This article revisits theologian Ulrich Duchrow’s three-decade-old use of the Protestant notion of status confessionis to denounce the capitalist global economy. Scholars quickly dismissed Duchrow’s argument; however, philosopher Thomas Pogge has developed a remarkable “negative duty”—based critique of the current global economic order that might help revitalize Duchrow’s position. The article argues that sound reasons exist for the churches to declare the contemporary world economy a—provisionally termed—status confessionis minor. After explaining the inadequacy of Duchrow’s original position and summarizing Pogge’s account, (...) the article develops a twofold argument. First, Pogge’s in-depth inquiry into the world economy gives Duchrow’s call for a status confessionis a strong yet narrowing economic foundation. Second, to declare the world economy a status confessionis minor is theological-ethically justifiable if the limited though indispensable “prophetic” significance of doing so is acknowledged. Thus, Duchrow’s approach is justified, but only partially. (shrink)

The late influential American intellectual Michael Novak was a self-declared devotee of Reinhold Niebuhr, arguably the foremost twentieth-century American theologian. Novak’s The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism (1982) was an attempt to fill the political-economic lacuna in Niebuhr’s thought. The present article offers a Niebuhrian irony–focused response to Novak’s democratic capitalism in view of climate change as probably the greatest threat facing humanity. Novak quite successfully extended Niebuhrian ideas into a theology-based vision of democratic capitalism as the only political-economic system effective (...) in widely lifting people out of poverty. Yet he failed to acknowledge human-induced climate change as beyond reasonable doubt and rooted in the predominantly American invention of a fossil energy–based capitalist political economy. This article’s thesis is that Novak’s democratic capitalism entails Niebuhrian irony: the virtue it displays about resources becomes a vice due to Novak’s irresponsible post–Spirit of Democratic Capitalism attempt to represent democratic capitalism as innocent of any dangerous climate-change implications. (shrink)

The possibilities for collecting, storing, and processing of data have increased significantly over the last decades. It has been argued that an increasing demand for health data will de...

Scholars and policymakers have increasingly advocated to engage citizens more substantially in the development of science and technology. However, to a large extent it has remained unknown how citizens can contribute to technology development. In this study, we systematically characterized citizens’ contributions in the development of nanotechnology for health. We explored to which technology aspects citizens are able to provide suggestions on and on which values their suggestions are based. Fifty citizens in the Netherlands were asked to discuss different applications (...) of nanotechnology for health. They were divided over eight focus groups, which lasted approximately 6.5h each. The citizens were able to contribute to various technology aspects; they mainly focused on the technologies’ implementation and use, they paid some attention to the development and system aspects, and also addressed, but less, the design and communication aspects. Their suggestions were often derived from concerns about the potential effects of the technologies and were predominantly based on the values of well-being, autonomy, and privacy. (shrink)

