining Hodge’s careful treatment of the structure of the Origin with a more cautious understanding of Herschel’s philosophy of science. This interpretation lets us understand why Darwin laid out the Origin in the way that he did and also why Herschel so strongly disagreed, including in Herschel’s heretofore unanalyzed marginalia in his copy of Darwin’s book. (shrink)