BackgroundThe emergence of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine has prompted the development of numerous ethical guidelines, while the involvement of patients in the creation of these documents lags behind. As part of the European PROFID project we explore patient perspectives on the ethical implications of AI in care for patients at increased risk of sudden cardiac death (SCD).AimExplore perspectives of patients on the ethical use of AI, particularly in clinical decision-making regarding the implantation of an implantable cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD).MethodsSemi-structured, future scenario-based (...) interviews were conducted among patients who had either an ICD and/or a heart condition with increased risk of SCD in Germany (n = 9) and the Netherlands (n = 15). We used the principles of the European Commission’s Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI to structure the interviews.ResultsSix themes arose from the interviews: the ability of AI to rectify human doctors’ limitations; the objectivity of data; whether AI can serve as second opinion; AI explainability and patient trust; the importance of the ‘human touch’; and the personalization of care. Overall, our results reveal a strong desire among patients for more personalized and patient-centered care in the context of ICD implantation. Participants in our study express significant concerns about the further loss of the ‘human touch’ in healthcare when AI is introduced in clinical settings. They believe that this aspect of care is currently inadequately recognized in clinical practice. Participants attribute to doctors the responsibility of evaluating AI recommendations for clinical relevance and aligning them with patients’ individual contexts and values, in consultation with the patient.ConclusionThe ‘human touch’ patients exclusively ascribe to human medical practitioners extends beyond sympathy and kindness, and has clinical relevance in medical decision-making. Because this cannot be replaced by AI, we suggest that normative research into the ‘right to a human doctor’ is needed. Furthermore, policies on patient-centered AI integration in clinical practice should encompass the ethics of everyday practice rather than only principle-based ethics. We suggest that an empirical ethics approach grounded in ethnographic research is exceptionally well-suited to pave the way forward. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to enter the conversation about stakeholder theory with the goal of clarifying certain foundational issues. I want to show, along with Boatright, that there is no stakeholder paradox, and that the principle on which such a paradox is built, the Separation Thesis, is nicely self-serving to business and ethics academics. If we give up such a thesis we find there is no stakeholder theory but that stakeholder theory becomes a genre that is quite rich. (...) It becomes one of many ways to blend together the central concepts of business with those of ethics. Rather than take each concept of business singly or the whole of “business” together and hold it to the light of ethical standards, we can use the stakeholder concept to create more fine-grained analyses that combine business and ethics; or more simply, we can tell many more, and more interesting, stories about business. (shrink)

This anthology consists of a collection of papers on the nature of dis positions and the role of disposition concepts in scientific theories. I have tried to make the collection as representative as possible, except that problems specifically connected with dispositions in various special sciences are relatively little discussed. Most of these articles have been previously published. The papers by Mackie, Essler and Trapp, Fetzer (in Section 11), Levi, and Tuomela appear here for the first time, and are simultaneously published (...) in Synthese 34, No. 4, which is a special issue on dispositions. Of the previously published material it should be emphasized that the papers by Hempel and Fisk have been extensively revised specially for this anthology. The papers are grouped in four sections, partlyon the basis of their content. However, due to the complexity of the issues involved, there is considerable overlap in content between the different sections, especially between Sections land 11. I wish to thank Professors James Fetzer and Carl G. Hempel for helpful advicc in compiling this anthology. (shrink)

Abstract:The purpose of this paper is to suggest that at least one strain of what has come to be called “stakeholder theory” has roots that are deeply libertarian. We begin by explicating both “stakeholder theory” and “libertarian arguments.” We show how there are libertarian arguments for both instrumental and normative stakeholder theory, and we construct a version of capitalism, called “stakeholder capitalism,” that builds on these libertarian ideas. We argue throughout that strong notions of “freedom” and “voluntary action” are the (...) best possible underpinnings for stakeholder theory, and in doing so, seek to return “stakeholder theory” to its managerial and libertarian roots found in Freeman (1984). (shrink)

This book is a unique collection of essays by the leading scholars in business ethics. The purpose of the volume is to examine the emergence of business ethics as an important element of managerial practice and as an integral area of scholarship. The four lead essays--by Norman Bowie, Kenneth Goodpaster, Thomas Donaldson, and Ezra Bowen--are examples of some of the best thinking about the role of ethics in business. These essays examine such issues as the nature of scholarship and knowledge (...) in business ethics, how ethics is a central factor in managerial leadership, the complexities of ethics in multinational and multicultural settings, and the problems of ethical literacy and moral debate in a free society. Each lead essay develops several themes which are then explored by other prominent thinkers, including Robert Solomon, Richard DeGeorge, and Joanne Cuilla. (shrink)

In this article, we will outline the principles of stakeholder capitalism and describe how this view rejects problematic assumptions in the current narratives of capitalism. Traditional narratives of capitalism rely upon the assumptions of competition, limited resources, and a winner-take-all mentality as fundamental to business and economic activity. These approaches leave little room for ethical analysis, have a simplistic view of human beings, and focus on value-capture rather than value-creation. We argue these assumptions about capitalism are inadequate and leave four (...) problems in their wake. We wish to reframe the narrative of capitalism around the reinforcing concepts of stakeholders coupled with value creation and trade. If we think about how a society can sustain a system of voluntary value creation and trade, then capitalism can once more become a useful concept. (shrink)

Business ethics, as a discipline, appears to be at a crossroads. Down one avenue lies more of the same: mostly philosophers takingwhat they know of ethics and ethical theory and applying it to business. There is a long tradition of scholars working in the area known as “business and society” or “social issues in management.” Most of these scholars are trained as social scientists and teach in business schools. Their raison d’etre has been admirable: trying to get executives and students (...) of business to understand the social impacts of business and to see business in broad, societal terms. (shrink)

In The Value Gap, Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen addresses the distinction between what is finally good and what is finally good-for, two value notions that are central to ethics and practical deliberation. The first part of the book argues against views that claim that one of these notions is either faulty, or at best conceptually dependent on the other notion. Whereas these two views disagree on whether it is good or good-for that is the flawed or dependent concept, it is argued, as (...) against both approaches, that goodness and goodness-for are independent value notions that cannot be fully understood in terms of one another. The second part provides an analysis of good and good-for in terms of a fitting-attitude analysis. By elaborating a more nuanced understanding of the key elements of this analysis—reasons and pro-attitudes—Rønnow-Rasmussen challenges the widespread idea that there are no genuine practical and moral dilemmas. The result is that the gap between favouring for a reason what is good and favouring for a reason what is good for someone appears insurmountable. (shrink)

Background: Medicine is full of value conflicts. Limited resources and legal regulations may place doctors in difficult ethical dilemmas and cause moral distress. Research on moral distress has so far been mainly studied in nurses. Objective: To describe whether Norwegian doctors experience stress related to ethical dilemmas and lack of resources, and to explore whether the doctors feel that they have good strategies for the resolution of ethical dilemmas. Design: Postal survey of a representative sample of 1497 Norwegian doctors in (...) 2004, presenting statements about different ethical dilemmas, values and goals at their workplace. Results: The response rate was 67%. 57% admitted that it is difficult to criticise a colleague for professional misconduct and 51% for ethical misconduct. 51% described sometimes having to act against own conscience as distressing. 66% of the doctors experienced distress related to long waiting lists for treatment and to impaired patient care due to time constraints. 55% reported that time spent on administration and documentation is distressing. Female doctors experienced more stress that their male colleagues. 44% reported that their workplace lacked strategies for dealing with ethical dilemmas. Conclusion: Lack of resources creates moral dilemmas for physicians. Moral distress varies with specialty and gender. Lack of strategies to solve ethical dilemmas and low tolerance for conflict and critique from colleagues may obstruct important and necessary ethical dialogues and lead to suboptimal solutions of difficult ethical problems. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to suggest that one of the dominant modes of thought in our society is a profound mistrust and misunderstanding of the role of business. A dominant myth in society is that business occupies the moral low ground, separate from ethics or a moral point of view. This position is characterized as the “business sucks” story, and the essay shows how the enactment of this story underlies business thinking among managers and business theorists. The essay (...) concludes with a suggestion to rethink and reinvent this story along more realistic and more empowering lines. Values based capitalism, or stakeholder capitalism, offers a better way to understand the complex role that business does and should play in modern society. (shrink)

Applied or practical ethics is perhaps the largest growth area in philosophy today, and many issues in moral, social, and political life have come under philosophical scrutiny in recent years. Taken together, the essays in this volume – including two overview essays on theories of ethics and the nature of applied ethics – provide a state-of-the-art account of the most pressing moral questions facing us today. Provides a comprehensive guide to many of the most significant problems of practical ethics Offers (...) state-of-the-art accounts of issues in medical, environmental, legal, social, and business ethics Written by major philosophers presently engaged with these complex and profound ethical issues. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of values in strategic management. We discuss recent criticisms of the concept of strategy and argue that the concept of value helps reconcile these criticisms with traditional models of strategy. We show that Andrews' model of corporate strategy rightly takes morally significant values to be essential to effective management. We show how the notion of value can be clarified and used in research into various conceptions of corporate morality.

In this essay on man Mr. Fuller expresses what may well be his penultimate view of the human condition. Here, in a mood at once philosophical and involved, Mr. Fuller traces man’s intellectual evolution and weighs his capability for survival on this magnificent craft, this Spaceship Earth, this superbly designed sphere of almost negligible dimension in the great vastness of space. Mr. Fuller is optimistic that man will survive and, through research and development and increased industrialization, generate wealth so rapidly (...) that he can do very great things. But, he notes, there must be an enormous educational task successfully accomplished right now to convert man’s ten­dency toward oblivion into a realization of his potential, to a universe-exploring advantage from this Spaceship Earth. It has been noted that Mr. Fuller spins ideas in clusters, and clusters of his ideas generate still other clusters. The concept “spaceship earth” is Mr. Fuller’s, and though used by Barbara Ward as the title of a work of her own the idea was acknowledged by her there as deriving from Mr. Fuller. The brilliant syntheses of some fundamental Fuller principles given here makes of this book a microcosm of the Fuller system. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment & Responsibility, EarlyView.

Phenomenal conservatives claim that seemings are sui generis mental states and can thus provide foundational non-doxastic justification for beliefs. Many of their critics deny this, claiming, instead, that seemings can be reductively analyzed in terms of other mental states—either beliefs, inclinations to believe, or beliefs about one’s evidence—that cannot provide foundational non-doxastic justification. In this paper, I argue that no tenable semantic reduction of ‘seems’ can be formulated in terms of the three reductive analyses that have been proposed by critics (...) of phenomenal conservatism. This is because Moore-paradoxical statements are generated when each of the reductive analyses is substituted for ‘seems’ in statements like ‘The stick is straight, but it does not seem to me that it’s straight.’ Since the latter statement is not Moore-paradoxical, the three proposed reductive analyses of ‘seems’ are unsuccessful. Absent a successful semantic reduction, however, there is no good reason to think a successful metaphysical reduction of seemings is forthcoming. Thus, there is an additional reason, unnoticed in the existing literature, to think that seemings are sui generis mental states. (shrink)

R K Elliott; Education, Love of One’s Subject, and the Love of Truth, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 135–153, https:/.

R. S. Woolhouse; IV*—Leibniz's Reaction to Cartesian Interaction, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 86, Issue 1, 1 June 1986, Pages 69–82, https:/.

This paper presents a minimal formulation of nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, by which is meant a formulation which describes the theory in a succinct, self-contained, clear, unambiguous and of course correct manner. The bulk of the presentation is the so-called “microscopic theory”, applicable to any closed system S of arbitrary size N, using concepts referring to S alone, without resort to external apparatus or external agents. An example of a similar minimal microscopic theory is the standard formulation of classical mechanics, which (...) serves as the template for a minimal quantum theory. The only substantive assumption required is the replacement of the classical Euclidean phase space by Hilbert space in the quantum case, with the attendant all-important phenomenon of quantum incompatibility. Two fundamental theorems of Hilbert space, the Kochen–Specker–Bell theorem and Gleason’s theorem, then lead inevitably to the well-known Born probability rule. For both classical and quantum mechanics, questions of physical implementation and experimental verification of the predictions of the theories are the domain of the macroscopic theory, which is argued to be a special case or application of the more general microscopic theory. (shrink)

R T Allen; ‘Because I Say So!’ Some Limitations Upon the Rationalisation of Authority, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 21, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

R K Elliott; Aestheticism, Imagination and Schooling: a reply to Ruby Meager, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 15, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 33–42.

The most common view of suicide today is that it is intentional self-killing.1 Because of the self-killing component, suicide is often described as self-inflicted death or as dying by one's own hand, and the victim is in turn often described as having done himself to death or as having taken his own life. But must one's death be self-inflicted in order to be suicide? The answer, I want to suggest, is arguably no.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXI, Number 2, November 1995, pp. 275-287 Virtue, Commerce, and Self-Love R. G. FREY Can economic activity be virtuous? Can the pursuit of commerce and profits be moral? Both Hume and Adam Smith are agreed that Britain will live or die as a trading nation, and trade requires the harvesting or production of goods with which to trade. This in turn requires that people be motivated (...) to harvest or to produce these goods, and neither Hume nor Smith give any evidence of believing that people are motivated by a general love of mankind, an extensive sympathy, or a broadly-encompassing benevolence to produce them. Indeed, quite the opposite appears to be the case: both writers think the pursuit of luxury, wealth, and the general riches of life have much more to do with the harvesting and production of goods for trade than does any widespread, general concern for the well-being of others. And this fact leads straightforwardly to the question I want to consider, namely, whether this kind of what I shall call economic motivation is compatible with moral motivation.1 In Smith, our question can be seen as leading to what is sometimes called the "Adam Smith problem" (which on another occasion I should want to argue is a pseudo-problem). The Theory of Moral Sentiments gives an account of moral motivation in which sympathy and/or benevolence plays an integral role, whereas in The Wealth of Nations self-love is very much to the fore. No remark in Smith is better-known than his statement of this latter position: R. G. Frey is at the Department of Philosophy, Bowling Green State University, 305 Shatzel Hall, Bowling Green OH 43403-0222 USA. e-mail: [email protected] 276 R. G. Frey It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.2 Now it has sometimes been suggested that the way to solve this problem is to keep economics and ethics separate, to try to confine economic activity to a domain about which, in essence, we do not ask ethical questions. But to most of us this clearly will not do; the whole point is that we do want to ask ethical questions about economic activity. That is, in pursuing their trades, it must be possible for the butcher, brewer, and baker to be acting morally; otherwise, commerce and virtue will be incompatible, and in enjoining us to take up and to pursue the former vigorously Hume and Smith would be advocating immorality. Again, neither writer gives any evidence of taking himself to be advocating any such thing. It must be possible, then, for motivation by selflove to be moral, if a vibrant, prosperous nation is to result from and to propagate further commerce and trade. If the cost of morality is penury and a life of dreadful unhappiness, then while such a life may recommend itself to one consumed with the monkish virtues, it is far from clear that it would recommend itself to the rest of us. I am interested here in Hume and in one possible way of construing his remarks on self-love in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.3 But first a few words on Mandeville are necessary, since it is he who sets the terms of the debate over the compatibility of moral and economic motivation. In The Fable of the Bees,4 Mandeville praises vice (or the pursuit of selfinterest ) in the cause of national prosperity and castigates virtue as threatening to undermine prosperity. Employing an egoistic account of man's passions and motivation, he argues that individual pursuit of self-interest or vice produces public benefits. Pride, avarice, and the pursuit of enjoyment, luxury, and the fine things of life create economic activity, jobs, and economic and social opportunities, and these in turn benefit society. His point is that growth of (i) mutually beneficial economic activity, (ii) increases in general... (shrink)

It is immensely difficult to give a philosophically adequate account of mental imagery. Peter F.R. Haynes, pp. 709–19) objects to the standard accounts, and offers one of his own which avoids the standard difficulties. Unfortunately it in turn seems to lapse into incoherence.Haynes rejects Cartesian accounts which would make images private objects in non-physical space. He also rejects current alternative views: both Rylean or behaviourist ones; and also intentionally complex ones, which assert that the relevant terms change their meaning. He (...) thinks that J. J. C. Smart's “topic neutral” approach may supply “the basis for a correct, intentionally simple, intuitively satisfying account of mental imagery”. But an adequate account must also be neutral, as Smart's is not, between different theories of mind. In addition to avoiding these difficulties an adequate theory has certain other desiderata; in particular Haynes places valuable emphasis on the need to explain the fact that we can sometimes mistake images for real perceptions or, more real perceptions for images. (shrink)

Writing a book on 'Understanding the Vedas' and doing it justice is without a doubt a challenging task due to the complex nature of the Vedas. While conscious of the challenges, I enjoyed writing this book for a few important reasons. The first and foremost reason to write the book was my deeper understanding over the years of the spirituality and wisdom in the Vedas due to my own Veda practice of 50+ years and additionally my research, study and teaching (...) of Vedas, Upanishads, Puranas and Bhagavad Gita. Along with my community involvement in our shared efforts to build and consecrate the Malibu Temple and along with Veda Circle members our organizing many sacred yajnas during the 40+ years in the Los Angeles area additionally strengthened my perspectives on the Vedas. Sharing these experiences of deeper understanding of the spirituality and wisdom in the Vedas and the karma aspects of temple worship and organizing and participating in various yajnas with Sanatana Dharma practitioners is the first and main reason to write this book. The second reason to write the book is closely tied to, but separate and distinct from, the first is that the conventional viewpoint of the Vedas as ritualistic and devoid of wisdom needs to be re-examined. The book explains in detail the spirituality and wisdom in the Vedas and positions the Vedas as texts of 'Karma with spirituality and wisdom'. The third reason to write the book is to provide a historical timeline of the progress of the Vedas from its origin in the days of antiquity of 6,000 BCE or earlier to the present days of 2,020 CE and a detailed discussion of the development of the other scriptural texts like Brahmanas, Aranyakas, Upanishads, Patanjali's Yoga Sutras etc. that evolved from the original Veda Samhitas. And the fourth reason was to provide a discussion of the Yajna practices of the present which would provide practical aspects of the Vedas to many dharmic followers. This book on 'Understanding the Vedas' addresses all of the aforementioned aspects. This book is written in 2 parts. Part 1 of the book provides an overview of the Vedas including the definitions of the various terms used in the Vedas and discusses in six chapters the current understanding of the Vedas. Part 2 in 5 chapters explains the spirituality and wisdom in the Vedas propounded by Sri Aurobindo in the early 20th century and popularized by Professor R. L. Kashyap by translating all the Veda Mantras by the early 21st century. It is the author's hope and expectation that all Sanatana Dharma followers and all those who want to understand the Vedas will benefit by reading this book. (shrink)

In his paper "rights" ("the philosophical quarterly", Volume 15, 1965, Pages 115-127), H j mccloskey maintains that only beings who can possess interests can possess rights; and he goes on to argue that animals cannot satisfy this requirement. In his paper "mccloskey on why animals cannot have rights" ("the philosophical quarterly", Volume 26, 1976, Pages 251-257), Tom regan disputes mccloskey's requirement. First, He queries whether mccloskey's "is" a requirement for the possession of rights; second, He tries to show that animals (...) can nevertheless satisfy it. On both counts, I contend that regan's arguments do not work. I also set out a mccloskey-Like position which is not open to regan's attack upon its legitimacy. I conclude with an example designed to show why regan has failed to establish that animals have interests. (shrink)

The dynamics of populations of self-replicating, hierarchically structured individuals, exposedto accidents which destroy their sub-units, is analyzed mathematically, specifically with regardto the roles of redundancy and sexual repair. The following points emerge from this analysis:0 A population of individuals with redundant sub-structure has no intrinsic steady-statepoint; it tends to either zero or infinity depending on a critical accident rate α c . Increased redundancy renders populations less accident prone initially, but populationdecline is steeper if a is greater than a fixed (...) value α d . Periodic, sexual repair at system-specific intervals prevents continuous decline and stabilizesthe population insofar as it will now oscillate between two fixed population levels. The stabilizing sexual interval increases with increased complexity provided this is accom-panied by appropriate levels of redundancy. The model closely simulates the dynamics of heterosis effects. Repair fitness is a population fitness: the chance of an individual being repaired is a functionof the statistical make-up of the population as a whole at that particular period. Populationsliving at α > α c either engage in sexual repair at the appropriate time or they die out. The mathematical properties of the model illustrate mechanisms which possibly played arole in the evolution of a mortal soma in relation to sexual reproduction. (shrink)